US IN ASIA: A NON-ALIGNMENT STRATEGY?

As territorial and maritime disputes in Asia have sparked
regional cold wars, the United States appears to have
adopted a non-aligned strategy to navigate in troubled
political space of the continent.
George Washington and Non-Alignment
Non-alignment as a diplomatic instrument of state craft
has been known to American Administrations for
centuries. Although the term “non-alignment” was not
used, the need of such a strategy was first articulated
by first President of the United States—George
Washington. In his farewell address, Washington warned
against the folly of getting involved in the European
entanglements.
In order to keep the US out of European quarrels,
controversies and collisions, he pleaded that “Europe
has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or
a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships
or enmities.”
Three centuries later, as the US recognizes the
economic and strategic significance of Asia for its
national interests, it encounters myriad Asian quarrels
and controversies over “sovereignty” issues. Such
disputes are “essentially foreign” to American
“concerns”.
Asia Pacific Today and the American Non-Alignment
Turbulence in the Asia Pacific is discernible in Sino-
Japanese rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The
spat over the islands, islets and reefs in the South China
Sea between China and five other claimants, such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei
threatens to contaminate the cooperative ties of China
with these countries. China-Taiwan conflict remains
unresolved despite a series of confidence building
measures and rising trade and investment ties.
During the Cold War days, Washington shunned the
non-alignment foreign policy championed by India and
many others. But the strategic compulsions and
economic imperatives of the post-Cold War era have
tempted the US policy makers to innovate “non-
alignment” strategy and apply in the mini-Cold Wars of
Asia.
TheUS political support to the idea of creation of a
“Palestinian State” in the post-9/11 incident and
building of pressure on Israel to seriously negotiate
peace; Washington’s policy of making India a “strategic
partner”, while elevating Pakistan’s status as “major
non-NATO ally” during the anti-terror operations in
Afghanistan; constructing a rock-solid economic
partnership with China, while maintaining defence and
security ties with Taiwan; giving lip service to
multilateral dialogue for resolution of South China Sea
disputes, yet conducting joint research with China for oil
exploration in the waters of this sea; refraining from
backing Japanese claim of sovereignty over Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands, but standing by the US-Japan bilateral
alliance treaty are some of the prominent illustrations of
American non-alignment.
It is true that non-alignment emerged out of a bipolar
power structure in the international system. The two
poles, represented by capitalist USA and communist
USSR, made it difficult for a large number of newly
independent countries to take sides in the Cold War. The
enlightened self-interest compelled them to pick out a
stratagem that would enable them to seek cooperation
with both the rival power blocs. The hostility to the idea
of non-alignment by both Washington and Moscow
often posed acute dilemmas for the non-aligned
countries. Since non-alignment was not maintenance of
equidistance from the two poles, non-aligned countries’
stances on various cold war related issues were
sometimes sympathetic to Moscow and sometimes
supportive of Washington. For example, India appeared
to have appreciated the US position on the Suez crisis,
but sympathized with Moscow’s approach to the
Hungarian crisis in 1956.
The United States in the post-Cold War era has no die-
hard adversary. Although there is visible decline of the
US influence in world affairs and relative rise of the
Chinese power, the PRC is no USSR. Up-and-coming
superpower China perceives an emerging new
containment strategy of the established superpower, the
USA.
American strategic community, on the other hand,
senses a Chinese project to push US out of the Asia
Pacific. Such mutual mistrust has, nevertheless, not
sparked a new cold war. Complex economic
interdependence is almost certain to preclude a Sino-US
Cold War, though cold confrontation seems to be
mounting between the two.
China has responded to America’s Asia rebalance
strategy by picking up squabbles with most American
allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and
others. But the non-aligned approach adopted by
Washington has resulted in growing Chinese
assertiveness and dwindling credibility in the US as a
security provider. The Asian allies of the US doubt, if
Washington would protect their interests at the cost of
losing business in China. American non-alignment
makes China fear less and America’s allies doubt more
about the efficacy of alliance treaties.