19 Oct 2014
IRAN: AN IMPERFECT NUCLEAR DEAL BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL?
Ruhee Neog
In the desperate scramble for a conclusive nuclear agreement, would an imperfect deal with Iran be better than no deal at all? An imperfect deal would imply a trade-off between political negotiations and technical verification, especially in the context of Iran’s so-called possible military dimensions (PMD). In this, how important is it to resolve the PMD issue? Would it be detrimental or useful for the conclusion of a final deal?
PMD here refers to covert indigenous work carried out in the past, whether design or research-oriented, towards an Iranian nuclear weapon. The environment seems ripe for a less than ideal deal, and as has been previously argued, for the sake of pragmatism, what is achievable trumps what could be the most ideal compromise between the P5+1 and Iran. There have been reports from both parties that the negotiations are moving forward very slowly; concern has also been expressed about not meeting the 24 November deadline and the subsequent future of a deal in that event. It has also been suggested by Iranian President Hasan Rouhani that Iran would be open to the idea of cooperating with the US in combating the ‘Islamic State’ only once some sort of understanding on the lifting of sanctions that is agreeable to Iran is reached. This could make the situation more urgent than it already is, and prove that despite pronouncements about conducting the talks in isolation and without subjecting it to the pressures of the external environment, the situation on the ground cannot be kept insulated.
Negotiations with Iran are being conducted at two levels; one is political in nature – with the P5+1 – and the other, technical – with the IAEA. In September, reports of Iran’s inability to deliver information on certain aspects of its PMD to the IAEA emerged, which led many to question whether this intractability would hold up the negotiations process. Indeed, it has been established that given the overarching political nature of the West-Iran rapprochement, the domestic political constituencies of the US and Iran will have significant leverage in okaying a final deal. Members of the US Congress have already expressed their displeasure by saying that it is imperative for the PMD issue to fully cleared by the IAEA before a deal can be struck. Iran, on the other hand, has rubbished the PMD claims, made public in an IAEA Board of Governors report released in 2011, by calling them “mere allegations.” In this environment, the P5+1 may choose to sideline the PMD issue to expedite the negotiations. However, given its increasing prominence owing to domestic political demands to see its full clearance, the P5+1 may not be able to eclipse it completely.
In the event that the IAEA and Iran manage to reach a compromise and details about the possible military dimensions of the latter’s nuclear weapons programme are revealed, to what extent would it be useful for a final deal? As Jeffrey Lewis argues in “We don’t want to see Iran’s Full Monty” (Foreign Policy), Iran “very likely” carried out some covert work on nuclear weapons in the past, which have since come to a halt. If Iran discloses these details, it could quite possibly derail the negotiations process. It will be a very hard sell for the Obama administration to convince the tough customers of the US Congress, who have already laid many obstacles in the path of the interim agreement, that a final deal that trades sanctions relief for a capped nuclear programme is in the best interest of the US, especially after Iran’s past activities come to light. Proof of weaponisation work can create an environment not conducive to rapprochement, and that these activities were conducted in the past will be irrelevant as popular sentiment quickly turns against Iran.
Therefore, while a detailed understanding of Iran’s past nuclear activities may be considered somewhat essential to guaranteeing a full scope verification agreement, a full disclosure by Iran has the potential to preclude any deal whatsoever. Stubbornly clinging to the ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ maxim would completely obliterate the diplomatic momentum built since November 2014. All things considered, an imperfect deal would be better than no deal at all.
MARITIME TERRORISM: KARACHI AS A STAGING POINT
Vijay Sakhuja
The recent attempt by the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the new wing of the Al Qaeda, to take control of PNS Zulfiqar, a Pakistan Navy frigate berthed in Karachi harbour and use it to attack US Navy warships has showcased the continued vulnerability of naval platforms to terrorists. The purported plan was to take control of the frigate and use other militants who would embark the ship by boat and stay onboard as ‘stowaways’ and sail out. When on the high seas, the ship would ‘get close to the U.S. ships…..and then turn the shipboard weapon systems on the Americans.’
The unsuccessful AQIS raid left 10 terrorist dead including a former Pakistan Navy officer Awais Jakhrani, who is reported to have had links with Jihadi elements. Further interrogations have led to the arrest of three other Pakistan Navy personnel in Quetta in Baluchistan who were attempting to escape to Afghanistan.
The attack exposed chinks in Pakistan’s naval defences particularly strategic infrastructure which host millions of dollars worth of naval hardware such as ships, submarines and dockyards. It is important to mention that this is not the first time that terrorist groups have managed to penetrate Pakistan’s naval defences. In the past there have been at least two other attacks on highly sensitive naval platforms and on foreign naval personnel. In 2002, 14 persons including 11 French naval engineers working on the submarine project were killed and 23 others were injured when an unidentified man blew himself up with his car after ramming it into a 46-seater Pakistan Navy bus outside the Karachi Sheraton Hotel.
The second attack was on Pakistan’s naval air base Mehran and was the handiwork of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant groups based in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan. As many as 15 attackers from the ‘Brigade 313’ of the Al Qaeda-Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami group led by Ilyas Kashmiri, took part in the operation which left 18 naval personnel killed, 16 wounded and two US built P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft destroyed. Significantly, the attackers had good knowledge of the naval base including security arrangements, exit and entry points, and the details of the hangers and aircraft.
These attacks showcase that Karachi is a staging point for maritime terrorism particularly for those groups who have taken a liking for naval targets. In fact, Karachi has been labeled as the ‘terror capital’ and is a paradise for terrorists, gunrunners, and drug smugglers. The city is rife with ethnic strife and home to crime syndicates particularly Dawood Ibrahim who is wanted in India for a number of crimes including the 1993 Mumbai blasts. The city is also known for the ‘point of departure’ for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) who sailed from Karachi on three boats and later hijacked the Kuber an Indian fishing off Porbandar, on the Gujarat coast and landed on unsecured waterfronts in south Mumbai.
Perhaps the most discomforting issue of the attacks is that Jihadi groups have dared the Pakistan Navy and caused enormous damage to its reputation, morale and material. They have penetrated the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy and the attacks on PNS Mehran and PNS Zulfiqar were planned and executed with the help of naval personnel. Referring to the PNS Zulfiqar attack, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif made a statement in the Parliament that the attack could not have taken place “Without assistance from inside, these people could not have breached security,” The entry of Jihadi elements is sure to cause suspicion among the other multinational partners with whom the Pakistan Navy works closely, particularly the United States. It is believed that some elements in the Pakistan Navy were upset with the US its raid deep into Pakistan which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden.
The above attacks also have a bearing on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations. In the absence of a nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy has drawn plans to build a rudimentary sea-leg of the nuclear triad with ships and conventional AIP-submarines fitted with nuclear weapons. Any attempt to attack or hijack these platforms and use them as ‘bargain chip’ for any Jihadi agenda would cause grave damage to global security.
However, it is fair to say that the Pakistan Navy is a responsible force and has taken part in a number of multinational operations in the Arabian Sea-Gulf of Aden fighting pirates and terrorists under the US led multinational coalition force TF-151. It has also been the force commander of the coalition forces during these operations and its professionalism has received accolades. The Pakistan naval authorities would have to sanitize the force and rebuild its image of a highly professional fighting force free of radical elements and jihadi thought with a strong commitment to serve national interests and Pakistan’s international commitments to ensure order at sea.
The recent attempt by the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the new wing of the Al Qaeda, to take control of PNS Zulfiqar, a Pakistan Navy frigate berthed in Karachi harbour and use it to attack US Navy warships has showcased the continued vulnerability of naval platforms to terrorists. The purported plan was to take control of the frigate and use other militants who would embark the ship by boat and stay onboard as ‘stowaways’ and sail out. When on the high seas, the ship would ‘get close to the U.S. ships…..and then turn the shipboard weapon systems on the Americans.’
The unsuccessful AQIS raid left 10 terrorist dead including a former Pakistan Navy officer Awais Jakhrani, who is reported to have had links with Jihadi elements. Further interrogations have led to the arrest of three other Pakistan Navy personnel in Quetta in Baluchistan who were attempting to escape to Afghanistan.
The attack exposed chinks in Pakistan’s naval defences particularly strategic infrastructure which host millions of dollars worth of naval hardware such as ships, submarines and dockyards. It is important to mention that this is not the first time that terrorist groups have managed to penetrate Pakistan’s naval defences. In the past there have been at least two other attacks on highly sensitive naval platforms and on foreign naval personnel. In 2002, 14 persons including 11 French naval engineers working on the submarine project were killed and 23 others were injured when an unidentified man blew himself up with his car after ramming it into a 46-seater Pakistan Navy bus outside the Karachi Sheraton Hotel.
The second attack was on Pakistan’s naval air base Mehran and was the handiwork of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant groups based in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan. As many as 15 attackers from the ‘Brigade 313’ of the Al Qaeda-Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami group led by Ilyas Kashmiri, took part in the operation which left 18 naval personnel killed, 16 wounded and two US built P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft destroyed. Significantly, the attackers had good knowledge of the naval base including security arrangements, exit and entry points, and the details of the hangers and aircraft.
These attacks showcase that Karachi is a staging point for maritime terrorism particularly for those groups who have taken a liking for naval targets. In fact, Karachi has been labeled as the ‘terror capital’ and is a paradise for terrorists, gunrunners, and drug smugglers. The city is rife with ethnic strife and home to crime syndicates particularly Dawood Ibrahim who is wanted in India for a number of crimes including the 1993 Mumbai blasts. The city is also known for the ‘point of departure’ for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) who sailed from Karachi on three boats and later hijacked the Kuber an Indian fishing off Porbandar, on the Gujarat coast and landed on unsecured waterfronts in south Mumbai.
Perhaps the most discomforting issue of the attacks is that Jihadi groups have dared the Pakistan Navy and caused enormous damage to its reputation, morale and material. They have penetrated the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy and the attacks on PNS Mehran and PNS Zulfiqar were planned and executed with the help of naval personnel. Referring to the PNS Zulfiqar attack, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif made a statement in the Parliament that the attack could not have taken place “Without assistance from inside, these people could not have breached security,” The entry of Jihadi elements is sure to cause suspicion among the other multinational partners with whom the Pakistan Navy works closely, particularly the United States. It is believed that some elements in the Pakistan Navy were upset with the US its raid deep into Pakistan which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden.
The above attacks also have a bearing on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations. In the absence of a nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy has drawn plans to build a rudimentary sea-leg of the nuclear triad with ships and conventional AIP-submarines fitted with nuclear weapons. Any attempt to attack or hijack these platforms and use them as ‘bargain chip’ for any Jihadi agenda would cause grave damage to global security.
However, it is fair to say that the Pakistan Navy is a responsible force and has taken part in a number of multinational operations in the Arabian Sea-Gulf of Aden fighting pirates and terrorists under the US led multinational coalition force TF-151. It has also been the force commander of the coalition forces during these operations and its professionalism has received accolades. The Pakistan naval authorities would have to sanitize the force and rebuild its image of a highly professional fighting force free of radical elements and jihadi thought with a strong commitment to serve national interests and Pakistan’s international commitments to ensure order at sea.
WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSES FROM THE REGION
Ranjit Gupta
Strange things are happening in West Asia. Those who created the modern jihad in an extremely misguided and immature tactical response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are today at war with its most extremist manifestation, the Islamic State. The latter has also succeeded in bringing about the almost impossible - uniting countries and regimes deeply antagonistic and hostile to each other in a common war against a common enemy. The US and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and a Shia government in Iraq, the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it - Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US and assorted Islamist groups, all in the same camp warring against the Islamic State.
The Islamic State (IS), an extremist Sunni entity, is a particularly serious existential threat to the regimes of the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, as its religious roots and those of Wahhabism are broadly the same. The rulers of the GCC countries know that if the IS succeeds in Iraq, a spillover into their countries is inevitable. The IS is thus a direct, immediate and strong existential challenge to the continuing rule of these regimes, something that has not happened before. After agonizing for weeks they have become active participants in a war against a Sunni entity in Shia ruled states. This is unprecedented and something that simply could not have even been imagined only a few months ago.
The IS is fanatically anti Shia; it is also the most potent threat to the pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and Syria and to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. For these three reasons the IS is now the single most active and potent direct threat to Iran’s influence and standing throughout West Asia. Iran is Iraq’s ally and is the first and only regional country that has provided actual assistance on the ground.
The IS thus simultaneously poses the biggest strategic threat to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, though for entirely different reasons. For the first time since the Islamic Revolution in Iran these two countries face a common threat. They are the two key players if the war against the IS is to succeed. They have to find a way to cooperate. This is going to be difficult particularly as Saudi Arabia continues to attach priority to regime change in Syria which is absolutely unacceptable to Iran. A particularly important meeting was held between the Saudi and Iranian Foreign Ministers in New York on 21 September 2014. Statements made by them indicate that both countries recognize that they have to work together to confront the common enemy.
The Iraqi central Government has been opposed to the Barzani run Kurdish regional government and Iran has traditionally been opposed to the Barzani faction of the Iraqi Kurds. Shia militias have been fighting against the Kurds. The Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey have never managed to put up a single united overall Kurdish front; indeed in Iraq they are divided in two rival groups. But in recent weeks all of them are now fighting together in many theatres against the Islamic State.
On 22 September, the United States launched air strikes against the ISIL in Syria and aircraft from Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also took part in the airstrikes while Qatar “played a supportive role”. Arab states have continued to be involved in such air strikes since then. Iraq welcomed these airstrikes with great excitement and enthusiasm.
President Assad reacted by saying that Syria “supports any international effort in the fight against terrorism”; Syrian Foreign Minister was supportive saying that “Syria had been informed before the strikes by the United States”. Analysts on Syrian State television said that these “air strikes did not constitute aggression as Syria was informed in advance.” They have other reasons for feeling rather pleased because the US airstrikes inflicted significant casualties on the Khorasan group and the Jabhat Al Nusra, also fighting against the Syrian regime. Significantly, Syrian opposition National Coalition President Hadi Al Bahra said “tonight the international community has joined our fight against the ISIS in Syria.”
Syria is very keen to be formally a part of the coalition against the IS but unfortunately the US and GCC countries are adamantly opposed to this even as they are tacitly cooperating with the regime directly and through Iran, in coordinating the airstrikes against the IS. Iran would have been happy to attend the meeting in Jeddah on September 11 and in Paris on September 15 to join the international coalition to fight the Islamic State but was not invited due to US opposition. There was no blistering condemnation from Iran which would have been the automatic reaction in the past. Iran has merely said that such actions do not have international legality.
After doggedly refusing to allow any support for any military action in Iraq or Syria against the Islamic State despite intense personal efforts by President Obama and the Secretaries of State and Defense, hours after the first airstrikes in Syria Erdogan said in New York that Turkey was now considering a role that "includes everything. Both military and political…Of course we will do our part." The next few days should see greater clarity about Turkey’s involvement.
CHINA IN NEPAL: INCREASING CONNECTIVITY VIA RAILWAYS
Pramod Jaiswal
China is steadily extending its reach into South Asia with its growing
economic and strategic influence in the region. It has huge trade
surpluses with all South Asian countries and it reciprocates these
surpluses with massive investment in infrastructural development,
socio-economic needs and energy production in those countries. It also
provides them with low-cost financial capital. The largest beneficiaries
of such economic assistance are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Nepal.
Due to China’s rising interest and influence in South Asia, India appears perplexed. Hence, it has changed its foreign policy gesturing. With the election of Narendra Modi as the Indian prime minister, New Delhi has given highest priority to its South Asian neighours. Inviting the heads of the South Asian countries during his swearing-in ceremony and making his first foreign visit to Bhutan and later to Nepal are the clear indications in those directions.
China’s Inroads in Nepal
Due to China’s rising interest and influence in South Asia, India appears perplexed. Hence, it has changed its foreign policy gesturing. With the election of Narendra Modi as the Indian prime minister, New Delhi has given highest priority to its South Asian neighours. Inviting the heads of the South Asian countries during his swearing-in ceremony and making his first foreign visit to Bhutan and later to Nepal are the clear indications in those directions.
China’s Inroads in Nepal
Given the claims that Nepal may be used by the US for its larger
strategy of encircling China, Beijing is concerned about Kathmandu being
manipulated by other external powers. Security experts on China state
that Beijing increased its interest in Kathmandu due to the perceived
threat to Tibet via Nepalese territory – particularly due to the
prolonged state of instability and transition in Nepal.
Ever since the March 2008 uprising, when the Tibetans strongly started
the global anti-China protests on the eve of the Beijing Olympic Games,
there has been a major shift in China’s policy towards Nepal.
The Nepalese King, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese army, used to be China’s trustworthy partner and served Beijing’s security interests. However, after Nepal became a republic in 2008, China found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists to do the same. They wanted to curb underground activities of the approximately 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. Ideological affinities made Maoists in Nepal cast sympathetic eyes on China. China accepted the friendly hand extended by the Maoists when they were in dire need of support from a strong power. The former Prime Minister of Nepal, Prachanda’s, acceptance of China’s invitation to attend the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics not only made him the first prime minister to break the tradition of making India the destination for the first foreign visit following assuming office, but also proved his inclination towards China.
Maoists view India and the US as ‘imperialist powers’ and have stated that they were fighting against their interference in Nepalese politics.
India expressed serious concern over Prachanda’s action. The Indian media went overboard stating that India has lost Nepal from its sphere of influence and that it would affect India’s security in the long run. Interestingly, China supported the Maoist Party only after they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly election of April 2008, while, it was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to suppress the Maoist insurgents at a time when India, the US and the UK had refused to provide help of such nature.
Linking Via Railways
The Nepalese King, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese army, used to be China’s trustworthy partner and served Beijing’s security interests. However, after Nepal became a republic in 2008, China found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists to do the same. They wanted to curb underground activities of the approximately 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. Ideological affinities made Maoists in Nepal cast sympathetic eyes on China. China accepted the friendly hand extended by the Maoists when they were in dire need of support from a strong power. The former Prime Minister of Nepal, Prachanda’s, acceptance of China’s invitation to attend the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics not only made him the first prime minister to break the tradition of making India the destination for the first foreign visit following assuming office, but also proved his inclination towards China.
Maoists view India and the US as ‘imperialist powers’ and have stated that they were fighting against their interference in Nepalese politics.
India expressed serious concern over Prachanda’s action. The Indian media went overboard stating that India has lost Nepal from its sphere of influence and that it would affect India’s security in the long run. Interestingly, China supported the Maoist Party only after they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly election of April 2008, while, it was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to suppress the Maoist insurgents at a time when India, the US and the UK had refused to provide help of such nature.
Linking Via Railways
China is planning to extend the Qinghai-Tibet Railway to Nepal by 2020.
The rail link is expected to be extended to the borders of India and
Bhutan as well. Through Qinghai-Tibet Railway, China connected its
existing railway system to Tibet’s capital Lhasa in 2006 – which passes
through challenging peaks on the Tibetan highlands, touching altitudes
as high as 5,000 meters as part of government efforts to boost economic
development in the neglected region. In August 2008, six additional rail
lines were proposed to connect to Qinghai-Tibet railway – such as the
Lhasa-Nyingchi and Lhasa-Shigatse in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the
Golmud (Qinghai province)-Chengdu (Sichuan province), Dunhuang (Gansu
province)-Korla (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), and the Xining
(Qinghai Province)-Zhangye (Gansu). The project is expected to be
completed before 2020 while the Lhasa–Shigatse segment was completed in
August 2014.
The Lhasa-Shigatse segment extends over 253 kilometers, carrying trains at 120 kmph through valleys and over three bridges that run across the Brahmaputra River. The opening of this segment has reduced the travel time from Lhasa to the remote border towns of Tibet by half. This particular railway line is to be extended to Rasuwagadhi in Nepal via the Shigatse-Kerung stretch. Rasuwagadhi is about 500 kilometers from Shigatse. It is also reported that the link will have two separate extension points, one with the Nepal border and the other with the borders of India and Bhutan.
Shigatse is an important monastery town, home to the Tashilhunpo monastery that has been the seat of the Panchen Lamas, and is an important centre of pilgrimage for many Tibetans.
In response to the Chinese attempt to extend the railway link from Tibet to the Nepalese border, Kathmandu has drafted a plan to extend its railway links to Nepal. Simultaneously, India has announced assistance worth Rs. 10.88 billion for the expansion of railway services in five places along the India-Nepal border.
Though Chinese claims that the rail network expansion will be crucial in economic, cultural, and tourism promotion in South Asia, it has alarmed New Delhi because of its strategic implications. While Nepal is shares a common dream of extending the railway line to Lumbini, the birth place of Lord Buddha, through Kathmandu, there is sign of nervousness among the Indian government due to the possible threat. Such fear might gradually fade after Modi’s invitation to the Chinese to fulfill his ambitious bullet train plan.
The Lhasa-Shigatse segment extends over 253 kilometers, carrying trains at 120 kmph through valleys and over three bridges that run across the Brahmaputra River. The opening of this segment has reduced the travel time from Lhasa to the remote border towns of Tibet by half. This particular railway line is to be extended to Rasuwagadhi in Nepal via the Shigatse-Kerung stretch. Rasuwagadhi is about 500 kilometers from Shigatse. It is also reported that the link will have two separate extension points, one with the Nepal border and the other with the borders of India and Bhutan.
Shigatse is an important monastery town, home to the Tashilhunpo monastery that has been the seat of the Panchen Lamas, and is an important centre of pilgrimage for many Tibetans.
In response to the Chinese attempt to extend the railway link from Tibet to the Nepalese border, Kathmandu has drafted a plan to extend its railway links to Nepal. Simultaneously, India has announced assistance worth Rs. 10.88 billion for the expansion of railway services in five places along the India-Nepal border.
Though Chinese claims that the rail network expansion will be crucial in economic, cultural, and tourism promotion in South Asia, it has alarmed New Delhi because of its strategic implications. While Nepal is shares a common dream of extending the railway line to Lumbini, the birth place of Lord Buddha, through Kathmandu, there is sign of nervousness among the Indian government due to the possible threat. Such fear might gradually fade after Modi’s invitation to the Chinese to fulfill his ambitious bullet train plan.
STRONGER DEMOCRATIC VALUES FOR A BETTER TOMORROW
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
In the last few months, geopolitical instability has resurfaced in Eurasia and the Middle East. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressing the World Economic Forum special meeting on Unlocking Resources for Regional Development in Istanbul stated: “Terrorism is not regional its global now and it has threaten the entire global peace.” He strongly condemned the ISIS for the current tumorous situation in Iraq and Syria.
Moussa Mara, Prime Minister of Mali said, “Islam is a religion of peace and must not be seen as an instrument of terror.” Calling for a concerted international response to the global cancer of terrorism, he urged for greater efforts by Islamic countries to explain Islam’s underlying precepts. Many speakers emphasised the importance of creating a stable and peaceful region. The author of this article was a participant at this important regional forum.
The battle against ISIS is escalating with aerial bombing by the US forces in Iraq and Syria. According to the Turkish President nearly 1.5 million refugees have entered the Turkish border for shelter and protection. Turkey with its geostrategic location surrounded by Europe, Middle East, North Africa and Eurasia has been experiencing significant growth over the past decade of about 5 per cent annually despite the global financial crisis. Structural reforms and macroeconomic stability have sustained the growth and the rising living standards. Additionally, the Turkey will be the forthcoming G20 Chair. The ongoing ISIS crisis in Middle East region could affect its economy and impact global trade. The ISIS threat is a serious threat to world peace. The international community needs to support the campaign against this extremist group.
Terrorism in any part of the world should be considered a serious threat. The Sri Lankan military battled for three-decades with one of the most brutal terrorist organisations, the LTTE, and was successful in defeating them. The country has lived through the threat of terrorism and has felt the bitter pain of dealing with the terrorist issue. The Sri Lankan economy has grown since 2009, which is when the war ended. The growth of GDP and new infrastructure such as highways, ports and airports could be seen. However the individual per capita increase is a cause for concern among the public who have not experienced it due to a rise in the cost of living.
In the last few months in Sri Lanka several provincial elections were held and the entire nation focused on elections and political talk shows, but the voter turn-out at was less than 50 per cent; in some provinces an even lower percentage was evident. This indicates the trust deficit between the public and the politicians or the lack of interest in the overall system, which could surface to become a serious issue. According to the 2014 Edelman trust barometer there is rise in trust towards NGOs and decrease in trust towards the government. In South Asia, with rising political corruption due to the lack of good governance, trust has decreased between the public and governments. Punishing corrupt politicians as done in India, such as the powerful South Indian Chief Minister Ms Jayalalitha, is a good example of the strong anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms prevalent in India. Such action could restore the trust deficit between elected representatives and the public. It is important that the South Asian region should try to end this generation of corrupt politicians.
Now the political discussion has begun on the next presidential election in Sri Lanka, as many believe the government will go for an early election beginning of next year. The process and the legitimacy for President Rajapaksa to contest for the third term has been questioned and a discussion forum called “Mahinda can” was created by a few intellectuals. One should realise the repercussions of constitutional amendments to extend term limits and the benefit s that could bring to the nation. Sri Lanka’s image as a rich democratic nation in the rest of the world could be questioned, but some may argue that it is better to have the third term as it provides political stability. The 18th Amendment has further strengthened executive power and made checks and balances weak. One may wonder as to what the other coalition political parties under the government would say. Even in the Philippines a recent survey was conducted to extend President Aquino’s term limit; around six in ten Filipinos are not in favour to amend the 1987 Constitution. This may be due to the fear of creating another autocratic leader such as Ferdinand Marcos.
The three-pronged approach discussed - fighting terrorism, establishing good governance and constitutional reform - is to secure or restore the rights of people, not to take away what was given. Through good governance, extremism, which leads to terrorism, can be minimised. As the world celebrates global dignity day on the 15 October, it would be important to respect different communities to create a peaceful dignified world with stronger democratic institutions to preserve and secure liberty.
ISLAMIC STATE AND INDONESIA: JAKARTA'S COUNTER-STRATEGIES
Max Regus
Earlier this year, Indonesia was shocked by the Islamic State's (IS) propaganda spread via YouTube to recruit new members. In fact, in certain parts of Java, some have even expressed their willingness to become new members of the IS. Given that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world (around 230 million), this has attracted regional and international attention.
What is the danger attached to Indonesians joining the IS? Will the State’s efforts to prevent and combat extremism be successful, given the hardline Islamic groups interested in becoming new members of the IS?
The Indonesians who are now the members of the IS are believed to be effectively influencing the hardliners to defend themselves as new members. Their role is to facilitate the IS in building relationships with radical groups in Indonesia and gaining the broad sympathy of Indonesian Muslims (The Jakarta Globe, 17 July 2014).
With respect to the IS, the Indonesian government has taken a decisive political position. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had instructed his government to control the development of the IS.
Prospective Political Stance
Some have questioned the ability of the Indonesian government to combat radical groups in comparison with its direct war on the IS. However, it must be acknowledged that radical groups are connected to political power in Indonesia - they have a strategic position through their provision of political resources for elites. It is also important to note that the practice of political decentralisation implies that the centre’sposition to control the emergence of political issues in local areas is less.
It seems that Indonesia is trying to learn from its past experiences by taking a decisive position against the IS. A war against the IS provides strategic momentum to shadow the historical burden of Indonesian Islam during the last decade, which has been associated with the presence of hard-liner groups. The government is also able to take a definite position against the IS because this organisation is international in character has no affiliation with Indonesian politics.
The government has also rejected the IS based on their violent propaganda mainly to recruit Indonesian people.
Indonesian Islamic Resistance
In trying to demonstrate Indonesia’s position, Indonesian Islamic scholars and some moderate (liberal) Islamic organisations have stated that the IS is not in accordance with the Islamic character of the country. In this context, it would also be interesting to discuss the positions of the existing radical groups that have been part of the Caliphate movement such as Hizb ut Tahr in Indonesia. Although they have a global Caliphate ideology, their position is contrary to that of the IS.
They believe that the violence of the IS is destroying the position of the Caliphate Islamiyah, which promotes a peaceful path without violence and brutality. They are supported by the specific understanding that the IS is clearly not an Islamic movement but one that is using Islam as a tool for global war propaganda. From their point of view, Indonesian Islam has a peaceful image.
In addition to the above, the Indonesian public is also confused by the inconsistency of the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication in revoking the IS YouTube propaganda. Further confusion arises from the fact that the Minister of Information and Communication has affiliations with the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia.
This political party is perceived by the Indonesian public to have connections with the hardline extremist groups within the country, which intend to apply sharia law in Indonesia. In this context, even the Indonesian public has a clear political position against the IS. Now, the government needs to introduce significant institutional enforcement to back its stand and take the strong initiative to consolidate different groups within Islam to defending Indonesia against the IS.
ISLAMIC STATE AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS: JIHADIST FROM EUROPE
Tuva Julie Smith
The prolonged fighting in Middle Eastern countries have attracted
numerous European Muslims to partake in them. Although estimations of
exact figures vary, approximately 2,000-5,500 foreign fighters (FFs)
have joined the Middle Eastern battlefield.
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)
estimates that 18 per cent of the total number of FFs is from Europe:
France (63-412); Britain (43-366); Germany (43-240); Belgium (76-296);
and the Netherlands (29-152) have most recruits. However, the most
heavily affected countries according to population size (per million)
are Belgium (27), Denmark (15), the Netherlands (9), Sweden (9), and
Norway (8).
The understanding of who these FFs are, and their motivations behind participating in the various ‘jihads’ is obscure. This article, presented from an European research perspective, aims to widen the understanding of this phenomenon by taking into account the patterns of joining and motivating factors.
Patterns of Joining
The understanding of who these FFs are, and their motivations behind participating in the various ‘jihads’ is obscure. This article, presented from an European research perspective, aims to widen the understanding of this phenomenon by taking into account the patterns of joining and motivating factors.
Patterns of Joining
The radicalisation of individuals and the distinct characteristics of
radicalised people depend on complex factors. The general assumptions of
poverty and lack of education admitted as core socio-economic reasoning
for radicalisation does not always comply with statements of European
researchers.
The socio-economic perspective reveals a diverse group, although rather violent in character acting on a private volunteering basis. Most commonly, they are young well-educated men and women in their twenties, either Muslim-born or Muslim converts enjoying good socio-economic footing. Many cases are similar to that of the teenager, Jejoen Bontinck, (BBC News) from Belgium, a Muslim-convert who decided to travel to Syria despite his education, sporting activities, etc. at home. Another example is that of 25-year old Abu Anwar (CNN news) from the southern England. He grew up in a middle-class household and enjoyed an easy life in Britain, but chose to leave citing the inability to practice Islam.
Furthermore, the European point of convergence tends to draw a line at this group's experience of feeling left behind in the mainstream society. There has been a tendency among some youth who lack a sense of belongingness to becoming more willing to embrace challenges more than what they already may be facing by joining the violent radical groups. According to Lars Gule, a Norwegian researcher on Extreme Islam at University College in Oslo and Akershus, some of these youths come across as inharmonious and already religiously alienated and frustrated before they join.
Moreover, European research reveals that having established a personal relationship to a central figure in a radical environment, such as a charismatic opinion leader, seems to be important when influencing people to support or carry out politically motivated attacks. More importantly, these leaders, or `recruiters´, are skilled in the sense of persuading young Muslims into believing that their religion is under attack, and as Muslims, they are obligated to defend fellow Muslims.
Identity, Revenge, Status or all Combined?
The socio-economic perspective reveals a diverse group, although rather violent in character acting on a private volunteering basis. Most commonly, they are young well-educated men and women in their twenties, either Muslim-born or Muslim converts enjoying good socio-economic footing. Many cases are similar to that of the teenager, Jejoen Bontinck, (BBC News) from Belgium, a Muslim-convert who decided to travel to Syria despite his education, sporting activities, etc. at home. Another example is that of 25-year old Abu Anwar (CNN news) from the southern England. He grew up in a middle-class household and enjoyed an easy life in Britain, but chose to leave citing the inability to practice Islam.
Furthermore, the European point of convergence tends to draw a line at this group's experience of feeling left behind in the mainstream society. There has been a tendency among some youth who lack a sense of belongingness to becoming more willing to embrace challenges more than what they already may be facing by joining the violent radical groups. According to Lars Gule, a Norwegian researcher on Extreme Islam at University College in Oslo and Akershus, some of these youths come across as inharmonious and already religiously alienated and frustrated before they join.
Moreover, European research reveals that having established a personal relationship to a central figure in a radical environment, such as a charismatic opinion leader, seems to be important when influencing people to support or carry out politically motivated attacks. More importantly, these leaders, or `recruiters´, are skilled in the sense of persuading young Muslims into believing that their religion is under attack, and as Muslims, they are obligated to defend fellow Muslims.
Identity, Revenge, Status or all Combined?
There are a variety of motivations that lead these individuals to travel
and partake in jihdas in far off lands. Some, the so-called identity
seekers, travel with an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Raffaello
Pantucci, an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute in London,
argues that European FFs are drawn to join by virtue of dissatisfaction
at home and the desire to find one’s identity.
Alternately, for some, the motivation to travel is the desire of power and status, given how participating as a FF equals high status among extreme Islamist groups in Europe. For instance, posting pictures of themselves with heavy weaponry in Syria provides reputation and acknowledgement among similar groups back home.
Additionally, some Europeans travel for legitimate purposes, such as for visiting their families or for education, but find themselves affected by violent situations. The recruiters then provide guidance, justification and encouragement for partaking in jihad.
Lastly, those upset over gruesome videos and images of destruction and suffering, and thus, seeking revenge for the lack of contribution and empathy from Western governments, as practicing Muslims, feel compelled to join. For instance, Abu Saif (NBC News), a 31-year old chef left Belgium to fight the US and Shiite Muslims in Syria after watching a YouTube video depicting the massacre of children. Social media is a significant platform with an undeniable power. It incorporates a source of information as well as inspiration. Its ability to mobilise has been deftly taken advantage of by groups such as the Islamic State.
Given the aforementioned phenomena, European FFs cannot be characterised under one monotypic umbrella. They are young well-educated men and women in their mid-twenties, who voluntarily partake in violent struggles they otherwise have no pre-given predisposition towards. Their motivations for jihad vary. Some are based on conscious choices of revenge, their ability to do more than just participate in demonstrations, whereas others join out of frustration, lack of belonging or rebellion. Additionally, people appear to unite as a result of horrifying images presented to them daily by media outlets. Thus, whether it is an act of revenge, status or identity seeking, they all combine, and, not surprisingly, it seems that their active use of social media represents the key source of their motivation for joining the wars as FFs.
Alternately, for some, the motivation to travel is the desire of power and status, given how participating as a FF equals high status among extreme Islamist groups in Europe. For instance, posting pictures of themselves with heavy weaponry in Syria provides reputation and acknowledgement among similar groups back home.
Additionally, some Europeans travel for legitimate purposes, such as for visiting their families or for education, but find themselves affected by violent situations. The recruiters then provide guidance, justification and encouragement for partaking in jihad.
Lastly, those upset over gruesome videos and images of destruction and suffering, and thus, seeking revenge for the lack of contribution and empathy from Western governments, as practicing Muslims, feel compelled to join. For instance, Abu Saif (NBC News), a 31-year old chef left Belgium to fight the US and Shiite Muslims in Syria after watching a YouTube video depicting the massacre of children. Social media is a significant platform with an undeniable power. It incorporates a source of information as well as inspiration. Its ability to mobilise has been deftly taken advantage of by groups such as the Islamic State.
Given the aforementioned phenomena, European FFs cannot be characterised under one monotypic umbrella. They are young well-educated men and women in their mid-twenties, who voluntarily partake in violent struggles they otherwise have no pre-given predisposition towards. Their motivations for jihad vary. Some are based on conscious choices of revenge, their ability to do more than just participate in demonstrations, whereas others join out of frustration, lack of belonging or rebellion. Additionally, people appear to unite as a result of horrifying images presented to them daily by media outlets. Thus, whether it is an act of revenge, status or identity seeking, they all combine, and, not surprisingly, it seems that their active use of social media represents the key source of their motivation for joining the wars as FFs.
STRATEGIC ESTRANGEMENT: AN ODD BEDFELLOW TO ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Vijay Shankar
The inextricable interdependence of survival of China’s despotic leadership, its economic growth and stability of State-controlled Capitalism poses a curious dilemma when large democratic economies choose to expand and boost economic engagement. This is particularly so when there exists unresolved geo-strategic fissures. And yet, the overriding importance of political stability and economic growth (in that order) to China’s Communist Party leadership presents an opportunity to best influence China.
Of the ten bloodiest massacres in history five of them occurred in China (Qing conquest of the Ming Dynasty 1618-83, casualties 25 million; Taiping rebellion 1850-64, casualties 20 million; An Lushan rebellion 755-63, casualties 13 million; Dungan Revolt 1862-77, casualties 10 million; Chinese Civil War 1927-50, casualties 7.5 million). It can hardly be accidental that all five were internal to China. Neither is it coincidental that this part of their grisly past is an important determinant of their resolve to suppress uprisings whether in Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square or indeed in the current more-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The so called “Umbrella Revolution” has thus far resisted strong arm tactics; the State buying off local tycoons and using veiled threats of the use of disproportionate force. The underlying fear of encroachment of the Party’s authoritarian values on Hong Kong’s way of life is at the core of dissent. Nonetheless a vacillating leadership runs the risk of being perceived as weak when withholding the impulse to action. All the while an edgy mainland China watches uneasily. The Party knows full well that to loosen grip is the first step down the slippery slope to political instability.
On the growth front China is at that stage in development when expectations and standards of living of its citizens can no longer be nourished by the diminishing sheen of the “China Price.” The IMF World Economic Outlook for 2014-15 marks a downward GDP growth forecast for China to under 7 per cent by 2015 as the economy attempts to make the transition to a more sustainable path along the service and technology sectors. This relative slow down puts a poser before Beijing: the only guarantee of the passivity of the masses is a satisfied populace; dissatisfaction amongst the citizenry animated by the urge to more democracy provides the recipe for mass upheavals, so how best can the current politico-economic situation be bridled?
In the meanwhile India finds itself fortuitously positioned. Politically, the Modi-dispensation’s has a resounding mandate and economically, there is an avowed emphasis on development, prodding an upward growth trend (indicated by the same IMF report), reaching 7 per cent by 2015 - a combination of both factors provides the vehicle to not just influence Sino-Indian relations but also to resolve our prickly border predicament. According to a study by the PHD Chamber of Commerce, an industry trade group in New Delhi, China has become India’s largest trading partner and in the wake of Premier Xi Jinping’s recent visit to India, targeting bilateral trade of over US$100 billion is not only achievable but also would make India amongst China’s top five trading partners.
Economic intertwining comes with its own set of tilting levers which may be actuated to mutually settle the tricky border situation. It must be kept in perspective that the 3,225 km border (un-demarcated in the main) has been influenced historically by considerable cartographic jugglery. Significant to the boundary situation are the Johnson Line of 1865 which placed the Aksai Chin in Kashmir (which the British never took seriously); and the McCartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 which showed Aksai Chin as Chinese. China was not a signatory to either of these frontier delineations. However, by the second decade of the 20th century as both China and Russia lapsed into turmoil the Raj sensed a closure to the ‘Great Game’ and the border was redrawn to the original territorially favourable Johnson Line.
At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the Johnson Line in the north and the McMahon Line in the east, also not ratified by China, were inheritances of the partition award. Both independent India and China harboured no apparent conflicting territorial claims. But the annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the consequent moves aimed at strategic consolidation of the Aksai Chin to conform to the McCartney-MacDonald Line presaged the coming armed clash of 1962. It is of some consequence to note that in 1960; Premier Zhou Enlai had ‘unofficially’ offered a quid pro quo in Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA); that India accept the McCartney Line while China would abandon its claims across the McMahon Line. The time for this ‘grand bargain’ has perhaps arrived.
Geopolitics and international relations are often greatly influenced by timing events to capitalise on circumstances. For India to consider on the one hand strategic estrangement of China while on the other intensify economic engagement, at a time when Beijing faces the prospects of a slow down in growth coupled with restiveness amongst its citizens is to miss the opportunity to bring about stability on our borders and indeed in relations. In turn this can only spur growth, which for both nations is currently most desirable. The time to resurrect Zhou’s ‘grand bargain’ is at hand and as Mark Twain put it, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”
The inextricable interdependence of survival of China’s despotic leadership, its economic growth and stability of State-controlled Capitalism poses a curious dilemma when large democratic economies choose to expand and boost economic engagement. This is particularly so when there exists unresolved geo-strategic fissures. And yet, the overriding importance of political stability and economic growth (in that order) to China’s Communist Party leadership presents an opportunity to best influence China.
Of the ten bloodiest massacres in history five of them occurred in China (Qing conquest of the Ming Dynasty 1618-83, casualties 25 million; Taiping rebellion 1850-64, casualties 20 million; An Lushan rebellion 755-63, casualties 13 million; Dungan Revolt 1862-77, casualties 10 million; Chinese Civil War 1927-50, casualties 7.5 million). It can hardly be accidental that all five were internal to China. Neither is it coincidental that this part of their grisly past is an important determinant of their resolve to suppress uprisings whether in Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square or indeed in the current more-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The so called “Umbrella Revolution” has thus far resisted strong arm tactics; the State buying off local tycoons and using veiled threats of the use of disproportionate force. The underlying fear of encroachment of the Party’s authoritarian values on Hong Kong’s way of life is at the core of dissent. Nonetheless a vacillating leadership runs the risk of being perceived as weak when withholding the impulse to action. All the while an edgy mainland China watches uneasily. The Party knows full well that to loosen grip is the first step down the slippery slope to political instability.
On the growth front China is at that stage in development when expectations and standards of living of its citizens can no longer be nourished by the diminishing sheen of the “China Price.” The IMF World Economic Outlook for 2014-15 marks a downward GDP growth forecast for China to under 7 per cent by 2015 as the economy attempts to make the transition to a more sustainable path along the service and technology sectors. This relative slow down puts a poser before Beijing: the only guarantee of the passivity of the masses is a satisfied populace; dissatisfaction amongst the citizenry animated by the urge to more democracy provides the recipe for mass upheavals, so how best can the current politico-economic situation be bridled?
In the meanwhile India finds itself fortuitously positioned. Politically, the Modi-dispensation’s has a resounding mandate and economically, there is an avowed emphasis on development, prodding an upward growth trend (indicated by the same IMF report), reaching 7 per cent by 2015 - a combination of both factors provides the vehicle to not just influence Sino-Indian relations but also to resolve our prickly border predicament. According to a study by the PHD Chamber of Commerce, an industry trade group in New Delhi, China has become India’s largest trading partner and in the wake of Premier Xi Jinping’s recent visit to India, targeting bilateral trade of over US$100 billion is not only achievable but also would make India amongst China’s top five trading partners.
Economic intertwining comes with its own set of tilting levers which may be actuated to mutually settle the tricky border situation. It must be kept in perspective that the 3,225 km border (un-demarcated in the main) has been influenced historically by considerable cartographic jugglery. Significant to the boundary situation are the Johnson Line of 1865 which placed the Aksai Chin in Kashmir (which the British never took seriously); and the McCartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 which showed Aksai Chin as Chinese. China was not a signatory to either of these frontier delineations. However, by the second decade of the 20th century as both China and Russia lapsed into turmoil the Raj sensed a closure to the ‘Great Game’ and the border was redrawn to the original territorially favourable Johnson Line.
At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the Johnson Line in the north and the McMahon Line in the east, also not ratified by China, were inheritances of the partition award. Both independent India and China harboured no apparent conflicting territorial claims. But the annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the consequent moves aimed at strategic consolidation of the Aksai Chin to conform to the McCartney-MacDonald Line presaged the coming armed clash of 1962. It is of some consequence to note that in 1960; Premier Zhou Enlai had ‘unofficially’ offered a quid pro quo in Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA); that India accept the McCartney Line while China would abandon its claims across the McMahon Line. The time for this ‘grand bargain’ has perhaps arrived.
Geopolitics and international relations are often greatly influenced by timing events to capitalise on circumstances. For India to consider on the one hand strategic estrangement of China while on the other intensify economic engagement, at a time when Beijing faces the prospects of a slow down in growth coupled with restiveness amongst its citizens is to miss the opportunity to bring about stability on our borders and indeed in relations. In turn this can only spur growth, which for both nations is currently most desirable. The time to resurrect Zhou’s ‘grand bargain’ is at hand and as Mark Twain put it, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”
MODI-OBAMA SUMMIT: CRITICISM FOR CRITICISM'S SAKE
Chintamani Mahapatra
India’s hyperactive Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now widely known for his magic - the Modi Magic. His charisma made him popular ever since he began his tour of India to campaign for the parliamentary election and his charm became more widespread going beyond the borders of India soon after he became the Indian Prime Minister.
In one month, Prime Minister Modi has held three summit level meetings with three world leaders - Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese President Xi Jinping and the US President Barack Obama. The Chinese leader announced an investment of US$20 billion to develop infrastructure in India; the Japanese leader declared an amount of US$35 billion and, while the American leader could make no such commitment, the US-Indian Business Council estimated that Modi’s visit to the US would bring about US$41 billion of investment to India.
Why the US president was not able to make an open commitment on investing in India is not unknown. It is the private corporate sector in the US that can make investment commitments and not the US administration. And, investment, after all, is not aid!
There is no doubt that Modi’s summit meeting with the US President was the most important among the three summits, not only because the US is a superpower, but because Washington’s approach towards the new government in Delhi would considerably impact China’s attitude and Japanese engagement vis-Ã -vis India.
Critics point out that Modi’s US visit was high on symbolism and low on substance. Some pointed out that the grand reception he received in New York was the handiwork of the Gujarati community in the US. It has also been argued that there was a big media hype in India about Modi’s US visit, but there was nothing of significant importance in the coverage by the US media. Still others complain that no new agreement was signed during the Modi-Obama summit, no big ticket item was proclaimed, and that there was nothing original in the joint statement issued by the two leaders.
These are actually criticisms for criticism’s shake. First of all, Modi’s address at the Madison Square was clearly aimed at the Indian American community and not just the Gujarati community. In fact, the short cultural programme before the Prime Minister’s arrival had an India flavour and the Rajasthani dance performance by Gujarati dancers symbolised the unity of India in diversity! The Prime Minister’s announcement of life time visas for overseas Indians (PIO and CIO) was not meant for the Gujarati community alone.
Secondly, American newspapers rarely give wide coverage to any one foreign leader, and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with the US President in view of this fact was like such meetings in the White House, that is, almost a daily affair. Moreover, an article by the PM in The Wall Street Journal, a major voice of corporate America, and a joint article by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in the influential The Washington Post were quite uncommon feats.
Finally, a pair of eagle eyes is needed to discover the novel elements in the US-India joint statement. First, the statement clearly and strongly sends signals to Pakistan to rope in its home-grown terrorist networks and to China to follow international law in handling maritime disputes in the South China Sea. No diplomatic nicety was shown, unlike earlier joint statements, in matters of tackling terrorism and managing freedom of the seas.
Secondly, the need to robustly tackle the IS and D-Company, among other terrorist outfits, and their safe heavens, was a significant part of the joint statement and the mark of the Modi Government on this issue was crystal clear.
Thirdly, the concord between the two leaders to clean up the logjam in the implementation of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement was an important declaration. The UPA government failed to implement years after the declaration of the nuclear deal and six years after signing the 123 agreement.
Significantly, Modi’s summit with President Obama preceded his unprecedented corporate diplomacy marked by his meetings with the CEOs of a large number of American Big Business houses and his public diplomacy with the influential Indian American community. In both these initiatives, the Prime Minister’s goal was to allure American investments into India to create smart cities, modernise the country’s infrastructure and turn India into a manufacturing hub of the world.
Modi was neither selling dreams nor making populist remarks. He had done his home work. Based on his understanding of India’s strengths - democracy, demography and demands - he tried to convince the American public and the government the benefit of doing business in and with India. Neither his corporate diplomacy nor his public diplomacy was anathema to the White House.
Modi has planted many seeds in the US. The road to success, however, is long and not without hurdles.
India’s hyperactive Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now widely known for his magic - the Modi Magic. His charisma made him popular ever since he began his tour of India to campaign for the parliamentary election and his charm became more widespread going beyond the borders of India soon after he became the Indian Prime Minister.
In one month, Prime Minister Modi has held three summit level meetings with three world leaders - Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese President Xi Jinping and the US President Barack Obama. The Chinese leader announced an investment of US$20 billion to develop infrastructure in India; the Japanese leader declared an amount of US$35 billion and, while the American leader could make no such commitment, the US-Indian Business Council estimated that Modi’s visit to the US would bring about US$41 billion of investment to India.
Why the US president was not able to make an open commitment on investing in India is not unknown. It is the private corporate sector in the US that can make investment commitments and not the US administration. And, investment, after all, is not aid!
There is no doubt that Modi’s summit meeting with the US President was the most important among the three summits, not only because the US is a superpower, but because Washington’s approach towards the new government in Delhi would considerably impact China’s attitude and Japanese engagement vis-Ã -vis India.
Critics point out that Modi’s US visit was high on symbolism and low on substance. Some pointed out that the grand reception he received in New York was the handiwork of the Gujarati community in the US. It has also been argued that there was a big media hype in India about Modi’s US visit, but there was nothing of significant importance in the coverage by the US media. Still others complain that no new agreement was signed during the Modi-Obama summit, no big ticket item was proclaimed, and that there was nothing original in the joint statement issued by the two leaders.
These are actually criticisms for criticism’s shake. First of all, Modi’s address at the Madison Square was clearly aimed at the Indian American community and not just the Gujarati community. In fact, the short cultural programme before the Prime Minister’s arrival had an India flavour and the Rajasthani dance performance by Gujarati dancers symbolised the unity of India in diversity! The Prime Minister’s announcement of life time visas for overseas Indians (PIO and CIO) was not meant for the Gujarati community alone.
Secondly, American newspapers rarely give wide coverage to any one foreign leader, and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with the US President in view of this fact was like such meetings in the White House, that is, almost a daily affair. Moreover, an article by the PM in The Wall Street Journal, a major voice of corporate America, and a joint article by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in the influential The Washington Post were quite uncommon feats.
Finally, a pair of eagle eyes is needed to discover the novel elements in the US-India joint statement. First, the statement clearly and strongly sends signals to Pakistan to rope in its home-grown terrorist networks and to China to follow international law in handling maritime disputes in the South China Sea. No diplomatic nicety was shown, unlike earlier joint statements, in matters of tackling terrorism and managing freedom of the seas.
Secondly, the need to robustly tackle the IS and D-Company, among other terrorist outfits, and their safe heavens, was a significant part of the joint statement and the mark of the Modi Government on this issue was crystal clear.
Thirdly, the concord between the two leaders to clean up the logjam in the implementation of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement was an important declaration. The UPA government failed to implement years after the declaration of the nuclear deal and six years after signing the 123 agreement.
Significantly, Modi’s summit with President Obama preceded his unprecedented corporate diplomacy marked by his meetings with the CEOs of a large number of American Big Business houses and his public diplomacy with the influential Indian American community. In both these initiatives, the Prime Minister’s goal was to allure American investments into India to create smart cities, modernise the country’s infrastructure and turn India into a manufacturing hub of the world.
Modi was neither selling dreams nor making populist remarks. He had done his home work. Based on his understanding of India’s strengths - democracy, demography and demands - he tried to convince the American public and the government the benefit of doing business in and with India. Neither his corporate diplomacy nor his public diplomacy was anathema to the White House.
Modi has planted many seeds in the US. The road to success, however, is long and not without hurdles.
A NEW AFGHANISTAN: FOUR MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT GHANI
Suba Chandran
Will the new political arrangement (President and a Chief Executive
Officer) in Afghanistan work, and more importantly, deliver? Though it
looks simple in paper, given the recent history between the two
contenders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah – will the power-sharing
deal help Afghanistan stabilise?
One Country, Two Executives
One Country, Two Executives
The understanding simply means that there would be two Executives for
Afghanistan – the President (Ashraf Ghani) and a Chief Executive Officer
(either Abdullah Abdullah, or someone nominated by him). It does solve
the electoral dispute that had been raging between the two contenders
and threatening to derail the political process. However, will the
arrangement address the challenges facing Afghanistan?
The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.
Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.
The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq
The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.
Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.
The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq
The agreement is primarily due to the US’ pressure. And that poses the
second challenge for the new Afghan arrangement. How seriously committed
will the US be, once the new Afghan structure is in place? Undoubtedly,
the multiple visits by the US Secretary of State John Kerry and his
constant dialogue with both parties have ensured that the electoral
process has not been completely wasted. Abdullah was ready to leave the
process and pursue a different political path. Thanks to Kerry, the two
contestants could be brought together.
Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s, remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.
However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.
Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.
Advantage Taliban-Pakistan
Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s, remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.
However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.
Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.
Advantage Taliban-Pakistan
The third major challenge would be the resurgence of the Taliban, and
their supporters across the Durand Line. Despite multiple efforts,
negotiations with the Taliban have not succeeded until today. Moving
ahead, the reasons behind the failure would factor heavily in the new
government.
There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.
The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.
It’s the Economy, Stupid
There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.
The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.
It’s the Economy, Stupid
The economic situation and the human development indicators have been
transformed dramatically over the last decade. There are more schools,
roads, transmission lines etc., than has ever been in the history of
Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is evolving slowly but steadily, as are
the country’s government structures and non-governmental institutions.
Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.
Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president.
Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.
Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president.
PIRATES PREFER ENERGY CARGO
Vijay Sakhuja
Early this month, pirates released the hijacked MT Sunrise 689, a small
product tanker bound for Vietnam which went missing soon after it left
Singapore. During the captivity that lasted nearly six days, the pirates
siphoned 2,000 of the total 5,200 metric tons of oil valued at $4
million. They also stole the personal belongings of the crew and
threatened to kill if they did not follow orders – but assured them that
their only aim was to steal the oil carried onboard the vessel.
This is the 12th incident of piracy in Southeast Asia involving small
oil tankers. These vessels are easy targets because they are small, have
smaller crews, move at slow speeds, and the low freeboard makes
boarding comparatively easier and quicker. Perhaps the most worrying
aspect of these attacks is that pirates in Southeast Asia have taken a
liking for small product tankers carrying diesel that is sold to
prospective customers, who re-sell for anywhere between $400 and $650
per ton in the black market.
These pirates or robbers are popularly referred to as ‘Petro Pirates’
and are believed to be part of transnational organised crime groups who
own small tankers and are networked with the oil smuggling mafia.
Furthermore, these Petro Pirates appear to only steal cargo and not harm
the crew. For instance, in June 2014, pirates hijacked Orapin 4, a Thai
oil tanker, with its cargo of oil worth nearly $2.2 million; they stole
the oil, did not hurt the crew, but robbed them of watches, cell
phones, money and other valuables. Similarly, in April 2014, pirates
raided a tanker off the coast of Malaysia and stole 3 million liters of
diesel. In fact the business model of Petro Pirates’ does not appear to
include ransoms.
Interestingly, a similar story is being played out along the west coast
of Africa but on a larger scale. Early this year, MT Kerala, a 75,000
ton tanker carrying diesel was hijacked by Nigerian pirates off the
Angolan coast. The vessel was released after being siphoned of 12,270
tons of its diesel cargo. The pirates took the usual precautions of
disabling the Automatic Identification System, switching off
communications, and repainting the name of the vessel.
The International Maritime Bureau’s half year report for January to June
2014 recorded 23 incidents off the west coast of Africa, and Nigerian
waters has witnessed 10 such attacks. These trends are a continuation of
the past reports and the UK Chamber of Shipping records state that acts
of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea are worrisome – 62
attacks in 2012; 51 in 2013. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 19 per
cent of all maritime attacks worldwide. Significantly, the Gulf of
Guinea is believed to be a greater threat to shipping than Somalia
because of its flourishing oil and gas industry which attracts shipping,
unlike Somalia, where pirates preyed on targets of opportunity along
the busy sea route.
The West African piracy is driven by a commodity – oil – which is
available in abundance. For instance, Nigeria is an oil-rich country and
produces nearly 2 million barrels of oil per day. However, it has
limited refining capacity resulting in both export of crude and import
of refined oil thus generating sufficient maritime traffic for pirates
to feed on.
Unlike Nigeria, Singapore does not produce any oil but is the hub of the
Asian petrochemicals industry with a sophisticated refining, storage,
and distribution infrastructure, and therefore attracts significant
tanker traffic. A variety of large and small vessels carrying oil and
gas make port calls to deliver crude or carry refined products to
regional and global markets. According to the US Energy Information
Agency, the petrochemical industry is the backbone of Singapore's
economy and it has a refining capacity of nearly 1.4 million barrels of
oil per day.
The aforementioned incidents along the west coast of Africa and in
Southeast Asian waters offer an interesting feature. The business model
of piracy in both cases involves hijacking vessels for the cargo carried
onboard, and in particular, the refined energy products such as diesel.
It is plausible that pirates in Southeast Asia may have borrowed the
idea from West Africa – who appear to have become more sophisticated and
have graduated to hijacking bigger ships.
In essence, the pirates may not have changed their Modus Operandi
of attacking both small and big ships; instead they have become
cargo/commodity conscious and believe that stealing refined energy
products is more lucrative than waiting for ransoms. However, it is
useful to mention that the stolen oil or other products are carried in
smaller vessels that are equally vulnerable to interception by security
forces.
"CHINA THREAT" IN SOUTH ASIA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA.
Siwei Liu
President Xi Jinping’s six-day South Asian trip is over. Apart from a series of bilateral agreements, friendly high-level dialogues and other interactions, the trip also demonstrated the direction of China’s South Asian policy. Indeed, with growing bilateral and multilateral interactions with South Asia, China is looking for a more flexible and comprehensive policy to accommodate the present situation, and to some extent, respond to the related arguments of China as a threat in the region.
Admittedly, one of the challenges for China’s current South Asian policy is how to address doubts about the motivations for China’s foreign policy in the region, in particular, India’s worries about the “China threat.” China has repeatedly stated that it is keen on promoting peaceful development and cooperation toward win-win outcomes and cooperate with India towards regional prosperity, but in some Indian assessments, China’s rising profile in South Asia is not good news. For example, an Indian analyst argues that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a ‘string of pearls’ that could eventually undermine India pre-eminence and potentially become an economic and security threat.
Obviously, Xi’s visits in September not only tried to confirm that Beijing is putting greater emphasis on this region, but also demonstrate that it want to address its neighbours’ “China threat” perception. For this, the Chinese leader presented Beijing current South Asian policy with some new characteristics.
First, Xi emphasised common regional development. In his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, he said, “A South Asia that enjoys peace, stability, development and prosperity serves the interests of countries and people in the region and of China as well. China wants to live in harmony with all countries in the region and contribute its share to the development of the region. ” Xi not only suggested that China should work with the relevant countries to step up economic integration and connectivity in the region but also proposed that they come together to join the “Belt” and “Road” initiatives that aim at strengthening connectivity among countries along the traditional land and maritime silk roads.
Second, Xi emphasised multi-dimensional cooperation with South Asian partners. For economic cooperation, in the next five years, China plans to work with South Asian countries to increase bilateral trade to US$150 billion, its investments in South Asia to US$30 billion, and provide US$20 billion in concessional facilities to the region. It needs to be mentioned that Beijing also focuses on other modes of cooperation and interaction with South Asia. China is concentrating its efforts on expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges with South Asia. It plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities for 5,000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5,000 youth, and train 5,000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. In addition, China will work with South Asian countries to implement the China-South Asia Partnership Initiative for Science and Technology, give full play to the role of the China-South Asia Expo, and build new platforms for mutually beneficial cooperation.
There is no denying that during his trip, President Xi reaffirmed China’s good neighbourly foreign policy and made efforts to deepen strategic relations at the multilateral and bilateral levels, which is a timely move. It reflects what President Xi described: “the principles of China's neighbour diplomacy as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.” However, a one-time diplomatic trip may not be enough to address all the concerns and issues.
Although Xi’s South Asian trip opened a new door for China-South Asia relations, it is necessary for China to understand that challenges and problems still exist. In the future, China needs to undertake more dialogues and interactions both through the official and civilian channels with South Asia, in particular, India. As the two biggest powers in the region, China and India should both be positive and see the multiple levels of potential interaction in the future, and join hands in cooperation. It will benefit this region and the rest of Asia as well. In addition, China also should be aware of other challenges it might face such as how to deal with South Asia’s complicated regional relations, in particular, India-Pakistan relations, which needs China’s smart and cautious diplomacy. Other issues like Afghanistan’s stability and development, especially after 2014, will also test Chinese political and diplomatic wisdom. Just as some analysts say, China should realize that instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into other parts of South Asia and could possible threaten China.
President Xi Jinping’s six-day South Asian trip is over. Apart from a series of bilateral agreements, friendly high-level dialogues and other interactions, the trip also demonstrated the direction of China’s South Asian policy. Indeed, with growing bilateral and multilateral interactions with South Asia, China is looking for a more flexible and comprehensive policy to accommodate the present situation, and to some extent, respond to the related arguments of China as a threat in the region.
Admittedly, one of the challenges for China’s current South Asian policy is how to address doubts about the motivations for China’s foreign policy in the region, in particular, India’s worries about the “China threat.” China has repeatedly stated that it is keen on promoting peaceful development and cooperation toward win-win outcomes and cooperate with India towards regional prosperity, but in some Indian assessments, China’s rising profile in South Asia is not good news. For example, an Indian analyst argues that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a ‘string of pearls’ that could eventually undermine India pre-eminence and potentially become an economic and security threat.
Obviously, Xi’s visits in September not only tried to confirm that Beijing is putting greater emphasis on this region, but also demonstrate that it want to address its neighbours’ “China threat” perception. For this, the Chinese leader presented Beijing current South Asian policy with some new characteristics.
First, Xi emphasised common regional development. In his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, he said, “A South Asia that enjoys peace, stability, development and prosperity serves the interests of countries and people in the region and of China as well. China wants to live in harmony with all countries in the region and contribute its share to the development of the region. ” Xi not only suggested that China should work with the relevant countries to step up economic integration and connectivity in the region but also proposed that they come together to join the “Belt” and “Road” initiatives that aim at strengthening connectivity among countries along the traditional land and maritime silk roads.
Second, Xi emphasised multi-dimensional cooperation with South Asian partners. For economic cooperation, in the next five years, China plans to work with South Asian countries to increase bilateral trade to US$150 billion, its investments in South Asia to US$30 billion, and provide US$20 billion in concessional facilities to the region. It needs to be mentioned that Beijing also focuses on other modes of cooperation and interaction with South Asia. China is concentrating its efforts on expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges with South Asia. It plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities for 5,000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5,000 youth, and train 5,000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. In addition, China will work with South Asian countries to implement the China-South Asia Partnership Initiative for Science and Technology, give full play to the role of the China-South Asia Expo, and build new platforms for mutually beneficial cooperation.
There is no denying that during his trip, President Xi reaffirmed China’s good neighbourly foreign policy and made efforts to deepen strategic relations at the multilateral and bilateral levels, which is a timely move. It reflects what President Xi described: “the principles of China's neighbour diplomacy as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.” However, a one-time diplomatic trip may not be enough to address all the concerns and issues.
Although Xi’s South Asian trip opened a new door for China-South Asia relations, it is necessary for China to understand that challenges and problems still exist. In the future, China needs to undertake more dialogues and interactions both through the official and civilian channels with South Asia, in particular, India. As the two biggest powers in the region, China and India should both be positive and see the multiple levels of potential interaction in the future, and join hands in cooperation. It will benefit this region and the rest of Asia as well. In addition, China also should be aware of other challenges it might face such as how to deal with South Asia’s complicated regional relations, in particular, India-Pakistan relations, which needs China’s smart and cautious diplomacy. Other issues like Afghanistan’s stability and development, especially after 2014, will also test Chinese political and diplomatic wisdom. Just as some analysts say, China should realize that instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into other parts of South Asia and could possible threaten China.
INDIA-PAKISTAN: WORKING BOUNDARIES AND LINES OF UNCONTROLLED FIRE
Salma Malik
After a much-deliberated stalemate, Afghanistan finally had a new democratic government with a power-sharing
arrangement. The signing of the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) provides a false sense of security to many who felt that the US military must not
pull out completely as the perceived regional proxies would turn Afghanistan into a complete proxy battlefield.
Though Pakistan has time and again reiterated its policy of non-interference and non-intervention in Afghan internal affairs, the same cannot be said about other regional actors. That will add to complicating the bilateral equation further. Another moot point is the Durand line, which always carries the potential to ignite
fiery exchanges of passionate and politically loaded rhetorics and on rare instances, exchange of firepower.
However, the more volatile of the “unofficial” boundaries has been the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary on the eastern border, which has over the years, successfully become a testing field of India-
Pakistan relations. Like any and all bilateral
arrangements between the two neighbors, the 2003 ceasefire agreement regarding the LoC has also been blatantly violated in the past several years. With both elected governments in Pakistan and India being driven by economics, the general perception was that even if there is no substantial progress on the bigger problem areas, at least both administrations will
try and maintain congenial relations and move towards progressive engagement. However the first sign of trouble was the calling-off of the Augus 2014 foreign
secretary level talks after Pakistan’s high commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri leadership. Interestingly, anyone familiar with the New Delhi diplomatic setup and the grand receptions held would
actually find a much greater number and variety of Kashmiri leadership in attendance, brushing shoulders
with all and sundry. Sensitivities aside, if seriously committed to the process, a better approach could have been registering a
well-worded protest and allowing the talks to proceed as per schedule. However, several times in the past too, much investment has been made in holding a meeting than making it meaningful. What if the meeting had proceeded as per schedule? There is little doubt that
nothing substantial would have resulted from the parleys. Despite a much clearer vision regarding what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants regarding
internal growth and development and a foreign policy to match with it, there was a somewhat vague gesturing vis-Ã -vis relations with Islamabad. Although, during his election campaigning Modi and his party had been vocally very anti-Pakistani, yet the very brief period of positive overturing soon after elections, gave space for optimism that perhaps things might be on the mend.The recent round of cross-LoC fire resulting in substantial infrastructural damage as well as heavy civilian fatalities on either sides of the LoC and working
boundary, has again brought out media histrionics seeking death to Pakistan and dealing the enemy (Islamabad) a crushing decisive blow. Where on one hand it makes the Modi government’s policy towards its
neighbor clear, it also retards the process (whatever it may be) substantially.
A recent statement by the new-kid-on-the-block, Bilawal Bhutto, regarding wresting the entire Kashmir from India got a knee-jerk reaction from across the border. Interestingly, one set of replies was hacking of the Pakistan Peoples Party web site by an Indian group which posted propaganda stuff with inflammatory statements. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too,
much to New Delhi’s displeasure highlighted the plight of Kashmiris at the recently concluded UNGA session in New York. Immediately, conspiracy theorists hinted at a silent pledge between Sharif and Modi regarding silence over the K-word.
However, what has intentionally been forgotten in this entire conflict narrative is the plight of flood-affected Kashmiri population, which has suffered loss of lives and livelihood.
Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations. Sooner or later the guns will fall silent, after claiming many lives both civilian and
military, with unpleasant words exchanged and angry gesturing at the political level. In the worse-case scenario, it may require a higher level of deployment, but that is highly unlikely. What it will claim in its wake is a chunk of peace, and a window of opportunity to act wisely by either side and discuss the problem, rather than indulging in blind rage and provocative statements.
Although New Delhi does not accord the same status to UNMOGIP than Pakistan, the latter’s proposal of making this office more proactive may not be a bad idea.
Apparently, sticking to bilateralism and seeking a third party’s role behind the curtains which results in crisis stability has become a norm for the two neighbors. The
current crossfire, while may apparently look like a good marketing strategy – with Modi allegedly approving an all-out assault – will further fracture the already fragile
base on which “conditional” peace stands. If either side is genuinely interested in peace, there is a need for reviewing both policies and postures.
After a much-deliberated stalemate, Afghanistan finally had a new democratic government with a power-sharing
arrangement. The signing of the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) provides a false sense of security to many who felt that the US military must not
pull out completely as the perceived regional proxies would turn Afghanistan into a complete proxy battlefield.
Though Pakistan has time and again reiterated its policy of non-interference and non-intervention in Afghan internal affairs, the same cannot be said about other regional actors. That will add to complicating the bilateral equation further. Another moot point is the Durand line, which always carries the potential to ignite
fiery exchanges of passionate and politically loaded rhetorics and on rare instances, exchange of firepower.
However, the more volatile of the “unofficial” boundaries has been the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary on the eastern border, which has over the years, successfully become a testing field of India-
Pakistan relations. Like any and all bilateral
arrangements between the two neighbors, the 2003 ceasefire agreement regarding the LoC has also been blatantly violated in the past several years. With both elected governments in Pakistan and India being driven by economics, the general perception was that even if there is no substantial progress on the bigger problem areas, at least both administrations will
try and maintain congenial relations and move towards progressive engagement. However the first sign of trouble was the calling-off of the Augus 2014 foreign
secretary level talks after Pakistan’s high commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri leadership. Interestingly, anyone familiar with the New Delhi diplomatic setup and the grand receptions held would
actually find a much greater number and variety of Kashmiri leadership in attendance, brushing shoulders
with all and sundry. Sensitivities aside, if seriously committed to the process, a better approach could have been registering a
well-worded protest and allowing the talks to proceed as per schedule. However, several times in the past too, much investment has been made in holding a meeting than making it meaningful. What if the meeting had proceeded as per schedule? There is little doubt that
nothing substantial would have resulted from the parleys. Despite a much clearer vision regarding what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants regarding
internal growth and development and a foreign policy to match with it, there was a somewhat vague gesturing vis-Ã -vis relations with Islamabad. Although, during his election campaigning Modi and his party had been vocally very anti-Pakistani, yet the very brief period of positive overturing soon after elections, gave space for optimism that perhaps things might be on the mend.The recent round of cross-LoC fire resulting in substantial infrastructural damage as well as heavy civilian fatalities on either sides of the LoC and working
boundary, has again brought out media histrionics seeking death to Pakistan and dealing the enemy (Islamabad) a crushing decisive blow. Where on one hand it makes the Modi government’s policy towards its
neighbor clear, it also retards the process (whatever it may be) substantially.
A recent statement by the new-kid-on-the-block, Bilawal Bhutto, regarding wresting the entire Kashmir from India got a knee-jerk reaction from across the border. Interestingly, one set of replies was hacking of the Pakistan Peoples Party web site by an Indian group which posted propaganda stuff with inflammatory statements. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too,
much to New Delhi’s displeasure highlighted the plight of Kashmiris at the recently concluded UNGA session in New York. Immediately, conspiracy theorists hinted at a silent pledge between Sharif and Modi regarding silence over the K-word.
However, what has intentionally been forgotten in this entire conflict narrative is the plight of flood-affected Kashmiri population, which has suffered loss of lives and livelihood.
Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations. Sooner or later the guns will fall silent, after claiming many lives both civilian and
military, with unpleasant words exchanged and angry gesturing at the political level. In the worse-case scenario, it may require a higher level of deployment, but that is highly unlikely. What it will claim in its wake is a chunk of peace, and a window of opportunity to act wisely by either side and discuss the problem, rather than indulging in blind rage and provocative statements.
Although New Delhi does not accord the same status to UNMOGIP than Pakistan, the latter’s proposal of making this office more proactive may not be a bad idea.
Apparently, sticking to bilateralism and seeking a third party’s role behind the curtains which results in crisis stability has become a norm for the two neighbors. The
current crossfire, while may apparently look like a good marketing strategy – with Modi allegedly approving an all-out assault – will further fracture the already fragile
base on which “conditional” peace stands. If either side is genuinely interested in peace, there is a need for reviewing both policies and postures.
A NUCLEAR BONUS TO COOPERATE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE?
Majid Izadpanahi
Since the 1979 revolution, the Iran has accused the US interference in the West Asia as the root of regional instability. But there are cases when Tehran has cooperated with Washington when their interests coincided.
The Islamic State (IS) has ambitious political, economic, military and ideological plans, and continues to occupy territories and seeks recognition. The IS has captured
oil-rich areas in Iraq and Syria and is smuggling oil via Turkey. It has beheaded journalists, has inflicted heavy casualties and human tragedies in Iraq and Syria’s
Kurdish areas. The IS has become the richest and most powerful terrorist group ever, and now is marching towards Baghdad.
Today, the IS is considered a national security threat both by Iran and the US. Its movement towards the southern Iraqi cities of Samarra, Najaf and Karbala is Iran’s red line. Also, its anti-Shia policy and its military operation near Iran’s border directly threaten Iran. The US considers the IS as a threat to its citizens, and especially its approach and plan to seize Iraq’s oil rich
areas in the south, as dangerous. Iran and the US have a history of cooperation in tackling common enemies. First, it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and second, Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Iran fully supported the US attack on the
Taliban regime in 2001, and collaborated to establish political order in Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference. But immediately after that, the then US
President George Bush labelled Iran as “Axis of Evil” shocking Tehran and embittering the bilateral. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran once again
supported the US led coalition and provided them with intelligence inputs. Subsequently, however, the “all options are on the table” and “the regime change”
option had extremely adverse impacts on the reformists’ bid to improve relations with Washington.
Today, once again, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and US over Iraq. The IS is marching towards Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan, and southern Iraq, threatening Shia-majority areas and the oil-rich Kurdish
regions of the country. An overthrow of the central government in Baghdad is neither Iran’s interest nor the US’.
At present, Iran supports all groups involved in fighting the IS inside Iraq and Syria. Iran provides military advice to the Iraqi government, has military cooperation
with the Kurds and covers the news of the developments in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in his recent visit
to Iraq, reflected Iran’s approach towards Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government by conveying Tehran’s support to him. By visiting President Masoud
Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan, he proved Iran’s support to them by providing arms, ammunitions and intelligence.
The US also gives moral, material and logistical support to the Iraqi government to keep the IS out of Iraq. Therefore, given how Iran and the US are trying to
eliminate the same enemy, it is pragmatic for the two to come closer. However, there are several reasons for Iran preference to fight the IS alone instead of joining the
US-led coalition. To begin with, Iran was not invited for the Paris Conference, organised to create a coalition West Asian countries – that included a number of corrupt regimes – to defeat the IS. Saudi Arabia is accused of supporting the IS and other terrorist groups
such as the Taliban. Turkey helps the IS in selling oil – the latter’s main source of income – via plastic pipelines and other routes. Iranian officials denounce this conference as a farce and state that they would rather fight the IS alone.
Despite not being invited to the Paris Conference, US leaders have admitted to the importance of Iran in eliminating the IS. On August 21, Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department, Marie Harf, stated, “there is a
positive role Iran can play.”
At home, in Iran, after three decades of chanting anti- American slogan, distrusting the US and being accused of sponsoring terrorism and building nuclear weapons
by the US, incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration is being pressured by the conservatives to continue the war alone. Building the Iraqi army, supporting the government of
Iraq, supporting the integrity of Iraq, Iraq’s stability and security and eliminating the IS are goals both Iran and the US are attempting to achieve. Iran supports US air
strikes on the IS because it can help the cause: defeating a very dangerous enemy in Tehran’s neighbourhood.
Destroying the same enemy still could not form a coalition that includes both Iran and the US. Iran is now more conscious of its actions and foreign policy because it still remembers that after its unconditional
cooperation with the US in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, not only they did not get the results they expected but their overtures too were rejected; and the
reformists and moderates were defeated in the subsequent presidential election.
Despite the fact that the US’ elimination of the IS serves Iranian interests, it seems that the Iranian government now wants a nuclear bonus in return for coalition in order to reduce the conservatives’ pressure.
Since the 1979 revolution, the Iran has accused the US interference in the West Asia as the root of regional instability. But there are cases when Tehran has cooperated with Washington when their interests coincided.
The Islamic State (IS) has ambitious political, economic, military and ideological plans, and continues to occupy territories and seeks recognition. The IS has captured
oil-rich areas in Iraq and Syria and is smuggling oil via Turkey. It has beheaded journalists, has inflicted heavy casualties and human tragedies in Iraq and Syria’s
Kurdish areas. The IS has become the richest and most powerful terrorist group ever, and now is marching towards Baghdad.
Today, the IS is considered a national security threat both by Iran and the US. Its movement towards the southern Iraqi cities of Samarra, Najaf and Karbala is Iran’s red line. Also, its anti-Shia policy and its military operation near Iran’s border directly threaten Iran. The US considers the IS as a threat to its citizens, and especially its approach and plan to seize Iraq’s oil rich
areas in the south, as dangerous. Iran and the US have a history of cooperation in tackling common enemies. First, it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and second, Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Iran fully supported the US attack on the
Taliban regime in 2001, and collaborated to establish political order in Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference. But immediately after that, the then US
President George Bush labelled Iran as “Axis of Evil” shocking Tehran and embittering the bilateral. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran once again
supported the US led coalition and provided them with intelligence inputs. Subsequently, however, the “all options are on the table” and “the regime change”
option had extremely adverse impacts on the reformists’ bid to improve relations with Washington.
Today, once again, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and US over Iraq. The IS is marching towards Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan, and southern Iraq, threatening Shia-majority areas and the oil-rich Kurdish
regions of the country. An overthrow of the central government in Baghdad is neither Iran’s interest nor the US’.
At present, Iran supports all groups involved in fighting the IS inside Iraq and Syria. Iran provides military advice to the Iraqi government, has military cooperation
with the Kurds and covers the news of the developments in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in his recent visit
to Iraq, reflected Iran’s approach towards Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government by conveying Tehran’s support to him. By visiting President Masoud
Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan, he proved Iran’s support to them by providing arms, ammunitions and intelligence.
The US also gives moral, material and logistical support to the Iraqi government to keep the IS out of Iraq. Therefore, given how Iran and the US are trying to
eliminate the same enemy, it is pragmatic for the two to come closer. However, there are several reasons for Iran preference to fight the IS alone instead of joining the
US-led coalition. To begin with, Iran was not invited for the Paris Conference, organised to create a coalition West Asian countries – that included a number of corrupt regimes – to defeat the IS. Saudi Arabia is accused of supporting the IS and other terrorist groups
such as the Taliban. Turkey helps the IS in selling oil – the latter’s main source of income – via plastic pipelines and other routes. Iranian officials denounce this conference as a farce and state that they would rather fight the IS alone.
Despite not being invited to the Paris Conference, US leaders have admitted to the importance of Iran in eliminating the IS. On August 21, Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department, Marie Harf, stated, “there is a
positive role Iran can play.”
At home, in Iran, after three decades of chanting anti- American slogan, distrusting the US and being accused of sponsoring terrorism and building nuclear weapons
by the US, incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration is being pressured by the conservatives to continue the war alone. Building the Iraqi army, supporting the government of
Iraq, supporting the integrity of Iraq, Iraq’s stability and security and eliminating the IS are goals both Iran and the US are attempting to achieve. Iran supports US air
strikes on the IS because it can help the cause: defeating a very dangerous enemy in Tehran’s neighbourhood.
Destroying the same enemy still could not form a coalition that includes both Iran and the US. Iran is now more conscious of its actions and foreign policy because it still remembers that after its unconditional
cooperation with the US in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, not only they did not get the results they expected but their overtures too were rejected; and the
reformists and moderates were defeated in the subsequent presidential election.
Despite the fact that the US’ elimination of the IS serves Iranian interests, it seems that the Iranian government now wants a nuclear bonus in return for coalition in order to reduce the conservatives’ pressure.
1 Oct 2014
AT THE KURDISTAN FRONT
Jonathan Spyer
A war is being waged along a 900-mile front between two entities that today constitute de facto quasi-states stretching across the old border between Syria and Iraq. These are the Islamic State to the south and a contiguous area of Kurdish-controlled territory to the north. Recently, I traveled to the latter, in regions of northern Iraq and northeast Syria, like the town of Derik, where I spoke with a Kurdish soldier who had recently been in a firefight with IS forces in the neighboring village of Jeza’a.
A war is being waged along a 900-mile front between two entities that today constitute de facto quasi-states stretching across the old border between Syria and Iraq. These are the Islamic State to the south and a contiguous area of Kurdish-controlled territory to the north. Recently, I traveled to the latter, in regions of northern Iraq and northeast Syria, like the town of Derik, where I spoke with a Kurdish soldier who had recently been in a firefight with IS forces in the neighboring village of Jeza’a.
A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter on the front lines near Erbil, September 10
“We
were fighting for 17 hours,” said the Kurd. He was with the People’s
Protection Units (YPG), affiliated with the PYD, the Syrian branch of
the Kurdistan Worker’s party, or PKK. “There must have been about 500 of
them,” he said of the IS militants. “Only about 90 of us. They’re
strange, the way they keep on coming at you. We got on each side of
them. In the end, you should have seen the trucks that came to take the
bodies away. Stacked up.”
He paused and took a drag on his cigarette. “I wasn’t hurt
bad,” he continued. “I dislocated my shoulder when I had to jump over a
wall after one of them threw a grenade. Then they got me out of there. I
killed three of them. It’s not nice, you know. One of them was just a
kid of about 16. But you’ve got no choice.”
So what does an IS attack look like, I asked. Do they just come running headlong at you?
“They don’t run,” he replied, looking directly at me as if
to acknowledge the eeriness of the thing he was saying. “They walk,” he
said. “At a normal pace. Towards you. Like they’re not afraid. And you
have to shoot them before they shoot you.”
The fighting at Jeza’a was one of the most intense clashes
to have taken place between the Islamic State and the YPG. The battle
formed part of a broader IS-Kurdish war taking place along a contiguous
frontline stretching from Jalawla on the Iraq-Iran border all the way to
Jarabulus on the line separating Syria from Turkey.
At Jeza’a, the Islamic State was trying to close the
corridor that the YPG had opened in order to bring Yazidi refugees from
the Sinjar Mountains to safety at the Newroz refugee camp outside Derik.
The more than 100,000 refugees who made their way to Newroz are
exhausted and traumatized. The Islamic State considers the Yazidi to be
“devil worshippers” who are thus denied the few privileges afforded the
so-called people of the book, i.e., Christians and Jews. Yazidi women
were sent to the prisons of IS-controlled Mosul, where they were later
sold as slaves or forced to wed IS fighters.
Conditions at Newroz are primitive, but there is food and
shelter. Further east, in the Kurdish Regional Government area of
northern Iraq, the towns of Dohuk and Erbil are swollen with refugees
who fled Mosul and Sinjar. The Islamic State’s march toward the KRG
capital of Erbil was stopped only by the intervention of the United
States Air Force, and they know that any attempt to push forward would
result in their obliteration from the air. The KRG’s Peshmerga forces
are facing them in hastily assembled positions cut into the dirt. These
frontlines are for the moment strangely silent.
In Erbil and in Dohuk, the half-built structures that
until very recently were symbols of economic growth and expansion have
been converted into makeshift homes for refugee families from further
south. You see refugees everywhere. In the evenings the cities have a
teeming, crowded feel to them. But the foreigners who came with the oil
companies that moved in to do business when the KRG was the most stable
part of Iraq are mostly gone. The bars and restaurants that opened up to
cater to them are empty. On a Thursday evening in the Deutscher Hof
restaurant in Erbil, one of the few places that serves cold beer, only a
couple of British security contractors are at the bar. The Indian staff
tell me that a month ago, the place would have been packed at this
time.
A considerable portion of Erbil’s Kurdish population also
left when it looked likely that the Islamic State was on its way. Some
sources spoke of a departure of up to 30 percent of Erbil’s residents.
The Peshmerga, with the help of Iraqi special forces as well as U.S. air
support, have begun to push back against IS. The Mosul Dam, a highly
symbolic conquest for the IS, was retaken on August 21. Since then, IS
has lost ground in a number of other places. The Peshmerga are now in
the process of reconquering oil fields close to Mosul.
West of the Syria-Iraq border, meanwhile, the YPG is
continuing its own fight against the Islamic State. I visited the
frontline area at the Yarubiya border crossing. The YPG seized the
crossing in early August, and now controls both the Iraqi and Syrian
sides of it. IS still holds a neighborhood immediately adjoining the
crossing. Sniping from both sides and mortar fire are regular
occurrences. But the morale of the YPG seemed high. “They can’t shoot,” a
female fighter told me cheerfully after we sprinted across open ground
to a concealed position a few hundred yards from a mosque where the IS
sniper was operating.
Conversations with Kurdish officials indicate that they do
not consider the fight with IS in Iraq and Syria to be a battle for the
preservation of those two states. Rather, the Kurdish national agenda
is visible just barely below the surface. General Maghdid Haraki of the
Peshmerga, an effective-looking figure clearly influenced by American
military style, put it most bluntly when he told me, “We have a
different land, different language, different mentality. I don’t know
why the world won’t see this. They just see ‘Iraq.’ ”
A senior KRG official linked to the political leadership
was more circumspect. “Iraqi Kurds are today still part of Iraq,” he
said. “But if a sectarian civil war starts in Iraq, we want no part of
it. And if the mess continues in Iraq and Kurdish rights are not
granted, then what is the point of it? Anyway, Kurds, like any other
nation, have the right to determine their own future.”
Nonetheless, the fact is that the Kurds are not unified
and their divisions are not easily resolved. The central rift is between
the two rival pan-Kurdish movements. One is Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic party, which controls the KRG. The other is Abdullah
Ocalan’s PKK, listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist
organization for its three-decade-long campaign of violence against
Turkey.
Still, when it comes to Kurdish self-determination,
PKK-associated officials sound similar to General Haraki and his
colleagues. Nilufer Koc, of the PKK-associated Kurdistan National
Congress, told me in Erbil that “what’s needed is a referendum on
independence here in Iraqi Kurdistan. And when we clear the issue of the
referendum, if a new Iraqi government continues to reject Kurdish
rights, then the Kurds need to take what belongs to them.”
UNSAVORY BEDFELLOWS
Lee Smith
Last week, Senator Ted Cruz helped unmask an
organization ostensibly founded to protect a Middle East minority. When
the Texas legislator, the keynote speaker, asked the gala dinner
audience comprising mostly Middle Eastern Christians at the In Defense
of Christians conference in Washington to stand with Israel, many hooted
and booed him off the stage. The hostility came as no surprise to me:
When I found myself the night before in the same bar as a group of IDC
speakers and organizers—at the Four Seasons in Georgetown—I ordered a
bottle of champagne and had it sent to their table. Not long after, the
D.C. Metropolitan Police detained me and a friend for an hour.
Gilbert Chagoury in 2003
IDC’s
proclaimed purpose—to protect Christians in the face of a jihadist
onslaught led at present by ISIS—is of utmost importance. However, too
many of the priests, prelates, and patriarchs from Lebanon, Syria, and
Iraq, as well as one of the organization’s key benefactors,
Lebanese-Nigerian billionaire Gilbert Chagoury, have also identified
themselves as supporters of the Iranian axis in the Middle East. ISIS is
a murderous group, but so is the regime in Tehran and so are its
clients, chief among them Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah in
Lebanon.
ISIS, as the world now knows all too well, has used
beheadings, crucifixions, and all forms of murder and torture to
terrorize its opponents, who include Christians, Yazidis, Alawites,
Shiite Muslims, and Sunnis who don’t pledge fealty. But Assad’s record
in Syria is no better. Besides the gas attacks and indiscriminate
bombings that have killed tens of thousands of innocents, his security
forces have specialized in acts of vindictive sadism. Early in the
uprising, for instance, they mutilated the corpse of a 13-year-old boy
before returning the body to his parents.
And yet many of the clerics invited to speak at the IDC
conference are openly supportive of Assad. For instance, Maronite
patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai calls Assad a reformer. Maybe he took
that message to the White House when he met with Obama and Susan Rice
Thursday afternoon to ask for continued American support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces, even if its military intelligence unit is
controlled by Hezbollah. But whatever is wrong with Hezbollah or Assad,
many of the IDC clerics reason, at least they’re killing the Sunni
extremists who would kill them.
I referenced this conception of Assad’s role in the note I
sent along with the champagne: “Thanks IDC—and thanks Bashar al-Assad,
‘Protector of Christians’! XOXOXO.” I asked the waitress to deliver the
bottle directly to Chagoury, who according to leaked U.S. diplomatic
cables has supported Michel Aoun, Hezbollah’s key Christian ally in
Lebanon. A 2007 cable also explains that Chagoury is close to Suleiman
Franjieh Jr., another pillar of Lebanon’s pro-Damascus, pro-Hezbollah
March 8 political coalition and a man who calls Assad his friend and
brother. Former prime minister of Lebanon Fouad Siniora suggested to
then U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman “that the U.S. deliver
to Chagoury a stern message about the possibility of financial sanctions
and travel bans against those who undermine Lebanon’s legitimate
institutions.”
My friend noticed that the bottle was returned to the bar
unopened. So there would be no thanks, sarcastic or otherwise, or
insults. We left, disappointed, and got into a taxi. A policeman stopped
the cab and told us to get out. His partner pulled out the note and
asked if I’d written it. Of course, I said. The recipient, she
explained, perceived it as a threat.
This was now getting interesting. A man who was a
confidant of Sani Abacha, head of one of the bloodiest and most corrupt
regimes in modern African history, and friends with Lebanese warlords
like Nabih Berri thought that a note accompanying a bottle of champagne
was threatening.
They can’t take a joke at their expense because usually
they don’t have to, my friend said. With them it’s always the principle
of “Do you know who I am?” This is what happens when you mess with a
powerful man, one of the richest men in the world. However, my friend
continued, this is not Nigeria or Lebanon—there are no thugs and
militias waiting in the wings. This is the United States of America.
The police asked us to wait while they talked with
Chagoury and his party. He’s a big Clinton donor. Who knows? Maybe he
had lawyers calling in to the police. After about half an hour, someone
with the Chagoury gang walked out from the hotel lobby and circled
around to get a look at us. The guy looked just like Samir Kassir, a
Lebanese journalist I met once when I lived in Beirut. But then I
remembered it couldn’t be him: Kassir was on the other side. For
opposing the Assad/Hezbollah condominium over Lebanon supported by the
likes of Chagoury, Kassir was killed with a car bomb in 2005.
What happens under the hoods of Lebanese cars, what goes
on in Nigerian prisons, is the province of men like Chagoury and their
political patrons. This is the capital of the free world. After an hour,
too long by any reckoning, the cops sent us on our way, happy to be
reminded on the eve of 9/11 that as Americans we stand with our friends
around the region of all faiths, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim, who
believe in what we believe in and fight for what we too often take for
granted—the right to express oneself freely, the obligation to mock
those who stand with murderers.
ALLAH AND WOMAN AT YALE
Daniel Gelernter
Ayaan Hirsi Ali spoke at Yale last week, and there was mild annoyance in the press section that no screaming protesters appeared to punch up the headlines. A small group distributed leaflets to people waiting outside; inside, all was quiet.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali spoke at Yale last week, and there was mild annoyance in the press section that no screaming protesters appeared to punch up the headlines. A small group distributed leaflets to people waiting outside; inside, all was quiet.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali
The
lack of disturb-ance was in part thanks to good planning—every seat was
filled, but no standing room was allowed, and the aisles were kept
clear. In the main, there was no disturbance because Ayaan Hirsi Ali is
hugely admired. The hundred or more people who were turned away for lack
of seats, some clutching copies of Infidel, her autobiography,
had hoped only to listen respectfully (and perhaps collect an
autograph). A great international thug syndicate has told Hirsi Ali
that, if she keeps talking, she’s dead. And she keeps talking. That
alone should win the admiration of every American.
Perhaps another reason the anti-Hirsi Ali protest fizzled
is that its front-line soldiers at Yale made fools of themselves. Yale’s
Muslim Students Association (MSA) was widely condemned for an open
letter that argued against her appearance on campus, claiming she lacked
the credentials to speak about Islam. (Never mind that she was raised
Muslim and now has a fatwa out against her.) The letter
referred to her childhood experiences of genital mutilation and forced
marriage as “unfortunate circumstances.”
The MSA’s letter was cosigned by 35 student organizations. Except not really. On the morning of Hirsi Ali’s appearance, the Yale Daily News reported
that many student groups—including Yale Hillel, Yale Friends of Israel,
and the Women’s Leadership Initiative—had been listed as cosigners
without their permission.
The attempts over the last decade to silence Ayaan Hirsi
Ali range from death threats to polite suggestions that she be barred
from campuses. They have served only to heighten her stature—and Hirsi
Ali is already impressively tall. She has a stately bearing, dresses
quietly and tastefully. She speaks slowly, with a rich and robust
accent. And you’ll never see a less affected speaker at a podium.
She began by thanking Yale in contrast with Brandeis
University. The latter had, only a few months earlier, first offered and
then rescinded an honorary degree and an invitation to appear at their
commencement ceremony. Yale will probably get more credit than it
deserves for the comparison: It was not the university but William F.
Buckley, Jr. Program, a conservative undergraduate group, that invited
her to speak on campus. Perhaps Yale will follow through and do the
decent thing and award her a degree this spring term. That would mean
something. It would turn Yale into a bastion of freedom overnight, at a
time when American universities are threatening to become an elaborate,
extremely expensive practical joke.
Hirsi Ali was introduced by Harvey Goldblatt, a professor
of Slavic languages, who praised her courage and especially her work on
women’s rights, and reminded the audience that part of a serious
academic environment is listening to opposing viewpoints. That this
reminder should be deemed necessary on a university campus is striking,
but even more striking was the almost pleading tone. There was a hidden
acknowledgment of helplessness, like a Wild-West saloon owner sidling up
to the local outlaws and saying, “Please, y’all, we don’t want any
trouble here.”
The protesters who had warned against a rabble-rousing
speech to be delivered by an ideological firebrand must have been doubly
disappointed. Hirsi Ali is a gentle, thoughtful speaker. There were no
red-meat “applause lines”—though she did often get applause. Her thesis
was simple: Any attempt to deal with Islamic terrorism is doomed unless
we acknowledge its connection to Islam. Every religion has a “core,” and
the core of Islam is to submit to the will of Allah. (That is, in fact,
what the word “Islam” means—submission to God. Hence also the
title of Hirsi Ali’s film collaboration with Dutch director Theo van
Gogh criticizing the treatment of women in Islam. Van Gogh was
subsequently murdered by an Islamic extremist.)
She insisted that there are not, as some suggest,
“many Islams”—but there are several sets of Muslims: The first group
are radicals who want to force the entire world into Islam by
eradicating everything else. The second group, the vast majority, are in
a “state of cognitive dissonance”—torn between the strict teachings of
the first group and their own consciences, which revolt at the
terrorists’ behavior. The third group, perhaps the smallest, are
reforming Muslims, who suggest, for example, that mosque and state
should be separate. Members of the third group are excommunicated,
exiled, threatened, murdered.
Hirsi Ali associates the rise of Islamic terrorism with
the rise of the first group. This new order represents a striking change
from the attitudes she knew growing up. In her early childhood in
Somalia, the attitude had been lenient: You kept what rules you could.
“If you neglected your religious duties, you were left alone.” Then a
new figure appeared, “the preacher teacher.” Most often he’d been
trained in Saudi Arabia. He would insist not only that all laws be
followed to the seventh-century letter, but that friends and family who
didn’t meet standards be snitched on immediately. If they would not
reform, ties must be broken. Christians must be converted or else ties
broken. Jews must simply be destroyed.
Hirsi Ali places the students of the MSA squarely in group
two—Muslims who should resist the radicals, but often unthinkingly (or
fearfully) direct their attacks in the wrong direction. Islamophobia,
she says, is a disingenuous term. Of course there are bigots of every
sort—there always have been. But why shouldn’t we criticize Islam as we
would any other religion? If we refrain from criticizing Islam alone, that expresses fear of Islam. That is true Islamophobia.
She concluded with a challenge to the MSA: Who is doing
the real damage to the image of Islam? Should these students protest
against reforming Muslims, or should they rather protest Boko Haram’s
sandwiching a Koran between two AK-47s on their flag? The flag’s
inscription reads “There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his
messenger.” The Saudi Arabian flag has the same inscription underlined
with a sword—in both cases, an ordinary theological inscription turned
into a threat. So, she asks, “will you submit—passively or actively—or
will you finally stand up to Allah?” Will you let the preacher teachers
destroy your communities, or will you tell them to bugger off? It was an inspiring speech and I think it would have given the MSA food
for thought, if they’d been there. I hope they get their hands on a
transcript.
FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ISIS
Gertrude Himmelfarb
The war on terror is over, the president assured us a
year ago. Now, we are told, that war is very much with us and will be
pursued with all due diligence. The president was obviously responding
to the polls reflecting the disapproval of the public, but also to
critics in his own party. Dianne Feinstein, chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, sadly commented on his admission that he had “no
strategy yet”: “I think I’ve learned one thing about this president,
and that is: He’s very cautious—maybe in this instance too cautious.”
The execution of Robespierre
Two
centuries ago, in the midst of another “war on terror”—or so he thought
of it—Edmund Burke rebuked his prime minister for a similar failing. He
had admired William Pitt for his leadership in the war with France, but
now, out of excessive caution, Pitt was seeking peace with that
“regicide” regime. “There is a courageous wisdom,” Burke wrote in his
“Letters on a Regicide Peace,” but “there is also a false reptile
prudence, the result not of caution but of fear. Under misfortunes it
often happens that the nerves of the understanding are so relaxed, the
pressing peril of the hour so completely confounds all the faculties,
that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be justly
estimated, can be so much as fully seen.”
That misplaced caution, or false prudence, was all the
more serious in the case of a “great state” like England, which had to
behave in a manner commensurate with its power.
The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never universal. I do not deny that in small truckling states a timely compromise with power has often been the means, and the only means, of drawling out their puny existence; but a great state is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be secure, it must be respected. Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not to be begged. They must be commanded: and they who supplicate for mercy from others can never hope for justice through themselves.
It is an odd argument to come from Burke, and perhaps the
more telling for that. If there is any one political principle
associated with Burke, it is prudence. “Letters on a Regicide Peace” was
written in 1796. Five years earlier, in his “Appeal from the New to the
Old Whigs,” he had pronounced prudence the first of all virtues.
“Prudence is not only first in rank of the virtues, political and moral,
but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.” But
prudence was associated with a corollary principle, “circumstances,”
which determine what is wise and prudent in any particular situation. On
this occasion, in a war with an implacable enemy, a misplaced prudence
was not a virtue but a fatal flaw.
The war with France was such an occasion, Burke believed,
because France was the consummate enemy, the very embodiment of terror.
The idea of the “Reign of Terror” (la Grande Terreur) was not,
as some have suggested, the invention of disaffected emigrés or hostile
historians. “Terror” was the term the revolutionaries publicly and
proudly applied to themselves. In December 1793, with the executions
well under way (they amounted to 30,000 or more in a two-year period),
the “Constitution of the Terror” officially inaugurated the “Government
of the Terror.” Robespierre, the head of the Committee of Public Safety,
explained why terror was the necessary instrument of the revolution—the
“Republic of Virtue,” as he saw it. “If the spring of popular
government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government
in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without
which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror
is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible.”
(Robespierre was executed shortly after, one of the notable victims of
the Terror.)
Burke agreed with Robespierre about this, if about nothing
else: There was a necessary connection between the revolution and
terror, as there was between the Revolutionary Wars and terror. Burke’s
“Letters on a Regicide Peace” (like his Reflections on the Revolution in France)
may be accused of hyperbole. But if his account of the “scourge and
terror” of the Revolutionary Wars seems exaggerated, it is not at all
exaggerated applied to the current wars waged by the Islamic State.
Indeed, it is uncannily prescient. With only slight changes of wording,
we can adapt and update Burke’s tract. “Out of the tomb of the murdered
Monarchy in France [read: “Out of the womb of the murderous Islamic
State”] has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more
terrific guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination
and subdued the fortitude of man.” (One can also imagine the Islamic
State, as it imposes sharia law upon its terrain, assuming for itself the title of “Republic of Virtue.”)
It was not only a murderous war, Burke insisted, it was a “peculiar” war, and that made it all the more threatening.
We are in a war of a peculiar nature. It is not with an ordinary community, which is hostile or friendly as passion or as interest may veer about; not with a State which makes war through wantonness, and abandons it through lassitude. We are at war with a system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may best contribute to their subversion. It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war. It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm, in every country. To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil.
Burke’s words can be echoed almost exactly today, for it
is just such a peculiar war we are waging against just such a peculiar
enemy. The Islamic State is not an ordinary state with which we can
negotiate or compromise, not a “manageable problem” we can resolve
gradually and temperately, but an “armed doctrine,” a “system,” a
“faction of opinion,” which knows no compromise and cannot be managed.
With such an enemy, there cannot be a “red line” defining how far, and
no further, we may go; a “no troops on the ground” policy, limiting our
involvement in the war; an “end-of-war” strategy that prescribes at the
outset when and how the war will be terminated. On the contrary, a war
with such an enemy is a total war—and, Burke insisted, a “long war” (his italics). “I speak it emphatically, and with a desire that it should be marked, in a long
war; because, without such a war, no experience has yet told us, that a
dangerous power has ever been reduced to measure or to reason.” The
purpose of the war must be nothing less than to “destroy that enemy” or
it will “destroy all Europe,” and to do so “the force opposed to it
should be made to bear some analogy and resemblance to the force and
spirit which that system exerts.”
The pamphlet containing the two “Letters on a Regicide
Peace,” published in October 1796, was Burke’s last published work. He
died the following year. (Two other letters were published
posthumously.) He had described himself to a friend as “a dejected old
man, buried in an anticipated grave of a feeble old age, forgetting and
forgotten in an obscure and melancholy retreat.” The “Letters on a
Regicide Peace” gives no hint of that. It is as bold and vigorous as the
Reflections—and it was surprisingly popular, considering the
fact that Burke was urging upon England a long, dangerous, and costly
war. The mood of the American public today, to judge by the polls,
should be receptive to his message, understanding our war on terror as
he understood his, and willing to pursue it with the commitment and
energy it deserves.
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