A NEW AFGHANISTAN: FOUR MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT GHANI

Suba Chandran

Will the new political arrangement (President and a Chief Executive Officer) in Afghanistan work, and more importantly, deliver? Though it looks simple in paper, given the recent history between the two contenders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah – will the power-sharing deal help Afghanistan stabilise?

One Country, Two Executives

The understanding simply means that there would be two Executives for Afghanistan – the President (Ashraf Ghani) and a Chief Executive Officer (either Abdullah Abdullah, or someone nominated by him). It does solve the electoral dispute that had been raging between the two contenders and threatening to derail the political process. However, will the arrangement address the challenges facing Afghanistan?

The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.

Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.

The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq

The agreement is primarily due to the US’ pressure. And that poses the second challenge for the new Afghan arrangement. How seriously committed will the US be, once the new Afghan structure is in place? Undoubtedly, the multiple visits by the US Secretary of State John Kerry and his constant dialogue with both parties have ensured that the electoral process has not been completely wasted. Abdullah was ready to leave the process and pursue a different political path. Thanks to Kerry, the two contestants could be brought together.

Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s,  remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.

However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.

Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.

Advantage Taliban-Pakistan

The third major challenge would be the resurgence of the Taliban, and their supporters across the Durand Line. Despite multiple efforts, negotiations with the Taliban have not succeeded until today. Moving ahead, the reasons behind the failure would factor heavily in the new government.

There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.

The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.

It’s the Economy, Stupid

The economic situation and the human development indicators have been transformed dramatically over the last decade. There are more schools, roads, transmission lines etc., than has ever been in the history of Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is evolving slowly but steadily, as are the country’s government structures and non-governmental institutions.

Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.

Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president. 

PIRATES PREFER ENERGY CARGO

Vijay Sakhuja

Early this month, pirates released the hijacked MT Sunrise 689, a small product tanker bound for Vietnam which went missing soon after it left Singapore. During the captivity that lasted nearly six days, the pirates siphoned 2,000 of the total 5,200 metric tons of oil valued at $4 million. They also stole the personal belongings of the crew and threatened to kill if they did not follow orders – but assured them that their only aim was to steal the oil carried onboard the vessel.

This is the 12th incident of piracy in Southeast Asia involving small oil tankers. These vessels are easy targets because they are small, have smaller crews, move at slow speeds, and the low freeboard makes boarding comparatively easier and quicker.  Perhaps the most worrying aspect of these attacks is that pirates in Southeast Asia have taken a liking for small product tankers carrying diesel that is sold to prospective customers, who re-sell for anywhere between $400 and $650 per ton in the black market. 

These pirates or robbers are popularly referred to as ‘Petro Pirates’ and are believed to be part of transnational organised crime groups who own small tankers and are networked with the oil smuggling mafia. Furthermore, these Petro Pirates appear to only steal cargo and not harm the crew. For instance, in June 2014, pirates hijacked Orapin 4, a Thai oil tanker, with its cargo of oil worth nearly $2.2 million; they stole the oil, did not hurt the crew, but robbed them of watches, cell phones, money and other valuables. Similarly, in April 2014, pirates raided a tanker off the coast of Malaysia and stole 3 million liters of diesel. In fact the business model of Petro Pirates’ does not appear to include ransoms.  

Interestingly, a similar story is being played out along the west coast of Africa but on a larger scale. Early this year, MT Kerala, a 75,000 ton tanker carrying diesel was hijacked by Nigerian pirates off the Angolan coast. The vessel was released after being siphoned of 12,270 tons of its diesel cargo. The pirates took the usual precautions of disabling the Automatic Identification System, switching off communications, and repainting the name of the vessel.  

The International Maritime Bureau’s half year report for January to June 2014 recorded 23 incidents off the west coast of Africa, and Nigerian waters has witnessed 10 such attacks. These trends are a continuation of the past reports and the UK Chamber of Shipping records state that acts of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea are worrisome – 62 attacks in 2012; 51 in 2013. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 19 per cent of all maritime attacks worldwide.  Significantly, the Gulf of Guinea is believed to be a greater threat to shipping than Somalia because of its flourishing oil and gas industry which attracts shipping, unlike Somalia, where pirates preyed on targets of opportunity along the busy sea route. 

The West African piracy is driven by a commodity – oil – which is available in abundance. For instance, Nigeria is an oil-rich country and produces nearly 2 million barrels of oil per day. However, it has limited refining capacity resulting in both export of crude and import of refined oil thus generating sufficient maritime traffic for pirates to feed on. 

Unlike Nigeria, Singapore does not produce any oil but is the hub of the Asian petrochemicals industry with a sophisticated refining, storage, and distribution infrastructure, and therefore attracts significant tanker traffic. A variety of large and small vessels carrying oil and gas make port calls to deliver crude or carry refined products to regional and global markets. According to the US Energy Information Agency, the petrochemical industry is the backbone of Singapore's economy and it has a refining capacity of nearly 1.4 million barrels of oil per day. 

The aforementioned incidents along the west coast of Africa and in Southeast Asian waters offer an interesting feature. The business model of piracy in both cases involves hijacking vessels for the cargo carried onboard, and in particular, the refined energy products such as diesel. It is plausible that pirates in Southeast Asia may have borrowed the idea from West Africa – who appear to have become more sophisticated and have graduated to hijacking bigger ships. 

In essence, the pirates may not have changed their Modus Operandi of attacking both small and big ships; instead they have become cargo/commodity conscious and believe that stealing refined energy products is more lucrative than waiting for ransoms. However, it is useful to mention that the stolen oil or other products are carried in smaller vessels that are equally vulnerable to interception by security forces.

"CHINA THREAT" IN SOUTH ASIA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA.

 Siwei Liu

President Xi Jinping’s six-day South Asian trip is over. Apart from a series of bilateral agreements, friendly high-level dialogues and other interactions, the trip also demonstrated the direction of China’s South Asian policy. Indeed, with growing bilateral and multilateral interactions with South Asia, China is looking for a more flexible and comprehensive policy to accommodate the present situation, and to some extent, respond to the related arguments of China as a threat in the region.

Admittedly, one of the challenges for China’s current South Asian policy is how to address doubts about the motivations for China’s foreign policy in the region, in particular, India’s worries about the “China threat.” China has repeatedly stated that it is keen on promoting peaceful development and cooperation toward win-win outcomes and cooperate with India towards regional prosperity, but in some Indian assessments, China’s rising profile in South Asia is not good news. For example, an Indian analyst argues that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a ‘string of pearls’ that could eventually undermine India pre-eminence and potentially become an economic and security threat.
Obviously, Xi’s visits in September not only tried to confirm that Beijing is putting greater emphasis on this region, but also demonstrate that it want to address its neighbours’ “China threat” perception. For this, the Chinese leader presented Beijing current South Asian policy with some new characteristics.

First, Xi emphasised common regional development. In his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, he said, “A South Asia that enjoys peace, stability, development and prosperity serves the interests of countries and people in the region and of China as well. China wants to live in harmony with all countries in the region and contribute its share to the development of the region. ” Xi not only suggested that China should work with the relevant countries to step up economic integration and connectivity in the region but also proposed that they come together to join the “Belt” and “Road” initiatives that aim at strengthening connectivity among countries along the traditional land and maritime silk roads.

Second, Xi emphasised multi-dimensional cooperation with South Asian partners. For economic cooperation, in the next five years, China plans to work with South Asian countries to increase bilateral trade to US$150 billion, its investments in South Asia to US$30 billion, and provide US$20 billion in concessional facilities to the region. It needs to be mentioned that Beijing also focuses on other modes of cooperation and interaction with South Asia. China is concentrating its efforts on expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges with South Asia. It plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities for 5,000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5,000 youth, and train 5,000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. In addition, China will work with South Asian countries to implement the China-South Asia Partnership Initiative for Science and Technology, give full play to the role of the China-South Asia Expo, and build new platforms for mutually beneficial cooperation.
There is no denying that during his trip, President Xi reaffirmed China’s good neighbourly foreign policy and made efforts to deepen strategic relations at the multilateral and bilateral levels, which is a timely move. It reflects what President  Xi described: “the principles of China's neighbour diplomacy as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.” However, a one-time diplomatic trip may not be enough to address all the concerns and issues.
Although Xi’s South Asian trip opened a new door for China-South Asia relations, it is necessary for China to understand that challenges and problems still exist. In the future, China needs to undertake more dialogues and interactions both through the official and civilian channels with South Asia, in particular, India. As the two biggest powers in the region, China and India should both be positive and see the multiple levels of potential interaction in the future, and join hands in cooperation. It will benefit this region and the rest of Asia as well. In addition, China also should be aware of other challenges it might face such as how to deal with South Asia’s complicated regional relations, in particular, India-Pakistan relations, which needs China’s smart and cautious diplomacy. Other issues like Afghanistan’s stability and development, especially after 2014, will also test Chinese political and diplomatic wisdom. Just as some analysts say, China should realize that instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into other parts of South Asia and could possible threaten China.

INDIA-PAKISTAN: WORKING BOUNDARIES AND LINES OF UNCONTROLLED FIRE

Salma Malik


After a much-deliberated stalemate, Afghanistan finally had a new democratic government with a power-sharing
arrangement. The signing of the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) provides a false sense of security to many who felt that the US military must not
pull out completely as the perceived regional proxies would turn Afghanistan into a complete proxy battlefield.
Though Pakistan has time and again reiterated its policy of non-interference and non-intervention in Afghan internal affairs, the same cannot be said about other regional actors. That will add to complicating the bilateral equation further. Another moot point is the Durand line, which always carries the potential to ignite
fiery exchanges of passionate and politically loaded rhetorics and on rare instances, exchange of firepower.
However, the more volatile of the “unofficial” boundaries has been the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary on the eastern border, which has over the years, successfully become a testing field of India-
Pakistan relations. Like any and all bilateral
arrangements between the two neighbors, the 2003 ceasefire agreement regarding the LoC has also been blatantly violated in the past several years. With both elected governments in Pakistan and India being driven by economics, the general perception was that even if there is no substantial progress on the bigger problem areas, at least both administrations will
try and maintain congenial relations and move towards progressive engagement. However the first sign of trouble was the calling-off of the Augus 2014 foreign
secretary level talks after Pakistan’s high commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri leadership. Interestingly, anyone familiar with the New Delhi diplomatic setup and the grand receptions held would
actually find a much greater number and variety of Kashmiri leadership in attendance, brushing shoulders
with all and sundry. Sensitivities aside, if seriously committed to the process, a better approach could have been registering a
well-worded protest and allowing the talks to proceed as per schedule. However, several times in the past too, much investment has been made in holding a meeting than making it meaningful. What if the meeting had proceeded as per schedule? There is little doubt that
nothing substantial would have resulted from the parleys. Despite a much clearer vision regarding what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants regarding
internal growth and development and a foreign policy to match with it, there was a somewhat vague gesturing vis-à-vis relations with Islamabad. Although, during his election campaigning Modi and his party had been vocally very anti-Pakistani, yet the very brief period of positive overturing soon after elections, gave space for optimism that perhaps things might be on the mend.The recent round of cross-LoC fire resulting in substantial infrastructural damage as well as heavy civilian fatalities on either sides of the LoC and working
boundary, has again brought out media histrionics seeking death to Pakistan and dealing the enemy (Islamabad) a crushing decisive blow. Where on one hand it makes the Modi government’s policy towards its
neighbor clear, it also retards the process (whatever it may be) substantially.
A recent statement by the new-kid-on-the-block, Bilawal Bhutto, regarding wresting the entire Kashmir from India got a knee-jerk reaction from across the border. Interestingly, one set of replies was hacking of the Pakistan Peoples Party web site by an Indian group which posted propaganda stuff with inflammatory statements. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too,
much to New Delhi’s displeasure highlighted the plight of Kashmiris at the recently concluded UNGA session in New York. Immediately, conspiracy theorists hinted at a silent pledge between Sharif and Modi regarding silence over the K-word.
However, what has intentionally been forgotten in this entire conflict narrative is the plight of flood-affected Kashmiri population, which has suffered loss of lives and livelihood.
Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations. Sooner or later the guns will fall silent, after claiming many lives both civilian and
military, with unpleasant words exchanged and angry gesturing at the political level. In the worse-case scenario, it may require a higher level of deployment, but that is highly unlikely. What it will claim in its wake is a chunk of peace, and a window of opportunity to act wisely by either side and discuss the problem, rather than indulging in blind rage and provocative statements.
Although New Delhi does not accord the same status to UNMOGIP than Pakistan, the latter’s proposal of making this office more proactive may not be a bad idea.
Apparently, sticking to bilateralism and seeking a third party’s role behind the curtains which results in crisis stability has become a norm for the two neighbors. The
current crossfire, while may apparently look like a good marketing strategy – with Modi allegedly approving an all-out assault – will further fracture the already fragile
base on which “conditional” peace stands. If either side is genuinely interested in peace, there is a need for reviewing both policies and postures.

A NUCLEAR BONUS TO COOPERATE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE?

Majid Izadpanahi


Since the 1979 revolution, the Iran has accused the US interference in the West Asia as the root of regional instability. But there are cases when Tehran has cooperated with Washington when their interests coincided.
The Islamic State (IS) has ambitious political, economic, military and ideological plans, and continues to occupy territories and seeks recognition. The IS has captured
oil-rich areas in Iraq and Syria and is smuggling oil via Turkey. It has beheaded journalists, has inflicted heavy casualties and human tragedies in Iraq and Syria’s
Kurdish areas. The IS has become the richest and most powerful terrorist group ever, and now is marching towards Baghdad.
Today, the IS is considered a national security threat both by Iran and the US. Its movement towards the southern Iraqi cities of Samarra, Najaf and Karbala is Iran’s red line. Also, its anti-Shia policy and its military operation near Iran’s border directly threaten Iran. The US considers the IS as a threat to its citizens, and especially its approach and plan to seize Iraq’s oil rich
areas in the south, as dangerous. Iran and the US have a history of cooperation in tackling common enemies. First, it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and second, Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Iran fully supported the US attack on the
Taliban regime in 2001, and collaborated to establish political order in Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference. But immediately after that, the then US
President George Bush labelled Iran as “Axis of Evil” shocking Tehran and embittering the bilateral. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran once again
supported the US led coalition and provided them with intelligence inputs. Subsequently, however, the “all options are on the table” and “the regime change”
option had extremely adverse impacts on the reformists’ bid to improve relations with Washington.
Today, once again, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and US over Iraq. The IS is marching towards Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan, and southern Iraq, threatening Shia-majority areas and the oil-rich Kurdish
regions of the country. An overthrow of the central government in Baghdad is neither Iran’s interest nor the US’.
At present, Iran supports all groups involved in fighting the IS inside Iraq and Syria. Iran provides military advice to the Iraqi government, has military cooperation
with the Kurds and covers the news of the developments in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in his recent visit
to Iraq, reflected Iran’s approach towards Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government by conveying Tehran’s support to him. By visiting President Masoud
Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan, he proved Iran’s support to them by providing arms, ammunitions and intelligence.
The US also gives moral, material and logistical support to the Iraqi government to keep the IS out of Iraq. Therefore, given how Iran and the US are trying to
eliminate the same enemy, it is pragmatic for the two to come closer. However, there are several reasons for Iran preference to fight the IS alone instead of joining the
US-led coalition. To begin with, Iran was not invited for the Paris Conference, organised to create a coalition West Asian countries – that included a number of corrupt regimes – to defeat the IS. Saudi Arabia is accused of supporting the IS and other terrorist groups
such as the Taliban. Turkey helps the IS in selling oil – the latter’s main source of income – via plastic pipelines and other routes. Iranian officials denounce this conference as a farce and state that they would rather fight the IS alone.
Despite not being invited to the Paris Conference, US leaders have admitted to the importance of Iran in eliminating the IS. On August 21, Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department, Marie Harf, stated, “there is a
positive role Iran can play.”
At home, in Iran, after three decades of chanting anti- American slogan, distrusting the US and being accused of sponsoring terrorism and building nuclear weapons
by the US, incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration is being pressured by the conservatives to continue the war alone. Building the Iraqi army, supporting the government of
Iraq, supporting the integrity of Iraq, Iraq’s stability and security and eliminating the IS are goals both Iran and the US are attempting to achieve. Iran supports US air
strikes on the IS because it can help the cause: defeating a very dangerous enemy in Tehran’s neighbourhood.
Destroying the same enemy still could not form a coalition that includes both Iran and the US. Iran is now more conscious of its actions and foreign policy because it still remembers that after its unconditional
cooperation with the US in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, not only they did not get the results they expected but their overtures too were rejected; and the
reformists and moderates were defeated in the subsequent presidential election.
Despite the fact that the US’ elimination of the IS serves Iranian interests, it seems that the Iranian government now wants a nuclear bonus in return for coalition in order to reduce the conservatives’ pressure.

AT THE KURDISTAN FRONT

Jonathan Spyer


A war is being waged along a 900-mile front between two entities that today constitute de facto quasi-states stretching across the old border between Syria and Iraq. These are the Islamic State to the south and a contiguous area of Kurdish-controlled territory to the north. Recently, I traveled to the latter, in regions of northern Iraq and northeast Syria, like the town of Derik, where I spoke with a Kurdish soldier who had recently been in a firefight with IS forces in the neighboring village of Jeza’a.

A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter on the front lines near Erbil, September 10

“We were fighting for 17 hours,” said the Kurd. He was with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), affiliated with the PYD, the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Worker’s party, or PKK. “There must have been about 500 of them,” he said of the IS militants. “Only about 90 of us. They’re strange, the way they keep on coming at you. We got on each side of them. In the end, you should have seen the trucks that came to take the bodies away. Stacked up.” 

He paused and took a drag on his cigarette. “I wasn’t hurt bad,” he continued. “I dislocated my shoulder when I had to jump over a wall after one of them threw a grenade. Then they got me out of there. I killed three of them. It’s not nice, you know. One of them was just a kid of about 16. But you’ve got no choice.”

So what does an IS attack look like, I asked. Do they just come running headlong at you? 

“They don’t run,” he replied, looking directly at me as if to acknowledge the eeriness of the thing he was saying. “They walk,” he said. “At a normal pace. Towards you. Like they’re not afraid. And you have to shoot them before they shoot you.”

The fighting at Jeza’a was one of the most intense clashes to have taken place between the Islamic State and the YPG. The battle formed part of a broader IS-Kurdish war taking place along a contiguous frontline stretching from Jalawla on the Iraq-Iran border all the way to Jarabulus on the line separating Syria from Turkey.

At Jeza’a, the Islamic State was trying to close the corridor that the YPG had opened in order to bring Yazidi refugees from the Sinjar Mountains to safety at the Newroz refugee camp outside Derik. The more than 100,000 refugees who made their way to Newroz are exhausted and traumatized. The Islamic State considers the Yazidi to be “devil worshippers” who are thus denied the few privileges afforded the so-called people of the book, i.e., Christians and Jews. Yazidi women were sent to the prisons of IS-controlled Mosul, where they were later sold as slaves or forced to wed IS fighters.

Conditions at Newroz are primitive, but there is food and shelter. Further east, in the Kurdish Regional Government area of northern Iraq, the towns of Dohuk and Erbil are swollen with refugees who fled Mosul and Sinjar. The Islamic State’s march toward the KRG capital of Erbil was stopped only by the intervention of the United States Air Force, and they know that any attempt to push forward would result in their obliteration from the air. The KRG’s Peshmerga forces are facing them in hastily assembled positions cut into the dirt. These frontlines are for the moment strangely silent.

In Erbil and in Dohuk, the half-built structures that until very recently were symbols of economic growth and expansion have been converted into makeshift homes for refugee families from further south. You see refugees everywhere. In the evenings the cities have a teeming, crowded feel to them. But the foreigners who came with the oil companies that moved in to do business when the KRG was the most stable part of Iraq are mostly gone. The bars and restaurants that opened up to cater to them are empty. On a Thursday evening in the Deutscher Hof restaurant in Erbil, one of the few places that serves cold beer, only a couple of British security contractors are at the bar. The Indian staff tell me that a month ago, the place would have been packed at this time.

A considerable portion of Erbil’s Kurdish population also left when it looked likely that the Islamic State was on its way. Some sources spoke of a departure of up to 30 percent of Erbil’s residents. The Peshmerga, with the help of Iraqi special forces as well as U.S. air support, have begun to push back against IS. The Mosul Dam, a highly symbolic conquest for the IS, was retaken on August 21. Since then, IS has lost ground in a number of other places. The Peshmerga are now in the process of reconquering oil fields close to Mosul.

West of the Syria-Iraq border, meanwhile, the YPG is continuing its own fight against the Islamic State. I visited the frontline area at the Yarubiya border crossing. The YPG seized the crossing in early August, and now controls both the Iraqi and Syrian sides of it. IS still holds a neighborhood immediately adjoining the crossing. Sniping from both sides and mortar fire are regular occurrences. But the morale of the YPG seemed high. “They can’t shoot,” a female fighter told me cheerfully after we sprinted across open ground to a concealed position a few hundred yards from a mosque where the IS sniper was operating.

Conversations with Kurdish officials indicate that they do not consider the fight with IS in Iraq and Syria to be a battle for the preservation of those two states. Rather, the Kurdish national agenda is visible just barely below the surface. General Maghdid Haraki of the Peshmerga, an effective-looking figure clearly influenced by American military style, put it most bluntly when he told me, “We have a different land, different language, different mentality. I don’t know why the world won’t see this. They just see ‘Iraq.’ ”

A senior KRG official linked to the political leadership was more circumspect. “Iraqi Kurds are today still part of Iraq,” he said. “But if a sectarian civil war starts in Iraq, we want no part of it. And if the mess continues in Iraq and Kurdish rights are not granted, then what is the point of it? Anyway, Kurds, like any other nation, have the right to determine their own future.”

Nonetheless, the fact is that the Kurds are not unified and their divisions are not easily resolved. The central rift is between the two rival pan-Kurdish movements. One is Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic party, which controls the KRG. The other is Abdullah Ocalan’s PKK, listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization for its three-decade-long campaign of violence against Turkey.

Still, when it comes to Kurdish self-determination, PKK-associated officials sound similar to General Haraki and his colleagues. Nilufer Koc, of the PKK-associated Kurdistan National Congress, told me in Erbil that “what’s needed is a referendum on independence here in Iraqi Kurdistan. And when we clear the issue of the referendum, if a new Iraqi government continues to reject Kurdish rights, then the Kurds need to take what belongs to them.”

UNSAVORY BEDFELLOWS

Lee Smith

Last week, Senator Ted Cruz helped unmask an organization ostensibly founded to protect a Middle East minority. When the Texas legislator, the keynote speaker, asked the gala dinner audience comprising mostly Middle Eastern Christians at the In Defense of Christians conference in Washington to stand with Israel, many hooted and booed him off the stage. The hostility came as no surprise to me: When I found myself the night before in the same bar as a group of IDC speakers and organizers—at the Four Seasons in Georgetown—I ordered a bottle of champagne and had it sent to their table. Not long after, the D.C. Metropolitan Police detained me and a friend for an hour.

Gilbert Chagoury in 2003

IDC’s proclaimed purpose—to protect Christians in the face of a jihadist onslaught led at present by ISIS—is of utmost importance. However, too many of the priests, prelates, and patriarchs from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, as well as one of the organization’s key benefactors, Lebanese-Nigerian billionaire Gilbert Chagoury, have also identified themselves as supporters of the Iranian axis in the Middle East. ISIS is a murderous group, but so is the regime in Tehran and so are its clients, chief among them Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

ISIS, as the world now knows all too well, has used beheadings, crucifixions, and all forms of murder and torture to terrorize its opponents, who include Christians, Yazidis, Alawites, Shiite Muslims, and Sunnis who don’t pledge fealty. But Assad’s record in Syria is no better. Besides the gas attacks and indiscriminate bombings that have killed tens of thousands of innocents, his security forces have specialized in acts of vindictive sadism. Early in the uprising, for instance, they mutilated the corpse of a 13-year-old boy before returning the body to his parents.

And yet many of the clerics invited to speak at the IDC conference are openly supportive of Assad. For instance, Maronite patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai calls Assad a reformer. Maybe he took that message to the White House when he met with Obama and Susan Rice Thursday afternoon to ask for continued American support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, even if its military intelligence unit is controlled by Hezbollah. But whatever is wrong with Hezbollah or Assad, many of the IDC clerics reason, at least they’re killing the Sunni extremists who would kill them.

I referenced this conception of Assad’s role in the note I sent along with the champagne: “Thanks IDC—and thanks Bashar al-Assad, ‘Protector of Christians’! XOXOXO.” I asked the waitress to deliver the bottle directly to Chagoury, who according to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables has supported Michel Aoun, Hezbollah’s key Christian ally in Lebanon. A 2007 cable also explains that Chagoury is close to Suleiman Franjieh Jr., another pillar of Lebanon’s pro-Damascus, pro-Hezbollah March 8 political coalition and a man who calls Assad his friend and brother. Former prime minister of Lebanon Fouad Siniora suggested to then U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman “that the U.S. deliver to Chagoury a stern message about the possibility of financial sanctions and travel bans against those who undermine Lebanon’s legitimate institutions.”

My friend noticed that the bottle was returned to the bar unopened. So there would be no thanks, sarcastic or otherwise, or insults. We left, disappointed, and got into a taxi. A policeman stopped the cab and told us to get out. His partner pulled out the note and asked if I’d written it. Of course, I said. The recipient, she explained, perceived it as a threat.

This was now getting interesting. A man who was a confidant of Sani Abacha, head of one of the bloodiest and most corrupt regimes in modern African history, and friends with Lebanese warlords like Nabih Berri thought that a note accompanying a bottle of champagne was threatening.

They can’t take a joke at their expense because usually they don’t have to, my friend said. With them it’s always the principle of “Do you know who I am?” This is what happens when you mess with a powerful man, one of the richest men in the world. However, my friend continued, this is not Nigeria or Lebanon—there are no thugs and militias waiting in the wings. This is the United States of America.

The police asked us to wait while they talked with Chagoury and his party. He’s a big Clinton donor. Who knows? Maybe he had lawyers calling in to the police. After about half an hour, someone with the Chagoury gang walked out from the hotel lobby and circled around to get a look at us. The guy looked just like Samir Kassir, a Lebanese journalist I met once when I lived in Beirut. But then I remembered it couldn’t be him: Kassir was on the other side. For opposing the Assad/Hezbollah condominium over Lebanon supported by the likes of Chagoury, Kassir was killed with a car bomb in 2005.

What happens under the hoods of Lebanese cars, what goes on in Nigerian prisons, is the province of men like Chagoury and their political patrons. This is the capital of the free world. After an hour, too long by any reckoning, the cops sent us on our way, happy to be reminded on the eve of 9/11 that as Americans we stand with our friends around the region of all faiths, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim, who believe in what we believe in and fight for what we too often take for granted—the right to express oneself freely, the obligation to mock those who stand with murderers.

ALLAH AND WOMAN AT YALE

Daniel Gelernter


Ayaan Hirsi Ali spoke at Yale last week, and there was mild annoyance in the press section that no screaming protesters appeared to punch up the headlines. A small group distributed leaflets to people waiting outside; inside, all was quiet.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali

The lack of disturb-ance was in part thanks to good planning—every seat was filled, but no standing room was allowed, and the aisles were kept clear. In the main, there was no disturbance because Ayaan Hirsi Ali is hugely admired. The hundred or more people who were turned away for lack of seats, some clutching copies of Infidel, her autobiography, had hoped only to listen respectfully (and perhaps collect an autograph). A great international thug syndicate has told Hirsi Ali that, if she keeps talking, she’s dead. And she keeps talking. That alone should win the admiration of every American.

Perhaps another reason the anti-Hirsi Ali protest fizzled is that its front-line soldiers at Yale made fools of themselves. Yale’s Muslim Students Association (MSA) was widely condemned for an open letter that argued against her appearance on campus, claiming she lacked the credentials to speak about Islam. (Never mind that she was raised Muslim and now has a fatwa out against her.) The letter referred to her childhood experiences of genital mutilation and forced marriage as “unfortunate circumstances.”

The MSA’s letter was cosigned by 35 student organizations. Except not really. On the morning of Hirsi Ali’s appearance, the Yale Daily News reported that many student groups—including Yale Hillel, Yale Friends of Israel, and the Women’s Leadership Initiative—had been listed as cosigners without their permission.

The attempts over the last decade to silence Ayaan Hirsi Ali range from death threats to polite suggestions that she be barred from campuses. They have served only to heighten her stature—and Hirsi Ali is already impressively tall. She has a stately bearing, dresses quietly and tastefully. She speaks slowly, with a rich and robust accent. And you’ll never see a less affected speaker at a podium.

She began by thanking Yale in contrast with Brandeis University. The latter had, only a few months earlier, first offered and then rescinded an honorary degree and an invitation to appear at their commencement ceremony. Yale will probably get more credit than it deserves for the comparison: It was not the university but William F. Buckley, Jr. Program, a conservative undergraduate group, that invited her to speak on campus. Perhaps Yale will follow through and do the decent thing and award her a degree this spring term. That would mean something. It would turn Yale into a bastion of freedom overnight, at a time when American universities are threatening to become an elaborate, extremely expensive practical joke.

Hirsi Ali was introduced by Harvey Goldblatt, a professor of Slavic languages, who praised her courage and especially her work on women’s rights, and reminded the audience that part of a serious academic environment is listening to opposing viewpoints. That this reminder should be deemed necessary on a university campus is striking, but even more striking was the almost pleading tone. There was a hidden acknowledgment of helplessness, like a Wild-West saloon owner sidling up to the local outlaws and saying, “Please, y’all, we don’t want any trouble here.”

The protesters who had warned against a rabble-rousing speech to be delivered by an ideological firebrand must have been doubly disappointed. Hirsi Ali is a gentle, thoughtful speaker. There were no red-meat “applause lines”—though she did often get applause. Her thesis was simple: Any attempt to deal with Islamic terrorism is doomed unless we acknowledge its connection to Islam. Every religion has a “core,” and the core of Islam is to submit to the will of Allah. (That is, in fact, what the word “Islam” means—submission to God. Hence also the title of Hirsi Ali’s film collaboration with Dutch director Theo van Gogh criticizing the treatment of women in Islam. Van Gogh was subsequently murdered by an Islamic extremist.)

She insisted that there are not, as some suggest, “many Islams”—but there are several sets of Muslims: The first group are radicals who want to force the entire world into Islam by eradicating everything else. The second group, the vast majority, are in a “state of cognitive dissonance”—torn between the strict teachings of the first group and their own consciences, which revolt at the terrorists’ behavior. The third group, perhaps the smallest, are reforming Muslims, who suggest, for example, that mosque and state should be separate. Members of the third group are excommunicated, exiled, threatened, murdered.

Hirsi Ali associates the rise of Islamic terrorism with the rise of the first group. This new order represents a striking change from the attitudes she knew growing up. In her early childhood in Somalia, the attitude had been lenient: You kept what rules you could. “If you neglected your religious duties, you were left alone.” Then a new figure appeared, “the preacher teacher.” Most often he’d been trained in Saudi Arabia. He would insist not only that all laws be followed to the seventh-century letter, but that friends and family who didn’t meet standards be snitched on immediately. If they would not reform, ties must be broken. Christians must be converted or else ties broken. Jews must simply be destroyed.

Hirsi Ali places the students of the MSA squarely in group two—Muslims who should resist the radicals, but often unthinkingly (or fearfully) direct their attacks in the wrong direction. Islamophobia, she says, is a disingenuous term. Of course there are bigots of every sort—there always have been. But why shouldn’t we criticize Islam as we would any other religion? If we refrain from criticizing Islam alone, that expresses fear of Islam. That is true Islamophobia.

She concluded with a challenge to the MSA: Who is doing the real damage to the image of Islam? Should these students protest against reforming Muslims, or should they rather protest Boko Haram’s sandwiching a Koran between two AK-47s on their flag? The flag’s inscription reads “There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger.” The Saudi Arabian flag has the same inscription underlined with a sword—in both cases, an ordinary theological inscription turned into a threat. So, she asks, “will you submit—passively or actively—or will you finally stand up to Allah?” Will you let the preacher teachers destroy your communities, or will you tell them to bugger off? It was an inspiring speech and I think it would have given the MSA food for thought, if they’d been there. I hope they get their hands on a transcript.

FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ISIS

Gertrude Himmelfarb

The war on terror is over, the president assured us a year ago. Now, we are told, that war is very much with us and will be pursued with all due diligence. The president was obviously responding to the polls reflecting the disapproval of the public, but also to critics in his own party. Dianne Feinstein, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, sadly commented on his admission that he had “no strategy yet”: “I think I’ve learned one thing about this president, and that is: He’s very cautious—maybe in this instance too cautious.”

The execution of Robespierre

Two centuries ago, in the midst of another “war on terror”—or so he thought of it—Edmund Burke rebuked his prime minister for a similar failing. He had admired William Pitt for his leadership in the war with France, but now, out of excessive caution, Pitt was seeking peace with that “regicide” regime. “There is a courageous wisdom,” Burke wrote in his “Letters on a Regicide Peace,” but “there is also a false reptile prudence, the result not of caution but of fear. Under misfortunes it often happens that the nerves of the understanding are so relaxed, the pressing peril of the hour so completely confounds all the faculties, that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be justly estimated, can be so much as fully seen.”

That misplaced caution, or false prudence, was all the more serious in the case of a “great state” like England, which had to behave in a manner commensurate with its power.

The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never universal. I do not deny that in small truckling states a timely compromise with power has often been the means, and the only means, of drawling out their puny existence; but a great state is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be secure, it must be respected. Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not to be begged. They must be commanded: and they who supplicate for mercy from others can never hope for justice through themselves.

It is an odd argument to come from Burke, and perhaps the more telling for that. If there is any one political principle associated with Burke, it is prudence. “Letters on a Regicide Peace” was written in 1796. Five years earlier, in his “Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,” he had pronounced prudence the first of all virtues. “Prudence is not only first in rank of the virtues, political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.” But prudence was associated with a corollary principle, “circumstances,” which determine what is wise and prudent in any particular situation. On this occasion, in a war with an implacable enemy, a misplaced prudence was not a virtue but a fatal flaw.

The war with France was such an occasion, Burke believed, because France was the consummate enemy, the very embodiment of terror. The idea of the “Reign of Terror” (la Grande Terreur) was not, as some have suggested, the invention of disaffected emigrés or hostile historians. “Terror” was the term the revolutionaries publicly and proudly applied to themselves. In December 1793, with the executions well under way (they amounted to 30,000 or more in a two-year period), the “Constitution of the Terror” officially inaugurated the “Government of the Terror.” Robespierre, the head of the Committee of Public Safety, explained why terror was the necessary instrument of the revolution—the “Republic of Virtue,” as he saw it. “If the spring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible.” (Robespierre was executed shortly after, one of the notable victims of the Terror.)

Burke agreed with Robespierre about this, if about nothing else: There was a necessary connection between the revolution and terror, as there was between the Revolutionary Wars and terror. Burke’s “Letters on a Regicide Peace” (like his Reflections on the Revolution in France) may be accused of hyperbole. But if his account of the “scourge and terror” of the Revolutionary Wars seems exaggerated, it is not at all exaggerated applied to the current wars waged by the Islamic State. Indeed, it is uncannily prescient. With only slight changes of wording, we can adapt and update Burke’s tract. “Out of the tomb of the murdered Monarchy in France [read: “Out of the womb of the murderous Islamic State”] has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrific guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination and subdued the fortitude of man.” (One can also imagine the Islamic State, as it imposes sharia law upon its terrain, assuming for itself the title of “Republic of Virtue.”)

It was not only a murderous war, Burke insisted, it was a “peculiar” war, and that made it all the more threatening.

We are in a war of a peculiar nature. It is not with an ordinary community, which is hostile or friendly as passion or as interest may veer about; not with a State which makes war through wantonness, and abandons it through lassitude. We are at war with a system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may best contribute to their subversion. It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war. It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm, in every country. To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil.

Burke’s words can be echoed almost exactly today, for it is just such a peculiar war we are waging against just such a peculiar enemy. The Islamic State is not an ordinary state with which we can negotiate or compromise, not a “manageable problem” we can resolve gradually and temperately, but an “armed doctrine,” a “system,” a “faction of opinion,” which knows no compromise and cannot be managed. With such an enemy, there cannot be a “red line” defining how far, and no further, we may go; a “no troops on the ground” policy, limiting our involvement in the war; an “end-of-war” strategy that prescribes at the outset when and how the war will be terminated. On the contrary, a war with such an enemy is a total war—and, Burke insisted, a “long war” (his italics). “I speak it emphatically, and with a desire that it should be marked, in a long war; because, without such a war, no experience has yet told us, that a dangerous power has ever been reduced to measure or to reason.” The purpose of the war must be nothing less than to “destroy that enemy” or it will “destroy all Europe,” and to do so “the force opposed to it should be made to bear some analogy and resemblance to the force and spirit which that system exerts.”

The pamphlet containing the two “Letters on a Regicide Peace,” published in October 1796, was Burke’s last published work. He died the following year. (Two other letters were published posthumously.) He had described himself to a friend as “a dejected old man, buried in an anticipated grave of a feeble old age, forgetting and forgotten in an obscure and melancholy retreat.” The “Letters on a Regicide Peace” gives no hint of that. It is as bold and vigorous as the Reflections—and it was surprisingly popular, considering the fact that Burke was urging upon England a long, dangerous, and costly war. The mood of the American public today, to judge by the polls, should be receptive to his message, understanding our war on terror as he understood his, and willing to pursue it with the commitment and energy it deserves.

NO WINNERS YET IN UKRAINE

Cathy Young

The conflict in Ukraine took some dramatic turns this month that led many observers to conclude that the Kremlin was succeeding in its effort to keep Ukraine under Russia’s thumb, with the collusion of a spineless West. Actually, while Russia has wrested some concessions, the handwringing is largely unwarranted—so far. But much depends on the West’s willingness to continue applying pressure to Russia and offer meaningful aid to Ukraine. And, even in the best-case scenario, a “frozen conflict” zone in eastern Ukraine is a likely and troubling outcome.

Civilians training to fight Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine

In the final days of August, when Ukrainian forces seemed close to routing the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, their successful push against the insurgency was abruptly and brutally reversed; all available evidence indicates that, despite Moscow’s implausible denials, the counter-offensive was led by invading Russian troops. With Ukrainian fighters demoralized and reeling from their sudden losses, President Petro Poroshenko agreed to ceasefire talks. On September 5, representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk signed an agreement that suspended Kiev’s “anti-terrorist operation” and at least temporarily left pro-Russian separatists in control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 

Then, on September 12, came the news that key parts of Ukraine’s about-to-be-ratified comprehensive trade agreement with the European Union would not take effect until the start of 2016, in consideration of Russia’s economic interests. This is, of course, the same agreement that former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych backed out of in late 2013 because of Kremlin pressure and bribery—a move that sparked the “Euromaidan” protests and sealed his political fate. Does the delay mean that Vladimir Putin has won and the revolution has lost?

Some believe so. A Time column by the magazine’s Moscow correspondent, Simon Shuster, was titled “How Putin Got His Way In Ukraine.” Shuster—whose Time cover story in late July portrayed Putin as having a near-supernatural ability to win and grow more formidable with each crisis—argues that the compromise made in Brussels gives the Russian strongman exactly what he wanted in the first place: a say over Ukraine’s relationship with Europe. This theme is echoed by European commentators such as Deutsche Welle’s Bernd Johann, who wrote, “The EU has bowed to pressure from Moscow. Ukraine can evidently become European only with the consent of Russia.”

Many Ukrainians share these concerns; deputy foreign minister Danylo Lubkivsky resigned in protest against the trade deal postponement, saying it sent “the wrong signal” both to the Russian aggressor and the citizens of Ukraine. The symbolism was reinforced when Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, approved the agreement with the EU on the same day that it passed the law on the “special order of self-government” in the rebel-held parts of eastern Ukraine.

In a blog post on the Ukrainska Pravda website, Poroshenko adviser Yuri Lutsenko urged his compatriots to “stop the cries of ‘all is lost.’ ” Lutsenko pointed out that the law applies only to parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and only for a three-year period—a far cry from Putin’s expansionist intent—and argued that the truce would give Ukraine a chance to recover from hostilities and shore up its military.

To some extent, this is spin control. But some independent Russian commentators critical of the Kremlin also believe Ukraine is gaining, not losing, from the Minsk agreement, whose terms are largely identical to the ones Poroshenko offered, and the rebels rejected, in June. Historian Mark Solonin argued on his blog that the deal spells the end of Putin’s quest to reclaim Novorossiya (“New Russia,” the czarist-era name for territories in eastern and southern Ukraine that many Russian nationalists regard as Russia’s own). The insurgents are required to disarm, disband, and allow local elections with proper monitoring—presumably by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which organized the negotiations. It seems unlikely they will comply; but, while the survival of the illegal Donetsk/Luhansk enclave certainly poses problems for Ukraine, these problems are by no means fatal.

While Ukraine was at a clear military disadvantage when it accepted the agreement, one should not overrate the strength of Russia’s position. A surprise attack to shore up the insurgency is one thing; a full-scale, long-term military operation that entails huge expenditures, extensive casualties, and de facto world pariah status is very different. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine has been frighteningly effective so far, and Putin’s approval ratings still hover around 85 percent. But it is far from certain that a population grown accustomed to stability and even relative affluence will remain docile in the face of an economic downturn and a steady stream of dead and wounded young men returning home. Surveys by the Levada Center, Russia’s most respected polling agency, show support for sending Russian troops into Ukraine dropped from 74 percent in March to just 41 percent in August.

From this perspective, the mass incursion of Russian troops into eastern Ukraine in late August looks less like a prelude to conquest than a face-saving stopgap measure to prevent Ukrainian troops from crushing the insurgency, retaking rebel-controlled territory, and dealing Russia and its proxies a humiliating defeat. Extending the insurgency’s lease on life allowed Putin to force Ukraine into negotiations in which Russia would ostensibly get to play peace broker.

The delay in the full implementation of the Ukraine-EU agreement might also be something of a face-saver for Russia. In many ways, argues pro-Maidan Ukrainian journalist Sergii Gorbachov, it also helps Ukraine. Postponing tariff-free imports from Western Europe (which Putin has claimed would flood Russian markets with cheap goods) and adoption of EU regulatory standards will give Ukraine breathing room to phase in economic reforms; meanwhile, the EU already allows tariff-free import of Ukrainian goods. The compromise also temporarily protects trade with Russia, the sudden loss of which would be a serious blow to Ukraine’s already ailing economy.

The delay will not affect Ukraine’s political integration into Europe, with a view—reiterated by Poroshenko on his visit to North America—to eventual EU membership. Thwarting that alliance, not stopping cheap imports, was Putin’s real goal when he strong-armed Yanukovych into rejecting the EU deal last year and agreeing to join Russia’s alternative “Eurasian Customs Union” with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The compromise on the trade agreement does not even come close to fulfilling those ambitions—just as the separatist enclave in eastern Ukraine, shrunken to about half the size it was in June, hardly fulfills  his ambitions for Novorossiya.

That doesn’t mean Ukraine, or the West, has won. There is little doubt that Putin will do further mischief, whether by trying to undermine Ukraine’s EU trade agreement or by trying to destabilize Ukraine through his proxies in Donetsk. The West must not let up on sanctions—which, contrary to pessimistic predictions, are starting to have some real bite—and must make it clear that there is a steep price to pay for continued Russian intervention, including covert intervention, in Ukraine. The OSCE must do what it can to monitor the situation in rebel-held areas. Ukraine must be given vitally needed aid, including defensive weapons.

As we enter a new Cold War, we should not underestimate Vladimir Putin. But it would also be wise not to overestimate him.

AL QAEDA IN INDIA

Saneya Arif

 

 

Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India? 

 

Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote. 

 

Following four reasons substantiate the assertion. 

 

Faith in democracy and secularism 

Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. 

 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction.

 

The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."  

 

Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages 

Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af-Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group. 

 

In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India. Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse. 

 

Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ

Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality. 

 

Moderate Nature of Islam in India

Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines. 

 

Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream. 

 

However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen 

Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state-discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour.

 

Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.

THE NAXAL IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE

Bibhu Prasad Routray

 

 

How does one analyse the killings of 6105 civilians and security forces in incidents related to left-wing extremism between 2005 and 2013? 

Given that the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), since its formation in 2004, has been responsible for majority of these killings, conventional analyses have mostly focused on big and small incidents that produced these victims. While such methods are useful in terms of attempting to grasp the growing or declining capacity of the outfit, it is also useful to analyse the unceasing violence as upshot of an ideology that has for decades underlined the necessity to shed the enemy's blood to bring about a change in social and political order. 

Three leaders – Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah – dominate the discourse on Naxalism, which began in the 1960s. Mazumdar, in his ‘Eight Documents’ in 1965, exhorted the workers of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) to take up armed struggle against the state. He underlined that action and not politics was the need of the hour. Such calls resulted in a number of incidents in which the CPI-M workers started seizing arms and acquiring land forcibly on behalf of the peasants from the big landholders in Darjeeling. These incidents went on to provide the spark for the 1967 peasant uprising. 

Following the formation of the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR), that emerged out of the CPI-M in November 1967 and was renamed as All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968, Mazumdar further reiterated his idea of khatam or annihilation of class enemies. Although incidents of individual assassinations influenced by khatam resulted in repressive state action targeting the naxalite cadres, the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), which was formed in 1969 breaking away from the CPI-Marxist, continued professing violence as the key tool of revolution.

While Mazumdar's preference for using violence to overthrow existing social order and seizing state power remained the CPI-ML's mode of operation till 1972, a counter ideology with a stress on agrarian consolidation preceding an armed struggle was reiterated by Kanu Sanyal following Mazumdar's death. Sanyal was not against the idea of an armed struggle per se. However, he opposed Mazumdar's advocacy of targeted assassination. 

In the subsequent years, the CPI-ML split into several factions. Although Sanyal himself headed a faction, he gradually grew redundant to the extreme left movement and committed suicide in 2010. Towards the last years of his life, Sanyal maintained that the CPI-Maoist's reliance on excessive violence does not conform to original revolutionary objectives of the Naxalite movement. On more than one occasion, Sanyal denounced the “wanton killing of innocent villagers”. In a 2009 interview, Sanyal accused the CPI-Maoist of exploiting the situation in West Bengal's Lalgarh "by using the Adivasis as stooges to carry forward their agenda of individual terrorism."

In Andhra Pradesh, since the 'Spring Thunder' of Srikakulam in 1970, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, was responsible for the growth of the Naxalite movement under the aegis of the CPI-ML. After leading a faction of the CPI-ML and forming the People's War Group (PWG) in 1980 Seetharamaiah oversaw a regime of intense violence, thus, earning the outfit the description of "the deadliest of all Naxal groups". Even after the expulsion of Seetharamaiah in 1991, the PWG and its factions remained the source of extreme violence targeting politicians and security forces in the state. 

Kanu Sanyal's reluctant support for armed violence was, thus, somewhat an aberration. Playing down the importance of mindless bloodshed remained a peripheral of the Naxalite movement. Each transformation of the movement thereafter in terms of splits, mergers, and formation of new identities escalated the ingrained proclivity to use violence as an instrument of expansion and influence. The CPI-Maoist represented a natural progression of this trend. And as the fatalities data reveal, each passing year, since its 2004 formation through a merger of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the PWG, it became more and more reliant on violence, rationalising the strategy as a defensive mechanism essential to its existence.  

In 2009 Koteshwar Rao alias Kishenji, who led the outfit in West Bengal termed the violence as a "struggle for independence". Ganapathy, the CPI-Maoist general secretary, reiterated in his February 2010 interview that the violence is only a "war of self-defence" or a "counter-violence" in response to a "brutal military campaign unleashed by the state". Maoist Spokesperson Azad, who was later killed in controversial circumstances, rejected the appeal for abjuring violence by then Home Minister P Chidambaram in April 2010 indicating that such a move would allow the "lawless" security forces "continue their rampage". Azad also maintained that while the outfit generally avoids attacking the non-combatants, "the intelligence officials and police informers who cause immense damage to the movement" can not be spared. 

Thus understood, few conclusions can be drawn, in contrast to beliefs that a peaceful resolution of the conflict could be possible. Its current frailty notwithstanding, regaining capacities to maximise violence would be a priority for the CPI-Maoist. It will continue to reject other methods of social and political change and maintain an unwavering faith in the utility of violence. Even while realising that a total victory vis-a-vis the state is unattainable, the outfit would remain an agent of extreme violence in its own spheres of influence.  

OBAMA'S NEW ISIS STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

PR Chari

 

 

In his widely anticipated 15th anniversary address on the  9/11 attacks, President Obama has clarified his  objectives in the Middle East: “We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, [the Islamic State] through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.” 

 

Its contours are taking shape, but the new strategy would involve airstrikes against militants and training the moderate opposition fighters in Syria. The US will wage war against the Islamic extremists and the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Wary of domestic opposition to getting mired in another overseas conflict after Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama emphasized that he would seek Congressional approval and international support from America’s Middle East and NATO allies. 

 

Could American air power and the ground forces of its partners destroy the Islamic State? There is enough realism around to appreciate that al Qaeda, ISIS and similar extremist organizations propagate beguiling ideals of equality, freedom, religious purity and so on to confront the Western alliance, headed by the United States. It is difficult to defeat an ideal, but its baneful effects can certainly be contained. This understanding, is currently informing Obama’s rejuvenated counter-insurgency strategy premised on assured domestic support and the cooperation of allies, but restricting military action to airstrikes and leaving ground action to allies.  

 

Only a modest augmentation of US troops in Iraq is envisaged, raising their total number to around 1500 for performing advisory functions by manning tactical operations centers, protecting American personnel and helping local security forces. An important, though unstated, component of this revised strategy is human intelligence to pinpoint the location of individual militant leaders for elimination by air and ground action. Jordan is critical here.

 

The new Obama strategy envisages training the Free Syrian Army. Saudi Arabia has apparently agreed to provide facilities in its territory for their training and turning them turned around to combat the Islamic extremists and the Assad regime. The dangers of this radical policy are two-fold. First, the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, would be getting embroiled in an enlarging Shia- Sunni sectarian conflict, with the lines of division getting increasingly blurred. Thus Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States are becoming uneasy partners to confront the ISIS and al Qaeda. But, Iran, alongside remnants of the Iraqi and Assad regime still feel obligated to support Hamas against Israel. How Obama’s revised Middle East strategy will sidestep these land mines of Middle East politics remains to be seen.

 

So, what do these developments signify for India? 

 

First, Obama’s 9/11 strategy is designed to ensure the continued American presence in the Middle East; its vestigial continuance would, hopefully, protect US national interests. It can similarly be adduced that the US will not leave Afghanistan altogether after 2014, but elements will remain in Bagram and other secure bases to enable air- and drone-strikes against identified militant forces. Air-strikes do not win wars, but they can seriously degrade the morale of rebel forces and weaken them by decapitating their leadership. It would be in India’s interests to support the US presence in Afghanistan, especially with the al Qaeda threatening to turn its attention against India. A dialogue with the US to firm up greater cooperation in this regard is called for. 

 

Second, it has been wryly observed that one assured supply source for ready weapons in ISIS’s brutal efforts to overrun Iraq and Syria is the US taxpayer. Significant numbers of semi-automatic rifles have been captured by ISIS from military stockpiles in Iraq and Syria, apart from heavier weapons like anti-tank HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank) and shoulder-fired anti-tank rockets that can destroy armored vehicles. Much the same situation might arise in Afghanistan after the departure of US and ISAF forces. According to reports significant numbers of vehicles, small arms and ammunition will be left behind as they are prohibitively costly to ship back to the United States. Much of this materiel might find its way into India via terrorist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but with interests in Kashmir. How this menace should be thwarted requires urgent consultations with the United States.

 

Third, the growth of sectarianism in the Middle East crisis should concern India. Extremists in the Middle East have targeted Christians and other ethnic minorities, but also rival schisms within Islam.  The Shia-Sunni divide has become corrosive, which is also excoriating South Asia, especially Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also India. This rapid growth in sectarianism has to be guarded against, especially with the coming into power in New Delhi of a political party with militant Hindu roots. Concerns here are not ill-founded.

 

Obama’s newly minted Middle East policy will therefore have  much wider repercussions, including the US pivot towards Asia that concerns India; further developments here will require India’s vigilant attention.

PAKISTAN AND THE COUP

 D Suba Chandran

 

 

Almost after a month of intense politicking in Islamabad and the multiple calls to Azadi and Inquilab with few thousand men and women, why have Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri failed to achieve their primary objectives? And why did the Khakis back off?

It appears very clear, that there is no revolution impending in the immediate or distant future in the political landscape of Pakistan. Nor is Nawaz Sharif is likely to resign, based on whatever has happened so far. It would be a different story that Sharif may be forced to resign at a future date for a different reason; but certainly, he is not resigning and yielding to the “Container” democrats and revolutionaries.

First and foremost, the primary objectives of Tahirul Qadri and Imran Khan failed under its own weight. Have they been pitched for something that is within the realms of possibility, they would have achieved their objectives, or at least a reached compromise closer to their position. Tahirul Qadri promised a revolution and Imran Khan asked for Nawaz Sharif’s resignation. 

Second reason for their failure has been their ability to engage their own party members and keep the protest movement coherent. Neither Qadri nor Imran Khan could galvanize their protests and sit-ins into a larger national movement. The numbers are sufficient enough to create disruption, but not large enough to usher into a revolution.

Worse, as it happened to the PTI, there have been internal dissensions within the party in terms of what needs to be achieved. Javed Hashmi episode clearly highlights that not everyone within his party agreed with Imran Khan. He has taken few decisions, contrary to what has been advised by his own party seniors. 

The Establishment did not move in. According to some, including Najam Sethi, a section within the military including senior serving officials conspired to over throw Nawaz Sharif using Imran Khan. However, the military high command did not agree to such a strategy engaging an open support to the revolutionaries against Nawaz Sharif. It is so obvious from the fact that the protesters were raising slogans in favour of the military when they were thrown out the building they had occupied earlier – Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri were waiting for the final decision by the “third” umpire. 

Perhaps, the military used Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri to achieve what they wanted. They used the crisis to ensure that the political leadership approaches them in the first place to arbiter, and later draw redlines in terms of what the Parliament could undertake and what should be left to the domain of the Khakhis. Once they got embedded into the political and foreign policy decision making, the military is not too keen in overtly overthrowing Nawaz Sharif.

Lack of popular support to the protestors and their backers in the Esrtbalishment could be another reason. Projecting a rare stand of unity, political parties (except the PTI) sided with the government. The PPP, MQM, ANP, JUI and JI did come together and realised that it is not in their interest to weaken the Parliament or supporting movement leading to a coup. None of the political parties are willing to face another elections in the near future, are be willing to accept Imran Khan as their next Prime Minister. With less that 40 seats at the National Assembly, the PTI simply does not have the numbers to make any real difference to the composition of Parliament. 

Fifth, there was fatigue, especially in the media and amongst the people. While a Jalsa may keep the attention of people for a short period, people did not have the patience to see such a tamasha being carried out on a daily basis.  There was so much buzz in the media in the initial days;  later it became a drag. Worse, the rains and floods have diverted the attention of people. 

Finally, there has been no international support forthcoming to Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri. The biggest blow came, when Pakistan’s all weather friend, decided to have a different look at the situation. China cancelled the visit of its President XI Jinping to Pakistan. Neither the US nor EU have been sympathetic to the cause of the revolutionaries. Perhaps, the military also took the cue.

Does the above mean, Sharif’s position is strengthened today? Hardly. In fact, his position is weaker than it was in July this year. He should be well aware he has got another lease and can continue in the Parliament. Only he would know what he has promised the military to ensure that the latter does not intervene. The biggest question that he should ask himself is – how did the situation come to this level in August 2014, just one year after that mammoth electoral victory in May 2013?

The earlier Sharif find answers to those factors that have caused the turnaround in the last fifteen months, the better for democracy in Pakistan. Should he pursue a vendetta politics and ensure Musharraf gets a stronger sentence? Should he engage in crony politics and ensure that the institutions are not strengthened? Should he follow a populist course and not engage in providing better governance? 

Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri may be the problems. But the solutions are with Nawaz Sharif.

ISI, INDIA AND SRI LANKA

 N Manoharan

 

 

The recent arrest of Sri Lankan national Arun Selvarajan in Chennai by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for spying on behalf of Pakistan’s ISI is concerning. He is the third Sri Lankan arrested for spying in the past over one year. Earlier, two Sri Lankan Muslims (Mohammed Sakir Hussain and Suleman Hussain) and an Indian (Thameen Ansari) were apprehended on similar charges. The arrestees confessed that their handlers were agents posted at Pakistani High Commission based in Colombo. Previously, it was Amir Zubair Siddiqui, who was posted as visa counsellor, and later it was Haji alias Siraj Ali.

 

Sri Lanka and the ISI

Sri Lanka may not be conniving with Pakistan against India, but is being used as a base by the ISI. Sri Lanka never allowed its territory for any anti-India activities and the ISI operations may be happening without Colombo’s knowledge. 

 

Why Sri Lanka has been chosen as a base by the ISI? Why are the Sri Lankans citizens involved? What is the purpose behind the Colombo module? What is the state of counter-intelligence capability of India? 

 

The ISI has been operating from some of the neighbouring countries of India like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Myanmar and even Maldives. The southern front of India remained unpenetrated for quite some time. Sri Lanka could be the best base to do that for two specific reasons: 

• Given the proximity and similarity of language and appearance, Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims, who also speak Tamil, would not find it difficult to reach Tamil Nadu and mix-up with the local population. Presence of large number of Sri Lankan refugees is yet another facilitating aspect. 

 

• Pakistan’s activities in Sri Lanka have not been seen with suspicion by the security establishment of the island state. Sri Lanka-Pakistan relations have been good without any irritants. Sri Lanka is ever grateful to Pakistan for all the military support during the Eelam War. In addition, when Sri Lanka was hauled by the international community for human rights excesses during that War, Islamabad rendered unstinted diplomatic support.

 

ISI and the Involvement of Sri Lankan Citizens

There are various reasons for the involvement of Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims in the spy ring. The primary motivation is financial. Unemployed youth are easy targets. There is a theory that argues that part of the reason for the involvement of Sri Lankan Muslims in ISI’s spy network is their increasing radicalisation. But, the theory may explain if they are involved in spying western targets based in India, but not acting against Indian targets.

 

Pakistan obviously has denied the existence of an ISI base in Sri Lanka targeted against India as “speculative” and “malicious media campaign”. The denial is not surprising. Pakistani ISI has been assiduously pursuing the objective of establishing espionage networks for collection of India’s defence related information with reference to deployment/movement of armed forces, information relating to vital installations including sensitive information pertaining to the latest knowhow with reference to technological advancement etc. For this purpose, it has been able to organise resident agents and even allure the lower staff in sensitive organizations for collection and communication of sensitive information. When there is a roadblock there, it has moved on to tap ethnic similarities in the neighbourhood.

 

Sri Lanka as a base: What is ISI’s Endgame?

What is concerning is the security dimension of the espionage. There are two aspects to spying. One is to just gather information about the enemy for the purpose of having information advantage. The second aspect is to collect information with the aim to inflict damage. Reconnaissance of Kalapakkam nuclear plant site, NSG Hub in Chennai, Coast Guard installations on the eastern coast, Officers’ Training Academy (OTA) in Chennai, Nagapattinam Port, the Madras Regimental Centre in Wellington, harbours in Chennai and Ennore, DGP office and the High Court complex in Chennai and Vizag and Kochi ports have been carried out. Places like the Sulur Air Base, the Naval detachment in Karaikal, naval installations located in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were on the pipeline. But, by then the spies have been arrested. Going by the confessions of the arrestees, information gathering was meant for planning a terror attack. The first ever terror attack in Chennai in May this year is not unconnected to the larger ISI plot.

 

Meeting the Challenge: What is required?

Whoever has been arrested is only a tip of the iceberg. It is important to find out how many more spies are on the prowl. This requires a thorough review and revamping of counter-intelligence capabilities of India. Counter-intelligence continues to be a weak spot in the Indian intelligence infrastructure. It is important to develop a totally different set of intelligence capabilities to cater to rapidly changing threat environment. This needs to be done at several levels—from training modules to doctrines to equipment to motivation. Intelligence at the state level requires modernisation. Human intelligence (HUMINT) requires more attention than just technical intelligence (TECHINT). Not the least, the intelligence flow has to be both ways: from the Centre to States and vice versa.

JAPAN, INDIA AND THE US AND THE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Vivek Mishra

 

 

While Modi’s visit to Japan in early September yielded dividends in other sectors, it failed to accomplish on the nuclear deal between the two countries. Reactions (or the lack of them) from Washington DC are important and warrant analysis, as India’s civilian nuclear cooperation with the US is stuck, primarily due to the Liability Bill issue. 

 

Much depends how the US perceives and reacts to the India-Japan nuclear deal, for two reasons; Japan is one of the most important post-War allies of the US and secondly, Japan and the US are share a common ground to cooperate with India through a civil nuclear deal.

 

US: Role Versus Reaction

The role of the US has been critical in influencing the India-Japan nuclear deal. Two developments in particular, the IAEA approval and the NSG waiver, were vital in effecting a change of heart in the global strategic community towards India’s inclusion and acceptance as a nuclear responsible state. This change included Japan.

 

The reaction of the US, on the other hand, towards the failure of the India-Japan nuclear deal has been akin to one of a mute spectator and probably, deliberately so. The US, on expected lines, has kept restraint in showing its reactions over a nuclear deal in which Japan is involved, given the unfortunate nuclear history between the two countries. Such a measured response from the US is, probably, to find a balance between its desire to make India a more nuclear-responsible state, and the benefits that are likely to accrue to the US in the eventuality of an India-Japan nuclear deal. 

 

The US itself has a significant nuclear cooperation with Japan primarily comprising research in fast reactor technology, fuel cycle technology, advanced computer simulation and modelling, small and medium reactors, safeguards and physical protection; and nuclear waste management. A common nuclear cooperation with India of both Japan and the US could result in a nuclear ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ A history of trilateral talks between India, Japan and the US since 2011, adds to this expectation. In cooperating with Japan and the US, India will stand to gain on a multilateral nuclear cooperation forum. In Japan, India also sees a potential supplier of reactors. Furthermore, interlinked economic stakes of the US and Japanese companies in nuclear cooperation makes it worth for India to bring the negotiations in this regard to a conclusive halt with Japan at the soonest. The US therefore, is expected to clandestinely influence the civil nuclear deal between India and Japan without showing either too much curiosity or disinterest, as there are many convergences between Japan and the US on their civ-nuke cooperation with India.

 

Behind the curtain cooperation?

There is a possibility that the US and Japan could be working behind the curtain to get India to the nuclear negotiating table, which it has thus far eschewed. The US understands that India’s deal with Japan could be a noose that it can tighten anytime, particularly at a nascent stage when it is still being negotiated. Blocking India’s civil nuclear deal with Japan is certainly not in the interest of the US, but delaying it might well prove useful. A prolonged delay in the deal could see an energy-deficit and frustrated India, with two of its civil-nuclear cooperation efforts in limbo, willing to renegotiate the terms of the agreement. Evidence towards this lies in the September 17 announcement by Nisha Biswal that, “There is a very strong desire by this new government, and a very strong desire by the US, to work through those tough issues and to be able to make progress.” 

 

The fact that the new government in India has shown a “strong desire” to work through “tough issues” related to the civ-nuke cooperation just after the failure to reach an agreement on the issue with Japan shows India’s diminishing patience with its unsuccessful civil-nuclear forays. An agreement with the US vis-à-vis the nuclear deal, which appears to be on the cards during Modi’s US visit, might well be the gateway to a similar deal with Japan.

 

The recent failure to finalise the deal with Japan is unlikely to cast its shadow on the much ballyhooed visit of Narendra Modi to the US. However, the civil nuclear cooperation between India and the US is expected to be a dominating issue.