PAKISTAN: HYPER-NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

For over six decades, the Pakistani elite have pursued a
`hyper-national security state’ geopolitical approach,
stemming from an almost continuous and obsessive
`search for power symmetry with India’, which has laid a
“geo-strategic curse” on the country at the expense of
any lasting political or economic reform. This has
resulted in `domestic stagnation and even chaos’.
Though seemingly successful in the short-term, or from
a tactical point of view, they distorted the country’s
development in the long run, imperilling its national
security.
This is the central thesis of the construct offered in `The
Warrior State – Pakistan in the Contemporary World’, a
new book by Dr TV Paul, Professor, International
Relations, McGill University, Canada.
Pakistan had its `great power patrons’ – the US and
China – both of whom it received massive military
assistance from; but even their policies and patronage
discouraged the adoption of `painful economic and
social reforms necessary for rapid, equitable economic
and political development’. Dr Paul tellingly brings out
how ever since its founding in 1947, Pakistan remained
at the center of major geopolitical struggles: the US-
Soviet Union rivalry; the conflict with India; the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan; and most recently, the
post-9/11 wars. Massive foreign aid kept pouring in
from major powers and their allies with a stake in the
region. The reliability of such aid defused any pressure
on the political elites to launch far-reaching domestic
reforms necessary to promote sustained growth, higher
standards of living, and more stable democratic
institutions.
Pakistan’s elite – primarily the military leaders who
repeatedly usurped power, abrogating constitution-
making and the evolution of democratic processes –
had, according to Dr Paul, `both the motive and
opportunity to pursue such policies’. Their strategic
ideas and ideological beliefs about statehood,
development and power became major factors in
determining strategies they followed. However, these
ideas were `devoid of prudence and pragmatism’ and
produced `unintended consequences, that were often
negative’.
Citing the European experience to understand the
relationship between war and state building in the
Pakistani context, the book suggests that Pakistan has
unfortunately tended to slide into the category of `weak’
or `failing states’ as its elites showed a proclivity to
dabble `in other regional conflicts, proxy wars or
promotion of insurgencies’, instead of devoting
capacities for `the creation of public goods to its
citizenry by way of education, healthcare, employment
and high standard of living’.
Tracing causes of this political evolution through its
turbulent history, Dr Paul concludes that Pakistan has
`ended up as a garrison or praetorian state’; whenever
the military ceded power to elected civilian governments,
it did so only partially. This left the country as a `
hybrid democratic model’ with the military remaining ` a
veto player’ in crucial decision making.
An interesting chapter is devoted to comparing
Pakistan’s internecine civil-military conflict with similar
situations in other Muslim majority countries such as
Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, and even with `non-Muslim
National Security States’ such as South Korea and
Taiwan. Though acknowledging some similarities
relating to the `existential nature of threats faced’, Dr
Paul finds Pakistan’s wars were `limited in nature’ and
were `never utilised by the elite to transform the
country’s economic policies’. The military’s dominance
`was never tamed’ and `the co-operation of civil society
groups’ was channelised `in the direction of geo-
political projects’, instead of garnering support for
policies of economic development. Religion was
repeatedly utilised in the quest for Islamic legitimacy
and as a crutch to justify the military’s abrogation of
democratic politics, in the process leading to the
`misuse of political Islam’; rise of sectarianism; and
endemic ethnic cleavages – all characteristics of weak,
insecurity-generating states.
The book examines how Pakistan is coping with `the
trap of the Warrior State’ today and whether it will
transform in the near future. Though some signs of
change are discerned, through growing introspection
among some sections of civil society, Dr Paul says
Pakistan’s `ongoing war-making efforts have deeply
affected its prospects for emerging as a tolerant,
prosperous and unified nation-state. He believes
`ironically, that Pakistan’s democratic elections and
political transitions made things worse domestically’,
leaving civil society much weaker and the middle class
`increasingly sympathetic to extremism’. The army has
recently taking on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
though this seems a reluctant and limited strategy
conditioned by calculations of calibrated response in the
context of Afghanistan. It still has the `temptation’ to
play `good Taliban’ and `bad Taliban’ while pursuing
tactical or asymmetric objectives. Offering a rather dour
prognosis, Dr Paul suggests that things could improve
`only if ideas and assumptions of the elite change
fundamentally’. The state could otherwise fall apart `if
they (the elite) persist in “double games”’.
The State’s long term policies have neither focussed on
economic development nor shown political cohesion.
Despite the impact of the internet revolution, enabled by
a reasonably free media, the younger generation has not
been allowed to globalise or benefit from economic
liberalisation. The education and science and technology
sectors have languished or remained bound under old
narratives of insecurity.
Emphasising `twin fears for the future in its immediate
neighbourhood’ – the fear of India and the fear of losing
primary influence over Afghanistan – Pakistan’s
military is shown to have assumed a protector’s role –
so typical in `Warrior States’ [Charles Tilly, in “War
Making & State Making as Organised Crime,” ‘Bringing
the State Back In’, 1985]. The army is called upon again
and again to assume the protector’s role from threats it
has itself created in the first place – thus showing how
`a protector can become a protection racketeer’.
Soundness of theoretical premises notwithstanding, this
is severe castigation indeed and may not go down well
with audiences in Pakistan, coming as it does from an
academic of Indian origin, albeit now ensconced in
hallowed climes. It also reflects, perhaps, an inadequate
and unduly pessimistic appreciation of complex social
and political factors influencing responses of various
players in the Pakistan’s domestic arena.
After Musharraf’s last disruption of democracy in
November 2007, the lawyers’ movement for restoration
of the higher judiciary definitely reflected deep-seated
changes in these relationships and a partial maturing of
civil society in the country. Both former President Asif
Ali Zardari and former Army Chief, Gen Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani understood these changes and made interesting
course corrections in typical behaviour patterns which
determined civil-military interactions in the five-year
interregnum (2008-2013). Thoughpolitical parties
remained weak, the army too could not or did not
voluntarily (sic!) exercise absolute power. The ignominy
of the Abbottabad action by the US to eliminate Osama
bin Laden was not lost either on a politically aware
polity or among young officers in the Pakistani Defence
Services, who were unhappy with their own impotence.
Though berated by new found judicial activism, the
civilian political leadership still sacked a retired General
as Defence Secretary during the strained `Memogate’
phase, though having to dismiss their chosen
Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, due to the
army’s insistence. Former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
Gilani nevertheless, lamented in a forceful speech in the
National Assembly that no organ of the State could
claim to be “a State within the State,” asserting that
“decision-making is done only by Parliament” and “all
institutions of the county remain answerable” to it.
Though civil society activism in Pakistan seems to have
ebbed, real political power is today diffused and spread
among several actors. The centre-right politicians who
received an overwhelming popular mandate in the 2013
general elections have built their own patronage and
connections with radical Islamic actors; and the latter
too have emerged with increasing clout in civil society.
The Pakistan People’s Party could not contest elections
freely due to threats from the Taliban and suffered at
the hustings due to anti-incumbency and mal-
governance. However, it retains its mass base in Sindh,
and could bounce back. As a national mainstream party,
it extended solidarity to the ruling PML (N), when civil-
military relations recently became strained. The
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM-Altaf) has its own
ethno-cultural clout, in the context of law and order
management in Karachi.
These factors place limits on the military’s ability to
control things entirely, though the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) remains the key military institution for
the manipulation of politics. This has been vividly
demonstrated in the crisis after the attack on Geo
compere, Hamid Mir, and the army-backed attempts to
coerce or curb freedom of the press.
On the ensuing military interaction with TTP too, Dr
Paul’s prognosis seems off the mark. With civilian
political leaders still paying lip service to mediation and
talks, how the army tackles what has been described as
the newest `existentialist threat’ against the State
perhaps needed to be explained beyond the parameters
of `a warrior state’ construct.
That said, Dr Paul’s book offers a rich bibliographic
canvas and is a welcome addition to the burgeoning
literature on political dynamics in Pakistan.