The previous article in this column discussed the talks
about talks with the Pakistani Taliban, and Sami-ul-Haq
being projected as the interlocutor between the State
and the Teherik-e-Taliban (TTP).
Since the previous column was written in early January
2014, three major developments have taken place. First
was a short military campaign against the militants in
Waziristan. Second was appointment of a 'four member
committee' by the government to negotiate with the
Taliban. Third was the acceptance of the TTP to
negotiate with the State, along with nomination of a
team from the Pakistani Taliban.
While the decision to negotiate with the TTP and the
latter’s response was itself a substantial achievement,
the harsh reality is that the problems for the State have
just begun. Given the issues and questions, this process
is likely to be anything but easy.
From Sami-ul-Haq to the Four Horsemen: A Changed
Strategy by the Government
During the last week of January 2014, the government
appointed a four member committee to negotiate with
the TTP, comprising of Rahimullah Yusufzai, Irfan
Siddiqui, Rustam Shah and Major (Retd) Amir.
Rahimullah Yusufzai is a well-known and independent
senior journalist. His writings in mainstream
newspapers have been balanced and he his insights are
respected. Irfan Siddiqui is also a senior journalist, but
today he is known more as a pro-Nawaz person; he is
also a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. Major
Amir has been reported as a former ISI officer who is
close to Nawaz Sharif. According to Amir Mir, "Major
(retd) Amir... has a murky past being the alleged
architect of the infamous ' Operation Midnight Jackal ' to
topple the first government of Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in 1989." ( The News , 30 January 2014). Rustam
Shah is a former diplomat who has served in
Afghanistan and is known to be sympathetic to the
Taliban.
In terms of the composition, it could be generally agreed
that two of them (Irfan Siddiqui and Major Amir) are
seen as closer to Nawaz Sharif. There is nothing wrong
in Sharif choosing his confidantes, in fact, given the
intricacies it is always useful for the Prime Miniester to
choose a team he has confidence in. However, as Fazlur
Rehman has already criticised, they were not chosen on
a consensus, nor they have a political background. The
four horsemen are all professionals in one field or the
other, but have never been politicians.
Will the four horsemen be able to deliver? Except for
Fazlur Rehman, the rest of the political leadership,
cutting across political lines at the national and regional
levels, seems to have faith in the new initiative.
From Suicide Attacks to a Ten Member Committee:
Understanding the Change in TTP
What has changed for the TTP in the last month that it
has agreed to negotiate with the government?
Was it because of the military strikes in Waziristan?
Given the nature of the attacks and the short duration,
it appears that the military strikes were aimed more at
convincing the US, where Sartaj Aziz was attempting to
revive the strategic dialogue between the two countries,
rather than at bringing the Taliban down. Had the latter
been the case, the strikes would have continued until
the TTP begged for a dialogue. However, this was not
the case.
Why did then the TTP agree to negotiate? Does it really
believe in negotiating with the government? Or is the
negotiation a strategy of its ongoing war with the
State?
What would the TTP Demand?
Will this negotiation between the TTP and the
government be without any preconditions? Unlikely. The
TTP is likely to emphasise that there should be no
military strikes in the first place. As a logical extension
of that, it is likely to pressurise the State to tell US that
the latter completely stop its drone programme. In fact,
the TTP leadership should be more worried about the
drone strikes than the military strikes. However
indiscriminate the military strikes are likely to be, they
can never be as precise as a drone attack. The TTP is
also likely to demand the release of its top leadership,
who have been arrested by the State and kept in
different jails.
Politically, the TTP is likely to pressurise the
government to sever ties with the US and ensure that
the Durand Line becomes irrelevant for the Afghan
militants.
Will the TTP also demand the imposition of shariah
elsewhere in Pakistan, as it demanded in Swat? It may
place that demand but is unlikely to carry it forward,
given that the time is not ripe. Such a demand may
perhaps be acceptable for the State in remote FATA or
the Swat valley, but not acceptable in the rest of
Pakistan. Not yet.
How Far will the State Go in Yielding to the TTP?
Clearly, the State is not keen in pursuing a military
option vis-à-vis the militants. The TTP would not
be satisfied with the status quo.
The primary question is not what the TTP wants.
Rather, it is how far the State is willing to go to
accommodate the TTP.
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