China’s Endgame in Afghanistan

 Teshu Singh

 

The US troops are expected to exit from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 but according to a recently signed Bilateral Security Agreement between Afghanistan and the US, the troops will remain until ‘end of 2024 and beyond’. Many Western countries look forward to China’s more active role in the country. Given the complexity of the situation in the country and the region, will China engage itself in Afghanistan? What is its end-game in Afghanistan?

China’s Interests in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is China’s neighbour and any development in the country is bound to affect internal dynamics in China. Given that Afghanistan is a landlocked country and shares a border with China, Beijing will engage with Kabul to secure its western periphery, especially Xinjiang region. Notably, non-interference in domestic issues of other countries is the lynchpin of Chinese foreign policy. However, China has so far made economic investments in Afghanistan, especially in its energy sector.

China needs a stable and secure neighbourhood for its ‘Peaceful Development’ plan that also emphasises on a stable and secure neighbourhood. In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation’ to lay out basic political principles and main directions of bilateral relations.

The region assumes more importance for China as it forms an important link in the ‘New Silk Road’ and is interconnected to China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS). Although the Road does not pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, it does pass through Urumqi and Khorgas in Xinjiang. Thus China is concerned about the overall security environment in the country that can affect the trade conducted through the corridor. The WDS that essentially aims to develop the western provinces of China is often disrupted by the Uyghur terrorism in the Xinjiang province.

Thousands of Uyghurs fighters are being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There have been several instances of attacks in the past few months alone. Consequently, China has witnessed instability spilling into Beijing as well. During the 1990s, China relied on Pakistan to manage its relationship with the extremist group but now it is sceptical of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Tools of Engagement

China has always been active in regional efforts pertaining to Afghanistan, such as: the ‘6 plus 2 initiative; the Kabul Process; and most recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Istanbul process. The SCO was created in part as a response to the events unfolding in Afghanistan. It is anticipated that it will fill the vacuum as a viable regional institution that has both Russia and China as full-time members and Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan as observers. Security is one of the most important issues on the SCO’s agenda; the main focus of the SCO is to combat three evils in the region: terrorism, separatism and extremism. China has been its active member and Afghan stability is one of the major concerns of the organisation.

In August 2014, China held the first and the biggest military drill under the banner of the SCO in Inner Mongolia. The drill was aimed at training 7,000 servicemen from five SCO member states to test the troops’ effectiveness in fighting terrorism.

Initiated in 2011, the Istanbul Process-‘Heart of Asia’ is a unique regional cooperation mechanism on Afghanistan that provides a platform for regional countries to improve interaction with Afghanistan. It aims to bring stability and development to the region. The fourth ministerial conference was held recently, which saw the participation of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang who strongly emphasised on the five points of China’s interests in the Afghanistan. During the conference, China put forward a proposal, titled ‘peace and reconciliation forum’ with an aim to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It looks forward to involve representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the Taliban.

China’s Endgame

Soon after taking office, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in his first international visit as the new president; his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, re-emphasised that China values ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership and supports Afghanistan to achieve stable transition and peaceful reconstruction’. During the meeting, he emphasised that Afghanistan's development goals are closely associated with China's promotion of regional cross-border economic development. The increasing China’s engagement is believed to a win-win situation for both China and Afghanistan.

China will be training 3,000 Afghan professionals in various fields over the next five years but will never put ‘boots on the ground’. Its role in Afghanistan will be a litmus test of its regional strategy. This can really help in establishing its image as a responsible global player in contrast to its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas.

Notably, China is interested in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan as much as it caters to Beijing's foreign economic policy with the ambition of a global power. China's endgame therefore is to emerge as a responsible regional power and eventually a global power.

Iran-Pakistan: Can Rouhani Resolve the Tensions?

 Majid Izadpanahi

 

Iran and Pakistan have been facing issues on the border relating to terrorism and drug trafficking for some time now. This has raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad, resulting in clashes. The recent clash in October resulted in casualties for both sides and the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran was summoned by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Iranian officials state that the terrorists and bandits use Pakistani territory as a base to attack Iranian border forces, and Pakistan categorically rejects the allegations. Iranian officials allege that Pakistan has no control over its own borders and Pakistan says that Iran should not justify its internal problems with external reasons.

Iran’s foreign policy post the 1979 Islamic Revolution shifted from a pro-US to anti-US stance, while Pakistan remained pro-US. The US’s policy of regime change in Tehran through destabilisation by the separatists was welcomed by Pakistan, especially evident in their support of the Iranian Jundallah.

The latest clash on the Iran-Pakistan border is not a new occurrence, but it is rare that a number of clashes take place frequently in the span of few days. Insofar it is unclear whether the clash was a reaction to the terrorist attacks on the Iranian Border Police or confrontation with the armed groups and drug barons that are active in the region. Nationalist Baloch groups, radical Sunni groups and drug traffickers are active in the Iran-Pakistan border region; Pakistan accuses India and sometimes Afghanistan, of fueling instability in the region. 

Evidently, the situation along the Iran-Pakistan border is worsening.

Are Both Sides Interested in a Military Solution?

Pakistan’s western border is its safest border; most Pakistani forces are positioned in the country’s eastern border with India and its northern borders with Afghanistan. The rest are positioned either in Sindh or Punjab. Despite the security and ethnic problems in Balochistan, Pakistan is not interested in beginning a new conflict on the western border by confronting Iranian forces. In other words, Pakistan has no military and financial ability to confront another country and engage in border conflicts. Such conflicts could lead to instability in Balochistan, such that it may may get out of Islamabad’s control.

Iran also understands the situation in Sistan Baluchestan, and has now engaged in a big conflict in its western borders. Tehran is therefore not interested in clashing with Pakistan and considers such a move unwise. Iran is also concerned about other actors beyond the region that tend to cause disputes in its eastern border given its wariness regarding the Islamic State and the role of some regional countries in creating it.

Therefore, Iran’s hard talk vis-à-vis the border clashes can be considered a diplomatic and military show that also sends a warning to the neighbours, especially Deputy Commander Brigadier-General Hossein Salami of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s statement that if Pakistan does not take any action against terrorists targeting Iran and drug traffickers, Iranian forces may enter its territory.

“Every country should fulfil its obligations towards its internal security as well as the security of the neighbouring countries,” Salami said. “We will find rebels anywhere, even inside the neighbouring countries and will take any action against them without restrictions if they do not stop their activity,” he added.

Iran’s reaction, that is expected to serve as a warning to non-state actors and one that follows limited aims, can impact regional equations. However, if the situation gets out of control, it can have a serious influence on Tehran’s military and security approach towards problems in Sistan Baluchestan. Such a situation will result in increased instability and insecurity in Iran’s eastern border. And that too is not in Tehran’s interests.

The conflict between Iran and Pakistan and Pakistan’s tacit support to non-state actors and separatists against Iran could be the result of Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s shaky relations with its neighbours and the US. The Pakistani state is extremely dependent on the US military and economic aid that is used especially against India. Iran-Pakistan relations are dependent on Iran’s relations with the US and the regional Arab countries.

So if Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani can achieve improved Iranian relations with the West and promoting Iran’s international position, it would reduce some sources of hostility in Iran-Pakistan relations. This would push Islamabad to change its hostile behaviour toward Tehran and reduce and eventually give up support to non-state actors, namely the Iranian Jundallah and Jaish-al Adl.

Article 370 Bandwagon

 Shujaat Bukhari

On December 1, 2013, Prime Minister Narendra Modi (then Gujarat Chief Minister) created a stir when he called for a debate on Article 370. He was addressing a public meeting in Jammu and surprised one and all with the ostensible departure from his party’s known stand of its outright abrogation. Since then the debate, though not at the official level, is on among the political parties. What is significant is the fact that Article 370 has dominated the campaign that is on for the ongoing elections in Jammu and Kashmir which started on November 25.

Both Modi and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh stressed upon not raking up Article 370, asking party cadre to concentrate on the issues of governance and development. But in practice both of them as also all others who are camping or campaigning in the state have already made it an issue. In reaction to what BJP is doing two main regional parties National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party have taken it head on swearing that they would not allow it to happen. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah made a direct attack on BJP on November 24. In an interview to PTI, he said: “Article 370 will sink BJP’s boat in J & K”. A day earlier PDP founder Mufti Mohammad Sayeed told an election rally in Bandipore that his party would do everything to protect Article 370.

It is interesting that by saying that this issue should not be raked up in the elections, the BJP leadership has achieved part of its goal by making it the sole discussion point in the elections. The way the political parties have shifted their focus to Article 370 and engaged themselves with BJP and what they call its “divisive agenda”, it seems that PM Modi has succeeded in doing what he said on December 1.

Space in newspaper editorials and columns is also devoted to this subject, which makes it clear that the discussion is on. It is a different issue that Modi had sought the debate on the lines whether this Article had helped Jammu and Kashmir state to grow or not. But the debate is centered around its link with the special status and not the development.

Article 370 is so heavy on the minds of regional parties that they even forgot to come out with their manifestos ahead of the first phase of elections. Only Congress managed to do it and that too just two days before the first phase. The issue has occupied the larger space in the election discourse. Both NC and PDP are finding it easy to touch the raw nerve and stonewall the BJP’s much ambitious plan of reaching to magic number of 44 in the elections. Both are aware that when it comes to politics, whether people would vote or boycott, the special identity is very close to the hearts of the people. Even those who believe that it is an empty shell and the only solution is in “Azadi” from India, have this feeling that if this Article is touched, it will be a psychological defeat for the people of Kashmir.

However, in case of BJP itself it seems to be a calculated move to be “soft” on Article 370, though the party’s position vis-a-vis this “core issue” has remained wavering during the last over a decade. What its position was in early 90’s, it’s not the same today. In January 1992, the then BJP president Murli Manohar Joshi along with Narendra Modi braved to reach Lal Chowk, the city centre of Srinagar to hoist the tricolour. This was only to assert that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and they had vowed to continue the struggle to get the Article scraped.

Abrogation of this Article was once among three core slogans “Ayodhaya, Uniform Civil Code and Article 370” but it went down the radar slowly. In 1998 Lok Sabha elections, its abrogation almost came as a threat from BJP. But in 1999 it was not focused on. Similarly in 2004, the then BJP President Vankiah Nadu while realizing the “Vision Document” maintained that this law was necessary. BJP’s state unit with more support in Jammu division has always advocated the complete integration of state with India. But interestingly in 2008 assembly elections, when it released the manifesto, this issue was missing. Though it benefited from the Amarnath land row, it stressed upon the alleged discrimination with Jammu region. Senior BJP leader Ashok Khujuria was then asked why Article 370 is missing, he shot back saying: “It’s immaterial whether there is a mention of Article 370′s abolition or not. It is an agenda in our hearts.”

This time too it is not known whether the party would forcefully include the issue in the poll manifesto that was not released till these lines were written. However, one thing is clear that BJP is treading on a cautious path keeping in view its ambitious plan of achieving the 44+ mission. Party’s strategy is well designed. Even if it is not in a position to get a significant number of seats from Valley, but the euphoria it has created has much more impact than the parties, which are in winning position. Its tacit alliance with at least two parties in North Kashmir and entry of some prominent faces from Valley has emboldened the party. Making its presence felt in Valley is perhaps the biggest dividend it can count in the recent past. Whether people at large may like it or not, but BJP is on the scene and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed election rally in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district also symbolizes its presence.

Whether there could be a serious debate on Article 370 is not known, but one thing is clear that PM Modi has forced the NC and PDP to ground their agendas of “Autonomy and Self Rule and embraced Sajad Lone who had talked about something bigger called “Achievable Nationhood”. He engaged them in this debate to forget their political bibles.

In order to have maximum seats to occupy the larger political space in the state, the party has cleverly gone low on the contentious issue of Article 370, thus trying if not to earn goodwill but at least not to annoy the people. It is a different issue that if BJP comes to power, how it would proceed. With power in Delhi, this combination could prove deadly in the months and years to come. But one thing is clear that as of now BJP has achieved its goal to make Article 370 a poll issue.

NASR: DANGERS OF PAKISTAN'S SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE

 Manpreet Sethi

In April 2011, Pakistan tested a 60 km very short-range ballistic missile called Nasr and claimed it to be nuclear capable. This has since been publicised as the tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) meant to deter India from mounting a conventional military response to any act of terrorism found to be sponsored from Pakistan. By doing so, Rawalpindi has signalled that its nuclear threshold is so low that any military action by India would compel it to escalate straight to the nuclear level since it does not have the capacity to fight a conventional war. The message, therefore, to India is to exercise caution even in the face of provocation since the escalation could quickly spin out of control. This is indeed a well thought out move by Pakistan to reclaim the space that India claims exists for it to undertake punitive action against a Pakistan-abetted proxy war.

However, if Pakistan is to make its TNW a credible component of its first use nuclear strategy, then it must build and deploy them in large enough numbers to have a substantial impact on the battlefield. Whether Pakistan has the fissile material and the technological capacity to do that is immaterial. Even if it does not have this today, it could well acquire it over time since there is no non-proliferation instrument that prohibits it from doing so. But the essential point of concern, not just to India, but to the larger international community as well, should be the existential risks that Pakistan is spreading through its TNW. For these weapons to be militarily meaningful, pre-delegation of their command and control is inevitable. This will bring in issues related to their safety and security. The chances of these weapons being seized by the proliferating and increasingly anti-establishment terrorist organisations are being ignored by Pakistan at its own peril.

Even more alarming are reports that have recently appeared that Pakistan is now moving out into the sea with its short-range nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles. Late last month a report in The Washington Post claimed that Pakistan was getting ready to operationalise its sea-based deterrent. Considering that China embarked on this path more than three decades ago and is yet to carry out the first patrol of a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear capable missiles, and that India too is yet to send its first SSBN for sea trials, leave alone operational patrols, Pakistan through its trademark jugaad strategy seems to have beaten both with its own version of sea-based deterrence.

It may be recalled that Pakistan had inaugurated its naval SFC (it has one for each one of the wings of the armed forces) in 2012. At the time, it could claim no naval assets in the strategic role. Many in the West dismissed this development as inconsequential since Pakistan's indigenous military capability was perceived as being unable of building and operationalising an SSBN over the next two decades. But, the country has shown that it could achieve ‘sea-based deterrence’ without having to take the beaten path. Instead of waiting for its SSBNs to be acquired/developed, Pakistan has chosen to equip its surface vessels and diesel electric-powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles.

The intention of doing so is to carry the aspect of TNW deterrence out to sea in order to further reduce India's manoeuvrability on the conventional plane. Yet again, Pakistan has displayed nuclear brinkmanship. The message once again to India, and to the Western South Asia watchers, is that the stakes are going to be too high in case of any break-out of hostilities. It assumes that India would be deterred from all action in view of the higher cost that it would suffer from any escalation. This, however, may prove to be a very costly assumption for Pakistan since the current mood in India does not appear to be one to silently absorb a terrorist provocation.

Meanwhile, the move to deploy nuclear-capable missiles on vessels that are not particularly survivable is an extremely destabilising act that leaves itself dangerously open to inadvertent escalation. An encounter of the surface or sub-surface assets of the two countries, which is not unusual, could result in a situation that quickly spins out of control.

Even scarier are scenarios regarding the security of the nuclear assets at sea. Only last month there was a "near successful hijacking" of a Pakistani missile frigate, PNS Aslat, by al Qaeda with the intention of attacking Indian warships. The possibility of a Pakistani warship that is armed with nuclear-tipped missiles falling into jihadi hands is a threat of a new kind with very alarming dimensions. By spreading its strategic assets on relatively vulnerable ships at sea, Pakistan is repeating the mistake it makes with TNWs on land. The dangers of their safety and security are being multiplied manifold. Unfortunately, Pakistan appears blind to the dangers it is creating for itself in the process.

The latest buzzword in Pakistani nuclear strategy is "full spectrum deterrence against all forms of aggression." The deployment of nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines is being touted as acquisition of second strike capability. But, a second strike capability comes from delivery systems that are survivable because they are exceptionally mobile, hidden or stealthy to escape a first strike and mount a retaliatory strike. Pakistan is claiming second strike capability by distributing its nuclear assets on visible, traceable, dual-use platforms that brings in an ambiguity that could trigger mistaken, unauthorised and inadvertent escalation. This version of sea-based deterrence is certainly not conducive to regional or international stability.

NAXALITES AND THE MIGHT OF A FRAGILE REVOLUTION

 Bibhu Prasad Routray

On the morning of 18 October 2014, Shiv Kumar, a personnel belonging to the Chhattisgarh Armed Police was pulled out of a passenger bus in Sukma district by a group of Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres and killed. Kumar was ill and was on his way to the hospital when the bus he had boarded was waylaid by extremists. On the previous day, Raghunath Kisku, Founder Member, Nagarik Suraksha Samity (NSS), an anti-Maoist organisation, was killed by Maoists in Ghatshila sub-division of Jharkhand's East Singhbhum district.

Kumar was the 69th security force personnel and Kisku, the 164th civilian, to be killed by Maoists in 2014. Other activities perpetrated by the Maoists till 15 September include 125 attacks on the police; 40 occasions of snatching of weapons from the security forces; and holding of 25 arms training camps and 46 jan adalats in areas under their influence. While the occurrence of larger attacks have substantially decreased, the number of extremism-related incidents roughly remain the same compared to the corresponding period in 2013 – indicating the continuation of the challenge.

And yet it is a hard time for the Maoists. Till 15 September, 1129 CPI-Maoist cadres were neutralised, including 49 who were killed in encounters, and 1080 cadres, arrested. While the outfit can take pride from the sacrifices made by these men and women, what continues to trouble it is the perpetual desolation creeping into its ranks and files, leading to a large number of surrender of its leaders and cadres.

Among the 395 who have surrendered till 30 September are leaders like Gumudavelli Venkatakrishna Prasad alias Gudsa Usendi, Secretary, Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), arguably the outfit's most potent military division based in Bastar and his wife Raji; GP Reddy, Member, the DKSZC, and his wife Vatti Adime; and Bhagat Jade and his wife Vanoja. According to the Chhattisgarh police, over 140 cadres have surrendered between June and September 2014 in Bastar alone, partly due to the disillusion with the outfit's ideology and partly convinced by the police's method of highlighting the discrimination suffered by the local Chhattisgarh cadres at the hands of those drawn from Andhra Pradesh.

Press statements of the CPI-Maoist, while condemning these surrenders as demonstration of opportunism and desertion of the movement by corrupt and politically degenerated persons, admit that the revolution is currently undergoing its most difficult phase. The CPI-Maoist has accused the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi of launching the third phase of Operation Green Hunt, a ruthless war aimed at annihilating the Maoists who are the "biggest threat" to its "pro-reform" policies. Asserting that it has merely only engaged in a "war of self defence," the outfit has called for a "widespread struggle to fight back the threat by uniting all the revolutionary and democratic forces."

Its progressively declining capacity to annihilate enemies since 2010 – in spite of the ability to pull off some of the most spectacular attacks on security forces and politicians in recent years – has remained a matter of worry for the CPI-Maoist. Its failure to disrupt the parliamentary and state assembly elections coupled with a regular desertion of its cadres has descended as an existential threat on the outfit that once controlled one-third of the country's geographical area. Even with the persisting bureaucratic inertia and unimaginative security force operations, most of the affected states have gained in their fight against the extremists.

However, the outfit's domination over large swathes of area in Chhattiagrh, Odisha and Jharkhand with significant presence in states like Bihar provides it with the ability to continue with its small ambushes. Its recruitment and fund raising ability appears to have shrunk. And yet, the outfit harps about a people's militia "now in thousands" united by apathy of the state and carefully calibrated image of the government being a representative of the exploitative industrial houses. Hence, a scenario in which surrenders and killings of the Maoists would push the outfit into oblivion is remote.

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), after months of deliberation, is now armed with a new policy to counter the Maoists. The policy, subject to cabinet approval, would remain open to use "any element of national power" against the extremists. Although it does not rule out peace talks with the extremists, it makes the peace process conditional to the CPI-Maoist renouncing violence. It plans to make the state police the lead counter-insurgent force against the extremists while assigning the central forces, especially the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the responsibility of holding the counter-insurgency grid together "like a glue." While impressive in its nuances, the approach is guided by the belief that it is possible to wipe out the Maoists by force alone.

The impact of the new official counter-Maoist policy remains to be seen. However, in the clash between a militarily 'down-and-not-yet-out' CPI-Maoist and the official security apparatus that has its own set of serious problems, little more than persistence of the logjam can be expected.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABLE CRUISE MISSILE: THE NIRBHAY TEST

 Sheel Kant Sharma

India’s test of the nuclear capable cruise missile Nirbhay last week was immensely significant in two ways. First, it marked the culmination of DRDO’s efforts of not only the past decade but also the ambitions of its heads. It was in 1987 that the then DRDO Chief Arunachalam is reported to have said that he was launching a study towards making a cruise missile like the then famous Tomahawk. The then Soviet Union had agreed with the US in 1987 to the historic INF Treaty; eliminating, inter alia, a whole class of medium range missiles including the nuclear capable ground launched cruise missiles of range 500-5000 km. The INF treaty then was the high point of interest for disarmament and armament aficionados going all the way up to then PM Rajiv Gandhi and therefore it was smart to want to study how the Tomahawk came into being. Even so, 37 years is a rather long time. However, given the enormous constraints and challenges under which the DRDO works in India the successful test is certainly “better late than never.” This is especially so since China savvy Pakistanis have already tested the Babur missile several times and like to brandish it to silence any tough talk by India about their transgressions across the border or trans-border terror outfits functioning from Pakistani soil.

Second, a cruise missile like Nirbhay has two main components, namely, the rocket launching it into space and the propulsion system that kicks in after the missile separates, brings out its wings and flies like an aircraft. The second component has been advanced in several stages from the original cruise missile that the Germans toyed with almost seven decades ago during World War II. Its latest version uses supersonic propulsion, not subsonic, and the scramjet engine for that purpose is also in its second if not third decade, ever since the Russians tested a cruise missile with supersonic speeds around 1994. The Indian technology elite must come up to the table to be counted. That India still tests an indigenous cruise missile with turbofan engine and can claim all parameters working to copybook precision is more on the side of contentment than resolve to really make it to the big league. If the Maruti 800 of 1980s vintage is surpassed today by much better Indian cars, why should India remain satisfied with claiming success about a strategic system that belongs well in the last century?

As regards encouragement to Indian scientists and engineers, a comparison with the subcontinental rival may be instructive: the maker of the Pakistani bomb had to suffer only the optics of incarceration by a military regime despite serious allegations and pressure from donors and allies, whereas a top DRDO scientist in democratic India has to suffer post-retirement for due diligence demanded by compulsions of jurisprudence in regard to dismissal of a lower-echelon employee, unconnected with acquisition of cutting edge technologies or state of the art missiles.  

The problem that the defence institutions face in India today must not be suppressed by patriotic pride about the accomplishment, which is justified at all times, but must be addressed head on. Why is India not able to make the engine fly the state- of-the-art aircraft? The Light Combat Aircraft is a project going apace with DRDO but with an imported engine with attendant restrictions. The Brahmos missile is supersonic but its range is MTCR compliant under 300 km and its engine is Russian. Former President Abdul Kalam is on record talking about the hypersonic missiles in his time as DRDO head as he propounded a 2020 vision. That was at a time when India had just emerged post 1998, shattering global misperceptions about its inherent strength and external powers’ erroneous complacence about India’s timidity (that it would not dare to cross the Rubicon). However, the DRDO has had to languish in the past decade plus with sub-critical progress on the technology front even when the only superpower recognised Indian prowess and appeared well disposed to see India’s rise, particularly in the technology arena.

The pace of the global march of advanced technology is far too quick for our establishment’s glacial responses and capricious working environment. Just let us look at the present controversy between the US and Russia about the latter’s alleged violation of the INF Treaty by testing advanced cruise missiles supposedly proscribed by the Treaty, and the Russian counter-allegation about the US testing and deployment of systems covered by the Treaty’s remit. Regardless of how Moscow and Washington settle this issue or fail to do so, the current reports have a Cold War ring about them, are becoming voluminous, and show the sheer sweep of new technologies that are in the works. The world is on the cusp of a veritable new age of weapon systems for long and short range strikes, with or without nuclear weapons. These technologies are as usual dual purpose and subject to controls - but such controls were also in vogue twenty years ago when, for instance, the Chinese weapon systems were still of much older vintage and were struggling to come of age. Nonetheless, the hype about China, then as now, would remain hard to fathom - then about its impending irresistible rise and now about its having arrived with real strength and considerable clout over today’s technology. So, the lesson is to plan for at least two decades hence, provide the scientists clear policy guidance, required support and protection from systemic infirmities, and an atmosphere for perseverance and striving.

Just in case this emphasis is mistaken for trite arms race enthusiasm, it must be stated that the arms race is in any case already thrust upon India, either from behind or from the front by its colluding neighbours. An action like the testing of an older missile system like Nirbhay too might bring the moral high priests against it and it would not be a surprise if old hat clamour surfaces about destabilisation in South Asia. But in the end it is the prowess that is recognised and cutting edge ability that is respected. DRDO has miles to go before it can have a justified - and overdue - boast in that regard.

ROUHANI AND IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: CHARTING THE CHANGE

 Majid Izadpanahi

After the presidential elections of 14 June 2013, Iran’s Hassan Rouhani has proved that he is introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as he did when he was nuclear negotiator. Iranians have shown that they seek moderation and reject a hardline policy. This election has therefore created opportunities and opened the door for a rapprochement between Iran and the West.
The results of this election was a clear message from Iranians to the world, particularly the US, that they prefer a rational policy and dialogue with the West, a moderate approach, and the preference to be a part of the international community, rather than following an adventurous policy, confrontation with the West, and isolation. The radicals in Iran faced a dramatic defeat despite their eight-year old domination of the executive system.
Why Change?
Ahmadinejad’s maladministration led to economic chaos, devaluation of the Iranian currency and decline of the rate of economic growth. The conservatives’ hardline policies led to the internationally isolation of Iran. Admadinejad’s controversial speeches and policies raised suspicions in the West about Iran’s nuclear programme. This led to the to imposition of international sanctions on Iran with the purpose of curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons programme at the United Nations Security Council. The sanctions targeted the Iranian oil industry, banks and its economy, which had an adverse impact on the Iranian economy as well as Iran’s economic relations with other countries. Through the sanctions, there was an attempt to deprive the Iranian government of oil revenue and finally influence the nuclear programme. In response to this, Ayatollah Khamenei termed the sanctions barbaric.
Today, Iranian President Rouhani is determined to bring to end speculation about Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and rebuild relations with the world and the West. Beyond that, he seeks to normalise the relationship with the US – as he himself said, Iran cannot be resentful of the US forever.
Iran-Middle East 
Relations between Iran and its neighbours are on an upward slope. Sultan Qaboos of Oman, who mediates between Tehran and Washington, visited Iran, perhaps to discuss mediation with the government. The ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Al Maktoum, in his interview with BBC in January 2014 demanded that the sanctions on Iran be lifted. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Saud Al faisal met Iranian Foreign Minister, Zavad Zarif in New York, where they discussed bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism and other regional problems.
Iran-Europe
There has been a significant change in Iran’s behaviour towards major European countries. After the seizing of the British Embassy by radicals and break in relations in 2011, the Iranian Foreign Minister recently met the British Foreign secretary and the respective embassies were reopened in Tehran and London. President Rouhani in his visit to Davos for the World Economic Forum invited oil companies to invest in Iran and was warmly welcomed by the large oil companies. Further, Iran and the P5+1 group reached an interim nuclear deal and the West has temporally suspended some of the sanctions on Iran until a final agreement is reached, when all sanctions will hopefully be removed.
Nuclear Deal
Just one month after Rouhani took the office Ayatollah Khamenei paved the way for flexibility in negotiations with the West by saying, “As long as red lines are not crossed … artful and heroic flexibility in all the political arenas are accepted.” This can be interpreted as Ayatollah Khamenei’s support for Rouhani’s foreign policy based on interactions with the West and integration in the international system.
Iran-US
Thirty five years after the Revolution and subsequent break in ties, the Iranian and American presidents had a landmark telephonic conversation, and the foreign ministers of both states have met several times in the form of bilateral and multilateral talks. The optimism that now has appeared is not only due to the gradual lifting of sanctions but also the results of the 2013 elections that brought back the pragmatists and reformists to power, who have already shown their eagerness for friendly relations with the West.
How Long Will the Change Last?
Everything now depends on how the US perceives the political situation in Iran and responds to the policy of the moderates. If the moderates and reformists get the expected results, it can increase their political manoeuvrability against the conservatives and radicals. The bottom line would be that the radicals would then not be able undermine the moderates’ authority.
Given the upcoming parliamentary elections in December 2015 in Iran, it becomes important to point out that parliament today is under the rule of conservatives. If the moderates hope to win, they will have to strengthen their position against the conservatives, and for this they need tangible achievements in terms of the economy and a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The nuclear deal can change Iran’s political and economic situation. And the sooner they achieve it, the better able they will be to change the power equation. 

MUSLIMS IN SRI LANKA: FOUR REASONS FOR THEIR MARGINALISATION

 Roomana Hukil

With the defeat of the Tamil Tigers after 26 years in 2009 in Sri Lanka, it was hoped that the Sri Lankan political space would see a new opening for a peaceful co-existence, and attempts were made to address the long standing grievances between the Tamil community and other minority groups. However, Sinhalese Buddhist triumphalism led to its consolidation of power within the ruling party. As a result, assertions for a single Sinhala Buddhist state were made and many instances of violence, essentially against the Sinhalese Muslims, drew the attention of the international community.
Such percolating hate-filled propaganda against the Sri Lankan minorities raise concerns about the prospects for reconciliation and reconstruction policies/processes. What has led to the marginalisation of Sri Lankan Muslims in Sri Lanka, especially when compared to the other ethno-religious minority groups in the country?
Historical Hiccup
At the beginning of the 20th century, the majoritarian attitude towards the minority was based on religious and not ethnic factors. This attitude changed during independence, when Tamil Indians were targeted based on their ethnicity. It was only post-independence that the Sri Lankan Muslims started being targeted on the basis of their religious, linguistic and ethnic differences. Disparities were first realised in the early 1990s, when 72,000 Tamil Muslims from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka were forcibly evicted by the LTTE when Jaffna peninsula was captured and hundreds were massacred.
This phenomenon has re-emerged with the defeat of the LTTE and, now, the divide is based on a composition of ethnic, religious, political and economic underpinnings.
Demography
The latest census indicates a vast increase in the number of Sinhalese Muslims from 8.5 to 9.7 per cent in 2001 and 2012 respectively. On the other hand, the Theravada Buddhists who represented 76.7 per cent of the population in 2001 have fallen to 70.2 per cent in 2012. This alteration disturbs the majority Buddhist community as well as the national political parties who consider electoral representation and allotment and distribution of the limited land as pressing concerns. Consequently, political parties are alleged to be supporting the cause for radical groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS).
Furthermore, on the eastern coast, Tamil and Sinhalese Muslims roughly share the same demographic composition that is steadily mounting. This is seen as an impediment to the Sinhalese Buddhist’s ideology of a ‘single Sinhala nation’ since they live in a minority there. 
Sensitivity Factor
The objective of the hardliners in Sri Lanka is to touch upon and raise sensitive issues that are common also to other less aggravated Sinhalese sections of the population. The aim is to create an inter-communal divide. Early 2013, the BBS campaigned against the system of certifying halal meat products in the country, stating that Muslims were trying to impose their food habits with an intention of bringing about Sharia law. Due to pressure exerted by the BBS, the government pronounced that the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU) should cease to issue halal certificates on meat products.
Supplementing the frantic urge to create communal divisions, the BBS also alleged the slaughter of cows in a meat inspection facility in Dematagoda. However, they were proven inaccurate.
Eye Openers
The status of Muslims has changed considerably since the 1970s, when Muslims were played against the LTTE. With the fall of the Tamil Tigers, the Sinhalese Muslims lost their value-laden image and ceased to exist as perceived assets to the Sinhala state. Also, post 2009, Muslims started flourishing in their business enterprises, trade and commerce units in urban spaces. They gained a foothold in the Sinhalese Army and acted as significant contributors to the economy. The Sinhalese Buddhists began to fear that their positions and opportunities were being overwhelmed by the minority groups.
Without the issue of the Sinhalese Muslims in Sri Lanka, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero would not be a popular figure. Radical establishments like the BBS seek out new enemies and problems to grow and survive. As a consequence, the BBS also urges Muslims to exhibit their anxiety and angst against the majority Sinhalese Buddhists so that they may spontaneously react, allowing the BBS to project the Muslims negatively and gain popular support from the majority Sinhalese population. 

As a result of these factors, Muslims are being pinned against the wall as were the Tamils in 1972 when the standardisation quota was implemented. Gradually, the moderate Tamils turned radical. This may seems as a distant possibility but certainly cannot be discounted for the Sinhalese Muslims. At present, Muslims in Sri Lanka are alienating themselves from the mainstream community. The issue, at this time, for the Sinhalese Muslims in Sri Lanka is to choose between living as ‘Muslims of Sri Lanka’ or as ‘Muslims in Sri Lanka’.

USING DEFENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT: NEW POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA

 Bhartendu Kumar Singh

 

Defence and development have remained watertight compartments in India’s national security discourse and are largely perceived within the ‘guns versus butter debate’. Both compete for the scarce resources and hesitate to reach out to each other, both in terms of academic literature or through policy manifestations.

While former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s model of ‘inclusive growth’ attempted to bridge this divide in conceptual terms, the incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has gone a step further and announced an investment of Rs. 50,000 crore towards the development and construction of six submarines on indigenous platforms. The move is likely to usher in another chapter where the defence sector would adopt a development approach in expanding the domestic military industrial complexes (MICs).

The new decision points towards an optimistic future in many ways. First, it is a significant step towards saving foreign exchange that is spent on the purchase of imported weaponry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the past five years, India accounted for 14 per cent of international arms imports. Its weapons imports are almost three times higher than China and Pakistan; and certainly embarrassing for a great power candidate that imports its 70 per cent armory through imports. An inflated dollar in the international market has only complicated India’s woes. Second, India funds the revitalisation process of foreign MICs.  Russia and Israel export 38 and 33 per cent of their arms respectively to India; and many European countries follow.

The sick MICs of these countries owe a lot to Indian benevolence for their resurrection. However, investing this money in domestic MIC will create jobs apart from the proliferation of ancillary industries in different geographical hubs. Third, such investments would also contribute in capacity development of defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and help them compete in the global market. It is quite a tragedy that there are only two Indian defence PSUs that figure in world’s top 100 arms producer: the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (40th position) and the Ordnance Factories (47th position). Their shares in arms exports are quite negligible and make a mockery of the taxpayers’ investments.

Past experiences in defence manufacturing, however, engender certain apprehensions. First, many defence projects have stretched beyond a reasonable period of time and have had excessive cost over-runs. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, for example, has been delayed for ages and now when it is ready for induction, the preference is for the French-made Rafale. Thus, the opportunity for self-reliance in a critical area like fighter jet technology is again being missed out. The progress in another ambitious project, MBT Arjun has been rather self-defeating, forcing the army to look for substitute purchases from Russia. Similarly, India’s Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), INS Vikrant, being built by the Cochin Shipyard Limited in Kochi, is delayed by four to five years, and is now likely to be on sea only around 2018. The 2011 defence production policy therefore needs to be made more robust to cater to these issues.

Second, as has been experienced in some projects, the ‘make in India’ efforts ultimately lead to ‘assemble in India’ wherein foreign components still dominate; technological growth does not take place and the efforts to expand the domestic MIC fail miserably. Dependence on foreign countries in critical technologies will dilute the efforts to make commercial use of indigenous defence products since a heavy forex would still fly abroad in royalty.

Additionally, several contemporary challenges thwart the government’s effort to create a mutually supportive environment where defence would promote development. First, the domestic MIC is dominated by defence PSUs and ordnance factories; with very little contribution from the private sector. Worse, their geographical distribution is mostly in developed pockets where the cost of labour and infrastructure is high. Backward states like Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa etc. should, therefore, also get an equitable pie in the development cake. Fresh capital investments must consider these issues since they will act as ‘engines of growth’ and could arrest outward migration from these regions.

Second, while the present capital investment is a generous step, sustaining it on a long-term basis would be difficult unless the revenue capital ratio (presently at 57:43) in the future defence budgets is rationalised. Rightsising of manpower based on global experience is the sin-qua-non for transferring the rupee towards the domestic MIC.

Third, getting the best from defence PSUs, despite fresh investments, remains a challenge since they work in a monolithic environment, behave largely as departmental extensions and resist corporate reforms. Its time to look beyond them; and the government’s incentives must indeed be reserved for investment in new technologies, patents and innovations in defence that could be marketed and put through commercial utilisation. If the private sector joins the bandwagon, it would be encouraging.

A developmental approach to defence that allows it to promote growth and development rather than treating it as only ‘cash outgo’ is required in administering the defence budget. Many middle powers like Germany, Sweden, Italy, Ukraine etc. make a killing from vibrant MICs providing jobs to millions and earning foreign exchange. India can similarly reorient its defence expenditure and unleash harmonious progress of defence and development. 

UNSC RESOLUTION 2178: COMPROMISING DEMOCRATIC VALUES?

 Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

 

Over the course of this year, the threat of Islamist terror changed dramatically for the worse. 13,000 people who do not belong either to Syria, or Iraq, now fight for the terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) in its battles in Syria and Iraq. A multilateral approach to tackle and eliminate security issues arising from terrorism is therefore pressing.

In September 2014, the UN Security Council and its member states agreed on Resolution 2178. The resolution condemns violent extremism and urges international cooperation to prevent foreign fighters from travelling to and from conflict areas. It aims at preventing the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. It is a binding agreement that requires all member states to implement changes in their national laws. The changes are expected to make it possible for the said States to impose stricter border controls and restrain people – from travelling to or transit through their territories – if they have “credible information that provides reasonable grounds” to believe that the person is involved in terrorism activities.

The Resolution was passed unanimously without any debate. However, what does the Resolution actually entail? Is it possible to implement laws on foreign nationals without compromising democratic values?

Considering the numbers of foreign fighters and the fear they generate is a reason in itself to agree to Resolution 2178 because it would be counter-productive to veto a move that intends to combat international threats? Furthermore, whether or not Resolution 2178 will have successful outcomes depends on how anti-terrorism laws are enforced by every individual country.

What stands out among anti-terrorism laws in several countries is the restriction on travel to conflict areas and the increase in surveillance. How countries choose to respond to the legally binding agreements, varies. In order to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders, the Australian government has implemented strict travel laws. Suspected terrorists captured during their travel to what the Australian Bill refers to as `no-go-zones´, without a valid reason can result in imprisonment for 10 years.

The Bill also allows the police to detain suspects for 14 days with any specific charges as long as there is suspicion of criminal conduct. However, Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism. Thus, there is scope for racial profiling to take place, given how member states can relate criminal conducts and define potential terrorists according to their own preferences and national laws. According to Marina Portnaya, Correspondent, Russia TV, this allows countries to monitor and use more targeted surveillance against people in the name of international security.

The unclear wording of the Resolution leaves room for countries to be biased, and decide whom to target, based on their own preferences. This can result in excuses for countries to implement repressive measures. In addition to racial profiling, the Resolution can end up giving law enforcement officers new tools to deal with activists or separatist groups by labelling them as terrorists according to their thoughts and beliefs rather than their actions. Additionally, governments have the authority to block websites that defend or encourage terrorism, exclusive of court orders, with imprisonment as the consequence. Critics view this as an attack on democratic rights and that innocent people become stripped of their rights regarding freedom of expression.

Another critique of Resolution 2178 is about the freedom of movement. Increased surveillance allows the legalisation of the collection of photographs at airports, and airlines will be legally obliged to pass on information about passengers flying to/from conflict areas. One of the concerns expressed has been that the restrictions on travelling to `no-go-zones´ can lead to the criminalisation of innocent people who genuinely go to visit family or friends.

The French Senate and its anti-terrorism laws authorised in mid-October better prepare the authorities to impose restrictions on citizens when there is a reason to believe that people are partaking or planning acts of terror. Any suspicion results in the potential listing of names on the Schengen Information System, imprisonment up to three years, and a $58,000 fine. Immigrant support organisations and human rights groups are concerned that these laws will affect migration because the Bill allows the governments to deny foreign nationals viewed as “undesirable” access to the country. Human rights specialist Simon Slama argues that France´s fear of terrorism will be taken advantage of by the government as a means to strengthen border controls and decrease immigration into the EU, especially putting restrictions on people from eastern European countries.

Regardless of the critiques, countries have legal backing for their laws because Resolution 2178 is a binding agreement adopted by the UN Security Council, which means that violation of the Resolution would imply violation of international laws. Human rights organisations might find it frustrating, but the vaguely-worded language and flexible definitions allow countries to design anti-terrorism laws to their own advantage and implement laws that suit their national politics. What is surprising is the extent to which governments are willing to compromise democratic values for the sake of security, as long as they have an international law to fall back on.

JAMAAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH: DESIGNS AND NETWORKS IN INDIA

 N Manoharan

 

In the wake of Burdwan blast, the Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh recently ordered an immediate neutralisation of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) terror modules in India. What is the JMB? What are its designs and network in India?
 

JMB, meaning ‘Assembly of Holy Warriors in Bangladesh’, is a Bangladesh-based terror outfit. Formed in 1998, the principal objective of the JMB is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh on the basis of Sharia laws. With a strong belief in Salafist ideology, it is opposed to modern principles of governance such as democracy, liberalism, socialism and secularism and considers them anti-Islamic. In the initial stages, funding to the JMB came from various sources: robbery, smuggling, donations, patronage, subscriptions and “taxations.” Very soon, it turned to more lucrative foreign sources and counterfeit currencies.

The then Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government’s political patronage also helped in the JMB’s phenomenal growth and influence. The government did not realise the gravity of the JMB’s designs until the terror group triggered country-wide serial bombings in August 2005 (500 bombs in 63 of 64 districts of Bangladesh in a span of half-an-hour).

In the ensuing crackdown, many of the JMB’s leaders and cadres were arrested or killed, especially by the Rapid Action Battalion of Bangladesh. It was at this stage that the JMB decided to shift some of its operations to India. Abdur Rahman (alias Shahadat), who sneaked into India in 2006, was instrumental in building the outfit’s network across the India-Bangladesh border. Around the same time, the operational wing of the JMB in West Bengal was declared as the “65th Unit.” The JMB has been operating a bomb-making units in Burdwan, West Bengal, India, in which grenades have also been manufactured and transported to Bangladesh in consignments. The fact that bomb blasts at Chennai and Patna in May this year have had JMB signatures indicate that the IEDs might have been diverted within India as well.

India is being used by the JMB not just for hideouts, but for recruitment as well. Recruitment is done through madrasas, mosques and effective use of social media. The JMB’s network is especially active in West Bengal’s districts of Murshidabad, Malda and Nadia and in parts of Muslim-majority districts in Assam. These areas are closer to the JMB’s stronghold of northern and north-western Bangladesh. Also, the JMB’s traditional strategy of creating networks of matrimonial alliances across the border helped in easy establishment of bases in India. Going by call records and visits of those JMB members who have now been arrested, the outfit appears to have footprints in southern India and Jammu and Kashmir as well. There are an estimated 50 modules operating in India.

What is more concerning is the JMB’s linkage with other terror groups in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even beyond. The common thread that connects all these groups is their anti-Indian, anti-democratic and pro-Salafist ideology. It is difficult to operate in India without the assistance of Indian militant groups. Some of the JMB’s known collaborators are the Indian Mujahideen, al Jihad, al Ummah and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). In the case of Pakistan, the JMB has a good network with the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HuJI); and with the Taliban and al Qaida in Afghanistan. For its operations in Myanmar, the JMB relied on Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), based in the Rohingya refugee camps in southern Bangladesh. Going by the latest slogan of JMB – “Jihad from Bangladesh to Baghdad” – such a wide network is obvious. The scope of the engagement among these terror groups ranges from training, recruitment, funding, information-sharing, arms procurement, operational assistance, manpower, and logistics. Funding to the JMB has been traced to NGOs based in countries of West Asia and Europe. This shows that the JMB’s network involves a section of the Bangladeshi Diaspora and other jihadi groups.

Bangladesh-based terror groups acting against India is not a new development. What is new is that the this is a Bangladeshi terror group based in India acting against both India and Bangladesh. This is a serious development. It is of utmost concern that the activities of the JMB in India have gone unnoticed for over half a decade. It would have remained so for long had blasts at Burdwan not taken place accidentally. Vote bank and communal politics, lack of capability of the state police forces, lack of proper of coordination between the Centre and the States, and lack of cooperation between India and Bangladesh are few reasons for the JMB’s successful hiding. These issues have to be addressed on an urgent basis.

Border guarding cannot afford to be slacked off on, and requires attention. A substantial amount of the JMB’s purpose is lost, if its cross-border activities are curtailed. This aside, India could consider strengthening Bangladesh’s counter-terrorism capabilities, especially in dealing with radical groups. The present government in Dhaka has been helpful in stifling North-east India-based militant groups that took shelter in Bangladesh. A weak and pro-Islamist regime in Bangladesh is not in the interest of India. Robust counter-terrorism cooperation between India and Bangladesh is imperative to tackle common enemies like the JMB.

ISLAMIC STATE: EFFICACY OF COUNTER-STRATEGIES

 Ranjit Gupta

 

The efficacy of the US strategy to defeat the Islamic State (IS) can only be meaningfully evaluated in the context of the current regional and international geopolitical configurations. It should be self-evident that there is no possibility at all of any political approach to successfully confront and overcome the challenge posed the IS. If the IS is not defeated, the whole system of nation states in West Asia will almost surely crumble. At the present critical juncture, given the ground realities in Iraq, Syria and the Arab world in general – and internal divisions amongst Arab states and between Arab states and non-Arab states such as Iran and Turkey – it should also be clear that there is no possibility of any regional military coalition being forged to take on the IS.

Therefore, countries of the region have little or no choice but to have the US lead the fight against the IS even though Washington’s military entanglements in the Arab and Muslim worlds have greatly adversely affected its credibility, influence and standing in the region; and have in fact been one of the primary causes of the rise of Islamic extremism. After all, the US has been the preeminent regional security architect for the past several decades and remains the major weapons supplier to regional countries barring Iran and Syria.

No other Western or non-regional country can do it or will even be willing to attempt to do it by themselves; even their involvement is predicated only on the US leading the war. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and UK too have joined in conducting airstrikes in Iraq. In a break from the traditional policy of not supplying arms to countries in zones of conflict, Germany will be supplying arms to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have carried out airstrikes in Syria. There are varying accounts of Qatar’s involvement. After doggedly refusing to allow any support for any military action in Iraq or Syria against the IS despite intense personal efforts by US President Barack Obama and the secretaries of state and defense, Turkey has reluctantly allowed the Free Syrian Army fighters and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga to transit its territory en route to Kobani to dislodge the IS from there.  

The central feature of the strategy is to carry out airstrikes both in Iraq and Syria initially to stop the heretofore irresistible advance of the IS and to degrade its capabilities. This has happened in many sectors if not everywhere. The US and its partners have by now carried out a few thousand airstrikes. However, Obama has made it clear that there will be no American boots on the ground, meaning Americans in the tens of thousands will not be there as in the past. Such involvement will only exacerbate extremism. Another caveat is that combat activity must absolutely include the active involvement of regional countries. This is what the US has been implementing. Even though it is clear that the war cannot be won through via air strikes alone, the reality is that the world has no better alternative to this approach for the present.  

So far, however, a Shiite coalition, of Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias and the Iraqi and Syrian governments, has been the main force arrayed against the IS on the ground apart from particularly valiant contributions by the Kurdish Peshmerga. Thus we have the strange scenario of seeing the US and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Shia ruled Iraq, the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US and assorted Islamist extremist groups, Kurds of different nationality groups and factions perpetually at loggerheads with each other, all in the same camp warring against the IS, tacitly cooperating with each other even if they more often than not publicly deny any open explicit collaboration. This is a part of the ground reality even if not a formal part of US strategy.

However, the fight against the IS cannot be compartmentalised. It occupies 2/5ths of the total territory of Syria and 2/5ths of the total territory of Iraq and is actually stronger in Syria; the border between the two countries has been erased. The IS cannot be defeated in Iraq without being defeated in Syria and therefore it will have to be confronted in Syria also. Despite recognising this as exhibited by the airstrikes in Syria, countries opposed to Assad are maintaining that they will not cooperate with Assad in fighting the IS and will continue supporting so called ‘moderate’ rebels by supplying arms. Such distinctions are completely arbitrary and subjective and have proven to be counterproductive. The US has promised $500 million worth of arms and training is going to be provided to the rebels in Saudi Arabia. This will only exacerbate and prolong Syria’s civil war and undermine the dire need of a united response to the IS.

The coalition’s policy approach in Syria maybe alright as a temporary tactic, but strategically, it is completely counterproductive.

THE FUTURE OF SAARC IS NOW

 Pramod Jaiswal

 

The 18th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit is taking place in Kathmandu at the historic moment when South Asia is going through massive transformation. India elected Narendra Modi as its prime minister with an overwhelming majority. Nepal voted for the second Constituent Assembly after the first failed to deliver the constitution within the stipulated time. Afghanistan, the newly inducted member of SAARC voted for Ashraf Ghani as its president. Sheikh Hasina and Nawaz Sharif were elected to the prime minister’s positions in Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively. The King of Bhutan devolved powers to his country-people who aspired for democracy.

Media reports suggest that three agreements – SAARC Railway Agreement, SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement and SAARC Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation – might be signed during the 18th SAARC Summit, scheduled for 26-27 November.

Formation of the SAARC

The SAARC was formed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to actualise their common goals, economic cooperation being one of them. Afghanistan was introduced as the newest member, in 2007.

Regionalism began and flourished around the world after World War II with the aim of liberalising trade among the member states of respective blocs. The end of the Cold War further strengthened their commitments towards greater economic cooperation via free trade agreements, such as in the European Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the Common Southern Market, and the Southern African Development Community. With the EU’s success story, there has been a rise in the number of such regional organisations. Founded in 1985, SAARC was a late arrival in following the growing trend of regionalism.

Opportune Moment  for SAARC
South Asia can have tremendous opportunity as the economy of the region has great impact on the global economy. The epicenter of global economy is gradually shifting towards the east with the emergence of China and India as the largest economies. Economic integration within South Asia region possesses great opportunity; China’s inclusion can change the game altogether. It is possible that China applied for observer status in the SAARC due to this potential. The challenge facing the leaders of SAARC member countries is to materialise the enormous potential for the betterment of the people of the region. South Asia is the least integrated region in the world with the lowest intra-regional trade. There is a pressing need for a speedy implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement.

Challenges 

South Asian regionalism has been suffering due to bilateral tensions and differences between the member countries. The region has a long history of conflicts, especially between India and Pakistan – who have fought four wars since 1947. Though the India-Pakistan rivalry is often blamed for SAARC’s failure, the reasons are in fact deeper and structural in nature. The geographical, ethnic, historical and political factors have gridlocked SAARC and will persist unless India adopts proactive confidence-building measures.

One of the major reasons for the failure of SAARC is that one of its members is much larger than all of its other members put together. India accounts for over 60 per cent of SAARC’s geographcical area, population, GDP, foreign exchange, gold reserves and armed forces. The huge resource and power imbalance generates an acute sense of insecurity among the member countries. Moreover, its relationship with the second largest member, Pakistan, causes polarisation instead of regional harmony owing to their historical conflict. Similarly, India shares boundaries (land and/or maritime) with all the member countries while they, (barring Pakistan and Afghanistan) do not share boundaries with each other. The existing unsettled border disputes and increasing conventional conflicts with India has increased a sense of insecurity among its neighbours.

Another important factor that hinders regional cooperation is the variation in their political beliefs. South Asia has witnessed all types of political systems – democracy, monarchy and dictatorship. India being the matured democracy and propagator of democracy in the region created asymmetry in political dealings among the member countries. Insecurity and distrust among the member countries forced smaller member countries to bandwagon with external powers (or other member countries) to balance India – thus hampering regional cooperation.

Modi’s invitation to the heads of governments of the SAARC member-states to his swearing-in ceremony was perhaps a signal that under his tenure as the prime minister, India would prioritise its neighbourhood. He visited Bhutan and Nepal and shared India’s desire to establish a SAARC satellite. One has to wait and watch if Modi would be able to fulfill those promises.

In order to revive the SAARC, one or more member countries can take initiatives to reduce distrust and insecurities among the member countries. Similarly, like-minded SAARC countries can form a sub-regional group and enjoy the benefits of regional cooperation. But cooperation in the sub-regional group which includes India will have limited cooperation within SAARC, while a sub-regional group that does not include India will suffer from a lack of contiguity and capacity constraints. India, being the largest economy of South Asia should show its benevolence and bear the cost of rejuvenating the SAARC for promoting regional cooperation in the region. Despite of the discouraging past, there is optimism among the member countries as all the South Asian countries have adopted democracy and are realising the benefits of regionalism.

" BRITAIN BELONGS TO ALLAH":ANJEM CHOUDARY AND HIS SUPPORTERS

 Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

“We don’t abide by British rule.” “Sharia is the law of God, and should be implemented in the whole world.” “The ‘flag of Sharia’ will eventually fly over Downing Street.” These are statements voiced by the radical preacher, Anjem Choudary, in the UK.

What do Choudary and his supporters seek?

Anjem Choudary, a 47 year-old British Muslim of Pakistani descent born in England, is a former lawyer and founding member of proscribed Islamist groups like al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK. These groups were banned based on government evidence of them operating as terrorist organisations with links to al Qaeda. According to Hope Not Hate, Choudary represents “the single biggest gateway to terrorism in recent British history.”

His support base is prominent. According to a recent poll by ICM Research, 40 per cent of 500 Muslim families that were surveyed expressed support for the establishment of strict Sharia laws in the UK. Policy Exchange reveals that one-third of the domestic Muslim youth would happily succumb to Sharia. According to Henry Jackson Society, 18 per cent of people linked to acts of terror have had associations with Choudary´s banned organisations. Hope Not Hate reveals that 200-300 supporters from Choudary’s European network have left to fight in Syria. His guidance has resulted in an indoctrination of vulnerable youth who have devoted themselves to terrorism in the UK and abroad.

The shared views of Choudary and sections of the British Muslim population who are his supporters have been well documented by the media. However, whether these supporters extend solidarity to Choudary because they genuinely believe in him or whether it is because of the cause he represents, is unclear. Jihad is considered a just war, and like Choudary, his supporters believe that the IS will surface as the winning power. They may not directly believe in Choudary as a person, but they seek the same end: a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.

If Sharia offers such an exceptional way of living, why is Choudary still living in Britain? When confronted with whether he should leave Britain, Choudary says, “Why should I? I was born here.” It is this supposedly oppressive apartheid system that, according to Choudary, impedes him from leaving: apparently if he decides to go, he will be arrested and his passport confiscated. “Muslims are imprisoned over here. We can’t travel abroad,” says Choudary. How then does he travel to Spain and France for Islamic conferences?

Choudary cheers for Muslims to quit their jobs and request unemployment benefits. He despises the country he lives in, but contentedly receives welfare benefits provided by the state. UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 categorises terrorism as the use of threat to intimidate or influence the government, organisations or the public with “the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.” Choudary somehow seems to stay on the right side of law. On occasions where he has been linked to convicted terrorists like Habib Ahmed (convicted for membership with al-Aqeda), Choudary has proclaimed that these people left his groups prior to the conviction, and he cannot therefore be held responsible for their actions. Thus, as a former lawyer, Choudary probably knows his way around British law so as to avoid prosecution for his provocative views on race relations and religion. However, there have been debates on whether his hate speeches should be met with resistance by law enforcement officers.

In 2010, the Terrorism Act led to the banning of Islam4UK, based on accusation of the group’s controversial statements about the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 bombings. Choudary openly condemned the act, saying, “We are now being targeted as an extremist or terrorist organisation and even banned for merely expressing that. I feel this is a failure of the concept of democracy and freedom.” On the contrary, Choudary said in an interview with Iranian Press TV: “As Muslims, we reject democracy, we reject secularism, and freedom, and human rights.” However, it is this democracy that allows Choudary to use his freedom of speech and make controversial statements. 

On 25 September, Choudary and eight other radicals were arrested in an anti-terror raid, based on the accusation of their support for banned organisations and for encouraging terrorism. However, Choudary was later released on bail. According to Choudary, the arrest was nothing more than a politically motivated move for the government to gain votes on Iraqi airstrikes, and went as far as to say that this bloody war will eventually “manifest itself on the streets of London.” In a multicultural society like Britain, views similar to Choudary’s have proved difficult to silence. An interesting question to ask is: if Britain were to adopt Sharia, how would people like Choudary react to hate speech against its state, and would the same rights to protest that radical Muslims enjoy today be granted in such a state?

THE ISLAMIST STATE AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS: JIHADIST FROM CENTRAL ASIA

 Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

As violent jihadist activities in Syria and Iraq intensify, the number of foreign nationals enrolling to fight for the Islamic State (IS) is witnessing an exponential growth. The case of Central Asian jihadists - fighters who are nationals of Tajikstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan - joining the Islamic State (IS) is interesting, especially given the political history of the region’s neighbourhood. Despite the involvement of Central Asian-origin people in the insurgency in Afghanistan over the past few years, several Central Asian radical Islamists have chosen to travel to Syria and Iraq instead of the former. There is a need to understand why nationals of Central Asian countries are joining the IS.
Central Asian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq
Today, there are an estimated 31,500 jihadists who fight under the IS’s banner in Syria and Iraq. Approximately 15,000 of them are estimated to be foreign fighters and 2000 of them are pitted as from Western countries. While the numbers of nationals of Western countries joining the IS are easier to find, the numbers of their Central Asian counterparts are comparatively difficult to obtain and/or ascertain. Some recent estimates pit the number at anywhere between 3000-4000, with Tajiks constituting the largest chunk. According to reports, there are about “250 Kazakh citizens, 100 Kyrgyz, 190 Tajiks, 500 Uzbeks, and about 360 Turkmens fighting alongside ISIS extremists,” that have been identified, with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan being the most vulnerable to IS influence, especially via Ferghana Valley. However, these numbers too are difficult to confirm.
Motivations for Joining the IS
Some motivations for joining the IS are common between Western jihadists and Central Asian jihadists. Among those are the organisational and administrative capabilities of the IS; the quality of life assured for IS fighters (that is comparatively higher than what the Afghan Taliban or al Qaeda ever provided); the chance to be on the ‘winning side’; and the potential to settle instead of having to run for cover (as opposed to the Taliban’s experience in Afghanistan). Another reason is the relative failure of al Qaeda in comparison to the Islamic State to hold territory.
More importantly, the 1300 year old prophecy in the Hadith about a ‘malahim’ (day of reckoning) speaks about the clash of Islam and the ‘infidels’ in Dabiq, Syria, is doing the rounds in the jihadist social media. The IS has in fact been using this Hadith to legitimise its actions in Iraq and Syria, and the historical religious significance of the prophecy has managed to draw more radical Islamists towards this insurgency. So strong is this prophecy’s influence on the group, that their official magazine is called Dabiq.
To this end, the war in Afghanistan is a jihad with nationalistic contours, but the war in Syria and Iraq is transnational in nature and does not aim to end at national borders. It is about something on a much larger scale - the recreation of the world as a single world order. And coming from the present-day territories of historical Khurasan - as also emphasised by the IS - these radicalised Central Asian fighters feel obligated to join.

Noticeable Trends
This sentiment could also have been augmented by the nature of news reports that are made available in these countries. The outrage over the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Israel’s offensives in Gaza, the flux in the Egyptian political environment, and the mistreatment of Muslims on various occasions across the globe have found ample space in their media. As Christian Bleuer states in the recent Afghanistan Analysts Network report, “…this author has very rarely seen in the media, or heard in local discussions, concerns over Uyghurs, Rohingyas, Chechens, Dagestanis or Afghans.” The argument about motivations depending on the call for universal jihad to protect Muslims everywhere therefore becomes complex here. There appears to be a general tendency to know and to be concerned more with what is happening in West Asia - Arab areas in particular - than other neighbouring areas with considerable Muslim populations. This means, in many ways, the primary driver is still the attraction to the status of the Arab world than just the cause of rallying for the global Ummah.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the IS’s anti-Shia policies that otherwise do not find much resonance in the Central Asian society have begun to attract the younger generation of Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. This is a shift from the trend followed by Central Asian recruits when they joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s policies have not been the elimination of Shias altogether, whereas, the IS’s policies are as much about the elimination of Shias as their goal to expand the borders of the ‘Islamic Caliphate’.
This indicates a trend of gradual Salafisation of the societies in the Central Asian republics. Ironically, the rise of al Qaeda over the past two decades has laid the groundwork for legitimising the IS’s (whom they disowned in February) agenda.

THE U.S, SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE SUCCESS OF AIRSTRIKES SO FAR

 KP Fabian

 

The battle for Kobane, the Kurdish town on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, is still raging, though indications are that the US’ airstrikes have so far failed to make a decisive impact and reverse the advance of the Islamic State (IS) fighters. The US’ airstrikes on the IS have been ongoing for almost a month in Syria and for two months in Iraq. Yet, Ramadi, the capital of the huge Anbar province in western Iraq might fall to IS soon. The question arises on whether or not US President Barack Obama’s strategy – military and political – against the IS will work.

On September 10, he announced that the US would “degrade and ultimately destroy” the IS. At present, it is clear that the US strategy is not working. But, the key question to raise is whether there is a coherent, consequential, and consistent US policy to deal with the crisis in Iraq and Syria. The answer is in the negative.

Washington’s policy has been vitiated by misjudgments and incoherence. In August 2011, President Obama, after a fortnight-long consultations with his counterparts in UK, France, and Germany, announced that there should be a regime change in Syria; President Basher al-Assad had forfeited his legitimacy and it was abundantly clear that he had to go. One might have reasonably concluded that Obama spoke out on the basis of a political assessment made by his intelligence agencies and diplomats, corroborated by their counterparts in the other three countries.

Obviously, the assessment was deeply flawed. UN officials who visited Syria to prepare the ground for the Kofi Annan mission that started in February 2012 found no reason to conclude that Assad was on his way out. How did Obama come to his conclusion? It appears that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had conveyed to US that their intelligence agencies had, after investigations, come to that conclusion. Perhaps, because Assad is close to Iran, and the US wants to weaken Iran, Washington might have uncritically accepted the Saudi-Qatar inputs.

In August 2012, Obama revealed the ‘red lines’ Assad should not cross, referring to moving or using chemical weapons. In August 2013, when Assad used chemical weapons and Washington consulted its allies, there were loud signals that the US and France were about to attack Syria. However, Russia picked a hint thrown by US Secretary of State John Kerry and made Assad agree to destroy his chemical weapons. While the decision to get the weapons destroyed without air attacks on Syria was reasonable, the fact remains that Saudi Arabia was deeply disappointed by what it read as Obama’s vacillation.

It has been argued by Obama’s critics, including former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, that, right at the beginning if the US  had  armed the moderate Syrians, extremist groups such as the al Qaeda and the IS would not have established themselves in the latter. Obama was reluctant to send arms as the US worried the arms would land up in wrong hands. But, in that case, Obama should not have made the August 2011 statement and given the impression that Washington would arm and support the rebels. The US-initiated Geneva process with Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi as Special Envoys for Syria, both eminent diplomats, was an elaborate charade.

The airstrikes are unlikely to destroy the IS but degrade, they might. Obama has virtually declared an open-ended war on the IS. His repeated pledge not to send ground troops is understandable, but his own defence team has made it clear that airstrikes are not enough. Obama’s plan to get about 5000 Syrians trained in Saudi Arabia and send them to Syria is rather fanciful. The 5000 cannot make much impact either on Assad or on the IS that has about 30,000 fighters. By the time they reach Syria, the IS might have expanded its hold.

In the longer term, the US might not mind Iraq’s breaking into three or more, a Kurdistan, a Shiastan, and one or more Sunnistans. The US’s long-term interest is to see an independent Kurdistan that holds about 40 per cent of Iraq’s oil – and where US companies are deeply engaged in. Perhaps, even Iran might not mind the breakup of Iraq if the Shiastan with its oil wealth will remain an obedient satellite. Turkey has plans to acquire territory from Syria – which is why it is asking for a buffer zone and a no-fly zone. However, if an independent Kurdistan is established in Iraq, it will ignite the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and even Iran, to work towards independence. Assad’s support from his Alawite base is declining and his photos are no longer shown at the burials of dead soldiers. He might hold what he has and the IS and others hold what they have, marking the end of Syria.

All told, it is the beginning of the end of the political boundaries set by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to serve the interests of UK and France. But, much more is at stake. When and how will the region recover peace and tranquility?

CHINA'S END GAME IN HONG KONG

 Teshu Singh

China has two Special Administrative Regions (SAR) - Hong Kong and Macau - that were reunified with the mainland in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Both SARs are a part of China under a unique system famously known as ‘one country, two systems’. Article 31 of the constitution of China provides for such an arrangement: “The state may establish special administrative region when necessary.” Hong Kong became a part of China after 156 years of British occupation. Today, it is economically prosperous with limited universal suffrage only in district council elections and parts of the legislative council. Up until now it has had five Chief Executives, three elected and two acting.

As the next elections for the Chief Executive are due in 2017, there has been widespread protest demanding the right to freely choose their representative themselves, as outlined in the “mini constitution” of Hong Kong, the system that implemented through the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Currently, China shortlists/screens the candidates first for the position of the Chief Executive position by a committee that is mostly comprised of pro-China elites appointed by the central government. Evidently, this defeats the real purpose of ‘one country two systems’. However, it does have an independent judiciary and the citizens definitely have more civil liberty than the mainlanders. Earlier China had promised free elections in 2017 but it is now resisting open nomination of the candidates. Unhappy with these arrangements the citizens have resorted to various means of protesting; two students groups, Hong Kong Federation and Scholarism, have been prominent in asking for uiversal adult franchise. In fact, the protest overshadowed the 65th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and has famously come to be known as the ‘Umbrella Revolution’.

Why China is resisting change? What is its end-game in Hong Kong?

Political Motivations
The new leadership is laying great emphasis on domestic politics and wants to tighten its grip over any growing struggle as well as all state apparatus. Xi Jinping has emerged as one of China’s ‘greatest Communist leaders’. His leadership is defined by the term ‘China Dream’; it represents ‘patriotism, innovation and unity’. For him, all developments should lead to the fulfilment of China’s drea. This has been reaffirmed by him: “For Chinese people both at home and abroad, a united Chinese nation is our shared root, the profound Chinese culture is our shared soul, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is our shared dream.” Eventually, this aspiration was adopted by the entire CCP. Therefore, China will not loosen its hold on any part of its territory. Recently, China has also taken tough stands on all it boundary disputes: the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Sino-Indian borders. Agreeing to any such demand would lead to further fissiparous tendencies within China, for example, the conflict in Xinjiang where the Uighur are demanding an East Turkestan.

Economic Interdependence
Hong Kong is indispensable for China; it connects China to the rest of the world in numerous ways. Hong Kong was the first country to follow the neoliberal model. As per the SAR regulations Hong Kong is free to make economic regulations and participate in international economic organisations under the name Hong Kong China. The economy of Hong Kong during 1970-80 was a success story with an unbeatable per capita income.

At present the Chinese economy is passing through a difficult phase and there have been issues with the full convertibility of the RMB. On the other hand, the currency of Hong Kong is legally issued by three major banks and the interest rates are driven by individual banks, giving a free hand to the market. Hong Kong has become a key hub for Chinese investment and provides Chinese companies with access to global capital markets for bond and loan financing. China has used Hong Kong for various economic experiments, for example, in 2007, it issued dim sum bonds. It is a bond issued outside China but in RMB instead of the local currency and until 2010 only Chinese and Hong Kong banks could issue it. The bond allows foreign investors to buy China-listed shares via the Hong Kong stock exchange. According to UNCTAD, October 2014, China’s outward direct investment in 2013 was USD 101 billion and it ranked third after the US and Japan in terms of outbound investment. As China's outward foreign direct investment grows, companies and economists see more opportunities for Hong Kong to become the launch pad to support China's "going out."

It is therefore needless to mention that Hong Kong is fully integrated with the global economy and is vital for China. China’s end-game in Hong Kong is to reap the benefits of its economy with a firm control on its state apparatus. But the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ is gaining a significant mass base and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident might be repeated in Hong Kong if timely measures are not taken.

IRAN: AN IMPERFECT NUCLEAR DEAL BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL?

Ruhee Neog

In the desperate scramble for a conclusive nuclear agreement, would an imperfect deal with Iran be better than no deal at all? An imperfect deal would imply a trade-off between political negotiations and technical verification, especially in the context of Iran’s so-called possible military dimensions (PMD). In this, how important is it to resolve the PMD issue? Would it be detrimental or useful for the conclusion of a final deal?
PMD here refers to covert indigenous work carried out in the past, whether design or research-oriented, towards an Iranian nuclear weapon. The environment seems ripe for a less than ideal deal, and as has been previously argued, for the sake of pragmatism, what is achievable trumps what could be the most ideal compromise between the P5+1 and Iran. There have been reports from both parties that the negotiations are moving forward very slowly; concern has also been expressed about not meeting the 24 November deadline and the subsequent future of a deal in that event. It has also been suggested by Iranian President Hasan Rouhani that Iran would be open to the idea of cooperating with the US in combating the ‘Islamic State’ only once some sort of understanding on the lifting of sanctions that is agreeable to Iran is reached. This could make the situation more urgent than it already is, and prove that despite pronouncements about conducting the talks in isolation and without subjecting it to the pressures of the external environment, the situation on the ground cannot be kept insulated.
Negotiations with Iran are being conducted at two levels; one is political in nature – with the P5+1 – and the other, technical – with the IAEA. In September, reports of Iran’s inability to deliver information on certain aspects of its PMD to the IAEA emerged, which led many to question whether this intractability would hold up the negotiations process. Indeed, it has been established that given the overarching political nature of the West-Iran rapprochement, the domestic political constituencies of the US and Iran will have significant leverage in okaying a final deal. Members of the US Congress have already expressed their displeasure by saying that it is imperative for the PMD issue to fully cleared by the IAEA before a deal can be struck. Iran, on the other hand, has rubbished the PMD claims, made public in an IAEA Board of Governors report released in 2011, by calling them “mere allegations.” In this environment, the P5+1 may choose to sideline the PMD issue to expedite the negotiations. However, given its increasing prominence owing to domestic political demands to see its full clearance, the P5+1 may not be able to eclipse it completely.
In the event that the IAEA and Iran manage to reach a compromise and details about the possible military dimensions of the latter’s nuclear weapons programme are revealed, to what extent would it be useful for a final deal? As Jeffrey Lewis argues in “We don’t want to see Iran’s Full Monty” (Foreign Policy), Iran “very likely” carried out some covert work on nuclear weapons in the past, which have since come to a halt. If Iran discloses these details, it could quite possibly derail the negotiations process. It will be a very hard sell for the Obama administration to convince the tough customers of the US Congress, who have already laid many obstacles in the path of the interim agreement, that a final deal that trades sanctions relief for a capped nuclear programme is in the best interest of the US, especially after Iran’s past activities come to light. Proof of weaponisation work can create an environment not conducive to rapprochement, and that these activities were conducted in the past will be irrelevant as popular sentiment quickly turns against Iran.
Therefore, while a detailed understanding of Iran’s past nuclear activities may be considered somewhat essential to guaranteeing a full scope verification agreement, a full disclosure by Iran has the potential to preclude any deal whatsoever. Stubbornly clinging to the ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ maxim would completely obliterate the diplomatic momentum built since November 2014. All things considered, an imperfect deal would be better than no deal at all.