SYRIA TODAY: IS REGIME CHANGE THE ANSWER?

There are three aspects of the Syrian imbroglio: First,
what was originally a political struggle has become a
progressively more devastating civil war. Second, those
fighting against the Assad regime have fragmented into
several distinct and contending elements - the Western
and Gulf countries’ backed Syrian National Coalition,
now the weakest of the opposition groups in terms of
fighting ability; a large array of Islamist groups, many
armed and funded by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
significant numbers of whom have come together under
two different Islamist fronts; the Nabhat Al Nusrah, an
effective fighting unit largely composed of Syrians but
an affiliate of Al Qaeda; and, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), an Al Qaeda outfit, consisting
mainly of Iraqis, the most extremist, brutal and effective
fighting unit, whose agenda goes much beyond the mere
removal of Assad and is the establishment of a
fundamentalist Islamist Emirate. The involvement of so
many different groups makes the possibility of any
solution very difficult. Third, the active involvement of
foreign countries – France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, UK and the US; this has led directly to
Syria getting to the point where it is now. The
enormous complexity of the situation should be self
evident.
Those advocating regime change need to seriously
ponder over the fact that that the internal situation
today in both Iraq and Libya is far worse than it was
when Saddam and Gaddhafi were in power. Intrusive
military interventions by foreign countries in Libya and
Iraq are not examples to be emulated but shunned.
Indeed, externally encouraged efforts towards regime
change in Arab countries must stop forthwith. Given the
current ground realities in Syria and its diverse ethnic
and sectarian makeup, regime change in Syria could
lead to a much worse outcome than in those two
countries, even the breakup of the country with deeply
destabilizing consequences for the Levant as a whole.
In the past year Assad has regained a lot of lost ground.
All other opposition rebels are now spending greater
effort fighting the ISIL considering it a more detestable
and dangerous enemy than the Assad regime. The very
recent Turkish air strike on a convoy of the ISIL and
Premier Erdogan’s visit to Iran suggest that Turkey is
rethinking its policy in Syria. There is increasing
reluctance of Western countries’ to aid rebels fearing
that arms will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
Thus, Assad is much stronger today vis-a-vis both his
domestic and international adversaries than in June
2012 when the first Geneva conference “agreed on
guidelines and principles for a political transition that
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”. It
is now increasingly highly unlikely that Assad can be
defeated on the battleground. Therefore, he is hardly
likely to agree to his handing over power in a conference
room. Pursuing regime change now is a no brainer.
Humanitarian issues such as ensuring that aid should
reach the millions in dire distress and urgently attending
to the desperate conditions of the 4 million plus
internally displaced should be accorded top priority. The
second priority must be addressing the growing violence
much of which, for all practical purposes, has now
morphed into pure terrorism. Geneva II can be said to
represent the beginning of a peace process and an
encouraging sign is agreement that the next meeting
will be held starting Feb 10th.
Another hopeful feature of Geneva II was, in the words
of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, “there is of course
agreement (amongst the fighting entities) that terrorism
…is a very serious problem inside Syria but there's no
agreement on how to deal with it”. Another good omen
is that both sides of internal Syrian conflict observed a
minutes silence together to remember those killed. Now
that a door has been opened, the warring parties within
Syria need to pursue these two issues on a priority
basis. However, the boycott of hard line extremists
suggests that in the unlikely event of any agreement, its
implementation would be sabotaged. This is a risk that
will have to be taken and should not become an excuse
for no action.
Iran was not represented even though the UN Secretary
General had invited it; the invite had to be withdrawn
due to strong US opposition. Iran commands the
greatest influence with Assad; Iran and Russia acting in
tandem are the only two countries that can persuade
Assad to make meaningful compromises. Iran’s
participation therefore is absolutely vital to the success
of any conference on Syria.
An agreement amongst the main players – the patrons
of the different contending parties within Syria: the P- 5,
EU, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - on a common
approach is a prerequisite. Therefore a separate
conference involving them should be held soonest
possible complementing a resumption of the Geneva II
talks on February 10. A priority subject should be taking
on the ISIL and similar extremist groups head on.