Political attention over the past few
weeks has been fixed on the drama of
the Abbott government’s first budget –
the winners and losers, the problem of
broken promises, the prospects in the
Senate. Beyond that, though, the budget
reinforces another trend of potentially great
significance for the quality of Australian
democracy. Since its beginnings, the
government has made a series of decisions
that mean public scrutiny of its policies and
their implementation is more difficult.
As soon as the Coalition took government last
September, it set about distinguishing itself
from its defeated, discredited predecessor. It
would be a “no surprises, no excuses”
government, Tony Abbott promised , and his
first weeks in the job were designed to project
an image of methodical deliberation. “Never
before in Australian history has there been
such a quiet transition to a new
administration,” veteran correspondent
Laurie Oakes wrote admiringly. “Abbott and
his team ignored the hungry media beast’s
demand to be fed.”
Within months, though, Oakes was accusing
the Coalition of “thumbing its nose at voters”
by avoiding media scrutiny. The new
government, it soon became clear, was even
more determined than its predecessors to
control the flow of information to the media
and the public.
The earliest decisions set the tone. All requests
for interviews with Coalition frontbenchers
would need the approval of the prime
minister’s office. MPs were banned from
engaging in political commentary on
Facebook and Twitter. The code of conduct for
ministerial staff gained a new clause, also
banning political commentary on social
media. One disenchanted senator, Ian
Macdonald, accused Abbott’s office and his
chief of staff, Peta Credlin, of “obsessive,
centralised control.”
Next, the government introduced rules
covering public servants’ use of social media
in their official and private capacities. “The
sweeping new rules will even cover public
servants posting political comments
anonymously, including mummy bloggers on
parenting websites,” marvelled the Daily
Telegraph. Public employees were expected to
report breaches by their colleagues.
The move was supported by the Human Rights
Commission’s new “freedom commissioner,”
Tim Wilson. “Ultimately,” he said, “public
servants voluntarily and knowingly choose to
accept these limits on their conduct when they
accept employment.” In other words, if they
didn’t like the new restrictions, they had the
freedom to resign.
The government also tightened freedom of
information, or FOI, procedures. After the
previous election, in 2010, at least seventeen
departments released the briefs they had
prepared for the incoming government,
providing valuable information to journalists
and the public about policy positions and
challenges. No such release came after last
year’s election, reported Crikey ’s Bernard
Keane, and officials were unable to explain
the logic behind the reversal. FOI requests for
the briefings were also refused .
In May, the attorney-general’s department
declined to release a $400,000 report by
KPMG examining three of Australia’s federal
courts. According to the Australian’s Sean
Parnell, it justified its decision on the novel
grounds that to make it public “would have an
impact on the proper and efficient conduct of
the department” because “it would impede the
provision of frank, independent advice from
professional services firms to inform policy.”
Such an open-ended exemption would justify
withholding any consultancy report to
government. As Parnell put it, “tactics of
secrecy and obfuscation have returned to the
fore in Canberra.”
Meanwhile, the under-resourced Office of the
Australian Information Commissioner was
taking 250 days, on average, to finalise
requests for external reviews of decisions to
refuse FOI requests. On budget night the
government neatly disposed of this problem
by abolishing the office. In future, appeals
against FOI refusals are to be handled by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Attorney-
General’s or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
The office was created in 2010 to address the
long turnaround times and expensive appeals
in the working of the FOI system; its abolition
is likely to make it harder and more
expensive for FOI users to extract
information.
The government’s resistance to disclosure is
having an impact not only on what
information is released but also on what is
produced, and by whom. Recent conservative
governments have been much more active
than the Rudd–Gillard government in
moulding the senior sections of the public
service to their liking. The most disturbing
example is the Abbott government’s
insistence, immediately on taking office, that
Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson resign
his position, with effect later this year. Both
John Howard and Peter Costello advised
against the forced resignation, and
Parkinson’s predecessor, Ken Henry,
described it as unprecedented in the
department’s 113-year history. “No
government has ever thought it appropriate to
remove the head of the Treasury,” he said,
“and put in somebody who they think is of… a
more comfortable political character.” If that
was Abbott’s motive, he said, then it was
“disappointing” and “a historic action.” But
according to the Conversation ’s Michelle
Grattan, a key factor was Parkinson’s earlier
role as head of the Department of Climate
Change.
11 Jun 2014
A NEW FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA FOR MODI: "LOOK WEST"
Within a week of the new Indian government assuming
office, South Block hosted two important events: the
foreign minister of Oman visited the new Indian minister
of external affairs, and a ministerial delegation from
Qatar followed shortly after, to hold foreign office
consultations with their Indian counterparts.
The timing of these visits is significant. It could indicate
some seriousness among the Indian leadership towards
deepening New Delhi’s engagement with West Asia.
Despite the overwhelming scale of historical and
economic linkages, Indian policy-making has not taken
substantial concentrated efforts towards expanding this
promising engagement.
A ‘Look West Policy’ (LWP) like India’s famed ‘Look
East Policy’ has often been spoken about, but there has
not been a formal institutionalisation of the same. This
will need a concentrated focus – like the LEP – for the
region, to formulate effective policies. While trade is a
significant component of this relationship, the essence
of the LWP will be the multi-dimensionality of its
character. As much as India trades with the region, also
important are the issues of security, culture, people-to-
people linkages, and those of a wider geopolitical and
geostrategic nature.
Look West Policy: Primary Rationales for Induction
Diaspora & remittances: The West Asian region is home
to millions of non-resident Indians; and they were
responsible for approximately half of the US$69 billion
worth of remittances that flowed into India in 2012.
However, the introduction of the Nitaqat laws in many
Gulf countries has resulted in several thousands of these
workers having to return to India. While it is unfair to
view the returnees as a liability, one cannot ignore the
economic and social impact of this mass re-migration.
India is not prepared to assimilate all these people into
its own economy just yet. Already, unemployment rates
are high, and the economy is not doing well. Job
creation will take a while, and until then, there will be
some strain on the economy.
Energy: India, being a growing economy, is perpetually
energy-hungry. West Asian nations are among the
primary suppliers of oil and gas that keep the Indian
economy running. Stable and more improved relations
between India and the region are key to securing and
expanding on these sources. Projects such as the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline lay suspended due to several
other reasons. However, proposed projects such as the
Oman-India Pipeline, an undersea gas pipeline – that
Iran too has expressed interest in – look promising.
India’s attempts at ensuring energy security therefore
cannot bypass engagements with the region.
Maritime security: Be it trade or energy supply routes,
or even national security, the significance of an effective
maritime security infrastructure in the Indian Ocean –
the maritime link connecting India with several of its key
West Asian partners – is pivotal to ensuring safety,
stability, and disaster-management for the region. The
Indian Ocean Region is a major geographical stretch
through which a large chunk of the world’s business is
conducted. Already, there is a constant threat of piracy
in the western Indian Ocean. A concentrated policy will
be needed to identify specific issues and areas of
cooperation between India and West Asia, in order to
ensure smooth and secure movement.
Furthermore, in recent times, there have been many
debates on the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to boost
connectivities between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. The two regions already have robust
connectivities, but more can be done. However, if this
concept of the Indo-Pacific has to become a reality,
there is a need for enhanced cooperation in various
areas among the key players in each region, before
connecting the regions. Eventually, the LWP and the LEP
can lay the foundations for the realisation of the ‘Indo-
Pacific’.
National and regional security: Any form of tumult in
the West Asian region invariably has an impact on India
and South Asia as a whole. For strategic reasons, India
seeks peace and political stability and security in the
West Asian region – sentiments reciprocated by the
countries of the region in their assessments towards
West Asia as well as South Asia. So far, India has been
pragmatic in its policies towards the West Asian region
–excellent examples of which are balancing its
relationships with Palestine and Israel; and Saudi Arabia
and Iran, among others.
However, there is more that needs to be done, and for
that, there needs to be better, more polished and astute
understanding of the region in our country – especially
in the light of the impending US withdrawal from
Afghanistan; the thawing in the US-Iran bilateral; the
ongoing civil war in Syria and its implications;
implementation of the Nitaqat policies in the Gulf
countries; and the rising fundamentalism, especially in
the franchisee-ing nature of terror networks, among
others.
These are among the primary reasons why India must
and will expedite its engagement with countries in West
Asia in the coming months. For the new government
that took office in May 2014 – one that won the
elections with a campaign based primarily on promises
of improved trade, economic development, employment,
investment and better infrastructure – there would not
be a more apt initiative to begin with than
institutionalising the LWP; updating, revolutionising and
expanding New Delhi’s linkages with India’s largest
trading partner-bloc, West Asia.
office, South Block hosted two important events: the
foreign minister of Oman visited the new Indian minister
of external affairs, and a ministerial delegation from
Qatar followed shortly after, to hold foreign office
consultations with their Indian counterparts.
The timing of these visits is significant. It could indicate
some seriousness among the Indian leadership towards
deepening New Delhi’s engagement with West Asia.
Despite the overwhelming scale of historical and
economic linkages, Indian policy-making has not taken
substantial concentrated efforts towards expanding this
promising engagement.
A ‘Look West Policy’ (LWP) like India’s famed ‘Look
East Policy’ has often been spoken about, but there has
not been a formal institutionalisation of the same. This
will need a concentrated focus – like the LEP – for the
region, to formulate effective policies. While trade is a
significant component of this relationship, the essence
of the LWP will be the multi-dimensionality of its
character. As much as India trades with the region, also
important are the issues of security, culture, people-to-
people linkages, and those of a wider geopolitical and
geostrategic nature.
Look West Policy: Primary Rationales for Induction
Diaspora & remittances: The West Asian region is home
to millions of non-resident Indians; and they were
responsible for approximately half of the US$69 billion
worth of remittances that flowed into India in 2012.
However, the introduction of the Nitaqat laws in many
Gulf countries has resulted in several thousands of these
workers having to return to India. While it is unfair to
view the returnees as a liability, one cannot ignore the
economic and social impact of this mass re-migration.
India is not prepared to assimilate all these people into
its own economy just yet. Already, unemployment rates
are high, and the economy is not doing well. Job
creation will take a while, and until then, there will be
some strain on the economy.
Energy: India, being a growing economy, is perpetually
energy-hungry. West Asian nations are among the
primary suppliers of oil and gas that keep the Indian
economy running. Stable and more improved relations
between India and the region are key to securing and
expanding on these sources. Projects such as the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline lay suspended due to several
other reasons. However, proposed projects such as the
Oman-India Pipeline, an undersea gas pipeline – that
Iran too has expressed interest in – look promising.
India’s attempts at ensuring energy security therefore
cannot bypass engagements with the region.
Maritime security: Be it trade or energy supply routes,
or even national security, the significance of an effective
maritime security infrastructure in the Indian Ocean –
the maritime link connecting India with several of its key
West Asian partners – is pivotal to ensuring safety,
stability, and disaster-management for the region. The
Indian Ocean Region is a major geographical stretch
through which a large chunk of the world’s business is
conducted. Already, there is a constant threat of piracy
in the western Indian Ocean. A concentrated policy will
be needed to identify specific issues and areas of
cooperation between India and West Asia, in order to
ensure smooth and secure movement.
Furthermore, in recent times, there have been many
debates on the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to boost
connectivities between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. The two regions already have robust
connectivities, but more can be done. However, if this
concept of the Indo-Pacific has to become a reality,
there is a need for enhanced cooperation in various
areas among the key players in each region, before
connecting the regions. Eventually, the LWP and the LEP
can lay the foundations for the realisation of the ‘Indo-
Pacific’.
National and regional security: Any form of tumult in
the West Asian region invariably has an impact on India
and South Asia as a whole. For strategic reasons, India
seeks peace and political stability and security in the
West Asian region – sentiments reciprocated by the
countries of the region in their assessments towards
West Asia as well as South Asia. So far, India has been
pragmatic in its policies towards the West Asian region
–excellent examples of which are balancing its
relationships with Palestine and Israel; and Saudi Arabia
and Iran, among others.
However, there is more that needs to be done, and for
that, there needs to be better, more polished and astute
understanding of the region in our country – especially
in the light of the impending US withdrawal from
Afghanistan; the thawing in the US-Iran bilateral; the
ongoing civil war in Syria and its implications;
implementation of the Nitaqat policies in the Gulf
countries; and the rising fundamentalism, especially in
the franchisee-ing nature of terror networks, among
others.
These are among the primary reasons why India must
and will expedite its engagement with countries in West
Asia in the coming months. For the new government
that took office in May 2014 – one that won the
elections with a campaign based primarily on promises
of improved trade, economic development, employment,
investment and better infrastructure – there would not
be a more apt initiative to begin with than
institutionalising the LWP; updating, revolutionising and
expanding New Delhi’s linkages with India’s largest
trading partner-bloc, West Asia.
WHAT CONCERNS YOUNG KASHMIR?
I never had any doubt about the ability of Kashmiri
youth to think and look positively towards making this
place better. But it is also a fact that they need to be
pushed to do something on their own. Dependence on
government jobs has always held them back from doing
something different. However, those who took a leaf out
in the non-governmental sector have proven that they
have the capacity to lead and be a source of livelihood
for many more.
It is not only the sense of job security when you join the
government, but also the inherent rot in the system that
discourages youth from taking entrepreneurship as their
career.
When Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently revoked the
Recruitment Policy he had himself implemented in 2010,
a senior government officer told me: “He has done the
greatest disservice to youth who had moved towards
self employment with dwindling benefits in a
government job”. But Omar had to do it in a bid to
resurrect his party after the recent poll debacle.
ALOHA TEST
What ails the system is something that concerns even a
youngster in a school. Last Sunday I had a chance to
sit in the interview panel for General Ability Test (GAT)
conducted by Aloha Learning Center for 9th class. While
I was impressed with the budding talent and
understanding of the issues the young students have
been developing, it was also painful to see how
depressed they were with the corruption, nepotism and
favouritism in the system. That is why many of them
had set their goal to become an IAS officer. Whether
they will succeed in first realizing their goal and later
curbing the corruption is a different issue but the way
this threat is weighing heavily on their minds speaks
volumes about how the society is reacting to it. “Either
you have to be from an elite family or you have to have
money, then only you can succeed,” a young student
told the panel, adding: “I want to become an IAS officer
and curb the corruption”.
There were a few voices about the human rights
violations, repression and denial of political rights. A few
of them wanted to be doctors despite the fact that the
profession is losing the sheen for want of jobs in the
government sector. “They (doctors) have made it a
business and I want to become a doctor who can help
the poor,” was the response of a girl student who
narrated how her grandfather was “mistreated” and was
taken to Amritsar for eye surgery.
Refrain, however, was that corruption has eaten into the
vitals of the society and politicians and bureaucrats
have set up a system of favouritism and nepotism in
which merit is marred and the poor are deprived. The
youngsters seemed determined in fighting this menace
but the question is that can one or two or ten such
people overcome this challenge. The sense of
hopelessness in the existing system has dangerous
dimension of drifting these youngsters away to
something else. To me it looked that corruption should
be a separate subject in the school curriculum to
sensitize them at the young age.
RABITA
Earlier in the last week of May similar concerns came up
during an interaction with the higher level of youth. The
occasion was “Rabita—Business Leadership Summit”,
organized by Center for Business Leadership led by
young lawyer Nadeem Qadri. The summit had young
graduates mostly from business management
background as the participants. Their articulation of
ideas was simply brilliant and above all their penchant
to make Kashmir better was visible on their faces. We
cut a beautiful and tasty cake made at home by a
young girl Farah Tanki. Armed with a degree in Food
Technology she has set on the path of taking up the
cake making as a full time business. There were many
such young boys and girls who came up with pragmatic
proposals.
They listened to successful entrepreneurs and business
leaders and were ready to draw inspiration from them.
But again what was flagged off as a major concern that
had potential to halt their dreams was corruption.
“Entrepreneurship is the only solution to a depressed
Kashmir but does the system allow us to move
forward,” questioned a young graduate. Age old
mechanisms based on stale rules and regulations have
dampened the spirits of young people as they are forced
to run from the pillar to post to even get themselves
registered. They did acknowledge that Entrepreneur
Development Institute at Pampore had come up with a
changed insight and outlook to help youth and many
had succeeded in moving forward from that platform.
But the overall policy set up fails to change the mind.
They urged for having a single window system for
clearance of cases as they had to pay for getting their
papers cleared from various agencies such as Industries
Department, Pollution Control Board and SIDCO. The
individual authorities need to be abolished.
In case the government wakes up to the concerns of
these youth, entrepreneurship can become a reality and
help the government also to overcome the challenge of
unemployment. According to a survey conducted by
International NGO Oxfam, ‘Kashmir today is a sea of
unemployed youth, a place where infrastructure is
crippled and there is almost no effort to encourage
private enterprises and self-employment.’ The study
reveals that opportunities for professional education
remain very limited. Out of roughly 700,000 youth in the
age group of 18-30 years, close to 50 percent remain
unemployed despite higher education. In addition to the
fact that employment is a major issue confronting
youth, addressing the political conflict also occupies a
special place in the entire discourse revolving around
them”.
Glorifying the government job, notwithstanding the fact
that we need people in administrative services, is not
the solution. Government must instil confidence among
the educated youth that the system that has worked
against the people for many decades now will follow the
road of changed world. Corruption is a menace that is
now a concern for even a class 9 student, this can be
seen as hope for its end but it has other effects as well
youth to think and look positively towards making this
place better. But it is also a fact that they need to be
pushed to do something on their own. Dependence on
government jobs has always held them back from doing
something different. However, those who took a leaf out
in the non-governmental sector have proven that they
have the capacity to lead and be a source of livelihood
for many more.
It is not only the sense of job security when you join the
government, but also the inherent rot in the system that
discourages youth from taking entrepreneurship as their
career.
When Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently revoked the
Recruitment Policy he had himself implemented in 2010,
a senior government officer told me: “He has done the
greatest disservice to youth who had moved towards
self employment with dwindling benefits in a
government job”. But Omar had to do it in a bid to
resurrect his party after the recent poll debacle.
ALOHA TEST
What ails the system is something that concerns even a
youngster in a school. Last Sunday I had a chance to
sit in the interview panel for General Ability Test (GAT)
conducted by Aloha Learning Center for 9th class. While
I was impressed with the budding talent and
understanding of the issues the young students have
been developing, it was also painful to see how
depressed they were with the corruption, nepotism and
favouritism in the system. That is why many of them
had set their goal to become an IAS officer. Whether
they will succeed in first realizing their goal and later
curbing the corruption is a different issue but the way
this threat is weighing heavily on their minds speaks
volumes about how the society is reacting to it. “Either
you have to be from an elite family or you have to have
money, then only you can succeed,” a young student
told the panel, adding: “I want to become an IAS officer
and curb the corruption”.
There were a few voices about the human rights
violations, repression and denial of political rights. A few
of them wanted to be doctors despite the fact that the
profession is losing the sheen for want of jobs in the
government sector. “They (doctors) have made it a
business and I want to become a doctor who can help
the poor,” was the response of a girl student who
narrated how her grandfather was “mistreated” and was
taken to Amritsar for eye surgery.
Refrain, however, was that corruption has eaten into the
vitals of the society and politicians and bureaucrats
have set up a system of favouritism and nepotism in
which merit is marred and the poor are deprived. The
youngsters seemed determined in fighting this menace
but the question is that can one or two or ten such
people overcome this challenge. The sense of
hopelessness in the existing system has dangerous
dimension of drifting these youngsters away to
something else. To me it looked that corruption should
be a separate subject in the school curriculum to
sensitize them at the young age.
RABITA
Earlier in the last week of May similar concerns came up
during an interaction with the higher level of youth. The
occasion was “Rabita—Business Leadership Summit”,
organized by Center for Business Leadership led by
young lawyer Nadeem Qadri. The summit had young
graduates mostly from business management
background as the participants. Their articulation of
ideas was simply brilliant and above all their penchant
to make Kashmir better was visible on their faces. We
cut a beautiful and tasty cake made at home by a
young girl Farah Tanki. Armed with a degree in Food
Technology she has set on the path of taking up the
cake making as a full time business. There were many
such young boys and girls who came up with pragmatic
proposals.
They listened to successful entrepreneurs and business
leaders and were ready to draw inspiration from them.
But again what was flagged off as a major concern that
had potential to halt their dreams was corruption.
“Entrepreneurship is the only solution to a depressed
Kashmir but does the system allow us to move
forward,” questioned a young graduate. Age old
mechanisms based on stale rules and regulations have
dampened the spirits of young people as they are forced
to run from the pillar to post to even get themselves
registered. They did acknowledge that Entrepreneur
Development Institute at Pampore had come up with a
changed insight and outlook to help youth and many
had succeeded in moving forward from that platform.
But the overall policy set up fails to change the mind.
They urged for having a single window system for
clearance of cases as they had to pay for getting their
papers cleared from various agencies such as Industries
Department, Pollution Control Board and SIDCO. The
individual authorities need to be abolished.
In case the government wakes up to the concerns of
these youth, entrepreneurship can become a reality and
help the government also to overcome the challenge of
unemployment. According to a survey conducted by
International NGO Oxfam, ‘Kashmir today is a sea of
unemployed youth, a place where infrastructure is
crippled and there is almost no effort to encourage
private enterprises and self-employment.’ The study
reveals that opportunities for professional education
remain very limited. Out of roughly 700,000 youth in the
age group of 18-30 years, close to 50 percent remain
unemployed despite higher education. In addition to the
fact that employment is a major issue confronting
youth, addressing the political conflict also occupies a
special place in the entire discourse revolving around
them”.
Glorifying the government job, notwithstanding the fact
that we need people in administrative services, is not
the solution. Government must instil confidence among
the educated youth that the system that has worked
against the people for many decades now will follow the
road of changed world. Corruption is a menace that is
now a concern for even a class 9 student, this can be
seen as hope for its end but it has other effects as well
JAPAN AND US IN ASIA PACIFIC: COUNTERING CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS
The statements issued by Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe and US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at
the Shangri La Dialogue show the renewal of tension in
the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China. The US remarks
were a follow-up to Abe’s criticism against China’s
assertiveness in the region with a special focus on the
South China Sea dispute.
What are the expectations that the US and Japan have
in the region and what do they expect from China?
Where is the region heading towards?
Deciphering the Statements
The statements at the Dialogue revolved around
resolving the South China Sea dispute, Chinese
assertiveness in the region, strengthening allies and
partners in the region, and enhancing ASEAN’s defence
capabilities and posture. It was mostly directed against
recent Chinese activities. The Chinese responded to the
allegations as being untruthful and a malicious attempt
that aimed at tarnishing its reputation in the
international system.
Shinzo Abe stated that Japan will play a proactive role
in Asia and in the world, under the new banner,
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.” It is likely to signify
that Japan is resorting to a Cold War stance or that its
role has been undermined in recent times. He also
extended his support to the ASEAN countries, and
advised them to act wisely and follow international rules
to settle the South China Sea dispute. He indirectly
criticised China for strengthening its military and using
coercion to settle the dispute, which is against the rule
of law. The repetition of the phrase ‘rule of law’ is likely
to strengthen his assertion that China is unwilling to
settle the dispute through international law and is
resorting to force or coercion.
Japan has resorted to alliance-making with the ASEAN
and other countries in the region to their defence
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This is so that the ASEAN
will not be undermined by China and can prevent the
use of force by the same in the future. Japan wants the
ASEAN to be proactive and effectively utilise the East
Asia Summit to check military expansion in the region
and be transparent on their military budget so that
misconception can be averted.
Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling
disputes through peaceful means, following international
rules, and strengtheningthe defence capabilities of the
allies that were directly criticising China’s recent
provocative behavior in the region. He mentioned that
countries in Asia-Pacific are working with the US to
sustain a rule-based order that has been followed since
the end of World War II, suggesting perhaps that the US
rule-based order has been undermined with the growing
assertion of China. He reaffirmed that the US would
increase its military engagement in the region than ever
before and strengthen its allies and partners because
the Asia-Pacific will play a crucial role in the 21st
century.
Hagel also mentioned that if China wants to play a
significant role in the region it has to use coercion
against North Korea’s destabilising provocation; this
would be in its own interest and also help regional
stability. This would be preferable to coercion being
against neighbours and neglecting that the South China
Sea is “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.” The
US believes that with the growing significance of the
ASEAN forum, it is essential that each country work
together to achieve greater cohesion and prevent
countries like China from taking advantage of them.
Where is the Region Heading?
Chinese assertiveness in the region has brought back
the US and Japan to play a proactive role. Hagel
revisited General George Marshall’s words that “the
strength of a nation does not depend alone on its
armies, ships and planes…[but] is also measured by…
the strength of its friends and [its] allies.” It is likely
that the US is resorting to a Cold War strategy by
creating alliances and partners to strengthen its
presence in the region. The US and Japan acknowledged
that strengthening the ASEAN security community can
be effectively used to counter the growing Chinese
aggression in the region. However, due to the lack of
consensus on the South China Sea dispute between the
ASEAN countries, it is unclear whether they will be able
cooperate with the US and Japan to settle the dispute.
It is likely that the region will become more volatile with
divergent issues like North Korea’s nuclear programme,
Thailand and Myanmar’s setbacks in democratic
development and various unresolved territorial disputes
complicating it. In addition to these circumstances,
Philippines filing a case against China in the
international tribunal followed by Vietnam’s threat to
file a case as well are only toughening Chinese
behaviour in the region.
The US and Japan are increasing their military
engagement and strengthening regional countries’
defence postures - this is likely to receive a counter-
attack from China. The synergism of Japan and the US
will first increase conflict among countries and add to
instability in the region before gradually lessening
tensions.
Shinzo Abe and US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at
the Shangri La Dialogue show the renewal of tension in
the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China. The US remarks
were a follow-up to Abe’s criticism against China’s
assertiveness in the region with a special focus on the
South China Sea dispute.
What are the expectations that the US and Japan have
in the region and what do they expect from China?
Where is the region heading towards?
Deciphering the Statements
The statements at the Dialogue revolved around
resolving the South China Sea dispute, Chinese
assertiveness in the region, strengthening allies and
partners in the region, and enhancing ASEAN’s defence
capabilities and posture. It was mostly directed against
recent Chinese activities. The Chinese responded to the
allegations as being untruthful and a malicious attempt
that aimed at tarnishing its reputation in the
international system.
Shinzo Abe stated that Japan will play a proactive role
in Asia and in the world, under the new banner,
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.” It is likely to signify
that Japan is resorting to a Cold War stance or that its
role has been undermined in recent times. He also
extended his support to the ASEAN countries, and
advised them to act wisely and follow international rules
to settle the South China Sea dispute. He indirectly
criticised China for strengthening its military and using
coercion to settle the dispute, which is against the rule
of law. The repetition of the phrase ‘rule of law’ is likely
to strengthen his assertion that China is unwilling to
settle the dispute through international law and is
resorting to force or coercion.
Japan has resorted to alliance-making with the ASEAN
and other countries in the region to their defence
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This is so that the ASEAN
will not be undermined by China and can prevent the
use of force by the same in the future. Japan wants the
ASEAN to be proactive and effectively utilise the East
Asia Summit to check military expansion in the region
and be transparent on their military budget so that
misconception can be averted.
Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling
disputes through peaceful means, following international
rules, and strengtheningthe defence capabilities of the
allies that were directly criticising China’s recent
provocative behavior in the region. He mentioned that
countries in Asia-Pacific are working with the US to
sustain a rule-based order that has been followed since
the end of World War II, suggesting perhaps that the US
rule-based order has been undermined with the growing
assertion of China. He reaffirmed that the US would
increase its military engagement in the region than ever
before and strengthen its allies and partners because
the Asia-Pacific will play a crucial role in the 21st
century.
Hagel also mentioned that if China wants to play a
significant role in the region it has to use coercion
against North Korea’s destabilising provocation; this
would be in its own interest and also help regional
stability. This would be preferable to coercion being
against neighbours and neglecting that the South China
Sea is “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.” The
US believes that with the growing significance of the
ASEAN forum, it is essential that each country work
together to achieve greater cohesion and prevent
countries like China from taking advantage of them.
Where is the Region Heading?
Chinese assertiveness in the region has brought back
the US and Japan to play a proactive role. Hagel
revisited General George Marshall’s words that “the
strength of a nation does not depend alone on its
armies, ships and planes…[but] is also measured by…
the strength of its friends and [its] allies.” It is likely
that the US is resorting to a Cold War strategy by
creating alliances and partners to strengthen its
presence in the region. The US and Japan acknowledged
that strengthening the ASEAN security community can
be effectively used to counter the growing Chinese
aggression in the region. However, due to the lack of
consensus on the South China Sea dispute between the
ASEAN countries, it is unclear whether they will be able
cooperate with the US and Japan to settle the dispute.
It is likely that the region will become more volatile with
divergent issues like North Korea’s nuclear programme,
Thailand and Myanmar’s setbacks in democratic
development and various unresolved territorial disputes
complicating it. In addition to these circumstances,
Philippines filing a case against China in the
international tribunal followed by Vietnam’s threat to
file a case as well are only toughening Chinese
behaviour in the region.
The US and Japan are increasing their military
engagement and strengthening regional countries’
defence postures - this is likely to receive a counter-
attack from China. The synergism of Japan and the US
will first increase conflict among countries and add to
instability in the region before gradually lessening
tensions.
10 Jun 2014
UKRAINE: TIME TO CUT A DEAL?
On 7 May, after months of unrelenting
economic, military and propaganda
campaigns against his fraternal
neighbour, Ukraine, President Putin
suddenly signalled what appeared to be a
change in direction. He called on the “pro-
Russian” separatists in the eastern
Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and
Luhansk to postpone their referendums on
independence, and declared that the
presidential elections scheduled by Kiev for
25 May were a “step in the right direction.”
Earlier, on 28 April, Russian defence
minister Sergey Shoigu had claimed that the
Russian forces deployed on the Ukraine
border for months had returned to their
bases, a claim Putin repeated on 7 May. As
became clear in each case, no such
withdrawals were observed by anyone able to
do so, which seemed to suggest that any
softening of the Kremlin’s line on Ukraine
was an optical illusion.
Seemingly in defiance of Putin’s calls for a
postponement, the separatists in Donetsk and
Luhansk held their hastily scheduled
“referenda” on 11 May, with slightly farcical
claims of huge turnouts and Soviet-style
electoral margins in their favour. But their
appeal for Moscow to annex them, as it had
earlier annexed Crimea, elicited no response.
Putin has since declared again his readiness
to accept the results of the Ukrainian
presidential poll and repeated his assurance
that the troops would be withdrawn; and this
time there are indications that the troops may
indeed be embarking on a draw-back (though
many of the units could be redeployed within
a couple of days).
Despite the more conciliatory tone, Putin has
continued to make some ominous
pronouncements: renewed threats of another
gas-price war to force Ukraine to pay the
abrupt increase Gazprom is demanding;
claims that Ukraine is in the grip of a civil
war; and the polite suggestion that his close
friend Viktor Medvedchuk (Putin is godfather
of one of Medvedchuk’s children), the most
pro-Kremlin politician in the Ukrainian
political class, should become the mediator
between the Kiev government and the
“rebels” in the eastern provinces. But to
Western capitals, desperately eager to find a
solution to the problem that would relieve
them of any need for sterner measures, any
change of tone will be grasped as a sign that
Putin is finally ready to “de-escalate.”
Putin is not known for any propensity to take
a backward step, much less sudden about-
turns. In the matter of Ukraine, he has shown
a particular determination to prevail from
well before the military operation against
Crimea. So what are we to make of Putin’s
unexpected amiability? What may have
brought it about, how genuine is it, and how
long may it last? Have his objectives changed,
or is this merely a tactical shift?
he heavy media coverage of the
Ukrainian issue recently has probably
made its fundamental grammar and
vocabulary more familiar to the general
reader. But to judge by commonly recurring
omissions and misconceptions in public
discussions some salient facts might be worth
recalling.
While Russians and Ukrainians are ethnically,
linguistically, religiously and culturally close,
there are important differences between
them, only partly flattened out by tsarist and
Soviet conditioning. And those differences are
apparent within Ukraine itself. For historical
reasons, central and western Ukraine have
come under the influence over centuries of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland. A
substantial minority concentrated in the west
are Uniate Catholics by belief or tradition,
whose homelands had never formed part of
Russia before the end of the second world
war. Though Orthodoxy is the religion, at
least nominally, of the overwhelming
majority, there is an important difference
between the followers of the Moscow and Kiev
Patriarchates of the Orthodox Church. The
Moscow Patriarchate has always been
favoured by Moscow and its Ukrainian
loyalists, but the more nationalist Kiev
Patriarchate may actually have a slightly
larger following within Ukraine. Their
relationship is troubled. There is also a much
smaller Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox
Church.
Moscow rulers have often sought to suppress
Ukrainian language and culture. The Soviet
leadership in its early years was more liberal
in such matters, but for much of its
subsequent history it was very oppressive.
Even since Ukraine became an independent
state, Russia has refused to tolerate more than
the most minimal cultural facilities for the
millions of Ukrainians living in Russia. In
Moscow-ruled Ukraine, by contrast, Russian
enjoyed a privileged status and the use of
Ukrainian was informally or formally
tabooed. Independent Ukraine has taken
modest steps to improve the relative position
of Ukrainian within the state, which has
tended to anger some Russian speakers.
But the use of Russian is under no serious
threat, and repeated suggestions in the media
that the government that emerged after the
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square)
protests wants to ban Russian are
misinformed. The bill in question, though
politically foolish given its timing, was aimed
not at “banning” Russian, a totally impossible
objective, but rather at restoring greater
official status to Ukrainian in an attempt to
rebalance very partially the wrongs of the
past. It was, anyway, very quickly vetoed by
provisional president Oleksandr Turchynov
and withdrawn.
The Soviet period was a series of demographic
disasters for most of the country. But it was
worst of all for the “ bloodlands” of Ukrainian,
Belarusian, Baltic and Polish settlement. Per
capita, Jews, but also Ukrainians and
Belarusians, suffered far more than Russians.
Slips of the tongue equating Soviet citizens
with “Russians” and referring to the twenty-
five or thirty million Russian dead in the
second world war serve to erase a universe of
suffering sustained in the west of the country,
in which Stalin’s regime was partly complicit
as a perpetrator. Similarly, in the 1930s
Ukrainians were among those national
groups, together with Jews and Poles, who
suffered disproportionately in the purges.
The early Bolshevik leadership had
encouraged strong development of the
languages and culture of the national
minorities, partly to ensure victory over the
Whites in the civil war of 1917–22. The
Ukrainian communist leadership of the 1920s
was active in this respect. From the late
1920s, however, Stalin brutally reversed this
policy to favour Russian, and the whole
emergent generation of Ukrainian national
communist leaders and cultural activists was
decimated.
Worst of all, in the process of brutally
collectivising agriculture in Ukraine (which
had been the breadbasket of the empire), and
then extracting grain from it for export, Stalin
inflicted terrible casualties. The culmination
was the artificial famine of 1932–33, which
led to mass starvation and innumerable acts
of cruelty aimed at preventing the victims
from receiving any relief. Historians debate
both the numbers of dead and the Kremlin’s
precise intent in manufacturing this holocaust
(known in Ukrainian as holodomor ), but
whether it was genocide by some definition or
not, at least three million Ukrainians perished
(and some estimates go higher).
The Soviet regime suppressed discussion of
these monstrous events and succeeded in
largely obliterating them not only from the
public domain, but also to a considerable
degree from popular awareness. The Russians
who were encouraged to migrate into
depopulated parts of Ukraine have even less
awareness of the past. Through discreet and
indeed hazardous family communication,
Ukrainians have retained at least a
fragmented folk memory of the great famine,
which naturally doesn’t always dispose them
positively to Moscow. For its part, the Putin
regime greatly resented pro-Western
president Viktor Yushchenko’s attempts to
restore a basic historical understanding
among Ukrainian citizens of the holodomor ,
which was at odds with Putin’s policy of
progressively rehabilitating Stalin and his
works. When Viktor Yanukovych succeeded
Yushchenko in 2010, he moved quickly to de-
emphasise the issue and de-fang it of any
anti-Russian accents, a difficult exercise in
the circumstances.
Until recently, despite the burden of history,
Ukrainians and Russians have continued to
get on reasonably well with one another in
Ukraine. Ukrainians living side by side with
Russians in other parts of the post-Soviet
sphere mingle easily, intermarry with
Russians, and often adopt Russian ethnicity
and the Russian language. The same has been
largely true of Ukraine itself. It was not the
case, Kremlin propaganda notwithstanding,
that ethnic Russians faced any threats of
persecution from Ukrainian fellow-citizens in
the east of Ukraine before the invasion of
Crimea. At most they might experience
irritation at the public use of what they
regarded as an inferior but basically
comprehensible rustic dialect in public places
or on street signs.
The main resentments of Russians in eastern
Ukraine centred on the fact that the central
government in Kiev, controlled by the
Donetsk-based Yanukovych clan, had done
nothing to improve their standard of living,
rather the reverse. Meanwhile, as they were
keenly aware, he and his notorious familia
were dipping into the public purse right up to
their armpits. Because of the cultural and
historical differences between the east and
west of the country, some political
polarisation also existed, reflected in differing
regional levels of support for the main
political parties.
But the differences were less than virulent,
and in the twenty-odd years since
independence they had been successfully
managed by elections that tended to produce
regular alternation between eastern-oriented
and western-oriented presidents. Eastern
Ukrainians were mostly unenthusiastic about
the pro-Western Orange revolution of 2004–
05 and the Maidan protests of 2013–14,
though a substantial minority in the east,
including Russians and Russian-speakers,
supported them as movements that might
improve their standards of living and
increase probity in public life.
In fact, there was a degree of structural
pluralism in Ukrainian society, which
contributed to the retention of more
democratic freedoms in the country than in
neighbouring Russia or Belarus, for example.
In that sense, Ukraine was a more democratic
polity than any other part of the former
Soviet Union, apart from the Baltic states and
Georgia, and remains so despite the current
artificially induced turbulence.
THE SEISMIC SHIFTS BEHIND THE COUP IN THAILAND
Thailand has been in crisis since an
armed forces coup overthrew prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra in
September 2006, ultimately forcing
him into exile. Although his opponents used
fair means and foul to keep various
incarnations of Thaksin’s party out of
power, his sister Yingluck Shinawatra
became Thailand’s first female prime
minister following a resounding electoral
victory for Thaksin’s Pheu Thai (For Thai)
party in 2011.
But Yingluck’s government started to unravel
in 2013 when it attempted a mass amnesty for
those charged with corruption or other
crimes. It was clear the amnesty was designed
to allow Thaksin to return from exile.
Opposition to the government surged, further
fuelled by the failure of a populist rice-
subsidy scheme that not only provided
opportunities for corruption but also proved
so costly that the government couldn’t honour
its payments. Yingluck faces corruption
charges over the scheme.
On 7 May, the Constitutional Court removed
Yingluck office for her role in trying to install
the brother of Thaksin’s former wife as police
chief. She pleaded, disingenuously, that he
was no longer family. The divorce was a
political convenience, of course, and
Yingluck’s manoeuvre shows just how
ingrained oligarchic politics is in Thailand.
In the end, the evolving crisis led to another
coup on 22 May. Intriguingly, it has met with
much less opposition than anyone expected.
o understand the crisis in Thai politics,
it’s important to examine the
momentous changes Thai society has
undergone in recent decades. If certain
key institutions, such as the monarchy, have
not yet been transformed, then they are about
to be. Old relationships have been
destabilised; new ones are not yet in place. It
is this setting – the perfect opening for a
populist demagogue like Thaksin – that
explains much more about contemporary
Thailand than the grossly simplified image of
a struggle between the “rural poor” and the
urban middle-class and elites.
I have been watching events unfold from
neighbouring Laos, a perfect observation
point. Thailand’s northeast region, just across
the border, accounts for 31 per cent of the
total population. Commonly called Isan (and
its people, Khon Isan), the region is mostly
ethnic Lao, and has been a major base of
support for Thaksin. According to
anthropologist Charles Keyes, the region’s
ethno-regional identity and solidarity has
made the local people into a formidable
political force. But, as Keyes also shows, Isan
has been transformed out of sight since he
first visited fifty years ago.
When Keyes and his wife Jane went to central
Isan in 1963–64 it was still the poorest region
in Thailand. Self-sufficient peasants battled
with irregular rainfall and poor soils to make
ends meet. The local geography conspired
against commercial agriculture, and so men
had begun heading to Bangkok for work in
construction or other menial jobs, especially
during the dry season. When Thailand
became a playground for US troops on leave
from the war in Vietnam, women headed to
the urban bars and brothels for work.
American aid drove roads through the region
and sped up the circulation of people between
city and countryside. Drawn out of their rural
isolation, the migrants came into contact with
others like themselves from across Isan,
fomenting an ethno-regional sentiment.
Together, they became aware of the wealth
differences between Isan and Bangkok.
For residents of Bangkok, many of whom were
of Sino-Thai descent, these dark, short-
statured people in simple clothing were ban
nok, “country bumpkins” whose dialect was
crude to their ears. When TV came along they
became the fall guys in Thai comedies, and in
everyday life they had to suffer the contempt
of those above them.
Keyes describes how the people of this region
became Thai through an expansion of the
national bureaucracy, the centralising of the
Buddhist sangha, and especially – since the
1930s – schools that educated both boys and
girls. They learned to use the central Thai
language and its various polite forms and,
especially from the 1950s on, they learned to
love the Thai king, Bhumiphol Adulyadej.
Essentially, it was good old-fashioned nation
building, and similar processes occurred for
every region, including Bangkok, where the
Chinese, for instance, needed to be turned
into Thais.
Migration in search of work, especially
overseas, transformed the lives of Isan’s
peasants to the point where they became rural
entrepreneurs. “By the early twenty-first
century,” writes Keyes, “non-agricultural
work had become the most significant source
of cash income for villagers. The money
villagers brought back from urban or overseas
work was increasingly invested not in
agriculture but in small enterprises such as
convenience stores, repair shops, and food
stalls as well as rice mills.” Importantly, it
was also used to pay for higher education for
children, of whom there were fewer now that
women were embracing birth control.
Thaksin’s power base is in the north, around
Chiang Mai, where the conditions suited full-
scale commercial farming. This, too, caused
migration from the countryside to the city
and upward mobility through education. The
north’s ethno-regional identity is strong –
they are known as Khon Muang – but because
their aristocracy had been seamlessly
absorbed by the Siamese state they are not
looked down on like the people of Isan.
Indeed, Thai soap operas are more likely to
romanticise old northern aristocratic life and
emulate its speech forms.
n one sense, what had been forming in
the Thai countryside by the time of
Thaksin’s rise in the late 1990s was a
rural entrepreneurial class determined to
better their lives and sweep away any
bureaucratic obstacles. Thaksin the mega-
entrepreneur played to this audience
perfectly, and his million-baht-per-village
loan scheme, alongside cheap universal
healthcare, won him unwavering support. The
majority of activists in the Red Shirt
movement are in their forties or older –
exactly the group that has made the transition
from scarcity to having tasted the good life.
Big, shiny cars are now ubiquitous on Isan’s
highways; as one Red Shirt follower said, “We
are not going back to riding motorcycles.”
This doesn’t quite fit with journalistic clichés
about the “rural poor.” In the same way,
bland assertions about the “Bangkok middle-
class” blur the changing urban landscape.
As its skyline shows, Bangkok has been
remade since 1980 by dramatic economic
growth. The city’s workforce has diversified
and middle-class occupations have grown
steeply. Labour shed by agriculture has
flowed into manufacturing, where the
workforce grew from 14 per cent of the total
in 1990 to 20 per cent in 2008. But white-
collar work grew even faster – from one-in-
five employees to almost one-in-three – and
within its ranks professionals and senior
white-collar workers grew fastest.
Even in Keyes’s rural village, 17 per cent of
children in 2005 had gone on from high
school to vocational colleges or (in 4 per cent
of cases) to university, and 22 per cent had
finished high school. Because most of them
sought white-collar jobs, often in the capital,
migrants played an important role in the
growth of the middle class in Bangkok. Many
are upwardly mobile, socially and culturally,
and have learned to speak flawless central
Thai. They dress for and aspire to an affluent
urban lifestyle. An important indicator of the
dislocations involved in cultural change,
however, is the fact that the Bangkok
metropolitan area has one of the highest non-
marriage rates for women in their twenties
and thirties of any city in Southeast Asia.
For these upwardly mobile new members of
the middle class, the plebeian style adopted by
the Red Shirts is exactly what they are
running away from. Of course, many of them
aren’t politically active, but others have
joined the anti-Thaksin forces because they
agree with the middle-class critique of the
government corruption epitomised by the
Thaksin years. No doubt these migrants are
part of the reason why the Thai press speaks
of bitter divisions in families over politics.
Over this same period, Thailand’s elite has
also changed radically. The Asian financial
crisis of 1997 hit Thailand especially hard,
sending many old business families to the
wall. The boom years had been built on major
inflows of foreign investment and a globalised
economy. Close relations with the Thai state
had once provided local capitalists with very
comfortable incomes, but now globalisation
had destabilised the cosy arrangements. In
fact, Thaksin’s wealth in the
telecommunications sector had initially been
built on a deal that gave him a monopoly. Yet
he was part of a new breed of Thai capitalists
who thought globally and aimed to take over
the government and run the state as if it was
a business. As Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris
Baker write in their superb biography,
“Thaksin’s project was built around a fatal
confusion – between business and politics,
country and company, Shin Corp and
Thailand. Throughout his career, politics and
profit-making were entwined around one
another like a pair of copulating snakes.”
After the election of his Thai Rak Thai (Thai
Love Thai) party in January 2001, Thaksin’s
already rich business and family network
went into a feeding frenzy.
The monarchy, headed by enigmatic King
Bhumiphol Adulyadej, is also about to change
irreversibly. A conservative who believes in
rule by righteous individuals, the king has
done deals with military dictators to
strengthen the monarchy but has never been
a thug himself. His preference, as much as
one can discern it, is for a form of guided
democracy. He has been an enormously
popular and respected figure for many
decades. But he became physically enfeebled
just as the political turmoil began, and the
Queen has since been crippled by a stroke,
and so now the royal couple are marionettes
of the Privy Council.
The heir, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, has
none of his father’s political talent or
charisma. He is believed to have had dealings
with Thaksin, although it is unclear what these
amount to. In late November last year,
according to the Economist, “the King signed a
decree mandating that all decisions by the
powerful defence council were subject to veto
by the Crown Prince,” but whether
Vajiralongkorn really wields this power is
moot. With the passing of King Bhumiphol,
the personalised networks that have been
spun around him for so long will unravel and
Vajiralongkorn will find himself presiding
over a weakened monarchy. It will be a big
blow for conservatives.
AFGHANISTAN, US AND THE PEACE PROCESS
If the rise in violence this month is any mark of the year
that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn
out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season
in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in
fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence,
shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there
have been several attacks, in and around the fortified
diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign
security personnel, government and military
installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what
is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its
third Presidential elections in April 2014.
US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend
is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents
targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced
their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a
pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition
process, withdrawal of international troops, and
handover of all political, security and development
responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the
challenges to peace and security are many, the
solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to
reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such
mechanism has been the Afghan peace and
reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was
launched in 2010. This process envisioned political
means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation
and reintegration of insurgents through talks and
negotiations. This process was to assist the security
transition process and set the stage for the handover of
all responsibilities from international to Afghan
ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of
achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and
growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation
needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With
the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the
insurgency almost next to none, many are left
wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014
period.
The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with
a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which
have been implemented simultaneously. The
reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-
national level where foot soldiers are enticed to
reintegrate and take advantages of the financial
incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on
the other hand has been implemented at the national
and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has
been approached to participate in official channels of
communication with the Afghan government in the
hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead
to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has
been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local
commanders, making reintegration a relatively
successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts
have consistently hit roadblocks with no major
achievements to date.
The Afghan government and its international partners
have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by
employing several trust-building mechanisms. These
include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan
government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist
against former Taliban members, the creation of a
political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for
their participation in mainstream politics, allowing
representatives of the insurgency to participate in track
II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed
groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be
included into the power structure of the state. In
response, the Taliban have increased their attacks
across Afghanistan, continued to engage in
indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the
spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which
marked the second highest recorded year since 2001,
targeted killings of Afghan government officials including
the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and
Afghan National Security Forces, continued
implementation of their draconian laws in areas under
their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the
Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet
regime which has sustained their inflexibility in
accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which
include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking
ties with international terrorists groups including al
Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban
have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the
years, their actions however continue to denote another
tone.
It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government
and its international backers will strike a peace deal
with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate
post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not
surprising considering that in the past five years the
Afghan government and the international community
have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts
have become ever more daunting as the security
transition process enters its last tranche and the
international community is set to withdraw by the end
of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges
between the Afghan government and the insurgency by
the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground
realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a
position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened,
instead of weakened, by the peace process.
that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn
out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season
in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in
fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence,
shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there
have been several attacks, in and around the fortified
diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign
security personnel, government and military
installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what
is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its
third Presidential elections in April 2014.
US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend
is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents
targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced
their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a
pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition
process, withdrawal of international troops, and
handover of all political, security and development
responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the
challenges to peace and security are many, the
solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to
reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such
mechanism has been the Afghan peace and
reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was
launched in 2010. This process envisioned political
means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation
and reintegration of insurgents through talks and
negotiations. This process was to assist the security
transition process and set the stage for the handover of
all responsibilities from international to Afghan
ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of
achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and
growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation
needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With
the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the
insurgency almost next to none, many are left
wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014
period.
The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with
a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which
have been implemented simultaneously. The
reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-
national level where foot soldiers are enticed to
reintegrate and take advantages of the financial
incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on
the other hand has been implemented at the national
and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has
been approached to participate in official channels of
communication with the Afghan government in the
hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead
to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has
been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local
commanders, making reintegration a relatively
successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts
have consistently hit roadblocks with no major
achievements to date.
The Afghan government and its international partners
have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by
employing several trust-building mechanisms. These
include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan
government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist
against former Taliban members, the creation of a
political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for
their participation in mainstream politics, allowing
representatives of the insurgency to participate in track
II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed
groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be
included into the power structure of the state. In
response, the Taliban have increased their attacks
across Afghanistan, continued to engage in
indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the
spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which
marked the second highest recorded year since 2001,
targeted killings of Afghan government officials including
the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and
Afghan National Security Forces, continued
implementation of their draconian laws in areas under
their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the
Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet
regime which has sustained their inflexibility in
accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which
include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking
ties with international terrorists groups including al
Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban
have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the
years, their actions however continue to denote another
tone.
It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government
and its international backers will strike a peace deal
with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate
post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not
surprising considering that in the past five years the
Afghan government and the international community
have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts
have become ever more daunting as the security
transition process enters its last tranche and the
international community is set to withdraw by the end
of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges
between the Afghan government and the insurgency by
the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground
realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a
position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened,
instead of weakened, by the peace process.
INDIA-CHINA BILATERAL UNDER NARENDRA MODI
As the recently formed government in New Delhi is
settling down, the domestic and external policies to be
adopted are being worked out. While no specific blue
print is available, one can take the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) election manifesto, speeches of the
BJP leaders during the election campaign, actions taken
over the past two weeks, the president’s address to the
Joint Session of the parliament on June 9, and the
contextual aspects into considerations to reflect on the
new government’s policies.
First, a common denominator among the
aforementioned aspects is Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and his team’s domestic rejuvenation agenda.
President Pranab Mukherjee’s address to the parliament
outlines the new government’s agenda for the next 60
months. A majority of the points in this address were
taken verbatim from the BJP manifesto. These include
enhancing the role of the manufacturing sector,
improving infrastructure projects across the country and
overall capacity build-up. It is clear, however, that for
this to happen, the foreign policy front needs to be re-
calibrated for the domestic agenda.
For instance, China had become the global
manufacturing hub thanks to its vigorous efforts over
the past two decades of reform and opening policies
and financial and technical assistance from Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the US. In this
regard, if Modi’s efforts are to transform India into a
“globally competitive manufacturing hub powered by
Skill, Scale and Speed,” he needs active cooperation of
all the countries mentioned above.
Additionally, for setting up “world class investment and
industrial regions, particularly along the Dedicated
Freight Corridors and Industrial Corridors,” the new
government needs Japan and the other countries.
Japan, in the recent period, committed nearly $92 billion
for the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and had also
been exploring the Bangalore-Chennai sector. While
clearances on land acquisition, environmental issues,
and labour reforms have delayed the project, more
thrust could be expected during Modi’s visit to Tokyo
next month.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his meetings with
the Indian officials during his recent visit, reiterated
China’s interest in setting up industrial zones in five
states and Beijing’s participation in railway projects. For
Japan, China and the EU countries, the proposed
diamond quadrilateral project of high speed trains, the
Sagar Mala port project, substantially augmenting
electricity generation capacity, the national solar
mission, etc. are lucrative and mutually beneficial.
Concerns on foreign investments closer to the security
establishments of course, prevail in India; and so are
anti-dumping duties on solar panels from China.
There are several commonalities in the new
government’s path forward and that of China’s. Both
leaderships emphasise on nurturing innovation; urban
mission programmes; renewable sources of energy;
among others. China’s 12th Five Year Plan outlined
these aspects, and both could learn from each other’s
experience.
Second, several items on the Modi government’s
domestic agenda could provide for opportunities or even
frictions with neighbours in the longer run. The BJP
manifesto and the presidential address suggested to
building world-class infrastructure, including the
“expansion of railways in hilly states and Northeast
region, conservation of Himalayan ecology; creating 50
tourist circuits and establishing a Central University of
Himalayan Studies.” While China itself had expanded its
infrastructure projects towards its peripheries in Tibet
and Xinjiang – often intruding into disputed territories
between India and Pakistan in the Northern areas – it is
suspicious of the dual-use aspects of these initiatives
by India.
Third, during the election campaign – such as at
Pasighat in February this year when Modi chastised
China for its “expansionist mindset” – and subsequently,
it is clear that securing the borders will be among the
priorities of the new government’s agenda. This is
reflected in the appointments of Gen. (Retd) VK Singh,
and Kiran Rejiju, among others. The presidential address
simply stated that the new government will “strengthen
defence preparedness,” but there was no mention of
revising the nuclear doctrine as stated earlier by the
BJP manifesto.
Fourth, the BJP-led government clearly identified the
Indian neighbourhood as its foreign policy priority. It
was reflected in the invitation to the South Asian
neighbours to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in
ceremony, and in his choice of Thimphu for his maiden
foreign visit. The presidential address also identified
China, Japan, Russia, the US and the EU; but it is clear
that India’s relations with the US and Japan are poised
to be on the upswing. Specifically on China, the
address, while reiterating the “strategic and cooperative
partnership” agreement of 2005, stated that the new
government “will engage energetically” with Beijing.
Fifth, the BJP manifesto and the presidential address
clearly identified zero tolerance to internal disturbances,
including terrorist incidents. While in the foreign policy
domain, this issue is mainly directed towards Pakistan,
there was also a mention during Foreign Minister Yi’s
visit to New Delhi that counter-terrorism efforts
between India and China will be furthered. So far,
although both India and China have acceded to the UN
Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 on
counter-terrorism, no effective coordination or
cooperation exists between the two nations that identify
this issue as number one security challenge.
settling down, the domestic and external policies to be
adopted are being worked out. While no specific blue
print is available, one can take the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) election manifesto, speeches of the
BJP leaders during the election campaign, actions taken
over the past two weeks, the president’s address to the
Joint Session of the parliament on June 9, and the
contextual aspects into considerations to reflect on the
new government’s policies.
First, a common denominator among the
aforementioned aspects is Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and his team’s domestic rejuvenation agenda.
President Pranab Mukherjee’s address to the parliament
outlines the new government’s agenda for the next 60
months. A majority of the points in this address were
taken verbatim from the BJP manifesto. These include
enhancing the role of the manufacturing sector,
improving infrastructure projects across the country and
overall capacity build-up. It is clear, however, that for
this to happen, the foreign policy front needs to be re-
calibrated for the domestic agenda.
For instance, China had become the global
manufacturing hub thanks to its vigorous efforts over
the past two decades of reform and opening policies
and financial and technical assistance from Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the US. In this
regard, if Modi’s efforts are to transform India into a
“globally competitive manufacturing hub powered by
Skill, Scale and Speed,” he needs active cooperation of
all the countries mentioned above.
Additionally, for setting up “world class investment and
industrial regions, particularly along the Dedicated
Freight Corridors and Industrial Corridors,” the new
government needs Japan and the other countries.
Japan, in the recent period, committed nearly $92 billion
for the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and had also
been exploring the Bangalore-Chennai sector. While
clearances on land acquisition, environmental issues,
and labour reforms have delayed the project, more
thrust could be expected during Modi’s visit to Tokyo
next month.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his meetings with
the Indian officials during his recent visit, reiterated
China’s interest in setting up industrial zones in five
states and Beijing’s participation in railway projects. For
Japan, China and the EU countries, the proposed
diamond quadrilateral project of high speed trains, the
Sagar Mala port project, substantially augmenting
electricity generation capacity, the national solar
mission, etc. are lucrative and mutually beneficial.
Concerns on foreign investments closer to the security
establishments of course, prevail in India; and so are
anti-dumping duties on solar panels from China.
There are several commonalities in the new
government’s path forward and that of China’s. Both
leaderships emphasise on nurturing innovation; urban
mission programmes; renewable sources of energy;
among others. China’s 12th Five Year Plan outlined
these aspects, and both could learn from each other’s
experience.
Second, several items on the Modi government’s
domestic agenda could provide for opportunities or even
frictions with neighbours in the longer run. The BJP
manifesto and the presidential address suggested to
building world-class infrastructure, including the
“expansion of railways in hilly states and Northeast
region, conservation of Himalayan ecology; creating 50
tourist circuits and establishing a Central University of
Himalayan Studies.” While China itself had expanded its
infrastructure projects towards its peripheries in Tibet
and Xinjiang – often intruding into disputed territories
between India and Pakistan in the Northern areas – it is
suspicious of the dual-use aspects of these initiatives
by India.
Third, during the election campaign – such as at
Pasighat in February this year when Modi chastised
China for its “expansionist mindset” – and subsequently,
it is clear that securing the borders will be among the
priorities of the new government’s agenda. This is
reflected in the appointments of Gen. (Retd) VK Singh,
and Kiran Rejiju, among others. The presidential address
simply stated that the new government will “strengthen
defence preparedness,” but there was no mention of
revising the nuclear doctrine as stated earlier by the
BJP manifesto.
Fourth, the BJP-led government clearly identified the
Indian neighbourhood as its foreign policy priority. It
was reflected in the invitation to the South Asian
neighbours to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in
ceremony, and in his choice of Thimphu for his maiden
foreign visit. The presidential address also identified
China, Japan, Russia, the US and the EU; but it is clear
that India’s relations with the US and Japan are poised
to be on the upswing. Specifically on China, the
address, while reiterating the “strategic and cooperative
partnership” agreement of 2005, stated that the new
government “will engage energetically” with Beijing.
Fifth, the BJP manifesto and the presidential address
clearly identified zero tolerance to internal disturbances,
including terrorist incidents. While in the foreign policy
domain, this issue is mainly directed towards Pakistan,
there was also a mention during Foreign Minister Yi’s
visit to New Delhi that counter-terrorism efforts
between India and China will be furthered. So far,
although both India and China have acceded to the UN
Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 on
counter-terrorism, no effective coordination or
cooperation exists between the two nations that identify
this issue as number one security challenge.
TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN: THE MEHSUD BREAKAWAY
On 28 May, 2014, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Wali-ur-Rehman faction led by Khan Said, also known
as Sajna, announced its separation from the TTP,
alleging that the current Mullah Fazlullah-led TTP is
bombing public places using fake names to avoid
responsibility. Sajna was a strong contender for the
TTP’s leadership after its former chief Hakimullah
Medsud was killed in a US drone attack in November
2013. The post was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah of
the Swati Taliban. Sajna was a key ally of former Wali-
ur-Rehman Mehsud, who originally led the breakaway
group and who was killed in a US drone strike in May
2013.
Why did the Split Take Place?
The TTP split into two factions after major group based
in South Waziristan quit the TTP and accused its
leadership of having fallen into invisible hands and
turning the TTP into an organisation providing safety to
criminals. Sajna’s spokesperson Azam Tariq said “We
announce separation from the TTP leadership which has
deviated from its path.” It accused the TTP leadership of
indulging in robberies, killing for money, extortion and
kidnapping for ransom with the help of a group of
conspirators, and said all these actions are considered
as un-Islamic.
The spokesman said the split too place because the
TTP under Fazlullah had become a den for extortionists,
and that it carried out blasts in mosques. This
assertion, however, does not hold much sincerity. This
is because the TTP has a long history of carrying out
blasts inside mosques, and their principal source of
income is extortion. Prima facie, it appears to be a case
of infighting for leadership roles.
Primarily, the split appears to have been a result of
tribal infighting for the leadership of the TTP. The TTP
has traditionally been a group of tribesmen from the
Mehsud clan, and Fazlullah is the first non-Mehsud
tribesman to have assumed leadership of the group.
Prior to joining the TTP, Fazlullah used to lead his own
militant organization called the Tehrik-i-Nafaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). He was never inclined
to any negotiation and used to carry our ruthlessly
violent attacks.
The military's role in this split is unclear. Unlike the
Afghan Taliban, the TTP never took commands from the
Pakistani military. Their primary targets are the military
and law-enforcing agencies. Time and gain, the TTP
attacked military posts, taking some officials as
captives, and subsequently, killing them brutally. The
government’s failed attempt at negotiations with the
TTP is also among the key reasons for the ongoing
civil-military tension in Pakistan.
What are the Potential Implications?
It is yet to be seen how the splinter groups act in the
coming days. There is a likelihood of Fazlullah
regrouping the cadres of his former organization, the
TNSM. His seat of power was Swat valley, where he is
believed to command the loyalty of many of his
followers. Now, both the splinter groups might try to
assert their existence and relevance by carrying out
more attacks.
The military might try to take the advantage of the
ongoing infighting and mount serious offensives to
cause damage to the groups. The government might try
to engage in negotiations with Sajna’s group that
appears eager to hold talks. The consent of military to
such negotiations is very less.
According to the Pak Tribune, following the
aforementioned split, 13 militants were killed in a
bombing and gun-fighting in North Waziristan last
week. 56 people have been killed in the violence that
erupted on 1 June between Sajna’s supporters and
those of the late Hakimullah Mehsud group in North
Waziristan.
The Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud group is likely to emerge
stronger after the division because it enjoys the support
of both the Punjabi Taliban, and al-Qaeda. This
breakaway may end the centrality of the TTP and lead
to further disintegration. However, the government has
not commented on the split and it is yet to be seen as
to how this would affect the government’s peace
initiative.
Wali-ur-Rehman faction led by Khan Said, also known
as Sajna, announced its separation from the TTP,
alleging that the current Mullah Fazlullah-led TTP is
bombing public places using fake names to avoid
responsibility. Sajna was a strong contender for the
TTP’s leadership after its former chief Hakimullah
Medsud was killed in a US drone attack in November
2013. The post was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah of
the Swati Taliban. Sajna was a key ally of former Wali-
ur-Rehman Mehsud, who originally led the breakaway
group and who was killed in a US drone strike in May
2013.
Why did the Split Take Place?
The TTP split into two factions after major group based
in South Waziristan quit the TTP and accused its
leadership of having fallen into invisible hands and
turning the TTP into an organisation providing safety to
criminals. Sajna’s spokesperson Azam Tariq said “We
announce separation from the TTP leadership which has
deviated from its path.” It accused the TTP leadership of
indulging in robberies, killing for money, extortion and
kidnapping for ransom with the help of a group of
conspirators, and said all these actions are considered
as un-Islamic.
The spokesman said the split too place because the
TTP under Fazlullah had become a den for extortionists,
and that it carried out blasts in mosques. This
assertion, however, does not hold much sincerity. This
is because the TTP has a long history of carrying out
blasts inside mosques, and their principal source of
income is extortion. Prima facie, it appears to be a case
of infighting for leadership roles.
Primarily, the split appears to have been a result of
tribal infighting for the leadership of the TTP. The TTP
has traditionally been a group of tribesmen from the
Mehsud clan, and Fazlullah is the first non-Mehsud
tribesman to have assumed leadership of the group.
Prior to joining the TTP, Fazlullah used to lead his own
militant organization called the Tehrik-i-Nafaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). He was never inclined
to any negotiation and used to carry our ruthlessly
violent attacks.
The military's role in this split is unclear. Unlike the
Afghan Taliban, the TTP never took commands from the
Pakistani military. Their primary targets are the military
and law-enforcing agencies. Time and gain, the TTP
attacked military posts, taking some officials as
captives, and subsequently, killing them brutally. The
government’s failed attempt at negotiations with the
TTP is also among the key reasons for the ongoing
civil-military tension in Pakistan.
What are the Potential Implications?
It is yet to be seen how the splinter groups act in the
coming days. There is a likelihood of Fazlullah
regrouping the cadres of his former organization, the
TNSM. His seat of power was Swat valley, where he is
believed to command the loyalty of many of his
followers. Now, both the splinter groups might try to
assert their existence and relevance by carrying out
more attacks.
The military might try to take the advantage of the
ongoing infighting and mount serious offensives to
cause damage to the groups. The government might try
to engage in negotiations with Sajna’s group that
appears eager to hold talks. The consent of military to
such negotiations is very less.
According to the Pak Tribune, following the
aforementioned split, 13 militants were killed in a
bombing and gun-fighting in North Waziristan last
week. 56 people have been killed in the violence that
erupted on 1 June between Sajna’s supporters and
those of the late Hakimullah Mehsud group in North
Waziristan.
The Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud group is likely to emerge
stronger after the division because it enjoys the support
of both the Punjabi Taliban, and al-Qaeda. This
breakaway may end the centrality of the TTP and lead
to further disintegration. However, the government has
not commented on the split and it is yet to be seen as
to how this would affect the government’s peace
initiative.
9 Jun 2014
POST AFGHAN ELECTION: END OF THE ROAD FOR TALIBAN?
Undoubtedly the elections in Afghanistan last week to
elect the next President is historical. According to initial
reports, more than 60 percent of the 12 million
electorate took part in the elections; given the security
environment and the ability of the State to organize
polling booths in every district, 60 percent is a
phenomenal statistics for the Afghan democracy.
Does the positive vote mean end of the road for Taliban
and to radical politics through threat and fear? Initial
responses to the elections from the US to our own
region have been as a vote against the Taliban, or a
sign of its decline. But is it not early to make an
assertion whether the Taliban would become irrelevant
after this election? Does militancy, such as that of the
Taliban, really decline and disappear? If it does, under
what conditions? What has been the success story in
our region so far?
True, the elections were not as violent, as it was
expected. There were few high profile attacks, including
the use of suicide bombs immediately before the
elections. The horror in the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the suicide attacks in one of the offices of the election
commission immediately before the elections did raise a
fear that the process would be violent. Few polling
booths were in fact closed due to security situation; and
in many places, especially in the southern and eastern
districts, where the Taliban is having its base, post
election interviews do inform that the threat from the
Taliban against voting did work.
By no stretch of imagination one could make an
argument that the Taliban is weak enough not to carry
out targeted attacks, or general bomb blasts anywhere
in Afghanistan. In fact, there were days in the recent
past of Afghanistan, which were even more violent than
what one had witnessed during the day of election last
week. Though the Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) are better trained and equipped today, the
security is not fool proof that the Taliban could not
penetrate.
Perhaps, this is a calibrated strategy by the Taliban. A
section within Afghanistan and outside was not sure
about the election outcome; they believed this one
would also be as farcical and fraudulent as the previous
one in 2009. With a deeply polarized society and strong
ethnic differences between the major communities, many
considered this election would be contentious and
inconclusive, leading only to further political instability.
So the calculation within the Taliban and their
supporters elsewhere could have been to wait and
watch; if the election process results in political
instability, it would only strengthen the case of the
Taliban and undermine the democratic process and a
transition funded and supported by the “West”. So why
use violence and undermine a process that is already
seen as faulty and unproductive? Perhaps, this was a
strategy in keeping a low profile.
Second reason for Taliban’s relative restraint during the
elections is to wait, watch and choose a time and place
of their own choice. The Taliban is well aware that this
is only the first round; if none of the candidates get the
desired percentage of votes, there would be a second
round amongst the top two. Taliban could very well
target the process at that time; perhaps, this could be a
future wait and watch strategy by the Taliban, as it did
immediately after the international security forces landed
in Afghanistan in 2001-02. They disappeared into the
mountains, only to engage in a guerrilla warfare, that
too successfully. Perhaps, this time the Taliban wanted
to gauge the response of the people, and pursue an
appropriate course of action. The fact that the election
process in the South and East were stunted does
highlight that its base is intact.
To conclude, it is too early to write off the Taliban. Few
high profile suicide attacks in Kabul would change the
entire context and the discourse.
The larger question and challenge for Afghanistan and
the rest of South Asia is – do militancy of the Taliban
variety decline and disappear? Or they only decay but
only mutate further? Even if the second round of
election is free of violence and results in a new
President taking over, what is the likely response of
Taliban in the near future?
In South Asia – we have few examples – the NSCN in
India’s Northeast, Khalistan movement in Punjab, the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Baloch insurgency in
Pakistan. The NSCN today has become a fractionalized
movement, and the level of corruption in the State has
only made an underground movement into a semi-over
ground but parallel government. In Punjab, the State
used force on the one hand, but politically co-opted the
parties and ensured there is better governance; as a
result, the Khalistan movement in Punjab today is all
but dead, except occasional posters and periodic
discussions.
In Balochistan, Pakistan used brutal force to undermine
the Baloch national movements more than three times
since independence. Neither there was better
governance, nor the local population got co-opted into
the mainstream. Same was the case in Sri Lanka as
well; the government towards the end of Eelam War,
used brute force to physically annihilate the LTTE.
Though violence has come to an end, the Sri Lankan
Tamils are still far from being satisfied.
Which way would the Taliban insurgency turn into in
Afghanistan after the elections? This is an important
question not only for Afghanistan, but also for the entire
regional security. Much would depend on how the
Afghan led and Afghan owned transition takes place at
the ground level, in terms of improving the situation of
the Afghan people.
Though the ANSF may be better trained and well
equipped to take on the Taliban militarily, the military
equation between the State and the Taliban is not going
to be the decisive factor. Political stability and social
reconstruction by the Afghan government, an inclusive
economic growth along with equitable distribution of
development in urban and rural areas would become the
decisive factor. Though corruption is also an issue, in
the case of Afghanistan, the critics are exaggerating the
case; this is a common issue for the entire South Asia
and accusing Afghanistan alone may not provide the
right answers.
So the question where would the Taliban go – is not in
the hands of Mullah Omar, but with the next President,
and the rest of international community including
Pakistan. If there is better governance, equitable
development and inclusive growth, the Taliban will be
relegated into an insignificant militant group that would
eventually mutate into splinter groups, like the multiple
Mujahideen groups did after the so called jihad against
the Russians in the 1980s. If the international
community lose interest in Afghanistan and allows the
positive developments to go down the drain, along with
ignoring any Pakistani ingress, it would only strengthen
the hands of the Taliban. Worse, if the next government
fail to deliver, support for the Taliban would only
increase. Not by design, but by default.
The success and failure of the Taliban, is not in the
hands of Mullah Omar. It rests with the next President
and his ability to take Afghanistan forward.
elect the next President is historical. According to initial
reports, more than 60 percent of the 12 million
electorate took part in the elections; given the security
environment and the ability of the State to organize
polling booths in every district, 60 percent is a
phenomenal statistics for the Afghan democracy.
Does the positive vote mean end of the road for Taliban
and to radical politics through threat and fear? Initial
responses to the elections from the US to our own
region have been as a vote against the Taliban, or a
sign of its decline. But is it not early to make an
assertion whether the Taliban would become irrelevant
after this election? Does militancy, such as that of the
Taliban, really decline and disappear? If it does, under
what conditions? What has been the success story in
our region so far?
True, the elections were not as violent, as it was
expected. There were few high profile attacks, including
the use of suicide bombs immediately before the
elections. The horror in the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the suicide attacks in one of the offices of the election
commission immediately before the elections did raise a
fear that the process would be violent. Few polling
booths were in fact closed due to security situation; and
in many places, especially in the southern and eastern
districts, where the Taliban is having its base, post
election interviews do inform that the threat from the
Taliban against voting did work.
By no stretch of imagination one could make an
argument that the Taliban is weak enough not to carry
out targeted attacks, or general bomb blasts anywhere
in Afghanistan. In fact, there were days in the recent
past of Afghanistan, which were even more violent than
what one had witnessed during the day of election last
week. Though the Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) are better trained and equipped today, the
security is not fool proof that the Taliban could not
penetrate.
Perhaps, this is a calibrated strategy by the Taliban. A
section within Afghanistan and outside was not sure
about the election outcome; they believed this one
would also be as farcical and fraudulent as the previous
one in 2009. With a deeply polarized society and strong
ethnic differences between the major communities, many
considered this election would be contentious and
inconclusive, leading only to further political instability.
So the calculation within the Taliban and their
supporters elsewhere could have been to wait and
watch; if the election process results in political
instability, it would only strengthen the case of the
Taliban and undermine the democratic process and a
transition funded and supported by the “West”. So why
use violence and undermine a process that is already
seen as faulty and unproductive? Perhaps, this was a
strategy in keeping a low profile.
Second reason for Taliban’s relative restraint during the
elections is to wait, watch and choose a time and place
of their own choice. The Taliban is well aware that this
is only the first round; if none of the candidates get the
desired percentage of votes, there would be a second
round amongst the top two. Taliban could very well
target the process at that time; perhaps, this could be a
future wait and watch strategy by the Taliban, as it did
immediately after the international security forces landed
in Afghanistan in 2001-02. They disappeared into the
mountains, only to engage in a guerrilla warfare, that
too successfully. Perhaps, this time the Taliban wanted
to gauge the response of the people, and pursue an
appropriate course of action. The fact that the election
process in the South and East were stunted does
highlight that its base is intact.
To conclude, it is too early to write off the Taliban. Few
high profile suicide attacks in Kabul would change the
entire context and the discourse.
The larger question and challenge for Afghanistan and
the rest of South Asia is – do militancy of the Taliban
variety decline and disappear? Or they only decay but
only mutate further? Even if the second round of
election is free of violence and results in a new
President taking over, what is the likely response of
Taliban in the near future?
In South Asia – we have few examples – the NSCN in
India’s Northeast, Khalistan movement in Punjab, the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Baloch insurgency in
Pakistan. The NSCN today has become a fractionalized
movement, and the level of corruption in the State has
only made an underground movement into a semi-over
ground but parallel government. In Punjab, the State
used force on the one hand, but politically co-opted the
parties and ensured there is better governance; as a
result, the Khalistan movement in Punjab today is all
but dead, except occasional posters and periodic
discussions.
In Balochistan, Pakistan used brutal force to undermine
the Baloch national movements more than three times
since independence. Neither there was better
governance, nor the local population got co-opted into
the mainstream. Same was the case in Sri Lanka as
well; the government towards the end of Eelam War,
used brute force to physically annihilate the LTTE.
Though violence has come to an end, the Sri Lankan
Tamils are still far from being satisfied.
Which way would the Taliban insurgency turn into in
Afghanistan after the elections? This is an important
question not only for Afghanistan, but also for the entire
regional security. Much would depend on how the
Afghan led and Afghan owned transition takes place at
the ground level, in terms of improving the situation of
the Afghan people.
Though the ANSF may be better trained and well
equipped to take on the Taliban militarily, the military
equation between the State and the Taliban is not going
to be the decisive factor. Political stability and social
reconstruction by the Afghan government, an inclusive
economic growth along with equitable distribution of
development in urban and rural areas would become the
decisive factor. Though corruption is also an issue, in
the case of Afghanistan, the critics are exaggerating the
case; this is a common issue for the entire South Asia
and accusing Afghanistan alone may not provide the
right answers.
So the question where would the Taliban go – is not in
the hands of Mullah Omar, but with the next President,
and the rest of international community including
Pakistan. If there is better governance, equitable
development and inclusive growth, the Taliban will be
relegated into an insignificant militant group that would
eventually mutate into splinter groups, like the multiple
Mujahideen groups did after the so called jihad against
the Russians in the 1980s. If the international
community lose interest in Afghanistan and allows the
positive developments to go down the drain, along with
ignoring any Pakistani ingress, it would only strengthen
the hands of the Taliban. Worse, if the next government
fail to deliver, support for the Taliban would only
increase. Not by design, but by default.
The success and failure of the Taliban, is not in the
hands of Mullah Omar. It rests with the next President
and his ability to take Afghanistan forward.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR DEAL: REGIONAL SHADOWS
There are indications of further substantive progress in
P5 plus Germany’s negotiations with Iran in the latest
round in Vienna. Iran has shown readiness and given
plans to change the design of the Arak research reactor
to drastically reduce plutonium in its spent fuel. While
Iran has no reprocessing plant and the Arak reactor is
still under construction, the plutonium production risk
has been one of the main sticking points about Iran’s
nuclear programme. The comprehensive agreement
which the negotiators hope to achieve by July 2014
looks distant still. It will need considerable hard work
and has 50-60 per cent chance of happening by the
deadline; going by the comments of the Chinese and
Russian negotiators after the latest round.
Iran’s stance as revealed in statements by the Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif remains consistent with its
line since November 2013, that it will take steps to
reduce the enrichment level, output and stocks at both
locations alongside agreed improvement in transparency
and access required for IAEA’s close monitoring. While
the Iranian part of the deal is focused on its nuclear
programme the other side, particularly the US
academics, congressmen and the Israelis have shown
differing views of what should constitute an acceptable
agreement to reward Iran with lifting of sanctions. On
the one hand, despite the heightened tensions about
Ukraine, Russian negotiators seem to show that there is
no impact on their (constructive) role in the P5-plus-
one process. On the other, there is a rising domestic
chorus in the US putting pressure on its negotiators
about the full range of demands from Iran in these
negotiations.
In recent weeks, more and more concern has come up
front that mere nuclear concessions by Iran should not
earn it the desired sanctions relief. The regional impact
of Iran’s role and policies has loomed large in recent
weeks as evident in commentaries about the visit of
President Obama to Saudi Arabia, the Middle East
shuttle diplomacy of Kerry, the role of Hizbullah and the
situation in Syria since the failure of Geneva II.
An article in the Washington Post co-authored by Gen
Petraeus on 10 April about these negotiations with Iran
goes to the extent of putting the clock back on the
entire contour of the Iran imbroglio over the past two
decades. Petraeus and his co-author stress that “a
successful nuclear deal with Iran could result in the
United States and its partners in the Middle East facing
a better-resourced and, in some respects, more
dangerous adversary”. This, they argue, is ‘because
sanctions relief would bolster Tehran’s capability to
train, finance and equip its terrorist proxies’ and
therefore ‘sanctions related to terrorism should remain
in place’ and should even be enhanced. Another very
exhaustive paper by well known US non-proliferation
scholar, Robert Einhorn, spells out the strict
requirements of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran
– while stating at the outset that he does not at all
address the sanctions relief part of the bargain. Israel’s
position on the accords since November 2013 has been
of stout negation of anything good in this process since
it would only relax the hold of tight sanctions on Iran
and remove its isolation – and with no sight of reliable
nuclear guarantees.
Ironically, if such arguments receive greater credence,
they would reinforce Iran’s innate fears from the very
beginning that the whole nuclear issue has been raked
up with ulterior regional aims. This line was probably
felt in Tehran particularly starkly in 2002-03 in the
context of a similar case against Iraq. Hence perhaps
the concessions that Iran was offering in its talks with
the European-3 (Germany, France and UK) in October
2003. The whole point of the relaxation of the situation
after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and subsequent back
channel progress between the US and Iran was to reach
a breakthrough with a limited focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme and sanctions relief. Iran is on record
stating that the deal will be dead if sanctions persist.
In a worsening situation, if these talks founder, Iran’s
regional concerns too might come to the fore and pull
back its leadership from the statesmanship
demonstrated over the past year. The reports about
Saudi Arabia’s mounting unease with prospects of Iran
emerging from the cold and speculations about Riyadh’s
drastic review of its strategic posture are significant.
Mutual apprehension between Iran and Saudi Arabia and
suspicions about the likely Saudi nuclear outsourcing to
Pakistan are likely to enormously complicate the
situation. Iran-Pakistan strains have been skillfully
managed so far despite provocations arising out of
sectarian strife in the region, the reported role of
Pakistani regular or retired troops in Bahrain, and recent
stories about Pakistani jihadis having joined the
opposition in Syria.
Sartaj Aziz has hinted at Pakistan’s mediation between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and going by past history of
Pakistan’s deft and uncanny ways in this regard, it
might be difficult to rule such stuff out in the unfolding
scenario of leverages and diplomacy. Is nuclear-armed
Pakistan thus again on the threshold of a big role post
the US exit from Afghanistan, with its human resources
deployed in Syria and who knows where else, and go-
between diplomacy elsewhere? Are the straws in the
wind about the likely relaxation of US (and NSG)
strictures on nuclear Pakistan integral to any larger
pattern, overlooking the terrorism angle?
P5 plus Germany’s negotiations with Iran in the latest
round in Vienna. Iran has shown readiness and given
plans to change the design of the Arak research reactor
to drastically reduce plutonium in its spent fuel. While
Iran has no reprocessing plant and the Arak reactor is
still under construction, the plutonium production risk
has been one of the main sticking points about Iran’s
nuclear programme. The comprehensive agreement
which the negotiators hope to achieve by July 2014
looks distant still. It will need considerable hard work
and has 50-60 per cent chance of happening by the
deadline; going by the comments of the Chinese and
Russian negotiators after the latest round.
Iran’s stance as revealed in statements by the Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif remains consistent with its
line since November 2013, that it will take steps to
reduce the enrichment level, output and stocks at both
locations alongside agreed improvement in transparency
and access required for IAEA’s close monitoring. While
the Iranian part of the deal is focused on its nuclear
programme the other side, particularly the US
academics, congressmen and the Israelis have shown
differing views of what should constitute an acceptable
agreement to reward Iran with lifting of sanctions. On
the one hand, despite the heightened tensions about
Ukraine, Russian negotiators seem to show that there is
no impact on their (constructive) role in the P5-plus-
one process. On the other, there is a rising domestic
chorus in the US putting pressure on its negotiators
about the full range of demands from Iran in these
negotiations.
In recent weeks, more and more concern has come up
front that mere nuclear concessions by Iran should not
earn it the desired sanctions relief. The regional impact
of Iran’s role and policies has loomed large in recent
weeks as evident in commentaries about the visit of
President Obama to Saudi Arabia, the Middle East
shuttle diplomacy of Kerry, the role of Hizbullah and the
situation in Syria since the failure of Geneva II.
An article in the Washington Post co-authored by Gen
Petraeus on 10 April about these negotiations with Iran
goes to the extent of putting the clock back on the
entire contour of the Iran imbroglio over the past two
decades. Petraeus and his co-author stress that “a
successful nuclear deal with Iran could result in the
United States and its partners in the Middle East facing
a better-resourced and, in some respects, more
dangerous adversary”. This, they argue, is ‘because
sanctions relief would bolster Tehran’s capability to
train, finance and equip its terrorist proxies’ and
therefore ‘sanctions related to terrorism should remain
in place’ and should even be enhanced. Another very
exhaustive paper by well known US non-proliferation
scholar, Robert Einhorn, spells out the strict
requirements of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran
– while stating at the outset that he does not at all
address the sanctions relief part of the bargain. Israel’s
position on the accords since November 2013 has been
of stout negation of anything good in this process since
it would only relax the hold of tight sanctions on Iran
and remove its isolation – and with no sight of reliable
nuclear guarantees.
Ironically, if such arguments receive greater credence,
they would reinforce Iran’s innate fears from the very
beginning that the whole nuclear issue has been raked
up with ulterior regional aims. This line was probably
felt in Tehran particularly starkly in 2002-03 in the
context of a similar case against Iraq. Hence perhaps
the concessions that Iran was offering in its talks with
the European-3 (Germany, France and UK) in October
2003. The whole point of the relaxation of the situation
after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and subsequent back
channel progress between the US and Iran was to reach
a breakthrough with a limited focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme and sanctions relief. Iran is on record
stating that the deal will be dead if sanctions persist.
In a worsening situation, if these talks founder, Iran’s
regional concerns too might come to the fore and pull
back its leadership from the statesmanship
demonstrated over the past year. The reports about
Saudi Arabia’s mounting unease with prospects of Iran
emerging from the cold and speculations about Riyadh’s
drastic review of its strategic posture are significant.
Mutual apprehension between Iran and Saudi Arabia and
suspicions about the likely Saudi nuclear outsourcing to
Pakistan are likely to enormously complicate the
situation. Iran-Pakistan strains have been skillfully
managed so far despite provocations arising out of
sectarian strife in the region, the reported role of
Pakistani regular or retired troops in Bahrain, and recent
stories about Pakistani jihadis having joined the
opposition in Syria.
Sartaj Aziz has hinted at Pakistan’s mediation between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and going by past history of
Pakistan’s deft and uncanny ways in this regard, it
might be difficult to rule such stuff out in the unfolding
scenario of leverages and diplomacy. Is nuclear-armed
Pakistan thus again on the threshold of a big role post
the US exit from Afghanistan, with its human resources
deployed in Syria and who knows where else, and go-
between diplomacy elsewhere? Are the straws in the
wind about the likely relaxation of US (and NSG)
strictures on nuclear Pakistan integral to any larger
pattern, overlooking the terrorism angle?
PERILS OF STRATEGIC NARCISSISM
China’s rise has powered an impulse to military growth
and unilateral intervention which in turn evokes
anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic
milieu. The paradoxical effect is to undermine its own
strategic standing.
Historical Similitude
The Franco-German War of 1870 forms a watershed in
strategic thought. After the annexation of the North
German Confederacy in 1866, Bismarck sought the
Southern German States. He deceived the French into
believing that a Prussian Prince would rule from the
throne of Spain as a larger strategy of encirclement. By
July 1870, France was conned into a seemingly
‘inevitable’ war. Germany through superior military craft
and technology inflicted a crushing defeat on the host.
In the process the balance of power in Europe was
upset. The War, from deception, to alliances,
provocation of crisis and defeat of the enemy forcing a
one-sided negotiation could well have been scripted by
Kautilya or, more significant to this narrative, Sun Tzu.
German victory ushered a strategic orientation to
compete with the principal imperial power, Britain. Three
strategic objectives swayed the rivalry: military
dominance over land and sea; global economic and
technological ascendancy in tandem with unimpeded
access to primary resources; and thirdly, diplomatic and
political pre-eminence. By 1890, Germany had
established continental military dominance and a
warship-build programme that would challenge British
command of the seas. Economically, Germany had
already overtaken Britain in heavy industries and
innovation, capturing global markets and amassing
capital. This in turn muscled influence and superiority in
one sector after another.
A thirty-year projection in 1890 suggested that
Germany, home to the most advanced industries having
unimpeded access to resources of the earth, best
universities, richest banks and a balanced society,
would achieve her strategic goals and primacy. Yet
precisely thirty years later, Germany lay in ruins, her
economy in shambles, her people impoverished and her
society fragmented. By 1920, her great power
aspirations lay shamed between the pages of the Treaty
of Versailles. The real lesson was that Germany’s quest
for comprehensive power brought about a
transformation amongst the status-quo powers to align
against, despite traditional hostility (Britain and France;
Britain and Russia) to contain and defeat a rising
Germany that sought to upset the existing global order.
China in Perspective
Historical analogies are notorious in their inability to
stage encores, yet they serve as means to understand
the present.
Contemporary fears of nations are driven by four vital
traumas: perpetuation of the State; impact of internal
and external stresses; reconciliation with the
international system; lastly, the conundrum of whether
military power produces political outcomes. The
paradigm of the day is ‘uncertainty’ with the tensions of
multi-polarity, tyranny of economics, anarchy of
expectations and polarisation along religio-cultural lines
all compacted by globalisation.
If globalisation is a leveller to the rest of the world, to
China, globalisation is about State capitalism, central
supremacy, controlled markets, managed currency and
hegemony. The military was to resolve fundamental
contradictions that threatened the Chinese State.
Significantly, globalisation provided the opportunity to
alter the status-quo. Against this backdrop is the
politics of competitive resource access and denial,
which rationalised the use of force. It is in this
perspective that the rise of China must be gauged.
China’s dazzling growth is set to overtake the US. Its
rise has been accompanied by ambitions of global
leadership. This has in turn spurred an unparalleled
military growth. In this circumstance the race to garner
resources by other major economies is fraught. But the
real alarm is that China seeks to dominate international
institutions without bringing about a change of her own
morphology. China’s claims on the South and East
China Sea; handling of internal dissent; proliferatory
carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases in
point.
The emergence of China from its defensive maritime
perimeters into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming
‘Third Security Chain’. Gone is Deng’s ‘power
bashfulness’; in its place is the conviction that the-
world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world. Its
insistence on a bilateral policy to settle disputes even
denies the natural impulse of threatened States to seek
power balance in collective security.
The Sense in Cooperative Security Strategies
The standpoint that provocation and intimidation can
benefit China by persuading the victim to negotiate
outstanding issues from a conciliatory position is a
strategically mistaken one. India, Japan, Vietnam and
the South China Sea Littorals have demonstrated so.
Far from acquiescing they have chosen to resist,
adopting (in trend) a cooperative security strategy. This
includes deliberate negative response to favour Chinese
economic monopoly even when the benefits are obvious.
While individual action may be insignificant, the
aggregate of combined action may impede China’s
growth which in turn question’s strategic stability of
dispensation.
The parallels with the rise and fall of Germany is
complete when it is noted that China’s Defence White
Paper of April 2013 underscores the will to expand
offensive military capability in pace with economic
growth. Internationally, this can only be viewed as
acutely threatening. The delusion that menaced States
will not align to contend and defy China’s grand design
is a strategically misleading notion.
and unilateral intervention which in turn evokes
anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic
milieu. The paradoxical effect is to undermine its own
strategic standing.
Historical Similitude
The Franco-German War of 1870 forms a watershed in
strategic thought. After the annexation of the North
German Confederacy in 1866, Bismarck sought the
Southern German States. He deceived the French into
believing that a Prussian Prince would rule from the
throne of Spain as a larger strategy of encirclement. By
July 1870, France was conned into a seemingly
‘inevitable’ war. Germany through superior military craft
and technology inflicted a crushing defeat on the host.
In the process the balance of power in Europe was
upset. The War, from deception, to alliances,
provocation of crisis and defeat of the enemy forcing a
one-sided negotiation could well have been scripted by
Kautilya or, more significant to this narrative, Sun Tzu.
German victory ushered a strategic orientation to
compete with the principal imperial power, Britain. Three
strategic objectives swayed the rivalry: military
dominance over land and sea; global economic and
technological ascendancy in tandem with unimpeded
access to primary resources; and thirdly, diplomatic and
political pre-eminence. By 1890, Germany had
established continental military dominance and a
warship-build programme that would challenge British
command of the seas. Economically, Germany had
already overtaken Britain in heavy industries and
innovation, capturing global markets and amassing
capital. This in turn muscled influence and superiority in
one sector after another.
A thirty-year projection in 1890 suggested that
Germany, home to the most advanced industries having
unimpeded access to resources of the earth, best
universities, richest banks and a balanced society,
would achieve her strategic goals and primacy. Yet
precisely thirty years later, Germany lay in ruins, her
economy in shambles, her people impoverished and her
society fragmented. By 1920, her great power
aspirations lay shamed between the pages of the Treaty
of Versailles. The real lesson was that Germany’s quest
for comprehensive power brought about a
transformation amongst the status-quo powers to align
against, despite traditional hostility (Britain and France;
Britain and Russia) to contain and defeat a rising
Germany that sought to upset the existing global order.
China in Perspective
Historical analogies are notorious in their inability to
stage encores, yet they serve as means to understand
the present.
Contemporary fears of nations are driven by four vital
traumas: perpetuation of the State; impact of internal
and external stresses; reconciliation with the
international system; lastly, the conundrum of whether
military power produces political outcomes. The
paradigm of the day is ‘uncertainty’ with the tensions of
multi-polarity, tyranny of economics, anarchy of
expectations and polarisation along religio-cultural lines
all compacted by globalisation.
If globalisation is a leveller to the rest of the world, to
China, globalisation is about State capitalism, central
supremacy, controlled markets, managed currency and
hegemony. The military was to resolve fundamental
contradictions that threatened the Chinese State.
Significantly, globalisation provided the opportunity to
alter the status-quo. Against this backdrop is the
politics of competitive resource access and denial,
which rationalised the use of force. It is in this
perspective that the rise of China must be gauged.
China’s dazzling growth is set to overtake the US. Its
rise has been accompanied by ambitions of global
leadership. This has in turn spurred an unparalleled
military growth. In this circumstance the race to garner
resources by other major economies is fraught. But the
real alarm is that China seeks to dominate international
institutions without bringing about a change of her own
morphology. China’s claims on the South and East
China Sea; handling of internal dissent; proliferatory
carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases in
point.
The emergence of China from its defensive maritime
perimeters into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming
‘Third Security Chain’. Gone is Deng’s ‘power
bashfulness’; in its place is the conviction that the-
world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world. Its
insistence on a bilateral policy to settle disputes even
denies the natural impulse of threatened States to seek
power balance in collective security.
The Sense in Cooperative Security Strategies
The standpoint that provocation and intimidation can
benefit China by persuading the victim to negotiate
outstanding issues from a conciliatory position is a
strategically mistaken one. India, Japan, Vietnam and
the South China Sea Littorals have demonstrated so.
Far from acquiescing they have chosen to resist,
adopting (in trend) a cooperative security strategy. This
includes deliberate negative response to favour Chinese
economic monopoly even when the benefits are obvious.
While individual action may be insignificant, the
aggregate of combined action may impede China’s
growth which in turn question’s strategic stability of
dispensation.
The parallels with the rise and fall of Germany is
complete when it is noted that China’s Defence White
Paper of April 2013 underscores the will to expand
offensive military capability in pace with economic
growth. Internationally, this can only be viewed as
acutely threatening. The delusion that menaced States
will not align to contend and defy China’s grand design
is a strategically misleading notion.
THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE IN ASIA PACIFIC
President Obama’s West Point speech in 2014 reflected
a qualified fatigue with internationalist causes. The
recent Chinese comment on North Korean threats about
an impending test had an interesting term in cautioning
its difficult but important neighbour: that there is no
justification for a new nuclear test and that North Korea
should not do it. It implies some kind of acceptance of
the status quo. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ye
during his Seoul visit continued to press for all in the six
party talks to persevere peacefully towards a
denuclearised peninsula. Visits and parleys among key
members of the six nations, with a focus on North
Korea, including Japan and North Korea, indicate
chances of a reactivation of the process. Meanwhile,
Russian anger against US and the G7 is being cited as
reason for Moscow’s new look at expanding relations
with Pyongyang. Russian support has expanded over
the past one year and particularly since the onset of the
crisis in Ukraine.
Russia has waved huge loans (US$10 billion) owed by
North Korea since the Soviet times and has offered US
$1 billion for a trans-Siberian railway project through
North to South Korea, received North Korean president
at the Sochi winter Olympics and sent a ministerial
delegation on a visit to Pyongyang to sign up on
important economic and trade cooperation. This
refashioning of ties between the Cold War allies might
add heft to Pyongyang’s hard stance for resumption of
the six party talks without preconditions. The G7
brandishing to Putin more sanctions for Russian actions
in Ukraine may have the effect of diminishing Russian
interest in tighter sanctions on North Korea. As for
Japan, a distinct possibility of Prime Minister Abe
making a visit to North Korea is being seen in the
announcement in the Diet by his foreign minister about
an upcoming official visit. Some headway has been
made in a meeting in Sweden in the direction of the
return of the Japanese kidnapped in North Korea and
Japan’s provision in turn for food supplies. This may
also be helpful to resume the six party talks.
The growing tensions in Southeast and East Asia
between China on one side and Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines on the other are giving rise to new ways to
deal with China, but possibly without disturbing the
existing non-weapon status of the highly developed
Japanese and South Korean nuclear enterprises. The so
called break out fears, much talked about in the context
of Iran, do not come to fore because of the impeccable
record of Seoul and Tokyo with the IAEA. However,
China has begun to raise questions about the high
plutonium holdings of Japan. The reason advanced by
Japan, namely, plutonium to meet fuel requirements for
its breeder programme, may be less credible in the wake
of Fukushima-induced anti-nuclear sentiment. As for
Seoul, it appears inclined to try non-nuclear options like
building its own ground-based mid-course missile
defence to cope with nuclear threats from the North,
instead of contemplating any deterrent route.
Within US too there are the long-held views being
reinforced by profound thinking that foresees far more
problems for strategic stability in case new allies
develop their own deterrent. Hence the reinforcing of US
rebalancing and commitment to the Asia-Pacific allies
as witnessed in the annual Shangri-La dialogue in
Singapore in end-May 2014. US Defense Secretary Hagel
was so candid in voicing concern about China’s
threatening actions in the South China Sea that the
Chinese reacted equally forcefully and virtually told
Hagel to lay off.
These are the facets of diverse approaches for the
management of the second nuclear age in the Asia-
Pacific and do not provide much reassurance. The latest
Pentagon reports show that China is underreporting its
defence expenditure by 20 per cent and suggest that the
correct annual figure should be US$145 billion, almost
four times that of India and ahead of Japan. China’s air
force is said to be growing at an alarming rate,
including with development of advanced drones and
testing of hypersonic missiles, which when combined
with earlier stories about its SSBNs and improvements
in its strategic forces, send unmistakable messages
about where China is headed. The recent US Justice
Department’s charges against Chinese generals about
cyber attacks against US businesses and China’s strong
reaction and counter-charges against the US
demonstrate an escalation of the Cold War-like rhetoric
in Asia.
Putin’s closeness to China as reflected in the conclusion
of a US$400 billion, thirty year, gas deal and a host of
others including about defence procurements as well as
Russian-Chinese joint veto in the UN Security Council
are indications of emerging new configurations in
geopolitics. These will call in to question what was
suggested even as recently as 2012 by the Yale
Professor Paul Bracken about an abiding common
interest of the existing great powers in managing the
second nuclear age (ie the age when new proliferating
States emerge). If anything, China and Russia appear to
be set to devising ways to mount a concerted challenge
to what the Chinese openly call US hegemony.
This is the short take from the dynamic that is evolving
in Asia. The news story about Russian arms to Pakistan
in this setting should raise Delhi’s heckles – the new
fangled diplomacy of Kerry and Hagel to woo Pakistan
(propensity of US think-tanks to reward Pakistan with a
nuclear deal), Russia’s indulgence, and China’s all-
weather friendship firmly backing its trusted ally
compounds the strategic scenario for India. A perceptive
remark by a former Indian Ambassador to Russia is
poignant to the US-India situation: “The US has been
looking to cooperate with an India that is strong enough
to be a balancer of China but (should not be strong)
enough to cause concern to Pakistan.” Talking of
paradoxes, the US is not alone. China’s position for
continued peaceful engagement and diplomacy about
North Korea, and its consistent reluctance to put
Pakistan or its terror outfits on the spot is in contrast
with the increasing severity with which it reacts to
Japan and bristles over outsiders counsel on maritime
disputes with Japan and in the South China Sea.
China has generally refused dialogue with India as a
nuclear weapon state invoking what it called the
international mainstream (eg NPT) whereas on Japan
and South China Sea it rejects anything that differs from
its own national hard line regardless of the weight of
international mainstream, eg, UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas, freedom of navigation and security of the
sea lanes.
In short, rules are less and less likely to govern the
evolving uncertainties in Asia except the inherent
strength and might of nations, or a concert thereof,
backing whoever takes a stand. This is the setting for
the first high level Sino-Indian diplomatic engagement
which begins over this weekend. As a special envoy of
Chinese president Xi, Foreign Minister Wang Ye is set to
meet the new government in Delhi with a message
comprising all the right and reassuring points.
a qualified fatigue with internationalist causes. The
recent Chinese comment on North Korean threats about
an impending test had an interesting term in cautioning
its difficult but important neighbour: that there is no
justification for a new nuclear test and that North Korea
should not do it. It implies some kind of acceptance of
the status quo. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ye
during his Seoul visit continued to press for all in the six
party talks to persevere peacefully towards a
denuclearised peninsula. Visits and parleys among key
members of the six nations, with a focus on North
Korea, including Japan and North Korea, indicate
chances of a reactivation of the process. Meanwhile,
Russian anger against US and the G7 is being cited as
reason for Moscow’s new look at expanding relations
with Pyongyang. Russian support has expanded over
the past one year and particularly since the onset of the
crisis in Ukraine.
Russia has waved huge loans (US$10 billion) owed by
North Korea since the Soviet times and has offered US
$1 billion for a trans-Siberian railway project through
North to South Korea, received North Korean president
at the Sochi winter Olympics and sent a ministerial
delegation on a visit to Pyongyang to sign up on
important economic and trade cooperation. This
refashioning of ties between the Cold War allies might
add heft to Pyongyang’s hard stance for resumption of
the six party talks without preconditions. The G7
brandishing to Putin more sanctions for Russian actions
in Ukraine may have the effect of diminishing Russian
interest in tighter sanctions on North Korea. As for
Japan, a distinct possibility of Prime Minister Abe
making a visit to North Korea is being seen in the
announcement in the Diet by his foreign minister about
an upcoming official visit. Some headway has been
made in a meeting in Sweden in the direction of the
return of the Japanese kidnapped in North Korea and
Japan’s provision in turn for food supplies. This may
also be helpful to resume the six party talks.
The growing tensions in Southeast and East Asia
between China on one side and Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines on the other are giving rise to new ways to
deal with China, but possibly without disturbing the
existing non-weapon status of the highly developed
Japanese and South Korean nuclear enterprises. The so
called break out fears, much talked about in the context
of Iran, do not come to fore because of the impeccable
record of Seoul and Tokyo with the IAEA. However,
China has begun to raise questions about the high
plutonium holdings of Japan. The reason advanced by
Japan, namely, plutonium to meet fuel requirements for
its breeder programme, may be less credible in the wake
of Fukushima-induced anti-nuclear sentiment. As for
Seoul, it appears inclined to try non-nuclear options like
building its own ground-based mid-course missile
defence to cope with nuclear threats from the North,
instead of contemplating any deterrent route.
Within US too there are the long-held views being
reinforced by profound thinking that foresees far more
problems for strategic stability in case new allies
develop their own deterrent. Hence the reinforcing of US
rebalancing and commitment to the Asia-Pacific allies
as witnessed in the annual Shangri-La dialogue in
Singapore in end-May 2014. US Defense Secretary Hagel
was so candid in voicing concern about China’s
threatening actions in the South China Sea that the
Chinese reacted equally forcefully and virtually told
Hagel to lay off.
These are the facets of diverse approaches for the
management of the second nuclear age in the Asia-
Pacific and do not provide much reassurance. The latest
Pentagon reports show that China is underreporting its
defence expenditure by 20 per cent and suggest that the
correct annual figure should be US$145 billion, almost
four times that of India and ahead of Japan. China’s air
force is said to be growing at an alarming rate,
including with development of advanced drones and
testing of hypersonic missiles, which when combined
with earlier stories about its SSBNs and improvements
in its strategic forces, send unmistakable messages
about where China is headed. The recent US Justice
Department’s charges against Chinese generals about
cyber attacks against US businesses and China’s strong
reaction and counter-charges against the US
demonstrate an escalation of the Cold War-like rhetoric
in Asia.
Putin’s closeness to China as reflected in the conclusion
of a US$400 billion, thirty year, gas deal and a host of
others including about defence procurements as well as
Russian-Chinese joint veto in the UN Security Council
are indications of emerging new configurations in
geopolitics. These will call in to question what was
suggested even as recently as 2012 by the Yale
Professor Paul Bracken about an abiding common
interest of the existing great powers in managing the
second nuclear age (ie the age when new proliferating
States emerge). If anything, China and Russia appear to
be set to devising ways to mount a concerted challenge
to what the Chinese openly call US hegemony.
This is the short take from the dynamic that is evolving
in Asia. The news story about Russian arms to Pakistan
in this setting should raise Delhi’s heckles – the new
fangled diplomacy of Kerry and Hagel to woo Pakistan
(propensity of US think-tanks to reward Pakistan with a
nuclear deal), Russia’s indulgence, and China’s all-
weather friendship firmly backing its trusted ally
compounds the strategic scenario for India. A perceptive
remark by a former Indian Ambassador to Russia is
poignant to the US-India situation: “The US has been
looking to cooperate with an India that is strong enough
to be a balancer of China but (should not be strong)
enough to cause concern to Pakistan.” Talking of
paradoxes, the US is not alone. China’s position for
continued peaceful engagement and diplomacy about
North Korea, and its consistent reluctance to put
Pakistan or its terror outfits on the spot is in contrast
with the increasing severity with which it reacts to
Japan and bristles over outsiders counsel on maritime
disputes with Japan and in the South China Sea.
China has generally refused dialogue with India as a
nuclear weapon state invoking what it called the
international mainstream (eg NPT) whereas on Japan
and South China Sea it rejects anything that differs from
its own national hard line regardless of the weight of
international mainstream, eg, UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas, freedom of navigation and security of the
sea lanes.
In short, rules are less and less likely to govern the
evolving uncertainties in Asia except the inherent
strength and might of nations, or a concert thereof,
backing whoever takes a stand. This is the setting for
the first high level Sino-Indian diplomatic engagement
which begins over this weekend. As a special envoy of
Chinese president Xi, Foreign Minister Wang Ye is set to
meet the new government in Delhi with a message
comprising all the right and reassuring points.
OBAMA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
The foreign policy community’s anxious wait to hear US
President Barack Obama make his foreign policy speech
at the West Point Military Academy finally came to an
end on 28 May, 2014. In his commencement address to
the graduating military officers, President Obama
outlined his foreign policy views and approaches that
stunned some analysts, and pleased many ruling elites
abroad.
Some saw a new foreign policy approach in the US
president’s speech, but those who keenly follow US
foreign policy, saw very little in the content that could
be described as new.
What was striking in the presidential address was
Obama’s strong articulation of liberal institutionalism at
a time when the potential military and economic rivals
of the US are busy flexing their muscles in parts of
Europe and Asia.
Highlighting the importance of observing international
norms and rules, President Obama said, “American
influence is always stronger when we lead by example.
We cannot exempt ourselves from the rules that apply
to everyone else.... What makes us exceptional is not
our ability to flout international norms and the rule of
law; it’s our willingness to affirm them through our
actions.”
The decision to affirm the importance of international
law, norms and institutions by a US president in the
backdrop of one military intervention every 17 months
between 1991 and 2001 is certainly a refreshing
development to believers in multilateralism. Obama
chided “a lot of sceptics who downplay the effectiveness
of multilateral action,” and said, “working through
international institutions, like the U.N. or respecting
international law” was not a sign of “weakness.”
While many would contest his own approach to the UN
in executing his war against terror in Afghanistan by
use of Drones, championing liberal institutionalism at a
time of planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
is understandable.
President Obama, moreover, has shown utmost restraint
in dealing with difficult situations, such as the ones in
Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
Chinese occupations of islands and atolls in South
China Sea. His difficulty in handling violence and
lawlessness in Iraq post the US withdrawal; in Egypt
after the Arab Spring; and in Libya after the overthrow
of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s regime gives ample reason
to sing the praise of liberal approach to international
politics as opposed to the neoconservative penchant for
frequent use of military and coercive diplomacy in
dealing with international crises.
Obama coded his policy of using soft power instead of
military means in this address by saying, “...U.S.
military action cannot be the only, or even primary,
component of our leadership in every instance. Just
because we have the best hammer does not mean that
every problem is a nail.”
Advocates multilateralism would certainly draw
inspiration from Obama’s liberal approach to world
affairs, but it is important note the traditional US foreign
policy approach, cutting across the political divide that
wasn’t missing in Obama’s speech. He made it loud
and clear: “Let me repeat a principle.... The United
States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when our core interests demand it.” And the US will
obviously determine what that “core interests” would
be. Does it mean his advocacy of liberalism is mere
opportunism?
In any case, Obama has come under fire from many
critics who say his foreign policy is just a “hedging
strategy” and devoid of any “grand strategy.” Many
Republicans and some Democrats have criticised his
foreign policy as “global retrenchment” of the US that
has shaken the confidence of allies and pleased the
adversaries.
Some have lamented that he said little about meeting
the emerging Russian challenge in Europe and the
Chinese effort to dominate Asia. Newspaper editorials in
the US carried no praise for Obama’s new foreign
policy. Lawmakers in the US too remained unhappy.
One Senator made a caustic remark on Obama’s
speech: “The President’s speech was just another great
example of his disastrous foreign policy. The reset and
the pivots have all failed. All you have to do is look at
Syria, Iran, Libya, Ukraine, or the South China Sea to
see where this foreign policy gets us in the world.”
President Obama has approximately one and a half
years before he leaves the White House. Many citizens
of the US were expecting the president to spell out his
foreign policy plans in coming months, but failed to get
any satisfaction from the West Point speech. The rest of
the world always carefully listens when an US president
speaks.
The fact that there was hardly any adverse reaction to
his speech from the rest of the world signals that
Obama was actually speaking to his own people at
West Point. One key new suggestion that needs more
clarification is his proposal to set up $5billion worth
structure to combat terrorism with willing partners
around the world.
President Barack Obama make his foreign policy speech
at the West Point Military Academy finally came to an
end on 28 May, 2014. In his commencement address to
the graduating military officers, President Obama
outlined his foreign policy views and approaches that
stunned some analysts, and pleased many ruling elites
abroad.
Some saw a new foreign policy approach in the US
president’s speech, but those who keenly follow US
foreign policy, saw very little in the content that could
be described as new.
What was striking in the presidential address was
Obama’s strong articulation of liberal institutionalism at
a time when the potential military and economic rivals
of the US are busy flexing their muscles in parts of
Europe and Asia.
Highlighting the importance of observing international
norms and rules, President Obama said, “American
influence is always stronger when we lead by example.
We cannot exempt ourselves from the rules that apply
to everyone else.... What makes us exceptional is not
our ability to flout international norms and the rule of
law; it’s our willingness to affirm them through our
actions.”
The decision to affirm the importance of international
law, norms and institutions by a US president in the
backdrop of one military intervention every 17 months
between 1991 and 2001 is certainly a refreshing
development to believers in multilateralism. Obama
chided “a lot of sceptics who downplay the effectiveness
of multilateral action,” and said, “working through
international institutions, like the U.N. or respecting
international law” was not a sign of “weakness.”
While many would contest his own approach to the UN
in executing his war against terror in Afghanistan by
use of Drones, championing liberal institutionalism at a
time of planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
is understandable.
President Obama, moreover, has shown utmost restraint
in dealing with difficult situations, such as the ones in
Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
Chinese occupations of islands and atolls in South
China Sea. His difficulty in handling violence and
lawlessness in Iraq post the US withdrawal; in Egypt
after the Arab Spring; and in Libya after the overthrow
of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s regime gives ample reason
to sing the praise of liberal approach to international
politics as opposed to the neoconservative penchant for
frequent use of military and coercive diplomacy in
dealing with international crises.
Obama coded his policy of using soft power instead of
military means in this address by saying, “...U.S.
military action cannot be the only, or even primary,
component of our leadership in every instance. Just
because we have the best hammer does not mean that
every problem is a nail.”
Advocates multilateralism would certainly draw
inspiration from Obama’s liberal approach to world
affairs, but it is important note the traditional US foreign
policy approach, cutting across the political divide that
wasn’t missing in Obama’s speech. He made it loud
and clear: “Let me repeat a principle.... The United
States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when our core interests demand it.” And the US will
obviously determine what that “core interests” would
be. Does it mean his advocacy of liberalism is mere
opportunism?
In any case, Obama has come under fire from many
critics who say his foreign policy is just a “hedging
strategy” and devoid of any “grand strategy.” Many
Republicans and some Democrats have criticised his
foreign policy as “global retrenchment” of the US that
has shaken the confidence of allies and pleased the
adversaries.
Some have lamented that he said little about meeting
the emerging Russian challenge in Europe and the
Chinese effort to dominate Asia. Newspaper editorials in
the US carried no praise for Obama’s new foreign
policy. Lawmakers in the US too remained unhappy.
One Senator made a caustic remark on Obama’s
speech: “The President’s speech was just another great
example of his disastrous foreign policy. The reset and
the pivots have all failed. All you have to do is look at
Syria, Iran, Libya, Ukraine, or the South China Sea to
see where this foreign policy gets us in the world.”
President Obama has approximately one and a half
years before he leaves the White House. Many citizens
of the US were expecting the president to spell out his
foreign policy plans in coming months, but failed to get
any satisfaction from the West Point speech. The rest of
the world always carefully listens when an US president
speaks.
The fact that there was hardly any adverse reaction to
his speech from the rest of the world signals that
Obama was actually speaking to his own people at
West Point. One key new suggestion that needs more
clarification is his proposal to set up $5billion worth
structure to combat terrorism with willing partners
around the world.
8 Jun 2014
SYRIA TODAY: IS REGIME CHANGE THE ANSWER?
There are three aspects of the Syrian imbroglio: First,
what was originally a political struggle has become a
progressively more devastating civil war. Second, those
fighting against the Assad regime have fragmented into
several distinct and contending elements - the Western
and Gulf countries’ backed Syrian National Coalition,
now the weakest of the opposition groups in terms of
fighting ability; a large array of Islamist groups, many
armed and funded by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
significant numbers of whom have come together under
two different Islamist fronts; the Nabhat Al Nusrah, an
effective fighting unit largely composed of Syrians but
an affiliate of Al Qaeda; and, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), an Al Qaeda outfit, consisting
mainly of Iraqis, the most extremist, brutal and effective
fighting unit, whose agenda goes much beyond the mere
removal of Assad and is the establishment of a
fundamentalist Islamist Emirate. The involvement of so
many different groups makes the possibility of any
solution very difficult. Third, the active involvement of
foreign countries – France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, UK and the US; this has led directly to
Syria getting to the point where it is now. The
enormous complexity of the situation should be self
evident.
Those advocating regime change need to seriously
ponder over the fact that that the internal situation
today in both Iraq and Libya is far worse than it was
when Saddam and Gaddhafi were in power. Intrusive
military interventions by foreign countries in Libya and
Iraq are not examples to be emulated but shunned.
Indeed, externally encouraged efforts towards regime
change in Arab countries must stop forthwith. Given the
current ground realities in Syria and its diverse ethnic
and sectarian makeup, regime change in Syria could
lead to a much worse outcome than in those two
countries, even the breakup of the country with deeply
destabilizing consequences for the Levant as a whole.
In the past year Assad has regained a lot of lost ground.
All other opposition rebels are now spending greater
effort fighting the ISIL considering it a more detestable
and dangerous enemy than the Assad regime. The very
recent Turkish air strike on a convoy of the ISIL and
Premier Erdogan’s visit to Iran suggest that Turkey is
rethinking its policy in Syria. There is increasing
reluctance of Western countries’ to aid rebels fearing
that arms will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
Thus, Assad is much stronger today vis-a-vis both his
domestic and international adversaries than in June
2012 when the first Geneva conference “agreed on
guidelines and principles for a political transition that
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”. It
is now increasingly highly unlikely that Assad can be
defeated on the battleground. Therefore, he is hardly
likely to agree to his handing over power in a conference
room. Pursuing regime change now is a no brainer.
Humanitarian issues such as ensuring that aid should
reach the millions in dire distress and urgently attending
to the desperate conditions of the 4 million plus
internally displaced should be accorded top priority. The
second priority must be addressing the growing violence
much of which, for all practical purposes, has now
morphed into pure terrorism. Geneva II can be said to
represent the beginning of a peace process and an
encouraging sign is agreement that the next meeting
will be held starting Feb 10th.
Another hopeful feature of Geneva II was, in the words
of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, “there is of course
agreement (amongst the fighting entities) that terrorism
…is a very serious problem inside Syria but there's no
agreement on how to deal with it”. Another good omen
is that both sides of internal Syrian conflict observed a
minutes silence together to remember those killed. Now
that a door has been opened, the warring parties within
Syria need to pursue these two issues on a priority
basis. However, the boycott of hard line extremists
suggests that in the unlikely event of any agreement, its
implementation would be sabotaged. This is a risk that
will have to be taken and should not become an excuse
for no action.
Iran was not represented even though the UN Secretary
General had invited it; the invite had to be withdrawn
due to strong US opposition. Iran commands the
greatest influence with Assad; Iran and Russia acting in
tandem are the only two countries that can persuade
Assad to make meaningful compromises. Iran’s
participation therefore is absolutely vital to the success
of any conference on Syria.
An agreement amongst the main players – the patrons
of the different contending parties within Syria: the P- 5,
EU, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - on a common
approach is a prerequisite. Therefore a separate
conference involving them should be held soonest
possible complementing a resumption of the Geneva II
talks on February 10. A priority subject should be taking
on the ISIL and similar extremist groups head on.
what was originally a political struggle has become a
progressively more devastating civil war. Second, those
fighting against the Assad regime have fragmented into
several distinct and contending elements - the Western
and Gulf countries’ backed Syrian National Coalition,
now the weakest of the opposition groups in terms of
fighting ability; a large array of Islamist groups, many
armed and funded by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
significant numbers of whom have come together under
two different Islamist fronts; the Nabhat Al Nusrah, an
effective fighting unit largely composed of Syrians but
an affiliate of Al Qaeda; and, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), an Al Qaeda outfit, consisting
mainly of Iraqis, the most extremist, brutal and effective
fighting unit, whose agenda goes much beyond the mere
removal of Assad and is the establishment of a
fundamentalist Islamist Emirate. The involvement of so
many different groups makes the possibility of any
solution very difficult. Third, the active involvement of
foreign countries – France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, UK and the US; this has led directly to
Syria getting to the point where it is now. The
enormous complexity of the situation should be self
evident.
Those advocating regime change need to seriously
ponder over the fact that that the internal situation
today in both Iraq and Libya is far worse than it was
when Saddam and Gaddhafi were in power. Intrusive
military interventions by foreign countries in Libya and
Iraq are not examples to be emulated but shunned.
Indeed, externally encouraged efforts towards regime
change in Arab countries must stop forthwith. Given the
current ground realities in Syria and its diverse ethnic
and sectarian makeup, regime change in Syria could
lead to a much worse outcome than in those two
countries, even the breakup of the country with deeply
destabilizing consequences for the Levant as a whole.
In the past year Assad has regained a lot of lost ground.
All other opposition rebels are now spending greater
effort fighting the ISIL considering it a more detestable
and dangerous enemy than the Assad regime. The very
recent Turkish air strike on a convoy of the ISIL and
Premier Erdogan’s visit to Iran suggest that Turkey is
rethinking its policy in Syria. There is increasing
reluctance of Western countries’ to aid rebels fearing
that arms will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
Thus, Assad is much stronger today vis-a-vis both his
domestic and international adversaries than in June
2012 when the first Geneva conference “agreed on
guidelines and principles for a political transition that
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”. It
is now increasingly highly unlikely that Assad can be
defeated on the battleground. Therefore, he is hardly
likely to agree to his handing over power in a conference
room. Pursuing regime change now is a no brainer.
Humanitarian issues such as ensuring that aid should
reach the millions in dire distress and urgently attending
to the desperate conditions of the 4 million plus
internally displaced should be accorded top priority. The
second priority must be addressing the growing violence
much of which, for all practical purposes, has now
morphed into pure terrorism. Geneva II can be said to
represent the beginning of a peace process and an
encouraging sign is agreement that the next meeting
will be held starting Feb 10th.
Another hopeful feature of Geneva II was, in the words
of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, “there is of course
agreement (amongst the fighting entities) that terrorism
…is a very serious problem inside Syria but there's no
agreement on how to deal with it”. Another good omen
is that both sides of internal Syrian conflict observed a
minutes silence together to remember those killed. Now
that a door has been opened, the warring parties within
Syria need to pursue these two issues on a priority
basis. However, the boycott of hard line extremists
suggests that in the unlikely event of any agreement, its
implementation would be sabotaged. This is a risk that
will have to be taken and should not become an excuse
for no action.
Iran was not represented even though the UN Secretary
General had invited it; the invite had to be withdrawn
due to strong US opposition. Iran commands the
greatest influence with Assad; Iran and Russia acting in
tandem are the only two countries that can persuade
Assad to make meaningful compromises. Iran’s
participation therefore is absolutely vital to the success
of any conference on Syria.
An agreement amongst the main players – the patrons
of the different contending parties within Syria: the P- 5,
EU, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - on a common
approach is a prerequisite. Therefore a separate
conference involving them should be held soonest
possible complementing a resumption of the Geneva II
talks on February 10. A priority subject should be taking
on the ISIL and similar extremist groups head on.
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