There are indications of further substantive progress in
P5 plus Germany’s negotiations with Iran in the latest
round in Vienna. Iran has shown readiness and given
plans to change the design of the Arak research reactor
to drastically reduce plutonium in its spent fuel. While
Iran has no reprocessing plant and the Arak reactor is
still under construction, the plutonium production risk
has been one of the main sticking points about Iran’s
nuclear programme. The comprehensive agreement
which the negotiators hope to achieve by July 2014
looks distant still. It will need considerable hard work
and has 50-60 per cent chance of happening by the
deadline; going by the comments of the Chinese and
Russian negotiators after the latest round.
Iran’s stance as revealed in statements by the Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif remains consistent with its
line since November 2013, that it will take steps to
reduce the enrichment level, output and stocks at both
locations alongside agreed improvement in transparency
and access required for IAEA’s close monitoring. While
the Iranian part of the deal is focused on its nuclear
programme the other side, particularly the US
academics, congressmen and the Israelis have shown
differing views of what should constitute an acceptable
agreement to reward Iran with lifting of sanctions. On
the one hand, despite the heightened tensions about
Ukraine, Russian negotiators seem to show that there is
no impact on their (constructive) role in the P5-plus-
one process. On the other, there is a rising domestic
chorus in the US putting pressure on its negotiators
about the full range of demands from Iran in these
negotiations.
In recent weeks, more and more concern has come up
front that mere nuclear concessions by Iran should not
earn it the desired sanctions relief. The regional impact
of Iran’s role and policies has loomed large in recent
weeks as evident in commentaries about the visit of
President Obama to Saudi Arabia, the Middle East
shuttle diplomacy of Kerry, the role of Hizbullah and the
situation in Syria since the failure of Geneva II.
An article in the Washington Post co-authored by Gen
Petraeus on 10 April about these negotiations with Iran
goes to the extent of putting the clock back on the
entire contour of the Iran imbroglio over the past two
decades. Petraeus and his co-author stress that “a
successful nuclear deal with Iran could result in the
United States and its partners in the Middle East facing
a better-resourced and, in some respects, more
dangerous adversary”. This, they argue, is ‘because
sanctions relief would bolster Tehran’s capability to
train, finance and equip its terrorist proxies’ and
therefore ‘sanctions related to terrorism should remain
in place’ and should even be enhanced. Another very
exhaustive paper by well known US non-proliferation
scholar, Robert Einhorn, spells out the strict
requirements of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran
– while stating at the outset that he does not at all
address the sanctions relief part of the bargain. Israel’s
position on the accords since November 2013 has been
of stout negation of anything good in this process since
it would only relax the hold of tight sanctions on Iran
and remove its isolation – and with no sight of reliable
nuclear guarantees.
Ironically, if such arguments receive greater credence,
they would reinforce Iran’s innate fears from the very
beginning that the whole nuclear issue has been raked
up with ulterior regional aims. This line was probably
felt in Tehran particularly starkly in 2002-03 in the
context of a similar case against Iraq. Hence perhaps
the concessions that Iran was offering in its talks with
the European-3 (Germany, France and UK) in October
2003. The whole point of the relaxation of the situation
after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and subsequent back
channel progress between the US and Iran was to reach
a breakthrough with a limited focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme and sanctions relief. Iran is on record
stating that the deal will be dead if sanctions persist.
In a worsening situation, if these talks founder, Iran’s
regional concerns too might come to the fore and pull
back its leadership from the statesmanship
demonstrated over the past year. The reports about
Saudi Arabia’s mounting unease with prospects of Iran
emerging from the cold and speculations about Riyadh’s
drastic review of its strategic posture are significant.
Mutual apprehension between Iran and Saudi Arabia and
suspicions about the likely Saudi nuclear outsourcing to
Pakistan are likely to enormously complicate the
situation. Iran-Pakistan strains have been skillfully
managed so far despite provocations arising out of
sectarian strife in the region, the reported role of
Pakistani regular or retired troops in Bahrain, and recent
stories about Pakistani jihadis having joined the
opposition in Syria.
Sartaj Aziz has hinted at Pakistan’s mediation between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and going by past history of
Pakistan’s deft and uncanny ways in this regard, it
might be difficult to rule such stuff out in the unfolding
scenario of leverages and diplomacy. Is nuclear-armed
Pakistan thus again on the threshold of a big role post
the US exit from Afghanistan, with its human resources
deployed in Syria and who knows where else, and go-
between diplomacy elsewhere? Are the straws in the
wind about the likely relaxation of US (and NSG)
strictures on nuclear Pakistan integral to any larger
pattern, overlooking the terrorism angle?
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