Undoubtedly the elections in Afghanistan last week to
elect the next President is historical. According to initial
reports, more than 60 percent of the 12 million
electorate took part in the elections; given the security
environment and the ability of the State to organize
polling booths in every district, 60 percent is a
phenomenal statistics for the Afghan democracy.
Does the positive vote mean end of the road for Taliban
and to radical politics through threat and fear? Initial
responses to the elections from the US to our own
region have been as a vote against the Taliban, or a
sign of its decline. But is it not early to make an
assertion whether the Taliban would become irrelevant
after this election? Does militancy, such as that of the
Taliban, really decline and disappear? If it does, under
what conditions? What has been the success story in
our region so far?
True, the elections were not as violent, as it was
expected. There were few high profile attacks, including
the use of suicide bombs immediately before the
elections. The horror in the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the suicide attacks in one of the offices of the election
commission immediately before the elections did raise a
fear that the process would be violent. Few polling
booths were in fact closed due to security situation; and
in many places, especially in the southern and eastern
districts, where the Taliban is having its base, post
election interviews do inform that the threat from the
Taliban against voting did work.
By no stretch of imagination one could make an
argument that the Taliban is weak enough not to carry
out targeted attacks, or general bomb blasts anywhere
in Afghanistan. In fact, there were days in the recent
past of Afghanistan, which were even more violent than
what one had witnessed during the day of election last
week. Though the Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) are better trained and equipped today, the
security is not fool proof that the Taliban could not
penetrate.
Perhaps, this is a calibrated strategy by the Taliban. A
section within Afghanistan and outside was not sure
about the election outcome; they believed this one
would also be as farcical and fraudulent as the previous
one in 2009. With a deeply polarized society and strong
ethnic differences between the major communities, many
considered this election would be contentious and
inconclusive, leading only to further political instability.
So the calculation within the Taliban and their
supporters elsewhere could have been to wait and
watch; if the election process results in political
instability, it would only strengthen the case of the
Taliban and undermine the democratic process and a
transition funded and supported by the “West”. So why
use violence and undermine a process that is already
seen as faulty and unproductive? Perhaps, this was a
strategy in keeping a low profile.
Second reason for Taliban’s relative restraint during the
elections is to wait, watch and choose a time and place
of their own choice. The Taliban is well aware that this
is only the first round; if none of the candidates get the
desired percentage of votes, there would be a second
round amongst the top two. Taliban could very well
target the process at that time; perhaps, this could be a
future wait and watch strategy by the Taliban, as it did
immediately after the international security forces landed
in Afghanistan in 2001-02. They disappeared into the
mountains, only to engage in a guerrilla warfare, that
too successfully. Perhaps, this time the Taliban wanted
to gauge the response of the people, and pursue an
appropriate course of action. The fact that the election
process in the South and East were stunted does
highlight that its base is intact.
To conclude, it is too early to write off the Taliban. Few
high profile suicide attacks in Kabul would change the
entire context and the discourse.
The larger question and challenge for Afghanistan and
the rest of South Asia is – do militancy of the Taliban
variety decline and disappear? Or they only decay but
only mutate further? Even if the second round of
election is free of violence and results in a new
President taking over, what is the likely response of
Taliban in the near future?
In South Asia – we have few examples – the NSCN in
India’s Northeast, Khalistan movement in Punjab, the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Baloch insurgency in
Pakistan. The NSCN today has become a fractionalized
movement, and the level of corruption in the State has
only made an underground movement into a semi-over
ground but parallel government. In Punjab, the State
used force on the one hand, but politically co-opted the
parties and ensured there is better governance; as a
result, the Khalistan movement in Punjab today is all
but dead, except occasional posters and periodic
discussions.
In Balochistan, Pakistan used brutal force to undermine
the Baloch national movements more than three times
since independence. Neither there was better
governance, nor the local population got co-opted into
the mainstream. Same was the case in Sri Lanka as
well; the government towards the end of Eelam War,
used brute force to physically annihilate the LTTE.
Though violence has come to an end, the Sri Lankan
Tamils are still far from being satisfied.
Which way would the Taliban insurgency turn into in
Afghanistan after the elections? This is an important
question not only for Afghanistan, but also for the entire
regional security. Much would depend on how the
Afghan led and Afghan owned transition takes place at
the ground level, in terms of improving the situation of
the Afghan people.
Though the ANSF may be better trained and well
equipped to take on the Taliban militarily, the military
equation between the State and the Taliban is not going
to be the decisive factor. Political stability and social
reconstruction by the Afghan government, an inclusive
economic growth along with equitable distribution of
development in urban and rural areas would become the
decisive factor. Though corruption is also an issue, in
the case of Afghanistan, the critics are exaggerating the
case; this is a common issue for the entire South Asia
and accusing Afghanistan alone may not provide the
right answers.
So the question where would the Taliban go – is not in
the hands of Mullah Omar, but with the next President,
and the rest of international community including
Pakistan. If there is better governance, equitable
development and inclusive growth, the Taliban will be
relegated into an insignificant militant group that would
eventually mutate into splinter groups, like the multiple
Mujahideen groups did after the so called jihad against
the Russians in the 1980s. If the international
community lose interest in Afghanistan and allows the
positive developments to go down the drain, along with
ignoring any Pakistani ingress, it would only strengthen
the hands of the Taliban. Worse, if the next government
fail to deliver, support for the Taliban would only
increase. Not by design, but by default.
The success and failure of the Taliban, is not in the
hands of Mullah Omar. It rests with the next President
and his ability to take Afghanistan forward.
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