A Fractured Mandate: The Big Picture

 D Suba Chandran

 

Most of the immediate reaction to the just concluded J&K Assembly election has been on its nature and the outcome. True, the verdict is fractured. But what caused it? Is the divided mandate a manifestation of a deeper issue that we have to focus more, than on who will form the government and who support it? What is the Big Picture that is evolving and what it means for the future stability of the State and its people?

Shujaat Bukhari titled his column as the “Fractured Mandate” and The Hindu editorial called it as a “Fragmented Verdict”. National newspapers referred the election results in the following phrases: “Jammu goes the saffron way”; “From a small fry, BJP emerges as major player in state”; and “No easy Options for PDP, BJP”. All these reflect perhaps a reality or a new beginning. The larger question is, what does this portend for J&K and how did this development emerge? Since an eventful year is coming to an end, it will be useful to do a retrospect and make a forecast on why it had happened and what it means.

Statistically, the BJP has swept the Jammu region, with an exception in few constituencies especially in Poonch district. From Bani, Basholi and Kathua to Chhamb, Akhnoor and Nowshera, the BJP has swept the region. However, further west, the story is different in Rajouri, Poonch, Mendhar and Surankote. PDP has captured Rajouri and Poonch, while Mendhar and Surankote have been won by the NC and Congress.

Similarly, there has been a sweep in Bhaderwah-Ramban-Kishtwar belt by the BJP. However, north of Ramban, across the Banihal, it is a different story in Kashmir Valley. The PDP has regained its support base in Kashmir Valley; in fact, had it not been for the boycott call and less polling in Sringar during the last elections, the PDP would have won more seats in 2008 itself.

Across the mighty Zoji La, there is yet another story in Kargil and Leh. The constituencies of Zanskar, Kargil, Leh and Nubra won by candidates who are independent or belonging to the Congress also tell a story.

Besides the bad performance of National Conference and Congress, which was expected, rejection of the Panthers Party and the emergence of Lone’s JKPC in north Kashmir, what do the recent elections signify?

Do the recent elections and its fractured mandate reflect a clear regional divide and a communal fault line in J&K? If the answer is an unfortunate yes, than the first big challenge for any party that forms the government is to address this divide. Why has the BJP that has swept the rest of Jammu region failed in Poonch and Rajouri? Why has PDP that has been the most successful in Valley, failed to repeat its performance outside it, except for few constituencies across the Pir Panjal? Any why has Ladakh neither preferred the BJP nor the PDP? This divide on regional and communal basis, perhaps is the biggest threat to the future of J&K.

The civil societies within J&K will have to ponder the larger implications of the election results, than narrowly focussing on whether PDP will align with BJP, or form the government with support from Congress and NC. The primary issue facing the political parties in J&K is not their ideology, or whether it helps or prevent from forming the next government. The big picture is how to address the looming threat, which has ended up in producing a hung verdict.

Non-addressal of the real cause, and looking at only managing its manifestation will only produce political instability and future hung assemblies. When did a party command a simple majority in J&K? Why has the State produced a series of hung assemblies in the last three elections? The answers remain elsewhere; the hung assembly is only a manifestation of a deeper problem, and just should not be seen as a Saffron Wave, or Modi sweep, or PDP resurgence.

Second major issue facing the new government in J&K and relatively another new one in New Delhi, is to break the political cycle between the State and Union governments. The issue is not whether the government in J&K is a coalition partner of the government in New Delhi; it is rather, how the two governments work in tandem in breaking the cycle of non-movement in crucial issues. Successful elections in J&K, formation of government, promise of movement between New Delhi and J&K, some movements and slogans on cross-LoC CBMs, stalemate, slow performance (if not non-performance) of the government within J&K,  disappointment, and the breakdown – has been the general pattern in the last fifteen years.

How to break the above cycle, and pursue a straight path? If the civil societies within J&K will have to come together to address the imbalance question within J&K, the civil societies in J&K and the rest of India will have to come together and discuss how to break the set pattern. Unfortunately, not only the political parties, even the civil societies on both sides of the Lakhanpur border post have invented myths that suit their narrative and does not understand the other.

Rest of India blissfully thinks that a successful election in J&K means the rejection of separatism and terrorism. Peace is measured in terms of absence of violence and the number of people killed or not killed in a day. On the other hand, J&K, especially the Valley is angry about anything and everything and points finger at New Delhi on every ills, with less or no introspection. Both the societies have created an artificial screen with inward looking script, reinforced by their own media perpetuating the monologue about each other. For the agencies and political parties, such a difference and screen fits their primary narrative and prevent them from breaking the cycle.

Else, there will be more Standing Committees, Working Groups and Interlocutors, running in a cyclical path. Perhaps, this is where the media, think tanks, research institutes and Universities could come in, and even join hands in preparing a framework, that would break the above cycle. Unfortunately, the above institutions – be it in J&K or in New Delhi, have been critiquing whatever is happening, without succeeding in providing an alternative. And the civil societies within J&K and across Lakhanpur post get carried away by daily developments and miss the big picture.

Let us sincerely hope, researchers and columnists do not have to write a similar commentary next December on our ability to break the cycle. There have been multiple false starts. Hope the new year and new governments in J&K and New Delhi achieve a sustainable breakthrough.

India’s Northeast: Need for a New Anti-Terror Policy

 Wasbir Hussain

The Christmas-eve massacre in Assam of more than 75 Adivasi men, women and children by rebels belonging to the Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB-S) has made two things clear - that it was a pure act of terrorism, not a routine incident of insurgency, and that an assortment of rebel leaders are still remote-controlling their trigger-happy foot soldiers from safe hideouts in India’s neighbourhood. By way of a response to this continuing bloodbath in Assam (46 people were gunned down by the same outfit in Baksa and Kokrajhar districts in May 2014), the new Government in New Delhi is expected to demonstrate on the ground its ‘zero tolerance’ policy on terror, besides coming up with a new anti-terror strategy that factors in the firm commitment of support from Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
The Narendra Modi Government must put its ‘zero tolerance’ policy against terrorism into immediate operation in Assam because the NDFB-S men, during their raids in Sonitpur and Kokrajhar districts on the evening of 23 December 2014, did not hesitate to kill infants by putting their gun barrels into their mouths. This explains the brutality of their crime and the commitment of this armed group to indulge in terror. The same group had killed an Additional Superintendent of Police in January 2014, shot dead 46 people in May, and killed a school girl in August because they suspected her of being a ‘police informer.’ The question that arises is obvious: what is the Unified Command of the Army, police and the paramilitary, headed by the Chief Minister, doing by way of measures to neutralise the rebels?
That the Government of India’s peace policy is flawed has been proved yet again by the latest carnage. New Delhi is already ‘talking peace’ with two other NDFB factions: the NDFB (Progressive) and the NDFB (Ranjan Daimary). For the record, the NDFB (Ranjan Daimary) group - and Daimary himself - has been clearly accused by the security establishment, including the CBI, for involvement in the October 2008 serial blasts in Assam that had killed 100 people. Now, despite the year-long killing and extortion spree by the NDFB-S gunmen, some Assam Police officers are reported to have been engaged in ‘talks’ with some leaders of the outfit. Such actions - talking peace with killer gangs - amounts to according legitimacy to such groups and their actions and only encourage newer militant groups to upscale their violent acts. It is this policy of the Centre that which among other reasons is keeping insurgency alive and kicking in the Northeast. The rebels by now know they only have to agree to sit for talks if the going gets tough for them!
Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh did talk sense when he visited Assam in the wake of the latest massacre. He said there is no question of engaging in talks with killers who have shot dead even infants and ruled out any political solution to the issues of groups like the NDFB-S. Singh talked of a ‘time-bound’ security offensive to neutralise the rebels. The Centre must now make a policy statement and announce a moratorium on peace talks with newer militant groups in Assam and elsewhere in the Northeast. This will go a long way in sending out a clear message to new insurgent outfits who would realise that they are henceforth going to be dealt with as nothing but a law and order problem. After all, the Government cannot be expected to sign fresh Bodo accords with the two NDFB factions it is currently talking to. Again, for those uninitiated, the Centre had signed a Bodo Accord with the rebel Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) in 2003. The BLT thereafter transformed itself into a political party, contested local elections, and has been ruling the area for the past decade.
As usual, there have been claims and counter-claims in the wake of the carnage - central intelligence agencies have said they had intercepted radio conversations in which NDFB-S leaders were instructing their hit-squads to target Adivasis and that they had forwarded these to the Assam Police. If this is true, the Assam Government owes the people of the state an explanation as to the action taken on the information. But, killings by insurgents have become so commonplace in Assam and other Northeastern states like Manipur and Meghalaya that the local governments can afford to be complacent and unaccountable. Of course, the ongoing peace talks with a plethora of rebel groups only add to the confusion, surely even among the security forces on how to respond to a situation. Therefore, the need for a new anti-terror strategy.
The fact that External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj was quick to speak to Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay seeking his Government’s assistance in tackling the NDFB-S militants indicates the rebels may have once again opened shop inside the Himalayan nation or are sneaking in and out of its dense jungles. This is not surprising because the ULFA, NDFB and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) were flushed out of Bhutan by a joint Bhutan-India military assault in 2003. The External Affairs Ministry has also confirmed that Sushma Swaraj was in touch with other ‘friendly neighbouring’ countries as part of India’s bid to tame the Northeast rebels. This means that New Delhi is in touch with Myanmar and Bangladesh.
The Modi Government’s neighbourhood push is indeed notable, but commerce aside, New Delhi must also work out institutional mechanisms with Thimphu, Naypyidaw and Dhaka to deal with insurgents who operate sans borders in their trasnational criminal journey. The question now is this: can India work out an anti-terror strategy that transcends its borders and work together with the security establishments in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan? There has been cooperation on this front but one is talking of something with standard protocols in place. One hopes Prime Minister Modi, Rajnath Singh and Sushma Swaraj will be able to devise an India-Myanmar-Bangladesh-Bhutan security umbrella to fight terror in the Northeastern frontier, and include Nepal too in the endeavour.

Obama’s Rapprochement with Cuba

 Amit Gupta

For the first six years of his presidency President Obama played nice with the Republicans in the hope that they would enact significant domestic policy reforms. Instead, he was met with obstruction and efforts to derail his most significant domestic achievement - the Affordable Care Act. Since the 2014 midterms the President has done what all his predecessors did when faced with domestic roadblocks - he has moved to try and conduct major changes in foreign policy. His administration has worked out a climate change deal with China and both countries have lowered tensions in the relationship. A food security deal has been struck with India thus paving the way for significant advances in the World Trade Organisation but the most interesting redefinition of US foreign policy has been the rapprochement with Cuba. After extensive and secret negotiations the US has decided to scrap the fifty year old policy of not engaging with Cuba and instead establish full diplomatic relations. Greater trade, investment, and increased flows of money from the Cuban diaspora in America to their relatives back home are expected to result from this policy shift.  Tourism has yet to be permitted but it is almost inevitable.

For over fifty years America’s Cuba policy has been held hostage by a vocal and politically active Cuban diaspora, conservatives who revile the Castro brothers as the last bastion of Communism in the western hemisphere, and by foreign policy and national security bureaucrats in Washington DC who have either built their careers on the Cuban embargo or just have long institutional memories. President Obama has correctly pronounced the policy a failure and, instead, sought to engage the Cuban government in a dialogue that will lead to a comprehensive transformation of the currently adversarial relationship. 
Opposition to the resumption of relations comes primarily from the Cuban-American community and the conservatives in the American political system.  Conservatives could have changed this policy a decade ago with little electoral blowback since the Cuban-American community has never been particularly fond of the Democrats because the die-hard Cuban nationalists still blame John F Kennedy for the botched Bay of Pigs invasion.
Further, the Cuban-Americans played a critical role in the electoral politics of Florida and were thus courted by both political parties in the US. But attitudes within the Cuban American community are changing and, at the same time, their political clout in Florida politics is diminishing as other Latino groups (who have a different political agenda) are surpassing the Cuban community in numbers. Moreover, the business opportunities that will come from opening up the island are going to be too hard for American corporations to resist. 
Cuba has high literacy rates and a trained work force that could work effectively if manufacturing is moved to that country. Its medical community can provide the type of care that makes medical tourism to the island an attractive possibility and there is great potential for American hotel groups that want to invest in the country’s tourist industry which at present is dominated by European companies. 
Additionally, members of the Cuban American diaspora have traditionally gone to Cuba from Mexico, Canada, and Jamaica but this is an unnecessarily arduous journey. Direct flights from the US would benefit both countries. 
Perhaps the biggest change is the one that President Obama is suggesting will happen. With greater interaction between the Cuban people and the US we are likely to see the push for increased liberalisation and democracy the lack of which being the very criteria on which sanctions were imposed in the 1960s. 
A Republican-led Congress, however, is going to make it difficult for the Obama Administration to move forward easily on rebuilding the relationship. There is already talk of not funding some of the President’s initiatives including paying for an embassy in Havana. What obstructionist and myopic Congressmen need to understand is that as Yitzhak Rabin put it: "You don’t need to talk to make peace with your friends. You need to make peace with your enemies.” Wise words.

China-North Korea: Reasons for Reconciliation

 Sandip Kumar Mishra

On the occasion of the third death anniversary of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on 17 December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a special message to the North Korean embassy in Bejing. The Chinese President underlined the significance of their “traditional friendship.” Xi Jinping also said that that China “is ready to work with the DPRK to maintain, consolidate and develop the traditional friendship.”

It is definitely a clear departure from the recent attitude of Xi Jinping and China towards North Korea. First, the message was delivered to the North Korean embassy in Beijing by the fifth highest official in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, Liu Yunshan. Second, it has been the most open and straight forward statement by the Chinese President emphasising China’s old friendship with North Korea since he assumed power in early 2013. Third, it was given on the occasion of the third death anniversary of Kim Jong-il, which according to the Confucian tradition means the end of the official mourning period and beginning of the new leader’s rule. In a way, it means granting legitimacy to Kim Jong-un, who has had a few differences smooth with China since coming to power. Fourth, Xi Jinping’s statement and the profile of the Chinese delegate to the North Korean embassy are very significant because they happened despite China not being officially invited to the death anniversary programme in North Korea.

What were China’s Objections?
The China-North Korea relationship has been derailed in recent years. China’s first and foremost discomfort with Pyongyang is related to the North Korean nuclear programme, not because of it does not want a nuclear North Korea but more because it would bring a direct US strategic response to the region. The North Korean nuclear programme may also propel South Korea and Japan to move on a similar course of nuclear weaponisation. The second important Chinese objection is the lack of economic reforms. China apparently wants North Korea to adopt Chinese-style reform if it wants to survive and survive well.

China was reportedly disappointed with Kim Jong-un on both accounts, and 2013 was particularly disappointing for bilateral relations. In February 2013, North Korea had its third nuclear test, which invited sharp international criticism. In March-April 2013, North Korea escalated military tensions and rhetoric towards South Korea and the US when they were conducting their annual joint military exercise. North Korea cut-off hot line communications with South Korea and closed down Gaeseong Industrial complex. In spite of Chinese persuasion, North Korea escalated the situation to a point that prompted the US to send its stat-of-the-art weapon systems to the region and install a missile defence system at Guam. In December 2013, North Korea executed the number two in the North Korean power hierarchy, Jang Song-thaek, who was supposed to be the closest to China and was pro-reform. It was reported that a clear signal was being sent to China.

Xi Jinping tried to put pressure on North Korea by cooperating with the international community on the issue of economic sanctions after the nuclear tests and by having two summit meets with South Korean leader Park Geun-hye without any high-level Chinese visits to North Korea.

Context of Rapprochement
However, it seems from recent developments that China has decided to reach out to North Korea even though North Korea does not look ready to change its course. There are important reasons for this. One, China has been disappointed by South Korean reciprocity, as despite good Chinese posturing, South Korea is still not ready to think beyond its primary ally in the region, the US. Two, US, South Korea and Japan recently signed a trilateral intelligence-sharing agreement related to threats emanating from North Korea. China has criticised this move and considers that the mechanism might be used to share information about China as well. Three, China does not find it appropriate on the part of the international community, especially the US, South Korea and Japan, to become ‘over-proactive’ on the issue of human rights violations in North Korea. Although because of the veto from China and Russia, the matter could not move forward, it was definitely a coordinated move to declare North Korean human rights violations ‘crime against humanity’ and refer it to the International Criminal Court (ICC). China worries that such precedents would be bad for Beijing. Four, North Korea over the past year had been moving closer to Russia. In December 2014, No Kwang-chol, vice chief of the General Staff of the North's Army met his Russian counterpart, and Choe Ryong-hae, the Workers' Party of Korea secretary met Russian Foreign Minster and pledged to improve bilateral defence and economic relations. Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Moscow in 2015.

All these developments have made China rethink its policy of putting pressure on North Korea and it seems that a new beginning in the estranged bilateral relationship might be sought by Xi Jinping. China has taken the first step in the process of rapprochement, now it’s up to North Korea to respond.

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India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Reviewing NFU and Massive Retaliation

 Gurmeet Kanwal

The BJP’s election manifesto had promised to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current times…” Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to re-validating their key features.
India had declared itself a state-armed with nuclear weapons after a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan, on 11 and 13 May 1998. India’s deterrence is premised on the dictum that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. A draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) chaired by the late K Subrahmanyam and handed over to the government on 17 August 1999.
After a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the government issued a statement on 04 January 2003 spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine. The government statement said that India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a ‘No First Use’ posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” It was also stated that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states; and, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.
Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on a few key issues: NFU will result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian population, cities and infrastructure; ‘massive’ retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory; and nuclear retaliation for chemical or biological attack would be illogical, especially as the attack may be by non-state actors.
Several Indian analysts have been critical of the NFU posture since its acceptance by the government. Recently, Lt Gen (Retd) BS Nagal, former C-in-C, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), has questioned the efficacy of the NFU doctrine. According to him, “It is time to review our policy of NFU… (the) choices are ambiguity or first use.” He gives six reasons for seeking a change: NFU implies acceptance of large-scale destruction in a first strike; the Indian public is not in sync with the government’s NFU policy and the nation is not psychologically prepared; it would be morally wrong - the leadership has no right to place the population ‘in peril’; NFU allows the adversary’s nuclear forces to escape punishment as retaliatory strikes will have to be counter value in nature; an elaborate and costly ballistic missiles defence (BMD) system would be required to defend against a first strike; and, escalation control is not possible once nuclear exchanges begin. (“Checks and Balances”, Force, June 2014.)
The most common scenarios normally considered appropriate for first use include first use by way of pre-emption based on intelligence warning, or during launch on warning (LoW) or launch through attack (LTA). In all of these, there are no easy answers to some obvious questions: What if intelligence regarding an imminent first strike is wrong? Can the destruction of the adversary’s cities be justified on suspicion of imminent launch? The adversary’s surviving nuclear weapons will be employed to successfully target major Indian cities. Is it worth risking Delhi, Mumbai and other cities for dubious gains?
Major military reverses during war are also offered as a justifiable reason for the first use of nuclear weapons. In none of the traditional worst-case scenarios, for example the cutting off of the Pathankot-Jammu national highway NH-1A somewhere near Samba by the Pakistan army, is the situation likely to become so critical as to justify escalation to nuclear levels by way of a first strike as sufficient reserves are available to restore an adverse situation.
The NFU posture is strategically logical and rational on several counts. It has led to major diplomatic gains, including the lifting of sanctions, civil nuclear cooperation agreements and accommodation in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these gains will be frittered away if India opts for first use. Complex command and control and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are necessary for a first use posture. A first use posture will deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold if it becomes necessary. First use will lower the nuclear threshold and make the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) more likely. And, South Asia will again be dubbed a ‘nuclear flashpoint’; this will encourage international meddling and will discourage investment.
Deterrence is ultimately a mind game. The essence of deterrence is that it must not be allowed to break down. India’s nuclear doctrine must enhance and not undermine nuclear deterrence. It emerges clearly that NFU is still an appropriate posture for India’s nuclear doctrine. However, the word ‘massive’ in the government statement should be substituted with ‘punitive’ as massive is not credible and limits retaliatory options. The threat of nuclear retaliation against chemical and biological attack should be dropped from the doctrine. The credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be substantially enhanced through appropriate signalling.

Foreign Fighters of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns and Punjabis?

D Suba Chandran

There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.
What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?
Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.
The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.
The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.
The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.
While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.
Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.
Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.
It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh - played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.
Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.
A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.
If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?
There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.

US-Russia and Global Nuclear Security: Under a Frosty Spell?

 Sheel Kant Sharma

It is twenty years since acute concern about unauthorised and malevolent access to sensitive nuclear material and radioactive substances, particularly from successor states to the former Soviet Union, roused the international community in 1994. Nuclear security has since remained at the centre of post-Cold War cooperation between the US and Russia over these past two decades - till that cooperation was given severe body blows by the chill that has set in the relations between Putin’s Russia and the West. While the immediate root of this frosty development lies in Ukraine and Crimea, President Putin’s Sochi speech last month seemed to lay down a new manifesto for a Cold War redux. The APEC summit in China and the G20 meeting in Australia earlier this month failed to dispel the frost and, on the contrary, hardened it as the Russian president was cold shouldered and treated with concerted tough talk by his Western interlocutors.

Even prior to these summits Russia had put an end to the twenty year process begun by the famous Nunn-Lugar team in the US to salvage nuclear material, technology and installations in Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Moscow used to describe them. This programme championed by the Nunn-Lugar team has been a success story that now risks being burnt up by the exacerbating diplomatic fracas with Russia. Even someone as committed to the transformation of East-West relations as Gorbachev has voiced fears about a renewed Cold War.

The Nuclear Security Summit process which has been the high point of Barack Obama’s presidency, and supported widely by 59 states, is not spared anymore by an irate Russia which has advised US and all concerned that it would only work for nuclear security within the IAEA framework. Russia announced it would not join the Sherpas’ meetings for the next NSS which is going to be hosted by US in 2016. There has been in addition a whole slew of international initiatives geared to securing nuclear materials, facilities and the enterprise in general from threats of terrorism. In all of these Russia had been an active and willing partner. Since its nuclear enterprise remains vast and as diversified as that of the US it is hard to visualise the future of all those initiatives without a well disposed Russia.

Fear of nuclear terrorism has gone up a few more notches in the past year due to the unmitigated horrors disseminated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and its propensity to stop at nothing. Among the elaborate action points deliberated and recommended by the Nuclear Security Summits so far, not all are limited to the IAEA even though its centrality has been progressively underscored. The principal requirement in grappling with threats to nuclear security is the combined unbroken pressure from moral, diplomatic, civil society and legal angles. The existing legal instruments and the Security Council edicts are still in the formative stage of enforcement. Undiminished support and cooperation of all major countries with nuclear materials and technology is the sine qua non. It remains to be seen how Russia will play ball in diverse forums.

There have been critiques of the post-Cold War world order, some of them quite harsh too, but to leverage such critiques to a particular situation of conflict and tension, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This applies to both sides of the tense situation in Ukraine just as it does to the ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear future. A relapse to a Cold War-like division of the world would benefit no one just as it did not help even during the heady years of the last Cold War. Neither the triumphalism that marked the 1990s nor a panicked reassertion of destructive power as witnessed in recent months can help in stabilising international nuclear diplomacy, be that in regard to non-proliferation or strategic arms reduction or nuclear security. The edifice created over the past two decades in regard to each of these spheres merits preserving.

Absence of negotiated agreements has also presaged a host of sub-legal or voluntary arrangements to fix the problems posed by inadequate controls on nuclear material - these voluntary arrangements ought not to be interrupted in pique or partisan parsimony as in budget cuts in the US Congress on valuable nuclear security programmes. As regards the centrality of the IAEA, that has also been a result of the growing common understanding about a range of voluntary steps that have been generally supported over the past two decades such as peer reviews, advisory services or collation of related data banks or coordination of intelligence and forensics among different organisations.

Prime Minister Modi stated in Canberra this week that we do not “have the luxury to choose who we work with and who we don’t.” This sentiment remains key to strengthening and sustaining a norms-based order to cope with new age threats like nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are two significant examples in this regard. The entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be a big step forward where cooperation of major players remains crucial. 

It is to be hoped that the tough talk possibly conceals quiet diplomacy to restore balance and stability in great power relations and pave the way forward. Until there is progress in that direction a climate of suspicion is unlikely to help global endeavour towards greater nuclear security.

Myanmar: Why the Islamic State Failed Here

 Aparupa Bhattacherjee

 

The Islamic State (IS) unilaterally declared an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This has resulted in the increase in the numbers of radicalised Muslims from all over the world travelling to the region to support the IS, and Southeast Asia is no exception.

According to reports, there are roughly 30 Malaysians, 60 Indonesians, 50 Filipinos, one Cambodian and a few Singaporeans have already joined the IS. However, there are barely any reports that cite Muslims from Myanmar having joined terrorist group. Why is that the case? Why are there low or negligible numbers of radical Islamist jihadists joining the IS from Myanmar? What are the general sentiments the Myanmarese Muslims foster towards the IS?

The Anti-Muslim Sentiment Factor
The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar to some extent thrives on the misinformed notion that most Muslims encourage terrorism. The presence of militant and secessionist groups such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and a newly formed fundamental group called the Arakan Mujahedeen (AM) have resulted in the development of such a perception. Muslims in Myanmar are aware of this notion and that radical Buddhists misuse the sentiment.

Thus, Myanmarese Muslims know and feel that any news of anyone from their community’s involvement in any kind of terrorist activity would worsen the already bad situation for them; especially given their small number (approximately four per cent) in comparison to the majority Buddhists (approximately 89 per cent).

Although there are grievances among Muslims over the use of violence against their community in various riots that have taken place since 2012, most of them feel that violence is not a good medium of response.

This became clear when the London based Myanmarese Muslim association became the first to announce their denial to support any al Qaeda dream to “raise the flag of Jihad” across South Asia, and stated that Myanmarese Muslims will never accept any assistance from a terrorist organisation.

Lack of Vanguards?

In Southeast Asian countries, most jihadist recruiters are home-grown terrorist organisations. In Myanmar, both the RSO and the ARNO are too weak to play this role.  The AM, although armed, so far claims to want to achieve political emancipation of the Rohingya Muslims via political means as opposed to resorting to violence.  The RSO, which shifted its base to Bangladesh after the 1977 Nagamin operation in Myanmar, has thrived due to support from the Islami Chhatra Shibir, a wing of Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and also from Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  Heavy crackdowns by the incumbent Awami League government in Dhaka, both on the JeI and the RSO, and the disintegration of the JI into several smaller and weaker groups are among the reasons for present state of the RSO.

Significant numbers of Myanmarese Muslims are naturalised citizens of the country; and even for those who are full citizens, restrictions are placed on travel simply because they belong to a minority religion. Thus, travelling to Iraq and Syria is only possible via Bangladesh, and that too, only illegally. This is no other viable option given Dhaka’s strict vigilance measures. Furthermore, the lack of support from recruiters too deters most radicalised Myanmarese Muslims from traveling to unknown lands to wage jihad.

Lower Levels of Ideological Indoctrination?

Both the RSO and the ARNO were formed with an aim to create a separate state for Rohingya Muslims as opposed to waging jihad. Economic and political segregation were the bases of the formation of these groups. They were introduced to the concept of ‘global jihad’ only after their link up with al Qaeda and the JI.

However, both organisations were not influential enough, and not based in Myanmar, resulted in their failure to instil their extremist ideology among the locals. Thus, unlike other terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the RSO and the ARNO did not manage to anchor the extremist ideology in their home ground.

The large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims who travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamic education in 1990s were the ones who brought the seeds of radical Islam to the region.  Myanmar was an exception in this case. Factors such as globalisation, urbanisation, and westernisation that, in the 1990s, led other Southeast Asian Muslims to travel abroad to study religion, did not influence the Myanmarese.  This was because Myanmar, during that period, was under the military Junta rule, and as a result, was cut off from the rest of the world.

Many madrassas in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Thailand also function as media for the dissemination of jihadist ideology. In Myanmar, the presence of such madrassas preaching radicalised interpretations of Islam are only restricted to the northern areas of the Arakan province; and here too, the numbers are trivial. Thus, it appears that Myanmar so far lacks the necessary apparatus key to create a conducive environment for the growth and grip of radical Islam – which also explains the limited influence, the IS’s propaganda for ‘global jihad’ has had on Myanmarese Muslims.

Pakistan: Why are Christians Being Persecuted?

 Roomana Hukil

 

On 4 November 2014, a young Christian couple was publically set on fire in Punjab, Pakistan. It was alleged by a mob of 1200 persons that the couple had desecrated verses from the Quran.  According to source, the mob had apparently offered a waiving of severe retribution if the couple converted to Islam, but when the couple refused, locked them in a brick kiln, and set on fire.

Harassment and instances of violence against Pakistan’s minority Christian community has increased suddenly in the past few years. Last year, anti-Christian riots erupted in Gojra and Lahore, causing 170 families to flee their homes.

According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2013, 501 people were victimised on blasphemy charges that entailed incidents categorised under “attacks on places of worship, stating derogatory remarks, disgracing in any form, unclear happenings and other cases.” While most outbreaks are instigated out of socio-economic reasons, they are constantly also backed by religious dogmas and false accusations of blasphemy. In the recent years, this trend has become increasingly pronounced. Assassinations of high-profile political leaders, attacks on the impoverished populations, and expulsions of minority students for misspelling/ misquoting the Quran point towards the intensification of radicalism and resultant attitudes among hard-line Islamists in Pakistan.

Why are Christians being targeted in Pakistan? Why is the Pakistani State reluctant to re-evaluate or repeal the biased blasphemy laws?

Vulnerability
Christians are the second-largest religious minority in Pakistan after the Hindus, representing 1.8 per cent of the country's total population. A large number of Christians reside in south Karachi, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While a section resides in the poorest sectors of Pakistan involved menial jobs, there is a significant section that is flourishing in the corporate sector, in Karachi. In Pakistan, any sense of economic progression or identity-assertion by a minority group results in a sense of paranoia among the radicals in the majority groups. Consequently, both sides, irrespective of their economic contribution to the country are vulnerable to the wrath of Islamist extremism in Pakistan.

Additionally, there has been a gradual change shift in the Christian community vis-à-vis their socio-economic and political demands. Since 1992, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) has been demanding a separate Christian province in Punjab. Furthermore, Christians have been extremely vocal in expressing equal rights, demanding state benefits, exhibiting intolerance towards the blasphemy laws and refuting the majoritarian attitude towards the minority groups. Asserting for greater autonomy and representation in society is largely dismissed in Pakistan. Minority communities that remain submissive and camouflage within the rest of the society are accepted by the radicals. Those who resist are assaulted.

For instance, the Pakistani Federal Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated on the grounds of supporting the cause of Pakistani Christians, condemning the 2009 Gojra riots and demanding for justice.

Role of Blasphemy Laws
Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was introduced during the 1980s. It reinstated the position of religious zealots to act according to their whims and fancies. Pakistan has some of the strictest anti-blasphemy laws in the world, and they prescribe punitive punishment to those who ‘deliberately intend to wound the religious sentiments of others in their sight, hearing, and presence through imprisonment, fine or both’.

The law has been been heavily criticised for extending protection towards the embodiments of the Islamic faith alone while excluding that of other religious faiths. While the law is applicable to all, in a multi-faith society such as Pakistan, it is seen as highly discriminatory, as even the slightest rumours about instances of defaming the Prophet and/or the Quran continues to spark hysteria amongst the radicalised Muslims.

Stagnant Status Quo

The state has condemned violent attacks against the Christian community, but its tight-lipped stance on the issue of amendment or repealing of the biased laws questions the government’s credibility and intents on the issue. Given the identity of the country as an Islamic Republic, the government feels that any move towards altering the blasphemy laws will infuriate religious extremists who might reciprocate in unfavourable ways. In 2011, the former Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was assassinated for criticising the blasphemy law while advocating for justice for Asia Bibi – a Christian woman who was sentenced to death over allegations of defaming the Prophet. The then government that had initially announced its intention to amend the law fell silent on the subject after Taseer’s assassination.

Repealing the law doesn’t alone or automatically mean the end of the woes of the Christian community. While it may bring about a change in the relationship politics between the majority and minority groups, this will be short-lived. Instead of promising to alter or remove the blasphemy law, one solution would be to create a national consensus on the need to reform the law by highlighting the death tolls and cases of abuse this law has invoked on minority groups.

However, the current trajectory of affairs indicates that the government will remain cautious on the issue as radical elements continue to grow in Pakistan. In the process, it will continue to disregard international humanitarian laws and continue to commit human rights violations by backing the interests of one section of the society whilst excluding the aspirations of the other.

Understanding the Attraction of Salafi and Wahhabi Movements

 Saneya Arif

 

This year, 17 October 2014, celebrated as Sir Syed Day in the memory of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), refreshed memories and raised questions related to various Islamic movements till date and their relevance in today’s world. Why have traditional Islamic movements failed today? Why have the Salafi and Wahhabi movements gained traction among the Muslim populations?

Aligarh, Deoband and Barelvi Movements

The Aligarh movement, like other movements, was initiated for a cherished goal. Aggrieved by the decimation of his community in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt, Khan saw modern scientific education to be the only ray of hope for restoring the lost glory of his people. Notwithstanding the opposition from his co-religionists, Khan succeeded in bringing modern education to Muslims. However, the fulfillment of the goal put a halt on the movement. Although a pioneering institution for imparting modern education, the AMU rarely occupies a space in the minds of Muslims today in the same sense. It is instead viewed as a hub where political dogma convert themselves into propaganda against the status quo.

Reasons more or less similar led to the loss of traction in the Deobandi and Barelvi movements – both of which are different from each other for an array of reasons. The Sunni groups, the Deobandis and the Barelvis are the two major groups of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent apart from the Shia Muslims. Barelvis consider the Deobandis as kafir (infidels). The latter accuse the Barelvis of being ignorant shrine and grave-worshippers. Both impart traditional education that is not much in fashion today due to the growing numbers of liberal and modern Muslims. Fatwas (legal opinion or learned interpretation) issued by madrassas affiliated to both movements, e.g. the Madrasa Manzar-e-Islam and Darul Uloom Deoband, have little following. The world view of the expanding Muslim moderates are in complete contrast with those of these institutions.

Contrary to popular perceptions, Muslims in India wish to keep themselves out of any trap of radicalisation today. Their affinity to modern ideas is a contrast to the paradigms propagated by these institutions. Today, the role of madrassas is confined to being mediums of imparting the knowledge of Quran only, and not centres of higher education. As a result, the Deoband and the Barelvi movements stand somewhat unwanted and irrelevant, as their preaching borders on the margins of intolerance and radicalism.

Salafi and Wahhabi Movements 

Today, the Salafi and Wahhabi movements, now a pivot of Islamic movements, dominate the global panorama. Salafi in traditional Islamic scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years after Prophet Mohammed. It was revived as a slogan and movement among latter-day Muslims by the followers of Muhammad Abduh to propagate the view that Islam, subject to several interpretations and explanations, had not been properly understood by anyone since the Prophet. It was here the Salafi school of thought gained importance among Muslims, claiming the power of rightful interpretation of the religion and serving as a beacon for the ignorant and easily-swayed Muslims.

The Wahhabi movement, on the other hand, is regarded as the central movement by most Muslims, due to its teachings regarding state and religion. According to this school of thought, the Ulema are responsible for the protection of the divine law and one can accept the rule of anyone who follows Shariah. Based on the principle of pure monotheistic worship, this movement also advocated purging of practices such as popularising cults of saints, and shrine visitation, widespread among Muslims since the spread of Sufi Islam. The movement considered these as impurities and innovations in Islam, an extreme form of which they believe may lead the believers to shirk (by practising idolatry or polytheism).

Such attempts to project a puritan form of Islam bereft of impurities and innovations have further benefited from and have been influenced by the rapidly transforming geopolitical scenarios in the modern era, resulting in Wahhabim becoming more open and inclusive – by targeting not just Sunni Muslims, but also non-Sunnis and non-Muslims in their preachings – and thereby attracting more audiences. Additionally, the spread of education and advancements in communication systems have made it easier to transmit Wahhabi doctrines to different segments of Muslim populations across the globe.

In the early years of the Wahhabi movement, there were instances where the press in Saudi Arabia was not allowed to publish photographs, illustrations and imagery of human faces as it was considered a taboo among the Wahhabis. That is no longer the case today. Noticeable positive changes such as education for girls and changing attitudes towards smoking, among others – that are no longer considered moral negligence deserving punishment – result in the movement being perceived as relatively open and therefore, acceptable. Lastly, the rise of terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) has given much assemblage to the Wahhabi movement. While the IS practices an extreme interpretation of the sharia, at a fundamental level, it follows Wahhabism.

Once considered to be an extremist pseudo-Sunni movement, Wahhabism has a different face in India. Although the seeds of polarisation continue to be sown from the outside world, Shias and Sunnis co-exist peacefully in India.

Iran-Pakistan: Can Rouhani Resolve the Tensions?

 Majid Izadpanahi

 

Iran and Pakistan have been facing issues on the border relating to terrorism and drug trafficking for some time now. This has raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad, resulting in clashes. The recent clash in October resulted in casualties for both sides and the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran was summoned by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Iranian officials state that the terrorists and bandits use Pakistani territory as a base to attack Iranian border forces, and Pakistan categorically rejects the allegations. Iranian officials allege that Pakistan has no control over its own borders and Pakistan says that Iran should not justify its internal problems with external reasons.

Iran’s foreign policy post the 1979 Islamic Revolution shifted from a pro-US to anti-US stance, while Pakistan remained pro-US. The US’s policy of regime change in Tehran through destabilisation by the separatists was welcomed by Pakistan, especially evident in their support of the Iranian Jundallah.

The latest clash on the Iran-Pakistan border is not a new occurrence, but it is rare that a number of clashes take place frequently in the span of few days. Insofar it is unclear whether the clash was a reaction to the terrorist attacks on the Iranian Border Police or confrontation with the armed groups and drug barons that are active in the region. Nationalist Baloch groups, radical Sunni groups and drug traffickers are active in the Iran-Pakistan border region; Pakistan accuses India and sometimes Afghanistan, of fueling instability in the region. 

Evidently, the situation along the Iran-Pakistan border is worsening.

Are Both Sides Interested in a Military Solution?

Pakistan’s western border is its safest border; most Pakistani forces are positioned in the country’s eastern border with India and its northern borders with Afghanistan. The rest are positioned either in Sindh or Punjab. Despite the security and ethnic problems in Balochistan, Pakistan is not interested in beginning a new conflict on the western border by confronting Iranian forces. In other words, Pakistan has no military and financial ability to confront another country and engage in border conflicts. Such conflicts could lead to instability in Balochistan, such that it may may get out of Islamabad’s control.

Iran also understands the situation in Sistan Baluchestan, and has now engaged in a big conflict in its western borders. Tehran is therefore not interested in clashing with Pakistan and considers such a move unwise. Iran is also concerned about other actors beyond the region that tend to cause disputes in its eastern border given its wariness regarding the Islamic State and the role of some regional countries in creating it.

Therefore, Iran’s hard talk vis-à-vis the border clashes can be considered a diplomatic and military show that also sends a warning to the neighbours, especially Deputy Commander Brigadier-General Hossein Salami of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s statement that if Pakistan does not take any action against terrorists targeting Iran and drug traffickers, Iranian forces may enter its territory.

“Every country should fulfil its obligations towards its internal security as well as the security of the neighbouring countries,” Salami said. “We will find rebels anywhere, even inside the neighbouring countries and will take any action against them without restrictions if they do not stop their activity,” he added.

Iran’s reaction, that is expected to serve as a warning to non-state actors and one that follows limited aims, can impact regional equations. However, if the situation gets out of control, it can have a serious influence on Tehran’s military and security approach towards problems in Sistan Baluchestan. Such a situation will result in increased instability and insecurity in Iran’s eastern border. And that too is not in Tehran’s interests.

The conflict between Iran and Pakistan and Pakistan’s tacit support to non-state actors and separatists against Iran could be the result of Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s shaky relations with its neighbours and the US. The Pakistani state is extremely dependent on the US military and economic aid that is used especially against India. Iran-Pakistan relations are dependent on Iran’s relations with the US and the regional Arab countries.

So if Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani can achieve improved Iranian relations with the West and promoting Iran’s international position, it would reduce some sources of hostility in Iran-Pakistan relations. This would push Islamabad to change its hostile behaviour toward Tehran and reduce and eventually give up support to non-state actors, namely the late Abdolmalek Rigi's Jundallah and the Jaish-al Adl.

Sri Lanka: Making a Case for Change

 Asanga Abeyagoonasekera

The final month of the year 2014 began with the news of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak. He was found not guilty of the massacre of civilians who protested for his overthrow in the 2011 Arab Spring. Society’s expectation for a total change in political culture was proven difficult to materialise due to numerous issues, of which Egypt is an example.
In the political landscape of Sri Lanka, as previously predicted, the presidential race begins on the road to the polls with a decision to be taken on 8 January 2015. Senior party member Maithreepala Sirisena, a member of the President’s own party, crossed over to challenge him as the opposition common candidate. The common candidacy presents a grand coalition of political forces. The joint opposition coalition harnesses the support of former President Chandrika Bandaranayake and the opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe. It promises an overhaul of contemporary political culture within a 100 days of assuming Presidency. The centre of this change lies in the abolition of the Executive Presidency.
A total change of the system is still to be implemented and its possibility remains curtailed due to the strength of the present Executive Presidential system. In implementing total system change, it is necessary to foresee its consequences and evaluate the practical aspects of the new system being implemented. To curtail or minimise the existing powers of the Presidency rather than going for a total system change is an option. Total system change is a gamble. It may be beneficial or could dismantle the development process and weaken existing political systems. The Executive Presidency has helped defeat terrorism; however, it is arguable that the very reason for the emergence of the conflict were these same Executive Powers. The 1982 extension of the parliamentary term without election is an example of the danger of this Presidency at play.
At the foothills of the Himalayas, the 18th SAARC summit showcased heated geopolitics. Pakistan's bid to invite China as a full member caused much speculation from neighbouring India. Reflecting on the words of former President JR Jayawardena at the inception of SAARC summit:  "We are setting this ship afloat today. There may be mutiny on board, I hope not. The sea may be stormy but the ship must sail in and enter the ports of poverty, hunger, unemployment, malnutrition, disease and seek to bring comfort to those who need it." SAARC should focus on improving living standards of the poorest in the region. Focus should lie on economic prosperity to the bottom of the pyramid, improving trade and infrastructure. In its thirty year history SAARC summits have been convened eleven times. Rivalry between member nations such as India and Pakistan limit the regional integration SAARC represents.
In this backdrop, Sino-South Asian engagement intensifies. AIIB projects such as the Maritime Silk Road continue on a budget of thirty billion dollars. During the summit, South Asian infrastructure development was promised by China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Madam Fu Ying. Chinese presence strengthens in regions such as the Middle East and Africa. Dubai is home to over 4,000 Chinese companies with trade without oil trade reaching $40 billion. Both partake in a bilateral strategic relationship. An ongoing African railway project through Chinese investments extends from Nairobi to Mombasa with plans to extend to Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. It is estimated to reach $100 billion Chinese investment by 2020. Such economic moves by China align with its target to become the world’s largest economy by 2025. Despite waves of Chinese political history shutting the nation out of the global sphere, China has made a giant comeback. Moving three hundred million Chinese citizens from a state of poverty to the middle income bracket is a remarkable domestic achievement. Domestic reform was not the result of sudden action but steady consistent reforms over time.
Democracy is necessary in order to preserve individual freedom and expand a nation’s power through free thought. Sri Lanka comes from a rich democratic culture and is progressing from being an economy that was factor-driven to being efficiency-driven. It should focus its strategy over the next three decades on graduating towards an innovation-driven economy. The people lie at the core of this economic shift. Outstanding political manifestos and rhetoric limited to a handful are redundant in the long term. 40 per cent students failing at GCE O/L is a warning for strategic investment in improving education quality and increasing budgets for R&D as it is connected. In a simple example, the investment in scientist engineers’ education will pave the way for future innovation. The economy is not a slot machine. Investments in casino projects are short-term, however investments in education, innovation and human resources to facilitate an innovation-driven economy is for the long-term. With developed human capital we will be able to tap few areas in the global value chain.
Blaise Pascal says “Man’s grandeur is that he knows himself to be miserable, grandeur must be abandoned to be appreciated. Continuity in everything is unpleasant.” Between grandeur and misery people aspire for betterment and continue the struggle to retain the richness left in democracy.

Pak-Afghan Reset: Will the Taliban and al Qaeda follow?

 D Suba Chandran

 

Following the visits of Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Chief of Army Staff and the ISI Chief to Kabul, and then of the new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to Islamabad – all in space of last two months, there seems to be a positive movement in the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in November 2014, and his meetings with Nawaz Sharif and Raheel Sharif have been reported as a big success by the local media.

There is optimism across the Durand Line that the bilateral relations are ready for a positive reset. And this is a welcome development.

But this positive development is likely to face a stiff challenge from the multiple Taliban factions and their supporters in Pakistan. The real question would be – whether the above two sections see the Pak-Afghan reset between Kabul, Islamabad and Rawalpindi as a part of their Endgame, or against their interests.

Afghan Taliban and the Pak-Afghan reset
After the bilateral visits identified above, there were two major suicide attacks in eastern Afghanistan. The first one in a play ground where the Afghans were watching a volley ball match, and the second one on a British embassy vehicle; both attacks killed more than 60 people together. The attacks signify that the multiple Taliban factions have their own agenda and may not be along the same lines on a Pak-Afghan reset.  With the multiple Taliban factions well entrenched and having safe havens on both sides of the Durand Line, an Endgame not in sync with the State, efforts would be detrimental to the larger push and only undermine the regional stability.

None of the multiple Taliban factions – the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani Network and the TTP, have any successful dialogues with the governments in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban – led by the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network, until now have shown no signs of reaching any understanding with the government in Afghanistan.

There were two parallel processes with the Afghan Taliban – one within Afghanistan, and the second one outside it. During the previous regime, Hamid Karzai, with approval from a Loya Jirga established an Afghan Peace Council to dialogue with the Taliban. Multiple meetings at formal and informal levels reached nowhere; the process only saw more targeted killings of the members of the Peace Council. Until today, there have been no signs of the Afghan Taliban wanting to engage the government in any meaningful dialogue.

Outside Afghanistan, there was an international process in engaging the Afghan Taliban, initially involving multiple actors in Europe, but finally settling with the US taking lead through Qatar. Referred as the Qatar process, this initiative also did not succeed. Though Karzai was blamed for scuttling this process, in retrospect, it appears that the Afghan Taliban was not interested in any successful engagement.

Perhaps, the Afghan Taliban has been bidding time and waiting for an opportune time. Early this year, it was waiting for the elections to take place and see the process fail. Despite the two rounds of elections and the huge crisis that followed between the two contenders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, thanks to the American pressure and the pragmatism shown by both groups, today Kabul is stable. Certainly the Afghan Taliban did not expect this. It should have been expecting an unstable political process, indirectly supporting its return to Kabul.

Now, the Afghan Taliban is likely to wait further till the end of 2014 and the complete withdrawal of international security forces. With gaps in Afghanistan’s counter-insurgency grid and the question over the continued international assistance to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, all that the Taliban has to do is to wait for some more time.

Also, the Afghan Taliban should find the international situation in its favour. Recent developments in Syria and Iraq have already started changing the focus of the international community from Afghanistan to Middle East. The international community considers the ISIL and not the al Qaeda and Taliban as a major threat to international stability. Such a perception should be seen as an opportunity by the Quetta Shura and Haqqani network alike. The international community may have the watch, but the Taliban has all the time.

What will be the endgame for the multiple Afghan Taliban factions towards the Afghan-Pakistan reset? If they are bidding time to strike, can they be brought on board by Kabul, Islamabad and Rawalpindi? And, can the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan be really reset, without the Afghan Taliban being onboard?

Taliban Supporters in Pakistan
At this moment, it is also not clear that the supporters of the Afghan Taliban within the Establishment (military and the ISI) in Pakistan. The question by Sartaj Aziz that why Pakistan should target those groups which are not fighting them should not be seen as an individual perspective. A substantial section within Pakistan (and its Establishment) considers that the Afghan Taliban is not a threat to them. In fact, they are perceived as a strategic asset vis-a-vis Kabul to achieve Pakistan’s long term interest.

There is no evidence to believe that the supporters of Afghan Taliban in Pakistan have completely changed their minds and are willing to look at Afghanistan in a different framework. Is Pakistan today ready to give up the Taliban and its leaders who are hiding in various parts of Pakistan? This will be the most important factor in any Pak-Afghan reset.

Unless the Haqqani network is dismantled and other Afghan Taliban leaders are handed over to Afghanistan, there is no reason for anyone to believe that the Taliban backers within Pakistan’s Establishment have a changed mindset today.

Role of the Pakistani Taliban
Besides the Afghan Taliban, there also is a strong network of Pakistan Taliban. Though divided into multiple factions, the Pakistani Taliban have been using Afghanistan as a backyard for their offensives east of the Durand Line. Most of them, even today consider Mullah Omar as their Supreme Leader.

Like that of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban also entered into multiple dialogues, including the latest one early this year. None of these dialogues achieved any major breakthrough; the TTP used as a strategy to divide the public opinion within Pakistan and confuse the larger national debate.

The larger question that needs to be addressed in this context is: what is likely to be the endgame of the TTP factions, if Islamabad and Kabul decide to reset their relations? Will they abide the larger relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and decide to give up their arms?

A section within Pakistan would even prefer the multiple factions of the TTP to join the Afghan Taliban and fight on the other side of the Durand Line. If Afghanistan becomes stable, with or without Mullah Omar and Haqqani network, what will Fazlullah and Khorasani in Swat and Mohmand do? What will the Punjabi fighters of the TTP, refereed as the Punjabi Taliban do, if Kabul, Islamabad and Rawalpindi decide to work together?

And what about the al Qaeda?
Finally, a short note on the likely response from the al Qaeda to Pakistan-Afghanistan reset. With a serious challenge from the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq to its international credibility within the jihadi world, and sections of the Taliban fighters willing to join the IS in Pakistan, the al Qaeda also is facing an existential challenge in South Asia. Given its investments and entrenchment in the Af-Pak region, and given the challenge to its supremacy in the Middle East, the al Qaeda is likely to refocus more within South Asia. The announcement of the al Qaeda network in South Asia by al Zawahiri recently is no coincidence.

Will the al Qaeda take a backseat and applaud the Afghan-Pakistan reset? Or will it use its network across the Durand Line to upset any understanding between the two countries? Pakistan and Afghanistan have taken a first step to restore the much wanted normalcy between the two countries. Will they also succeed in restraining the multiple Taliban factions, al Qaeda and their supporters in the Establishment? The success of the first rests on the second.

India-Russia Nuclear Vision Statement: See that it Delivers

 Manpreet Sethi

As expected, Russian President Valdimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi covered all the usual areas of cooperation during the former’s visit to New Delhi on 11 December, 2014. Russia has been India’ close partner over decades and the latter has reiterated the importance of the relationship in contemporary times too. The Druzhba Dosti Vision Statement (VS) covers the period of the next decade, anchored in a special strategic partnership.

Obviously, the nuclear component of this relationship, which traverses the entire range of activities from fuel fabrication to plant decommissioning, is especially noteworthy. Building on the agreements signed by both in 2008 and 2010, the 2014 Strategic Vision for Strengthening Atomic Energy Cooperation envisages the construction of a dozen nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. It may be recalled that Kudankulam (KK) 1, India's first Russian reactor, attained full-rated power in 2014, and KK 2 is nearly ready too. Meanwhile, a General Framework Agreement was signed in April 2014 for the construction of KK 3 and 4 at the same site.

The next tranche of Russian nuclear reactors will require fresh site(s). The 2014 nuclear cooperation VS mentions that the construction of future nuclear plants would take into account “India’s demand for power, the then available nuclear technologies including those that may be developed jointly, mutually acceptable technical and commercial terms, and the prevalent electricity tariffs.” Evidently and wisely, a lot has been left to the consideration of factors prevalent in the future.

The Agreement also emphasises the involvement of Indian suppliers of manufacturing equipment, fuel assemblies and spares for Russian reactors to be constructed in India. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of India's decision to import reactors from the international nuclear market has been the insistence on including a large local component into their construction. Even before Modi vocalised ‘Make in India’, the nuclear sector has always been bound by this dictum. In fact, until 2008, it did not have the option of foreign material, technology or components. Retaining that focus while realising the ambitious national nuclear expansion plans would certainly open employment opportunities for the millions of young engineers and technicians passing out of the Indian education system annually. In fact, another important aspect of the VS in this context is the prospect of exploring “opportunities for sourcing materials, equipment and services from Indian industry for the construction of the Russian-designed nuclear power plants in third countries.”

Given that the Russian nuclear industry is keen on exports, this would enhance the capability and capacity of the Indian nuclear industry through necessary transfer of technology.

The Statement also mentions joint extraction of natural uranium through technical cooperation in mining activities, “within their own territories and in third countries.” This would be significant for India if it is to fulfill its nuclear expansion ambitions without having to worry about the availability of fuel.  At the same time, collaboration on radioactive waste management, research and development on fusion reactors etc. are all forward-looking aspects of the VS.

So, what stands in the way of realising the potential of the vision of the statement? A few issues must be given due consideration. First, the identification of fresh site(s) for the new Russian reactors may not be as easy as it sounds. Given that public acceptance issues have acquired a worrisome dimension in the post-Fukushima environment, the acquisition of necessary land will call for much greater investment, and not just monetary, by the nuclear establishment to reach out to the constituencies to inform and educate them with the objective of winning them over.

Second, the Indian nuclear liability law will require amendments to become palatable to the nuclear industry anywhere, at home or abroad. While rather cryptically, Russian government officials have “in principle” agreed to the Indian nuclear liability law, this has been done after factoring in the costs involved in the process. According to some reports, the first and second units of the Kudankulam nuclear power plants had cost India $1 billion each, but new units will cost triple the amount in view of India's nuclear liability law. Even if this may be an exaggeration, it must not be forgotten that any nuclear industry, including Russian, is in the business of doing business. The cost will be handed down to India only.

In such a situation, critics of nuclear power will jump at the opportunity to drum up opposition to construction of new nuclear plants on the ground of the high costs. Economics of nuclear reactors has always been a matter of concern. In the past, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. has contended that its Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors have been comparable in cost to other sources of electricity. But, a high cost of imported reactors, owing to the nuclear liability law imposing a huge burden on any nuclear industry, would put a black mark against nuclear power.

Therefore, it would be a good idea to take a fresh look at the issue so as to be able to make use of the opportunities that have opened up for India in the field of international nuclear commerce. Amendment of the law is not to appease outsiders but to make nuclear power an implementable viable option for India itself.

A VS may be crafted when the decision-makers see potential, but it can only be realised when they also see and address the challenges that stand in the way.

Maoist Attack on the CRPF: Time for New Counter-strategies

 Bibhu Prasad Routray

The 1 December 2014 killing of 14 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Chhattisgarh's Sukma district by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) should invariably go down as one of the country's worst security force operations in recent times. In terms of the killing of trained personnel, looting of their weapons, and the follow up response of a well established security establishment in the state, the attack surpasses even the far bigger extremist attacks of the past in which the force had lost far larger number of personnel. The incident further gives rise to the question whether a victory over the Maoists is at all possible under a CRPF-State police force combination formula?

The attack took place as over 2000 personnel of the CRPF were conducting a four-phase operation against the extremists in the district. As expressed by the involved personnel to the media, without much of intelligence to back these initiatives, there was little objective behind the operations rather than what broadly is described as area domination exercises. During the end of the third phase of the operation, a section of the force, variously described as consisting of 200 to 700 personnel came under attack by the Maoists – who apparently used civilian villagers as shields. There was little resistance from the forces, who as reports suggest got away only 14 fatalities. While 12 perished in the combat, two personnel died while being shifted. Had the Maoists persisted and continued their attacks, the toll could have been much higher, perilously close to the 2010 Dantewada attack in which the CRPF lost 76 troopers. The attack has led to an early conclusion of the area domination exercise in Sukma.

The attack raises several questions regarding the ability of the force that has been designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgent force after the Kargil attack, vis-a-vis the Maoists. There are issues of leadership, logistics, intelligence and coordination with the state police force. However, none of these concerns are new. Each investigation following a major attack has unravelled the same ills affecting the force that has been fighting the extremists for nearly a decade and whose battalion strength in the conflict theater has grown manifold over the years. While some incremental improvements in the way operations have been conducted are natural and are there for everybody to see, fundamental issues such as the CRPF leadership's strategy of fighting the war with well-motivated and adequately supported personnel have been chronically absent.

This explains why the transient successes that have pushed the 10-year old CPI-Maoist arguably to its weakest state notwithstanding, the CRPF's own history of engagement with the extremists is replete with mistakes, setbacks, and a perennial search for the right principles of operational accomplishment. The force's projects to generate intelligence by setting up an dedicated wing; its initiatives of developing bonds with the tribal population by providing them with gifts, medical facilities, and organising sports and cultural events; and its efforts to narrow down the differences with the state police forces have all achieved marginal results. Even the 10-battalion strong Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA), raised with the specific objective of fighting the Maoists, which has since been diluted to make them deal with the insurgents of all denominations in the northeast, have minor achievements to demonstrate, in the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)'s own assessments.

The uncomfortable conclusion one can derive from the state-of-affairs is that the CRPF, in its present state, is not the force that can deliver significant successes in the Maoist conflict theaters. Even with an ever-expanding budget of Rs. 12,169.51 crores for the current financial year - amounting to almost 1/5th of the MHA's entire budget – the successive chiefs of the force have failed to provide its fighting troops even the basic of the provisions. Media narratives indicate soldiers keeping themselves operationally fit with rice, lentils and Maggi noodles. Worse still, seen in combination with poor condition of the state police forces and their virtual irrelevance to the conflict resolution project, it points at an ignominious future of a permanent state of conflict in a sizeable geographical expanse of the country.

In response to the Sukma attack, the MHA plans to induct more forces into Chhattisgarh. Such a move, in the pipeline since the new government assumed power in New Delhi in May 2014, is based on the premise that more boots on the ground would be able to reverse the success of the Maoists. Nothing can be farther from truth. The CRPF's failure needs to be seen in the context of the overall lack of imagination among the country's policy makers in dealing with the Maoist threat. Ever since the CPI-Maoist emerged as a major challenge, lackadaisical, reactionary, and adhoc-ish measures have been passed off as official policies. Even as such experimentation continues, the soldiers, among others, are paying with their blood and lives in conflicts mainland Indians are completely oblivious to.

Rise of the Islamic State: Implications for the Arab World

Ranjit Gupta

Though it is going to take a long time to defeat the Islamic State (IS), and it must be defeated, some silver linings of the very dark cloud the IS represents are beginning to be hazily visible over the horizon.

Since the proclamation of the IS, strange things have begun happening in West Asia. The IS is not only against the Shia governments of Iraq and Syria but also of Iran; it is even more against the Sunni governments of the Gulf monarchies, in particular, Saudi Arabia, apart from the US in particular and the West in general; it is also fighting against al Qaeda and its clones and affiliates. The IS is against everybody. It has no allies.

It has thus succeeded in bringing about a heretofore difficult to imagine scenario: countries, entities and regimes traditionally antagonistic and hostile to each other find themselves engaged in a common war against a common enemy. Thus, we have the rather strange spectacle of seeing the US and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Shia-ruled Iraq; the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the US and assorted Islamist extremist groups, and, Kurdish factions perpetually at loggerheads with each other and with the governments of the nations they are part of – all of them in the same camp warring against the IS.

This could have some very positive consequences in a region where hostile and conflictual relationships are endemic:

First, after the fall of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein-ruled government, sectarian and ethnic fissures came to the fore in Iraq in a manner that had never been the case before. Sunnis have been the traditional ruling element in Iraq throughout history, but since 2003 they have not only been deeply alienated but also deliberately humiliated. Therefore, the involvement of Shias, Sunnis and Kurds in the common fight against the IS is very encouraging and could be cathartic and therapeutic. This bodes well for Iraq’s future since it had begun to appear that its being partitioned along sectarian and ethnic divides was becoming inevitable.

This enforced togetherness may finally persuade regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies to work together in the common and shared interests of fighting to eliminate Islamist extremism and sectarianism.

A third potentially significant consequence is that this will ultimately help to promote disenchantment of the average Muslim, particularly in the Gulf region, whether he is Sunni or Shia, with sectarianism and Islamist extremism, and make them realize that these ideologies are very dangerous for all Muslims.

The fourth potential consequence is that as the war against the IS progresses well, combined with the possibility of a deal between Iran and the P5 on the nuclear issue, all this may lead to real possibilities of a negotiated political solution to the civil war in Syria, which otherwise seems impossible to envisage.

The fifth flows from the fact that the intense rivalry between the IS and al Qaeda for control of the global jihadist movement is already causing intra-jihadist infighting and this can be expected to escalate throughout the region and this augurs well for the defeat of pernicious extremist and jihadi groups.
 One consequence of the derailing of the Arab Spring has been the enormous strain on GCC unity, primarily due to Qatar taking a very different stance as compared to other GCC countries in relation to various Islamist groups. This was hampering the fight against the IS. The GCC Summit held in Qatar last week appears to have resolved the differences.  

The IS experience should also make Arab regimes and their Western patrons finally realise that pandering to religion for short-term geopolitical gains only creates Frankenstein monsters that devour their own creators. The reality is that the leaders of the Arab world have long been in denial about their own responsibility for their problems; the outside world is constantly blamed. The fact is that in the post-World War II era more Muslims have been killed by Muslims than by all others put together. As per the Country Threat Index, among the 10 most dangerous countries in the world, 9 are Muslim countries and 6 of them are Arab countries.

These facts have to be squarely faced. Time has come for very serious introspection. The emergence of the IS has created that opportunity. Lasting peace in the Arab world will be possible only if an ideological battle is waged and won within Islam to change the poisonous mindsets that have enveloped much of the Arab world. Some positive indications are already evident in new approaches by GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both domestically and otherwise.

Arab countries being overwhelmingly Muslim countries, political Islam must be given space and legitimacy to function in domestic political processes; banning or prohibiting political Islam only leads to radicalisation of those elements of society that are more religiously inclined than others. Wide-ranging political reform processes must also start now, concomitantly with the execution of the war against the IS. Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started, has demonstrated that a new path is possible.

AND NOW, THEY ARE COMING FOR OUR CHILDREN

 D Suba Chandran

Can the Taliban become any further barbaric than this? Targeting a school, and killing more than 130 children?
Children are not only our soul and the most precious of our existence, but also our future – individual and collective. Children transcend all boundaries – social, political and religious; they have to be viewed, pursued and cherished as children. We send our children to school, not only to gain personal knowledge, but also to learn to socialise in a group, thereby preparing for the larger social role for all of us as a society.
School is the first institution of social construction, outside the family and relatives. School is the starting point of our individual and collective existence. School is the first cradle of all civilizations. Individuals do not make the society; schools provide the first opportunity towards building a larger social edifice.
Children and schools should be sacrosanct. There is no need for any special Conventions either at the national or international levels, which have to underline the above. Whatever may be the situation and whatever may be the nature of social, political and religious positions, children and schools have to be kept away from our prejudices.
Aristotle, in a different context wrote “he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.” In the present context, one who does not understand the simple premise that the children and schools are sacrosanct has to be a beast, and should be treated and responded so.
Imagine being the father or mother of that unfortunate child in Peshawar school yesterday. After the children go inside the school campus, we all would love to hear the sound of that final bell, after which all those little angels come running out of the schools in their cute uniforms. As parents we love to hug them, carry them in our hands and then place them on our shoulders, bicycles, motor bikes and cars. They would start telling stories of the day, what they did with their friends and what their teachers taught. That should be a normal day, irrespective of whichever society we come from – West or East, rich or poor.
What happened in Peshawar should be considered as one of our darkest days. The bells did not ring. Instead a group of inhuman butchers (terrorist is too soft a term for them) let their machine guns make that noise. Some of us did take our children back from schools, not with their bags; instead we carried them in bags. The children did come running to us, but covered in blood and pierced with bullets. We did hold them, but some of them were not there to tell a story of what had happened that day. Perhaps, as a society we should be telling the story for the rest of lives on what had happened on 16 December in Peshawar.
How did we come to this stage? Was it all sudden and we did not know what was coming? Remember that famous verse – “First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.”
Perhaps, as a society, a section of us tried to justify what the Taliban did and is doing. Perhaps, we tried to ascribe reason for their violence. Perhaps, we tried to externalise the problem and tried to find excuses. We blamed the American war on terrorism. We blamed all the intelligence agencies in the world. We told repeatedly that this is not our war. We encouraged the Taliban by not standing up. We did not tell them as a society in a whole, that whatever may be the reason, violence cannot be justified. They killed in FATA. They killed in Swat. They brutally assassinated our leaders. They targeted our infrastructure and institutions.
When they targeted school earlier in Swat, we ignored. When they pumped bullets into Malala, we started slowly waking up. But then, we did not stand up in unison and condemn the acts as butchery and those who commit those acts as savages. When Malala received the Nobel peace prize, a section of us saw her as a Western conspiracy. We even celebrated anti-Malala day! When societies afar, for example in East Asia, converted her book “I am Malala” into Chinese, a section of us spread a venom in the minds of our children and made them stand with a placard “I am not Malala”.  We even tried to reason and comfort ourselves that not all Taliban are bad. We considered some as even “our Taliban” Hey wait, some are even Good Taliban!
And now they are coming for our children. And our future. The time has now come to stand up in unison and call butcher a butcher. There are few things and few institutions that should be kept way from all politics. Schools and children should be considered sacrosanct and this cannot be violated – whatever may be the circumstances and whatever may be the reasons. If we fail to do so, then there would not be much difference between us and them.
The Taliban may have already justified as a revenge act against the military strikes in North Waziristan. It appears more than revenge; this is a warning of how they will retaliate, if the military targets them. The Taliban is well aware, that the State will not be able to protect all the schools; even if it does, for a determined suicide bomb, any such measures are insufficient.
What happened in Peshawar is not a revenge attack, but blackmail. Pure and simple. Taliban is blackmailing us not to target them; if we do, they will respond and attack us in those areas where it would hurt as the most. Earlier attack in the Wagah border has to been seen with the same perspective. Given the South Asian way of life, movement and assembly is very common – whether it is market, or school or place of worship. We assemble all over in huge numbers for different reasons; no State can succeed in protecting all such meetings. In simple language, for a determined terrorist, we are sitting ducks and potential target.
We cannot hide and try to protect ourselves. Doing so is yielding to their blackmail. We have to tell them and act against their violence. Even if there are grievances, resistance and reactions will have to be bound by certain norms. We are bound by social norms. We are a society. We are a civilization.
Rest in peace, dear children. You did not die alone. A part of our history died with you. A part of our humanity died with you. We failed to protect you. We failed to protect our future. We will remember 16 December.