Gurmeet Kanwal
The BJP’s election manifesto had promised to review India’s nuclear
doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current times…”
Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important
government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to
re-validating their key features.
India had declared itself a state-armed with nuclear weapons after a
series of nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan, on 11 and 13 May 1998.
India’s deterrence is premised on the dictum that nuclear weapons are
political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole
purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by
India’s adversaries. A draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) chaired by the late K
Subrahmanyam and handed over to the government on 17 August 1999.
After a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the
government issued a statement on 04 January 2003 spelling out India’s
nuclear doctrine. The government statement said that India will build
and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a ‘No First Use’
posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a
nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” It was
also stated that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive
and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; nuclear weapons will not be
used against non-nuclear weapon states; and, India will retain the
option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major
attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.
Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on a few key
issues: NFU will result in unacceptably high initial casualties and
damage to Indian population, cities and infrastructure; ‘massive’
retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear
strike on Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory; and nuclear
retaliation for chemical or biological attack would be illogical,
especially as the attack may be by non-state actors.
Several Indian analysts have been critical of the NFU posture since its
acceptance by the government. Recently, Lt Gen (Retd) BS Nagal, former
C-in-C, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), has questioned the efficacy of
the NFU doctrine. According to him, “It is time to review our policy of
NFU… (the) choices are ambiguity or first use.” He gives six reasons for
seeking a change: NFU implies acceptance of large-scale destruction in a
first strike; the Indian public is not in sync with the government’s
NFU policy and the nation is not psychologically prepared; it would be
morally wrong - the leadership has no right to place the population ‘in
peril’; NFU allows the adversary’s nuclear forces to escape punishment
as retaliatory strikes will have to be counter value in nature; an
elaborate and costly ballistic missiles defence (BMD) system would be
required to defend against a first strike; and, escalation control is
not possible once nuclear exchanges begin. (“Checks and Balances”,
Force, June 2014.)
The most common scenarios normally considered appropriate for first use
include first use by way of pre-emption based on intelligence warning,
or during launch on warning (LoW) or launch through attack (LTA). In all
of these, there are no easy answers to some obvious questions: What if
intelligence regarding an imminent first strike is wrong? Can the
destruction of the adversary’s cities be justified on suspicion of
imminent launch? The adversary’s surviving nuclear weapons will be
employed to successfully target major Indian cities. Is it worth risking
Delhi, Mumbai and other cities for dubious gains?
Major military reverses during war are also offered as a justifiable
reason for the first use of nuclear weapons. In none of the traditional
worst-case scenarios, for example the cutting off of the Pathankot-Jammu
national highway NH-1A somewhere near Samba by the Pakistan army, is
the situation likely to become so critical as to justify escalation to
nuclear levels by way of a first strike as sufficient reserves are
available to restore an adverse situation.
The NFU posture is strategically logical and rational on several counts.
It has led to major diplomatic gains, including the lifting of
sanctions, civil nuclear cooperation agreements and accommodation in
multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these gains will be
frittered away if India opts for first use. Complex command and control
and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems are necessary for a first use posture. A first use posture will
deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the
nuclear threshold if it becomes necessary. First use will lower the
nuclear threshold and make the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
more likely. And, South Asia will again be dubbed a ‘nuclear
flashpoint’; this will encourage international meddling and will
discourage investment.
Deterrence is ultimately a mind game. The essence of deterrence is that
it must not be allowed to break down. India’s nuclear doctrine must
enhance and not undermine nuclear deterrence. It emerges clearly that
NFU is still an appropriate posture for India’s nuclear doctrine.
However, the word ‘massive’ in the government statement should be
substituted with ‘punitive’ as massive is not credible and limits
retaliatory options. The threat of nuclear retaliation against chemical
and biological attack should be dropped from the doctrine. The
credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be substantially
enhanced through appropriate signalling.
No comments:
Post a Comment