The announcement of a drawdown timeline for US
troops from Afghanistan predictably garnered mixed
reactions. However, most of the issues that brought the
US-led ISAF to the region still remain unresolved. Where
on one hand Osama bin Laden’s killing is an ace for the
US, the al Qaeda as an entity still remains. This leaves
the second spoiler, the Afghan Taliban, as well as their
faith brothers, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Both
of them have the advantage of being sons of the soil.
There is no timeline to chase, so they have the luxury to
act as spoilers, keep the security profile turbulent in real
time and wait for the ‘foreigners’ to exit. Though the
Afghan Taliban has suffered significant losses, their
structures, ability to recruit, and countrywide operations
remain intact with new tactics and means to hold
ground.
Afghanistan today is not the one left in the wake of the
Soviet withdrawal and the faulty Geneva Accords. This
is good news, as even in the worst-case future scenario,
one cannot envision the international community leaving
Kabul in the lurch. However it correspondingly gives rise
to another problem: that too many actors with vested
interests will turn Afghanistan into their proxy strategic
playfield. For the moment, Afghans are happy with this
international focus and seemingly positive attention, but
the years to come may change this happy picture. A
larger chunk of Afghan civil society, which is highly
proactive in democratic nation-building, is drawn from
the Afghan diaspora, who despite their best intentions
may not be able to withstand a possible surge in
militancy and violence in case a situation so arises. The
law enforcement and security apparatus, ANSF, though
much improved and stronger than before still has a long
way to go and its performance post transition would at
best remain a mixed bag, which given Afghanistan’s
complex security dynamics, is not at all a good news.
That leaves the ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’
democratic and nation-building process, which like
many of the ‘Made in US’ products leaves much to be
desired. In a cross-section of Afghan nationals, there
exists deep skepticism about the ‘Afghan-owned’
component largely missing from the frame, thus once
again constructing a system that has very weak
foundations.
Much depends on the results of the forthcoming
elections. With all the presidential candidates and their
affiliates minus incumbent president Karzai consenting
to the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), Afghanistan
requires a strong representative government with
indigenous legitimacy and capacity to extend its writ
outside Kabul without external props. Will the Taliban
be willing to negotiate and agree to some non-violent
power-sharing? There are serious doubts. What would
be the impact of these developments on Pakistan?
Though the Pakistani government is already in talks
with the TTP (Pakhtun faction) and there is a temporary
respite from the US drones, bombings and civilian
killings have not reduced and nor has the US announced
a complete termination of its drone attack policy. In fact
most of the Taliban high shura has comfortably crossed
over into Afghanistan and will remain there for as long
as it suits them. Though the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban are pursuing their independent agenda, one
must not forget their past links and the strength and
resilience of their networks. In addition, the history of
Pak-US relations is highly checkered, and even after
eleven plus years, Pakistani society remains highly
divided about whether this has been Pakistan’s war.
In case the talks with the TTP fail and there is a breach
in the security framework that would result as a part of
the agreement, would post-2014 Afghanistan be able to
provide security cooperation to Pakistan, mainly in the
shape of border closure, hot pursuit into ‘friendly’
territory to capture militants, intelligence-sharing and
perceivable joint operations? With divergent perspectives
and a strong sense of the other side being the spoiler,
there is doubt that such a cooperative security regime
could work. However, for the Afghan and Pakistan
Taliban, the post 2014 timeline would actually be a
welcoming notion. So long as there is an American
security interest and presence, there is optimism for a
better security framework. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan can conveniently dump their bad diplomacy
on the US. It also acts as a balancer against a stronger
Indian presence.
Though Pakistani decision-makers have reinforced the
point that they have no reservations with New Delhi’s
‘legitimate’ interests in Afghanistan, they would always
remain wary of any military or strategic role India has in
Afghanistan. Realistically, every country, be it the US
(Monroe doctrine) or India (Nepal, Bhutan), has similar
concerns when it comes to its strategic interests.
Afghanistan of the future holds increased economic and
commercial activity and corresponding involvement of
the international community, as well as pressure for
increased transit and trilateral (India-Pakistan-
Afghanistan) trade. Pakistan has to prepare itself for the
changing trends and pressures. Ironically, the energy
pipelines still remain somewhat elusive; a problematic
profile for energy-stressed Pakistan specifically. The
coming months are fraught with multiple challenges that
need a sustainable, well-articulated and well thought-
out approach. The 2014 exit timeline in fact heralds a
new chapter in the region’s strategic relations, which
would largely shape future dynamics.
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