Over the past two decades, China has grown
exponentially, both in military prowess and economic
might. The US, one of the major contributing factors to
China’s rise, now realises the importance of countering
this advancement. But is its policy of ‘congagement’,
apt for the issue at hand?
Inconsistent Engagement
Over the past decade, the US maintained a policy of
‘engagement’ towards China. This has in fact been a
tactic to hedge its own bets, without getting into the
primary context. Militarily, Washington has been
facilitating Beijing’s participation in multilateral defense
exercises such as the Cobra Gold and RIMPAC, thus
coming clean and allowing China to gauge US intentions
in the region. Economically, the US has granted China
the Most Favoured Nation status, thereby reducing
export control policies and allowing Beijing to operate
relatively freely in the US markets.
Washington has tried to maximise bilateral ties while
keeping existing disputes in control. Simultaneously, the
US continuously tries to bring China into various arms
control regimes dealing with WMDs, proliferation, arms
trade, etc., and also into international regimes such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Bilaterally, Washington has tried to involve Beijing in the
regional issues regarding North Korea, and may also
invite it to assist with Iran.
While there can be several intended results from this
relationship, the most practical and favorable outcome
is that of Beijing’s integration into the international
system. If China gets as engaged in international
relations as most other Western nations, the probability
of a military intervention by Beijing decreases. This is
because the leadership in Beijing understands the
benefits the current ‘rules of the game’ have to offer,
and also to avoid doing anything that would scuttle its
own off-shore interests.
However, engagement is a relatively flawed policy, as it
does not offer advice on what needs to be done, in the
event of Beijing not adhering to current international
norms. The primary assumption – engaging China on
the international stage as a primary actor, to change its
outlook towards a positive direction – is an a priori
concept. Should this prove to be incorrect, engagement
would have only assisted China in becoming a more
threatening adversary in the future.
Containment: Boon or a Bane?
Containment is seen as a more realistic approach of
dealing with a powerful China in the future. Under this
policy, all elements of the US-China relationship would
be subservient to the primary objective: preventing
China’s growth. This would entail drastically reducing
US-China trade agreements, particularly insuring non-
proliferation of technology and military
development. Furthermore, Washington will have to
enhance its regional presence in the Asia-Pacific,
engaging with other nation states in the region, into
forming an ‘anti-China’ alliance. The US would also
have to convince other potential political and security
partners into limiting their diplomatic and trade
relations with China.
As realist international theory dictates, rising powers
generally tend to assert themselves on the global scene
and challenge the predominant power. This challenge
often translates in a systematic war with the
predominant power. Washington needs to take these
containment steps to ensure this ‘systematic war’ is not
realised. Also, given its political tradition of imperial
rule, China is unlikely to democratise, and this would
only lead to an increase in its bellicosity.
In the present geopolitical scenario, containment will be
a difficult policy to implement. Obtaining domestic
consensus for subordinating other policy goals (such as
trade and commerce) to dealing with a Chinese threat
that is yet to manifest itself will not be easy. This may
even lead to Beijing becoming increasingly hostile
towards the US’ interests. Furthermore, policy will
require the total cooperation of all leading industrial and
military nations of the world to succeed – that which
doesn’t seem to be the case. In the last decade, along
with the US, other major regional players too have been
pivoting to China, and not all of them may want to
sever their economic and diplomatic relationship with
the latter.
Feasibility of a Middle Path
Not only the Obama administration, but much of the US
policy establishment is ambiguous in their reactions
towards the growing Chinese economic and military
power. Recently, the curious term called
‘congagement’ (a mix of containment and engagement)
is making rounds in the US policy circles. It describes
the current policy confusion and contortions of
Washington towards Beijing Well. Many call this a
hedging strategy.
‘Congagement’, however, is built on contradictory
policies. The aspects of engagement and containment
are incoherent – they do not complement each other.
This hedging strategy is unsubstantiated. Hedging is
defined as ‘making an investment to reduce the risk of
adverse decision movements in an asset’. In the China
policy analogy, the US position is that of engaging
China in bilateral agreements, facilitating the bridging of
the gaps between both countries, while at the same
time enhancing its own position to ensure proper
counter-measures for any future Chinese threats.
This confusing stance is the primary reason why
Washington cannot directly or indirectly retaliate to
Beijing’s influence or activities detrimental to its own
security. US President Barack Obama’s ambiguous
silence on the issue of the South China Sea dispute
stands evidence for this. Furthermore, Washington’s
inability to react more than just making international
statements in the recent case of cyber espionage by
China validates this.
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