As the recently formed government in New Delhi is
settling down, the domestic and external policies to be
adopted are being worked out. While no specific blue
print is available, one can take the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) election manifesto, speeches of the
BJP leaders during the election campaign, actions taken
over the past two weeks, the president’s address to the
Joint Session of the parliament on June 9, and the
contextual aspects into considerations to reflect on the
new government’s policies.
First, a common denominator among the
aforementioned aspects is Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and his team’s domestic rejuvenation agenda.
President Pranab Mukherjee’s address to the parliament
outlines the new government’s agenda for the next 60
months. A majority of the points in this address were
taken verbatim from the BJP manifesto. These include
enhancing the role of the manufacturing sector,
improving infrastructure projects across the country and
overall capacity build-up. It is clear, however, that for
this to happen, the foreign policy front needs to be re-
calibrated for the domestic agenda.
For instance, China had become the global
manufacturing hub thanks to its vigorous efforts over
the past two decades of reform and opening policies
and financial and technical assistance from Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the US. In this
regard, if Modi’s efforts are to transform India into a
“globally competitive manufacturing hub powered by
Skill, Scale and Speed,” he needs active cooperation of
all the countries mentioned above.
Additionally, for setting up “world class investment and
industrial regions, particularly along the Dedicated
Freight Corridors and Industrial Corridors,” the new
government needs Japan and the other countries.
Japan, in the recent period, committed nearly $92 billion
for the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and had also
been exploring the Bangalore-Chennai sector. While
clearances on land acquisition, environmental issues,
and labour reforms have delayed the project, more
thrust could be expected during Modi’s visit to Tokyo
next month.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his meetings with
the Indian officials during his recent visit, reiterated
China’s interest in setting up industrial zones in five
states and Beijing’s participation in railway projects. For
Japan, China and the EU countries, the proposed
diamond quadrilateral project of high speed trains, the
Sagar Mala port project, substantially augmenting
electricity generation capacity, the national solar
mission, etc. are lucrative and mutually beneficial.
Concerns on foreign investments closer to the security
establishments of course, prevail in India; and so are
anti-dumping duties on solar panels from China.
There are several commonalities in the new
government’s path forward and that of China’s. Both
leaderships emphasise on nurturing innovation; urban
mission programmes; renewable sources of energy;
among others. China’s 12th Five Year Plan outlined
these aspects, and both could learn from each other’s
experience.
Second, several items on the Modi government’s
domestic agenda could provide for opportunities or even
frictions with neighbours in the longer run. The BJP
manifesto and the presidential address suggested to
building world-class infrastructure, including the
“expansion of railways in hilly states and Northeast
region, conservation of Himalayan ecology; creating 50
tourist circuits and establishing a Central University of
Himalayan Studies.” While China itself had expanded its
infrastructure projects towards its peripheries in Tibet
and Xinjiang – often intruding into disputed territories
between India and Pakistan in the Northern areas – it is
suspicious of the dual-use aspects of these initiatives
by India.
Third, during the election campaign – such as at
Pasighat in February this year when Modi chastised
China for its “expansionist mindset” – and subsequently,
it is clear that securing the borders will be among the
priorities of the new government’s agenda. This is
reflected in the appointments of Gen. (Retd) VK Singh,
and Kiran Rejiju, among others. The presidential address
simply stated that the new government will “strengthen
defence preparedness,” but there was no mention of
revising the nuclear doctrine as stated earlier by the
BJP manifesto.
Fourth, the BJP-led government clearly identified the
Indian neighbourhood as its foreign policy priority. It
was reflected in the invitation to the South Asian
neighbours to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in
ceremony, and in his choice of Thimphu for his maiden
foreign visit. The presidential address also identified
China, Japan, Russia, the US and the EU; but it is clear
that India’s relations with the US and Japan are poised
to be on the upswing. Specifically on China, the
address, while reiterating the “strategic and cooperative
partnership” agreement of 2005, stated that the new
government “will engage energetically” with Beijing.
Fifth, the BJP manifesto and the presidential address
clearly identified zero tolerance to internal disturbances,
including terrorist incidents. While in the foreign policy
domain, this issue is mainly directed towards Pakistan,
there was also a mention during Foreign Minister Yi’s
visit to New Delhi that counter-terrorism efforts
between India and China will be furthered. So far,
although both India and China have acceded to the UN
Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 on
counter-terrorism, no effective coordination or
cooperation exists between the two nations that identify
this issue as number one security challenge.
10 Jun 2014
TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN: THE MEHSUD BREAKAWAY
On 28 May, 2014, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Wali-ur-Rehman faction led by Khan Said, also known
as Sajna, announced its separation from the TTP,
alleging that the current Mullah Fazlullah-led TTP is
bombing public places using fake names to avoid
responsibility. Sajna was a strong contender for the
TTP’s leadership after its former chief Hakimullah
Medsud was killed in a US drone attack in November
2013. The post was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah of
the Swati Taliban. Sajna was a key ally of former Wali-
ur-Rehman Mehsud, who originally led the breakaway
group and who was killed in a US drone strike in May
2013.
Why did the Split Take Place?
The TTP split into two factions after major group based
in South Waziristan quit the TTP and accused its
leadership of having fallen into invisible hands and
turning the TTP into an organisation providing safety to
criminals. Sajna’s spokesperson Azam Tariq said “We
announce separation from the TTP leadership which has
deviated from its path.” It accused the TTP leadership of
indulging in robberies, killing for money, extortion and
kidnapping for ransom with the help of a group of
conspirators, and said all these actions are considered
as un-Islamic.
The spokesman said the split too place because the
TTP under Fazlullah had become a den for extortionists,
and that it carried out blasts in mosques. This
assertion, however, does not hold much sincerity. This
is because the TTP has a long history of carrying out
blasts inside mosques, and their principal source of
income is extortion. Prima facie, it appears to be a case
of infighting for leadership roles.
Primarily, the split appears to have been a result of
tribal infighting for the leadership of the TTP. The TTP
has traditionally been a group of tribesmen from the
Mehsud clan, and Fazlullah is the first non-Mehsud
tribesman to have assumed leadership of the group.
Prior to joining the TTP, Fazlullah used to lead his own
militant organization called the Tehrik-i-Nafaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). He was never inclined
to any negotiation and used to carry our ruthlessly
violent attacks.
The military's role in this split is unclear. Unlike the
Afghan Taliban, the TTP never took commands from the
Pakistani military. Their primary targets are the military
and law-enforcing agencies. Time and gain, the TTP
attacked military posts, taking some officials as
captives, and subsequently, killing them brutally. The
government’s failed attempt at negotiations with the
TTP is also among the key reasons for the ongoing
civil-military tension in Pakistan.
What are the Potential Implications?
It is yet to be seen how the splinter groups act in the
coming days. There is a likelihood of Fazlullah
regrouping the cadres of his former organization, the
TNSM. His seat of power was Swat valley, where he is
believed to command the loyalty of many of his
followers. Now, both the splinter groups might try to
assert their existence and relevance by carrying out
more attacks.
The military might try to take the advantage of the
ongoing infighting and mount serious offensives to
cause damage to the groups. The government might try
to engage in negotiations with Sajna’s group that
appears eager to hold talks. The consent of military to
such negotiations is very less.
According to the Pak Tribune, following the
aforementioned split, 13 militants were killed in a
bombing and gun-fighting in North Waziristan last
week. 56 people have been killed in the violence that
erupted on 1 June between Sajna’s supporters and
those of the late Hakimullah Mehsud group in North
Waziristan.
The Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud group is likely to emerge
stronger after the division because it enjoys the support
of both the Punjabi Taliban, and al-Qaeda. This
breakaway may end the centrality of the TTP and lead
to further disintegration. However, the government has
not commented on the split and it is yet to be seen as
to how this would affect the government’s peace
initiative.
Wali-ur-Rehman faction led by Khan Said, also known
as Sajna, announced its separation from the TTP,
alleging that the current Mullah Fazlullah-led TTP is
bombing public places using fake names to avoid
responsibility. Sajna was a strong contender for the
TTP’s leadership after its former chief Hakimullah
Medsud was killed in a US drone attack in November
2013. The post was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah of
the Swati Taliban. Sajna was a key ally of former Wali-
ur-Rehman Mehsud, who originally led the breakaway
group and who was killed in a US drone strike in May
2013.
Why did the Split Take Place?
The TTP split into two factions after major group based
in South Waziristan quit the TTP and accused its
leadership of having fallen into invisible hands and
turning the TTP into an organisation providing safety to
criminals. Sajna’s spokesperson Azam Tariq said “We
announce separation from the TTP leadership which has
deviated from its path.” It accused the TTP leadership of
indulging in robberies, killing for money, extortion and
kidnapping for ransom with the help of a group of
conspirators, and said all these actions are considered
as un-Islamic.
The spokesman said the split too place because the
TTP under Fazlullah had become a den for extortionists,
and that it carried out blasts in mosques. This
assertion, however, does not hold much sincerity. This
is because the TTP has a long history of carrying out
blasts inside mosques, and their principal source of
income is extortion. Prima facie, it appears to be a case
of infighting for leadership roles.
Primarily, the split appears to have been a result of
tribal infighting for the leadership of the TTP. The TTP
has traditionally been a group of tribesmen from the
Mehsud clan, and Fazlullah is the first non-Mehsud
tribesman to have assumed leadership of the group.
Prior to joining the TTP, Fazlullah used to lead his own
militant organization called the Tehrik-i-Nafaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). He was never inclined
to any negotiation and used to carry our ruthlessly
violent attacks.
The military's role in this split is unclear. Unlike the
Afghan Taliban, the TTP never took commands from the
Pakistani military. Their primary targets are the military
and law-enforcing agencies. Time and gain, the TTP
attacked military posts, taking some officials as
captives, and subsequently, killing them brutally. The
government’s failed attempt at negotiations with the
TTP is also among the key reasons for the ongoing
civil-military tension in Pakistan.
What are the Potential Implications?
It is yet to be seen how the splinter groups act in the
coming days. There is a likelihood of Fazlullah
regrouping the cadres of his former organization, the
TNSM. His seat of power was Swat valley, where he is
believed to command the loyalty of many of his
followers. Now, both the splinter groups might try to
assert their existence and relevance by carrying out
more attacks.
The military might try to take the advantage of the
ongoing infighting and mount serious offensives to
cause damage to the groups. The government might try
to engage in negotiations with Sajna’s group that
appears eager to hold talks. The consent of military to
such negotiations is very less.
According to the Pak Tribune, following the
aforementioned split, 13 militants were killed in a
bombing and gun-fighting in North Waziristan last
week. 56 people have been killed in the violence that
erupted on 1 June between Sajna’s supporters and
those of the late Hakimullah Mehsud group in North
Waziristan.
The Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud group is likely to emerge
stronger after the division because it enjoys the support
of both the Punjabi Taliban, and al-Qaeda. This
breakaway may end the centrality of the TTP and lead
to further disintegration. However, the government has
not commented on the split and it is yet to be seen as
to how this would affect the government’s peace
initiative.
9 Jun 2014
POST AFGHAN ELECTION: END OF THE ROAD FOR TALIBAN?
Undoubtedly the elections in Afghanistan last week to
elect the next President is historical. According to initial
reports, more than 60 percent of the 12 million
electorate took part in the elections; given the security
environment and the ability of the State to organize
polling booths in every district, 60 percent is a
phenomenal statistics for the Afghan democracy.
Does the positive vote mean end of the road for Taliban
and to radical politics through threat and fear? Initial
responses to the elections from the US to our own
region have been as a vote against the Taliban, or a
sign of its decline. But is it not early to make an
assertion whether the Taliban would become irrelevant
after this election? Does militancy, such as that of the
Taliban, really decline and disappear? If it does, under
what conditions? What has been the success story in
our region so far?
True, the elections were not as violent, as it was
expected. There were few high profile attacks, including
the use of suicide bombs immediately before the
elections. The horror in the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the suicide attacks in one of the offices of the election
commission immediately before the elections did raise a
fear that the process would be violent. Few polling
booths were in fact closed due to security situation; and
in many places, especially in the southern and eastern
districts, where the Taliban is having its base, post
election interviews do inform that the threat from the
Taliban against voting did work.
By no stretch of imagination one could make an
argument that the Taliban is weak enough not to carry
out targeted attacks, or general bomb blasts anywhere
in Afghanistan. In fact, there were days in the recent
past of Afghanistan, which were even more violent than
what one had witnessed during the day of election last
week. Though the Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) are better trained and equipped today, the
security is not fool proof that the Taliban could not
penetrate.
Perhaps, this is a calibrated strategy by the Taliban. A
section within Afghanistan and outside was not sure
about the election outcome; they believed this one
would also be as farcical and fraudulent as the previous
one in 2009. With a deeply polarized society and strong
ethnic differences between the major communities, many
considered this election would be contentious and
inconclusive, leading only to further political instability.
So the calculation within the Taliban and their
supporters elsewhere could have been to wait and
watch; if the election process results in political
instability, it would only strengthen the case of the
Taliban and undermine the democratic process and a
transition funded and supported by the “West”. So why
use violence and undermine a process that is already
seen as faulty and unproductive? Perhaps, this was a
strategy in keeping a low profile.
Second reason for Taliban’s relative restraint during the
elections is to wait, watch and choose a time and place
of their own choice. The Taliban is well aware that this
is only the first round; if none of the candidates get the
desired percentage of votes, there would be a second
round amongst the top two. Taliban could very well
target the process at that time; perhaps, this could be a
future wait and watch strategy by the Taliban, as it did
immediately after the international security forces landed
in Afghanistan in 2001-02. They disappeared into the
mountains, only to engage in a guerrilla warfare, that
too successfully. Perhaps, this time the Taliban wanted
to gauge the response of the people, and pursue an
appropriate course of action. The fact that the election
process in the South and East were stunted does
highlight that its base is intact.
To conclude, it is too early to write off the Taliban. Few
high profile suicide attacks in Kabul would change the
entire context and the discourse.
The larger question and challenge for Afghanistan and
the rest of South Asia is – do militancy of the Taliban
variety decline and disappear? Or they only decay but
only mutate further? Even if the second round of
election is free of violence and results in a new
President taking over, what is the likely response of
Taliban in the near future?
In South Asia – we have few examples – the NSCN in
India’s Northeast, Khalistan movement in Punjab, the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Baloch insurgency in
Pakistan. The NSCN today has become a fractionalized
movement, and the level of corruption in the State has
only made an underground movement into a semi-over
ground but parallel government. In Punjab, the State
used force on the one hand, but politically co-opted the
parties and ensured there is better governance; as a
result, the Khalistan movement in Punjab today is all
but dead, except occasional posters and periodic
discussions.
In Balochistan, Pakistan used brutal force to undermine
the Baloch national movements more than three times
since independence. Neither there was better
governance, nor the local population got co-opted into
the mainstream. Same was the case in Sri Lanka as
well; the government towards the end of Eelam War,
used brute force to physically annihilate the LTTE.
Though violence has come to an end, the Sri Lankan
Tamils are still far from being satisfied.
Which way would the Taliban insurgency turn into in
Afghanistan after the elections? This is an important
question not only for Afghanistan, but also for the entire
regional security. Much would depend on how the
Afghan led and Afghan owned transition takes place at
the ground level, in terms of improving the situation of
the Afghan people.
Though the ANSF may be better trained and well
equipped to take on the Taliban militarily, the military
equation between the State and the Taliban is not going
to be the decisive factor. Political stability and social
reconstruction by the Afghan government, an inclusive
economic growth along with equitable distribution of
development in urban and rural areas would become the
decisive factor. Though corruption is also an issue, in
the case of Afghanistan, the critics are exaggerating the
case; this is a common issue for the entire South Asia
and accusing Afghanistan alone may not provide the
right answers.
So the question where would the Taliban go – is not in
the hands of Mullah Omar, but with the next President,
and the rest of international community including
Pakistan. If there is better governance, equitable
development and inclusive growth, the Taliban will be
relegated into an insignificant militant group that would
eventually mutate into splinter groups, like the multiple
Mujahideen groups did after the so called jihad against
the Russians in the 1980s. If the international
community lose interest in Afghanistan and allows the
positive developments to go down the drain, along with
ignoring any Pakistani ingress, it would only strengthen
the hands of the Taliban. Worse, if the next government
fail to deliver, support for the Taliban would only
increase. Not by design, but by default.
The success and failure of the Taliban, is not in the
hands of Mullah Omar. It rests with the next President
and his ability to take Afghanistan forward.
elect the next President is historical. According to initial
reports, more than 60 percent of the 12 million
electorate took part in the elections; given the security
environment and the ability of the State to organize
polling booths in every district, 60 percent is a
phenomenal statistics for the Afghan democracy.
Does the positive vote mean end of the road for Taliban
and to radical politics through threat and fear? Initial
responses to the elections from the US to our own
region have been as a vote against the Taliban, or a
sign of its decline. But is it not early to make an
assertion whether the Taliban would become irrelevant
after this election? Does militancy, such as that of the
Taliban, really decline and disappear? If it does, under
what conditions? What has been the success story in
our region so far?
True, the elections were not as violent, as it was
expected. There were few high profile attacks, including
the use of suicide bombs immediately before the
elections. The horror in the Serena Hotel in Kabul and
the suicide attacks in one of the offices of the election
commission immediately before the elections did raise a
fear that the process would be violent. Few polling
booths were in fact closed due to security situation; and
in many places, especially in the southern and eastern
districts, where the Taliban is having its base, post
election interviews do inform that the threat from the
Taliban against voting did work.
By no stretch of imagination one could make an
argument that the Taliban is weak enough not to carry
out targeted attacks, or general bomb blasts anywhere
in Afghanistan. In fact, there were days in the recent
past of Afghanistan, which were even more violent than
what one had witnessed during the day of election last
week. Though the Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) are better trained and equipped today, the
security is not fool proof that the Taliban could not
penetrate.
Perhaps, this is a calibrated strategy by the Taliban. A
section within Afghanistan and outside was not sure
about the election outcome; they believed this one
would also be as farcical and fraudulent as the previous
one in 2009. With a deeply polarized society and strong
ethnic differences between the major communities, many
considered this election would be contentious and
inconclusive, leading only to further political instability.
So the calculation within the Taliban and their
supporters elsewhere could have been to wait and
watch; if the election process results in political
instability, it would only strengthen the case of the
Taliban and undermine the democratic process and a
transition funded and supported by the “West”. So why
use violence and undermine a process that is already
seen as faulty and unproductive? Perhaps, this was a
strategy in keeping a low profile.
Second reason for Taliban’s relative restraint during the
elections is to wait, watch and choose a time and place
of their own choice. The Taliban is well aware that this
is only the first round; if none of the candidates get the
desired percentage of votes, there would be a second
round amongst the top two. Taliban could very well
target the process at that time; perhaps, this could be a
future wait and watch strategy by the Taliban, as it did
immediately after the international security forces landed
in Afghanistan in 2001-02. They disappeared into the
mountains, only to engage in a guerrilla warfare, that
too successfully. Perhaps, this time the Taliban wanted
to gauge the response of the people, and pursue an
appropriate course of action. The fact that the election
process in the South and East were stunted does
highlight that its base is intact.
To conclude, it is too early to write off the Taliban. Few
high profile suicide attacks in Kabul would change the
entire context and the discourse.
The larger question and challenge for Afghanistan and
the rest of South Asia is – do militancy of the Taliban
variety decline and disappear? Or they only decay but
only mutate further? Even if the second round of
election is free of violence and results in a new
President taking over, what is the likely response of
Taliban in the near future?
In South Asia – we have few examples – the NSCN in
India’s Northeast, Khalistan movement in Punjab, the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Baloch insurgency in
Pakistan. The NSCN today has become a fractionalized
movement, and the level of corruption in the State has
only made an underground movement into a semi-over
ground but parallel government. In Punjab, the State
used force on the one hand, but politically co-opted the
parties and ensured there is better governance; as a
result, the Khalistan movement in Punjab today is all
but dead, except occasional posters and periodic
discussions.
In Balochistan, Pakistan used brutal force to undermine
the Baloch national movements more than three times
since independence. Neither there was better
governance, nor the local population got co-opted into
the mainstream. Same was the case in Sri Lanka as
well; the government towards the end of Eelam War,
used brute force to physically annihilate the LTTE.
Though violence has come to an end, the Sri Lankan
Tamils are still far from being satisfied.
Which way would the Taliban insurgency turn into in
Afghanistan after the elections? This is an important
question not only for Afghanistan, but also for the entire
regional security. Much would depend on how the
Afghan led and Afghan owned transition takes place at
the ground level, in terms of improving the situation of
the Afghan people.
Though the ANSF may be better trained and well
equipped to take on the Taliban militarily, the military
equation between the State and the Taliban is not going
to be the decisive factor. Political stability and social
reconstruction by the Afghan government, an inclusive
economic growth along with equitable distribution of
development in urban and rural areas would become the
decisive factor. Though corruption is also an issue, in
the case of Afghanistan, the critics are exaggerating the
case; this is a common issue for the entire South Asia
and accusing Afghanistan alone may not provide the
right answers.
So the question where would the Taliban go – is not in
the hands of Mullah Omar, but with the next President,
and the rest of international community including
Pakistan. If there is better governance, equitable
development and inclusive growth, the Taliban will be
relegated into an insignificant militant group that would
eventually mutate into splinter groups, like the multiple
Mujahideen groups did after the so called jihad against
the Russians in the 1980s. If the international
community lose interest in Afghanistan and allows the
positive developments to go down the drain, along with
ignoring any Pakistani ingress, it would only strengthen
the hands of the Taliban. Worse, if the next government
fail to deliver, support for the Taliban would only
increase. Not by design, but by default.
The success and failure of the Taliban, is not in the
hands of Mullah Omar. It rests with the next President
and his ability to take Afghanistan forward.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR DEAL: REGIONAL SHADOWS
There are indications of further substantive progress in
P5 plus Germany’s negotiations with Iran in the latest
round in Vienna. Iran has shown readiness and given
plans to change the design of the Arak research reactor
to drastically reduce plutonium in its spent fuel. While
Iran has no reprocessing plant and the Arak reactor is
still under construction, the plutonium production risk
has been one of the main sticking points about Iran’s
nuclear programme. The comprehensive agreement
which the negotiators hope to achieve by July 2014
looks distant still. It will need considerable hard work
and has 50-60 per cent chance of happening by the
deadline; going by the comments of the Chinese and
Russian negotiators after the latest round.
Iran’s stance as revealed in statements by the Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif remains consistent with its
line since November 2013, that it will take steps to
reduce the enrichment level, output and stocks at both
locations alongside agreed improvement in transparency
and access required for IAEA’s close monitoring. While
the Iranian part of the deal is focused on its nuclear
programme the other side, particularly the US
academics, congressmen and the Israelis have shown
differing views of what should constitute an acceptable
agreement to reward Iran with lifting of sanctions. On
the one hand, despite the heightened tensions about
Ukraine, Russian negotiators seem to show that there is
no impact on their (constructive) role in the P5-plus-
one process. On the other, there is a rising domestic
chorus in the US putting pressure on its negotiators
about the full range of demands from Iran in these
negotiations.
In recent weeks, more and more concern has come up
front that mere nuclear concessions by Iran should not
earn it the desired sanctions relief. The regional impact
of Iran’s role and policies has loomed large in recent
weeks as evident in commentaries about the visit of
President Obama to Saudi Arabia, the Middle East
shuttle diplomacy of Kerry, the role of Hizbullah and the
situation in Syria since the failure of Geneva II.
An article in the Washington Post co-authored by Gen
Petraeus on 10 April about these negotiations with Iran
goes to the extent of putting the clock back on the
entire contour of the Iran imbroglio over the past two
decades. Petraeus and his co-author stress that “a
successful nuclear deal with Iran could result in the
United States and its partners in the Middle East facing
a better-resourced and, in some respects, more
dangerous adversary”. This, they argue, is ‘because
sanctions relief would bolster Tehran’s capability to
train, finance and equip its terrorist proxies’ and
therefore ‘sanctions related to terrorism should remain
in place’ and should even be enhanced. Another very
exhaustive paper by well known US non-proliferation
scholar, Robert Einhorn, spells out the strict
requirements of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran
– while stating at the outset that he does not at all
address the sanctions relief part of the bargain. Israel’s
position on the accords since November 2013 has been
of stout negation of anything good in this process since
it would only relax the hold of tight sanctions on Iran
and remove its isolation – and with no sight of reliable
nuclear guarantees.
Ironically, if such arguments receive greater credence,
they would reinforce Iran’s innate fears from the very
beginning that the whole nuclear issue has been raked
up with ulterior regional aims. This line was probably
felt in Tehran particularly starkly in 2002-03 in the
context of a similar case against Iraq. Hence perhaps
the concessions that Iran was offering in its talks with
the European-3 (Germany, France and UK) in October
2003. The whole point of the relaxation of the situation
after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and subsequent back
channel progress between the US and Iran was to reach
a breakthrough with a limited focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme and sanctions relief. Iran is on record
stating that the deal will be dead if sanctions persist.
In a worsening situation, if these talks founder, Iran’s
regional concerns too might come to the fore and pull
back its leadership from the statesmanship
demonstrated over the past year. The reports about
Saudi Arabia’s mounting unease with prospects of Iran
emerging from the cold and speculations about Riyadh’s
drastic review of its strategic posture are significant.
Mutual apprehension between Iran and Saudi Arabia and
suspicions about the likely Saudi nuclear outsourcing to
Pakistan are likely to enormously complicate the
situation. Iran-Pakistan strains have been skillfully
managed so far despite provocations arising out of
sectarian strife in the region, the reported role of
Pakistani regular or retired troops in Bahrain, and recent
stories about Pakistani jihadis having joined the
opposition in Syria.
Sartaj Aziz has hinted at Pakistan’s mediation between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and going by past history of
Pakistan’s deft and uncanny ways in this regard, it
might be difficult to rule such stuff out in the unfolding
scenario of leverages and diplomacy. Is nuclear-armed
Pakistan thus again on the threshold of a big role post
the US exit from Afghanistan, with its human resources
deployed in Syria and who knows where else, and go-
between diplomacy elsewhere? Are the straws in the
wind about the likely relaxation of US (and NSG)
strictures on nuclear Pakistan integral to any larger
pattern, overlooking the terrorism angle?
P5 plus Germany’s negotiations with Iran in the latest
round in Vienna. Iran has shown readiness and given
plans to change the design of the Arak research reactor
to drastically reduce plutonium in its spent fuel. While
Iran has no reprocessing plant and the Arak reactor is
still under construction, the plutonium production risk
has been one of the main sticking points about Iran’s
nuclear programme. The comprehensive agreement
which the negotiators hope to achieve by July 2014
looks distant still. It will need considerable hard work
and has 50-60 per cent chance of happening by the
deadline; going by the comments of the Chinese and
Russian negotiators after the latest round.
Iran’s stance as revealed in statements by the Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif remains consistent with its
line since November 2013, that it will take steps to
reduce the enrichment level, output and stocks at both
locations alongside agreed improvement in transparency
and access required for IAEA’s close monitoring. While
the Iranian part of the deal is focused on its nuclear
programme the other side, particularly the US
academics, congressmen and the Israelis have shown
differing views of what should constitute an acceptable
agreement to reward Iran with lifting of sanctions. On
the one hand, despite the heightened tensions about
Ukraine, Russian negotiators seem to show that there is
no impact on their (constructive) role in the P5-plus-
one process. On the other, there is a rising domestic
chorus in the US putting pressure on its negotiators
about the full range of demands from Iran in these
negotiations.
In recent weeks, more and more concern has come up
front that mere nuclear concessions by Iran should not
earn it the desired sanctions relief. The regional impact
of Iran’s role and policies has loomed large in recent
weeks as evident in commentaries about the visit of
President Obama to Saudi Arabia, the Middle East
shuttle diplomacy of Kerry, the role of Hizbullah and the
situation in Syria since the failure of Geneva II.
An article in the Washington Post co-authored by Gen
Petraeus on 10 April about these negotiations with Iran
goes to the extent of putting the clock back on the
entire contour of the Iran imbroglio over the past two
decades. Petraeus and his co-author stress that “a
successful nuclear deal with Iran could result in the
United States and its partners in the Middle East facing
a better-resourced and, in some respects, more
dangerous adversary”. This, they argue, is ‘because
sanctions relief would bolster Tehran’s capability to
train, finance and equip its terrorist proxies’ and
therefore ‘sanctions related to terrorism should remain
in place’ and should even be enhanced. Another very
exhaustive paper by well known US non-proliferation
scholar, Robert Einhorn, spells out the strict
requirements of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran
– while stating at the outset that he does not at all
address the sanctions relief part of the bargain. Israel’s
position on the accords since November 2013 has been
of stout negation of anything good in this process since
it would only relax the hold of tight sanctions on Iran
and remove its isolation – and with no sight of reliable
nuclear guarantees.
Ironically, if such arguments receive greater credence,
they would reinforce Iran’s innate fears from the very
beginning that the whole nuclear issue has been raked
up with ulterior regional aims. This line was probably
felt in Tehran particularly starkly in 2002-03 in the
context of a similar case against Iraq. Hence perhaps
the concessions that Iran was offering in its talks with
the European-3 (Germany, France and UK) in October
2003. The whole point of the relaxation of the situation
after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and subsequent back
channel progress between the US and Iran was to reach
a breakthrough with a limited focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme and sanctions relief. Iran is on record
stating that the deal will be dead if sanctions persist.
In a worsening situation, if these talks founder, Iran’s
regional concerns too might come to the fore and pull
back its leadership from the statesmanship
demonstrated over the past year. The reports about
Saudi Arabia’s mounting unease with prospects of Iran
emerging from the cold and speculations about Riyadh’s
drastic review of its strategic posture are significant.
Mutual apprehension between Iran and Saudi Arabia and
suspicions about the likely Saudi nuclear outsourcing to
Pakistan are likely to enormously complicate the
situation. Iran-Pakistan strains have been skillfully
managed so far despite provocations arising out of
sectarian strife in the region, the reported role of
Pakistani regular or retired troops in Bahrain, and recent
stories about Pakistani jihadis having joined the
opposition in Syria.
Sartaj Aziz has hinted at Pakistan’s mediation between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and going by past history of
Pakistan’s deft and uncanny ways in this regard, it
might be difficult to rule such stuff out in the unfolding
scenario of leverages and diplomacy. Is nuclear-armed
Pakistan thus again on the threshold of a big role post
the US exit from Afghanistan, with its human resources
deployed in Syria and who knows where else, and go-
between diplomacy elsewhere? Are the straws in the
wind about the likely relaxation of US (and NSG)
strictures on nuclear Pakistan integral to any larger
pattern, overlooking the terrorism angle?
PERILS OF STRATEGIC NARCISSISM
China’s rise has powered an impulse to military growth
and unilateral intervention which in turn evokes
anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic
milieu. The paradoxical effect is to undermine its own
strategic standing.
Historical Similitude
The Franco-German War of 1870 forms a watershed in
strategic thought. After the annexation of the North
German Confederacy in 1866, Bismarck sought the
Southern German States. He deceived the French into
believing that a Prussian Prince would rule from the
throne of Spain as a larger strategy of encirclement. By
July 1870, France was conned into a seemingly
‘inevitable’ war. Germany through superior military craft
and technology inflicted a crushing defeat on the host.
In the process the balance of power in Europe was
upset. The War, from deception, to alliances,
provocation of crisis and defeat of the enemy forcing a
one-sided negotiation could well have been scripted by
Kautilya or, more significant to this narrative, Sun Tzu.
German victory ushered a strategic orientation to
compete with the principal imperial power, Britain. Three
strategic objectives swayed the rivalry: military
dominance over land and sea; global economic and
technological ascendancy in tandem with unimpeded
access to primary resources; and thirdly, diplomatic and
political pre-eminence. By 1890, Germany had
established continental military dominance and a
warship-build programme that would challenge British
command of the seas. Economically, Germany had
already overtaken Britain in heavy industries and
innovation, capturing global markets and amassing
capital. This in turn muscled influence and superiority in
one sector after another.
A thirty-year projection in 1890 suggested that
Germany, home to the most advanced industries having
unimpeded access to resources of the earth, best
universities, richest banks and a balanced society,
would achieve her strategic goals and primacy. Yet
precisely thirty years later, Germany lay in ruins, her
economy in shambles, her people impoverished and her
society fragmented. By 1920, her great power
aspirations lay shamed between the pages of the Treaty
of Versailles. The real lesson was that Germany’s quest
for comprehensive power brought about a
transformation amongst the status-quo powers to align
against, despite traditional hostility (Britain and France;
Britain and Russia) to contain and defeat a rising
Germany that sought to upset the existing global order.
China in Perspective
Historical analogies are notorious in their inability to
stage encores, yet they serve as means to understand
the present.
Contemporary fears of nations are driven by four vital
traumas: perpetuation of the State; impact of internal
and external stresses; reconciliation with the
international system; lastly, the conundrum of whether
military power produces political outcomes. The
paradigm of the day is ‘uncertainty’ with the tensions of
multi-polarity, tyranny of economics, anarchy of
expectations and polarisation along religio-cultural lines
all compacted by globalisation.
If globalisation is a leveller to the rest of the world, to
China, globalisation is about State capitalism, central
supremacy, controlled markets, managed currency and
hegemony. The military was to resolve fundamental
contradictions that threatened the Chinese State.
Significantly, globalisation provided the opportunity to
alter the status-quo. Against this backdrop is the
politics of competitive resource access and denial,
which rationalised the use of force. It is in this
perspective that the rise of China must be gauged.
China’s dazzling growth is set to overtake the US. Its
rise has been accompanied by ambitions of global
leadership. This has in turn spurred an unparalleled
military growth. In this circumstance the race to garner
resources by other major economies is fraught. But the
real alarm is that China seeks to dominate international
institutions without bringing about a change of her own
morphology. China’s claims on the South and East
China Sea; handling of internal dissent; proliferatory
carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases in
point.
The emergence of China from its defensive maritime
perimeters into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming
‘Third Security Chain’. Gone is Deng’s ‘power
bashfulness’; in its place is the conviction that the-
world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world. Its
insistence on a bilateral policy to settle disputes even
denies the natural impulse of threatened States to seek
power balance in collective security.
The Sense in Cooperative Security Strategies
The standpoint that provocation and intimidation can
benefit China by persuading the victim to negotiate
outstanding issues from a conciliatory position is a
strategically mistaken one. India, Japan, Vietnam and
the South China Sea Littorals have demonstrated so.
Far from acquiescing they have chosen to resist,
adopting (in trend) a cooperative security strategy. This
includes deliberate negative response to favour Chinese
economic monopoly even when the benefits are obvious.
While individual action may be insignificant, the
aggregate of combined action may impede China’s
growth which in turn question’s strategic stability of
dispensation.
The parallels with the rise and fall of Germany is
complete when it is noted that China’s Defence White
Paper of April 2013 underscores the will to expand
offensive military capability in pace with economic
growth. Internationally, this can only be viewed as
acutely threatening. The delusion that menaced States
will not align to contend and defy China’s grand design
is a strategically misleading notion.
and unilateral intervention which in turn evokes
anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic
milieu. The paradoxical effect is to undermine its own
strategic standing.
Historical Similitude
The Franco-German War of 1870 forms a watershed in
strategic thought. After the annexation of the North
German Confederacy in 1866, Bismarck sought the
Southern German States. He deceived the French into
believing that a Prussian Prince would rule from the
throne of Spain as a larger strategy of encirclement. By
July 1870, France was conned into a seemingly
‘inevitable’ war. Germany through superior military craft
and technology inflicted a crushing defeat on the host.
In the process the balance of power in Europe was
upset. The War, from deception, to alliances,
provocation of crisis and defeat of the enemy forcing a
one-sided negotiation could well have been scripted by
Kautilya or, more significant to this narrative, Sun Tzu.
German victory ushered a strategic orientation to
compete with the principal imperial power, Britain. Three
strategic objectives swayed the rivalry: military
dominance over land and sea; global economic and
technological ascendancy in tandem with unimpeded
access to primary resources; and thirdly, diplomatic and
political pre-eminence. By 1890, Germany had
established continental military dominance and a
warship-build programme that would challenge British
command of the seas. Economically, Germany had
already overtaken Britain in heavy industries and
innovation, capturing global markets and amassing
capital. This in turn muscled influence and superiority in
one sector after another.
A thirty-year projection in 1890 suggested that
Germany, home to the most advanced industries having
unimpeded access to resources of the earth, best
universities, richest banks and a balanced society,
would achieve her strategic goals and primacy. Yet
precisely thirty years later, Germany lay in ruins, her
economy in shambles, her people impoverished and her
society fragmented. By 1920, her great power
aspirations lay shamed between the pages of the Treaty
of Versailles. The real lesson was that Germany’s quest
for comprehensive power brought about a
transformation amongst the status-quo powers to align
against, despite traditional hostility (Britain and France;
Britain and Russia) to contain and defeat a rising
Germany that sought to upset the existing global order.
China in Perspective
Historical analogies are notorious in their inability to
stage encores, yet they serve as means to understand
the present.
Contemporary fears of nations are driven by four vital
traumas: perpetuation of the State; impact of internal
and external stresses; reconciliation with the
international system; lastly, the conundrum of whether
military power produces political outcomes. The
paradigm of the day is ‘uncertainty’ with the tensions of
multi-polarity, tyranny of economics, anarchy of
expectations and polarisation along religio-cultural lines
all compacted by globalisation.
If globalisation is a leveller to the rest of the world, to
China, globalisation is about State capitalism, central
supremacy, controlled markets, managed currency and
hegemony. The military was to resolve fundamental
contradictions that threatened the Chinese State.
Significantly, globalisation provided the opportunity to
alter the status-quo. Against this backdrop is the
politics of competitive resource access and denial,
which rationalised the use of force. It is in this
perspective that the rise of China must be gauged.
China’s dazzling growth is set to overtake the US. Its
rise has been accompanied by ambitions of global
leadership. This has in turn spurred an unparalleled
military growth. In this circumstance the race to garner
resources by other major economies is fraught. But the
real alarm is that China seeks to dominate international
institutions without bringing about a change of her own
morphology. China’s claims on the South and East
China Sea; handling of internal dissent; proliferatory
carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases in
point.
The emergence of China from its defensive maritime
perimeters into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming
‘Third Security Chain’. Gone is Deng’s ‘power
bashfulness’; in its place is the conviction that the-
world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world. Its
insistence on a bilateral policy to settle disputes even
denies the natural impulse of threatened States to seek
power balance in collective security.
The Sense in Cooperative Security Strategies
The standpoint that provocation and intimidation can
benefit China by persuading the victim to negotiate
outstanding issues from a conciliatory position is a
strategically mistaken one. India, Japan, Vietnam and
the South China Sea Littorals have demonstrated so.
Far from acquiescing they have chosen to resist,
adopting (in trend) a cooperative security strategy. This
includes deliberate negative response to favour Chinese
economic monopoly even when the benefits are obvious.
While individual action may be insignificant, the
aggregate of combined action may impede China’s
growth which in turn question’s strategic stability of
dispensation.
The parallels with the rise and fall of Germany is
complete when it is noted that China’s Defence White
Paper of April 2013 underscores the will to expand
offensive military capability in pace with economic
growth. Internationally, this can only be viewed as
acutely threatening. The delusion that menaced States
will not align to contend and defy China’s grand design
is a strategically misleading notion.
THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE IN ASIA PACIFIC
President Obama’s West Point speech in 2014 reflected
a qualified fatigue with internationalist causes. The
recent Chinese comment on North Korean threats about
an impending test had an interesting term in cautioning
its difficult but important neighbour: that there is no
justification for a new nuclear test and that North Korea
should not do it. It implies some kind of acceptance of
the status quo. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ye
during his Seoul visit continued to press for all in the six
party talks to persevere peacefully towards a
denuclearised peninsula. Visits and parleys among key
members of the six nations, with a focus on North
Korea, including Japan and North Korea, indicate
chances of a reactivation of the process. Meanwhile,
Russian anger against US and the G7 is being cited as
reason for Moscow’s new look at expanding relations
with Pyongyang. Russian support has expanded over
the past one year and particularly since the onset of the
crisis in Ukraine.
Russia has waved huge loans (US$10 billion) owed by
North Korea since the Soviet times and has offered US
$1 billion for a trans-Siberian railway project through
North to South Korea, received North Korean president
at the Sochi winter Olympics and sent a ministerial
delegation on a visit to Pyongyang to sign up on
important economic and trade cooperation. This
refashioning of ties between the Cold War allies might
add heft to Pyongyang’s hard stance for resumption of
the six party talks without preconditions. The G7
brandishing to Putin more sanctions for Russian actions
in Ukraine may have the effect of diminishing Russian
interest in tighter sanctions on North Korea. As for
Japan, a distinct possibility of Prime Minister Abe
making a visit to North Korea is being seen in the
announcement in the Diet by his foreign minister about
an upcoming official visit. Some headway has been
made in a meeting in Sweden in the direction of the
return of the Japanese kidnapped in North Korea and
Japan’s provision in turn for food supplies. This may
also be helpful to resume the six party talks.
The growing tensions in Southeast and East Asia
between China on one side and Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines on the other are giving rise to new ways to
deal with China, but possibly without disturbing the
existing non-weapon status of the highly developed
Japanese and South Korean nuclear enterprises. The so
called break out fears, much talked about in the context
of Iran, do not come to fore because of the impeccable
record of Seoul and Tokyo with the IAEA. However,
China has begun to raise questions about the high
plutonium holdings of Japan. The reason advanced by
Japan, namely, plutonium to meet fuel requirements for
its breeder programme, may be less credible in the wake
of Fukushima-induced anti-nuclear sentiment. As for
Seoul, it appears inclined to try non-nuclear options like
building its own ground-based mid-course missile
defence to cope with nuclear threats from the North,
instead of contemplating any deterrent route.
Within US too there are the long-held views being
reinforced by profound thinking that foresees far more
problems for strategic stability in case new allies
develop their own deterrent. Hence the reinforcing of US
rebalancing and commitment to the Asia-Pacific allies
as witnessed in the annual Shangri-La dialogue in
Singapore in end-May 2014. US Defense Secretary Hagel
was so candid in voicing concern about China’s
threatening actions in the South China Sea that the
Chinese reacted equally forcefully and virtually told
Hagel to lay off.
These are the facets of diverse approaches for the
management of the second nuclear age in the Asia-
Pacific and do not provide much reassurance. The latest
Pentagon reports show that China is underreporting its
defence expenditure by 20 per cent and suggest that the
correct annual figure should be US$145 billion, almost
four times that of India and ahead of Japan. China’s air
force is said to be growing at an alarming rate,
including with development of advanced drones and
testing of hypersonic missiles, which when combined
with earlier stories about its SSBNs and improvements
in its strategic forces, send unmistakable messages
about where China is headed. The recent US Justice
Department’s charges against Chinese generals about
cyber attacks against US businesses and China’s strong
reaction and counter-charges against the US
demonstrate an escalation of the Cold War-like rhetoric
in Asia.
Putin’s closeness to China as reflected in the conclusion
of a US$400 billion, thirty year, gas deal and a host of
others including about defence procurements as well as
Russian-Chinese joint veto in the UN Security Council
are indications of emerging new configurations in
geopolitics. These will call in to question what was
suggested even as recently as 2012 by the Yale
Professor Paul Bracken about an abiding common
interest of the existing great powers in managing the
second nuclear age (ie the age when new proliferating
States emerge). If anything, China and Russia appear to
be set to devising ways to mount a concerted challenge
to what the Chinese openly call US hegemony.
This is the short take from the dynamic that is evolving
in Asia. The news story about Russian arms to Pakistan
in this setting should raise Delhi’s heckles – the new
fangled diplomacy of Kerry and Hagel to woo Pakistan
(propensity of US think-tanks to reward Pakistan with a
nuclear deal), Russia’s indulgence, and China’s all-
weather friendship firmly backing its trusted ally
compounds the strategic scenario for India. A perceptive
remark by a former Indian Ambassador to Russia is
poignant to the US-India situation: “The US has been
looking to cooperate with an India that is strong enough
to be a balancer of China but (should not be strong)
enough to cause concern to Pakistan.” Talking of
paradoxes, the US is not alone. China’s position for
continued peaceful engagement and diplomacy about
North Korea, and its consistent reluctance to put
Pakistan or its terror outfits on the spot is in contrast
with the increasing severity with which it reacts to
Japan and bristles over outsiders counsel on maritime
disputes with Japan and in the South China Sea.
China has generally refused dialogue with India as a
nuclear weapon state invoking what it called the
international mainstream (eg NPT) whereas on Japan
and South China Sea it rejects anything that differs from
its own national hard line regardless of the weight of
international mainstream, eg, UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas, freedom of navigation and security of the
sea lanes.
In short, rules are less and less likely to govern the
evolving uncertainties in Asia except the inherent
strength and might of nations, or a concert thereof,
backing whoever takes a stand. This is the setting for
the first high level Sino-Indian diplomatic engagement
which begins over this weekend. As a special envoy of
Chinese president Xi, Foreign Minister Wang Ye is set to
meet the new government in Delhi with a message
comprising all the right and reassuring points.
a qualified fatigue with internationalist causes. The
recent Chinese comment on North Korean threats about
an impending test had an interesting term in cautioning
its difficult but important neighbour: that there is no
justification for a new nuclear test and that North Korea
should not do it. It implies some kind of acceptance of
the status quo. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ye
during his Seoul visit continued to press for all in the six
party talks to persevere peacefully towards a
denuclearised peninsula. Visits and parleys among key
members of the six nations, with a focus on North
Korea, including Japan and North Korea, indicate
chances of a reactivation of the process. Meanwhile,
Russian anger against US and the G7 is being cited as
reason for Moscow’s new look at expanding relations
with Pyongyang. Russian support has expanded over
the past one year and particularly since the onset of the
crisis in Ukraine.
Russia has waved huge loans (US$10 billion) owed by
North Korea since the Soviet times and has offered US
$1 billion for a trans-Siberian railway project through
North to South Korea, received North Korean president
at the Sochi winter Olympics and sent a ministerial
delegation on a visit to Pyongyang to sign up on
important economic and trade cooperation. This
refashioning of ties between the Cold War allies might
add heft to Pyongyang’s hard stance for resumption of
the six party talks without preconditions. The G7
brandishing to Putin more sanctions for Russian actions
in Ukraine may have the effect of diminishing Russian
interest in tighter sanctions on North Korea. As for
Japan, a distinct possibility of Prime Minister Abe
making a visit to North Korea is being seen in the
announcement in the Diet by his foreign minister about
an upcoming official visit. Some headway has been
made in a meeting in Sweden in the direction of the
return of the Japanese kidnapped in North Korea and
Japan’s provision in turn for food supplies. This may
also be helpful to resume the six party talks.
The growing tensions in Southeast and East Asia
between China on one side and Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines on the other are giving rise to new ways to
deal with China, but possibly without disturbing the
existing non-weapon status of the highly developed
Japanese and South Korean nuclear enterprises. The so
called break out fears, much talked about in the context
of Iran, do not come to fore because of the impeccable
record of Seoul and Tokyo with the IAEA. However,
China has begun to raise questions about the high
plutonium holdings of Japan. The reason advanced by
Japan, namely, plutonium to meet fuel requirements for
its breeder programme, may be less credible in the wake
of Fukushima-induced anti-nuclear sentiment. As for
Seoul, it appears inclined to try non-nuclear options like
building its own ground-based mid-course missile
defence to cope with nuclear threats from the North,
instead of contemplating any deterrent route.
Within US too there are the long-held views being
reinforced by profound thinking that foresees far more
problems for strategic stability in case new allies
develop their own deterrent. Hence the reinforcing of US
rebalancing and commitment to the Asia-Pacific allies
as witnessed in the annual Shangri-La dialogue in
Singapore in end-May 2014. US Defense Secretary Hagel
was so candid in voicing concern about China’s
threatening actions in the South China Sea that the
Chinese reacted equally forcefully and virtually told
Hagel to lay off.
These are the facets of diverse approaches for the
management of the second nuclear age in the Asia-
Pacific and do not provide much reassurance. The latest
Pentagon reports show that China is underreporting its
defence expenditure by 20 per cent and suggest that the
correct annual figure should be US$145 billion, almost
four times that of India and ahead of Japan. China’s air
force is said to be growing at an alarming rate,
including with development of advanced drones and
testing of hypersonic missiles, which when combined
with earlier stories about its SSBNs and improvements
in its strategic forces, send unmistakable messages
about where China is headed. The recent US Justice
Department’s charges against Chinese generals about
cyber attacks against US businesses and China’s strong
reaction and counter-charges against the US
demonstrate an escalation of the Cold War-like rhetoric
in Asia.
Putin’s closeness to China as reflected in the conclusion
of a US$400 billion, thirty year, gas deal and a host of
others including about defence procurements as well as
Russian-Chinese joint veto in the UN Security Council
are indications of emerging new configurations in
geopolitics. These will call in to question what was
suggested even as recently as 2012 by the Yale
Professor Paul Bracken about an abiding common
interest of the existing great powers in managing the
second nuclear age (ie the age when new proliferating
States emerge). If anything, China and Russia appear to
be set to devising ways to mount a concerted challenge
to what the Chinese openly call US hegemony.
This is the short take from the dynamic that is evolving
in Asia. The news story about Russian arms to Pakistan
in this setting should raise Delhi’s heckles – the new
fangled diplomacy of Kerry and Hagel to woo Pakistan
(propensity of US think-tanks to reward Pakistan with a
nuclear deal), Russia’s indulgence, and China’s all-
weather friendship firmly backing its trusted ally
compounds the strategic scenario for India. A perceptive
remark by a former Indian Ambassador to Russia is
poignant to the US-India situation: “The US has been
looking to cooperate with an India that is strong enough
to be a balancer of China but (should not be strong)
enough to cause concern to Pakistan.” Talking of
paradoxes, the US is not alone. China’s position for
continued peaceful engagement and diplomacy about
North Korea, and its consistent reluctance to put
Pakistan or its terror outfits on the spot is in contrast
with the increasing severity with which it reacts to
Japan and bristles over outsiders counsel on maritime
disputes with Japan and in the South China Sea.
China has generally refused dialogue with India as a
nuclear weapon state invoking what it called the
international mainstream (eg NPT) whereas on Japan
and South China Sea it rejects anything that differs from
its own national hard line regardless of the weight of
international mainstream, eg, UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas, freedom of navigation and security of the
sea lanes.
In short, rules are less and less likely to govern the
evolving uncertainties in Asia except the inherent
strength and might of nations, or a concert thereof,
backing whoever takes a stand. This is the setting for
the first high level Sino-Indian diplomatic engagement
which begins over this weekend. As a special envoy of
Chinese president Xi, Foreign Minister Wang Ye is set to
meet the new government in Delhi with a message
comprising all the right and reassuring points.
OBAMA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
The foreign policy community’s anxious wait to hear US
President Barack Obama make his foreign policy speech
at the West Point Military Academy finally came to an
end on 28 May, 2014. In his commencement address to
the graduating military officers, President Obama
outlined his foreign policy views and approaches that
stunned some analysts, and pleased many ruling elites
abroad.
Some saw a new foreign policy approach in the US
president’s speech, but those who keenly follow US
foreign policy, saw very little in the content that could
be described as new.
What was striking in the presidential address was
Obama’s strong articulation of liberal institutionalism at
a time when the potential military and economic rivals
of the US are busy flexing their muscles in parts of
Europe and Asia.
Highlighting the importance of observing international
norms and rules, President Obama said, “American
influence is always stronger when we lead by example.
We cannot exempt ourselves from the rules that apply
to everyone else.... What makes us exceptional is not
our ability to flout international norms and the rule of
law; it’s our willingness to affirm them through our
actions.”
The decision to affirm the importance of international
law, norms and institutions by a US president in the
backdrop of one military intervention every 17 months
between 1991 and 2001 is certainly a refreshing
development to believers in multilateralism. Obama
chided “a lot of sceptics who downplay the effectiveness
of multilateral action,” and said, “working through
international institutions, like the U.N. or respecting
international law” was not a sign of “weakness.”
While many would contest his own approach to the UN
in executing his war against terror in Afghanistan by
use of Drones, championing liberal institutionalism at a
time of planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
is understandable.
President Obama, moreover, has shown utmost restraint
in dealing with difficult situations, such as the ones in
Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
Chinese occupations of islands and atolls in South
China Sea. His difficulty in handling violence and
lawlessness in Iraq post the US withdrawal; in Egypt
after the Arab Spring; and in Libya after the overthrow
of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s regime gives ample reason
to sing the praise of liberal approach to international
politics as opposed to the neoconservative penchant for
frequent use of military and coercive diplomacy in
dealing with international crises.
Obama coded his policy of using soft power instead of
military means in this address by saying, “...U.S.
military action cannot be the only, or even primary,
component of our leadership in every instance. Just
because we have the best hammer does not mean that
every problem is a nail.”
Advocates multilateralism would certainly draw
inspiration from Obama’s liberal approach to world
affairs, but it is important note the traditional US foreign
policy approach, cutting across the political divide that
wasn’t missing in Obama’s speech. He made it loud
and clear: “Let me repeat a principle.... The United
States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when our core interests demand it.” And the US will
obviously determine what that “core interests” would
be. Does it mean his advocacy of liberalism is mere
opportunism?
In any case, Obama has come under fire from many
critics who say his foreign policy is just a “hedging
strategy” and devoid of any “grand strategy.” Many
Republicans and some Democrats have criticised his
foreign policy as “global retrenchment” of the US that
has shaken the confidence of allies and pleased the
adversaries.
Some have lamented that he said little about meeting
the emerging Russian challenge in Europe and the
Chinese effort to dominate Asia. Newspaper editorials in
the US carried no praise for Obama’s new foreign
policy. Lawmakers in the US too remained unhappy.
One Senator made a caustic remark on Obama’s
speech: “The President’s speech was just another great
example of his disastrous foreign policy. The reset and
the pivots have all failed. All you have to do is look at
Syria, Iran, Libya, Ukraine, or the South China Sea to
see where this foreign policy gets us in the world.”
President Obama has approximately one and a half
years before he leaves the White House. Many citizens
of the US were expecting the president to spell out his
foreign policy plans in coming months, but failed to get
any satisfaction from the West Point speech. The rest of
the world always carefully listens when an US president
speaks.
The fact that there was hardly any adverse reaction to
his speech from the rest of the world signals that
Obama was actually speaking to his own people at
West Point. One key new suggestion that needs more
clarification is his proposal to set up $5billion worth
structure to combat terrorism with willing partners
around the world.
President Barack Obama make his foreign policy speech
at the West Point Military Academy finally came to an
end on 28 May, 2014. In his commencement address to
the graduating military officers, President Obama
outlined his foreign policy views and approaches that
stunned some analysts, and pleased many ruling elites
abroad.
Some saw a new foreign policy approach in the US
president’s speech, but those who keenly follow US
foreign policy, saw very little in the content that could
be described as new.
What was striking in the presidential address was
Obama’s strong articulation of liberal institutionalism at
a time when the potential military and economic rivals
of the US are busy flexing their muscles in parts of
Europe and Asia.
Highlighting the importance of observing international
norms and rules, President Obama said, “American
influence is always stronger when we lead by example.
We cannot exempt ourselves from the rules that apply
to everyone else.... What makes us exceptional is not
our ability to flout international norms and the rule of
law; it’s our willingness to affirm them through our
actions.”
The decision to affirm the importance of international
law, norms and institutions by a US president in the
backdrop of one military intervention every 17 months
between 1991 and 2001 is certainly a refreshing
development to believers in multilateralism. Obama
chided “a lot of sceptics who downplay the effectiveness
of multilateral action,” and said, “working through
international institutions, like the U.N. or respecting
international law” was not a sign of “weakness.”
While many would contest his own approach to the UN
in executing his war against terror in Afghanistan by
use of Drones, championing liberal institutionalism at a
time of planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
is understandable.
President Obama, moreover, has shown utmost restraint
in dealing with difficult situations, such as the ones in
Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
Chinese occupations of islands and atolls in South
China Sea. His difficulty in handling violence and
lawlessness in Iraq post the US withdrawal; in Egypt
after the Arab Spring; and in Libya after the overthrow
of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s regime gives ample reason
to sing the praise of liberal approach to international
politics as opposed to the neoconservative penchant for
frequent use of military and coercive diplomacy in
dealing with international crises.
Obama coded his policy of using soft power instead of
military means in this address by saying, “...U.S.
military action cannot be the only, or even primary,
component of our leadership in every instance. Just
because we have the best hammer does not mean that
every problem is a nail.”
Advocates multilateralism would certainly draw
inspiration from Obama’s liberal approach to world
affairs, but it is important note the traditional US foreign
policy approach, cutting across the political divide that
wasn’t missing in Obama’s speech. He made it loud
and clear: “Let me repeat a principle.... The United
States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when our core interests demand it.” And the US will
obviously determine what that “core interests” would
be. Does it mean his advocacy of liberalism is mere
opportunism?
In any case, Obama has come under fire from many
critics who say his foreign policy is just a “hedging
strategy” and devoid of any “grand strategy.” Many
Republicans and some Democrats have criticised his
foreign policy as “global retrenchment” of the US that
has shaken the confidence of allies and pleased the
adversaries.
Some have lamented that he said little about meeting
the emerging Russian challenge in Europe and the
Chinese effort to dominate Asia. Newspaper editorials in
the US carried no praise for Obama’s new foreign
policy. Lawmakers in the US too remained unhappy.
One Senator made a caustic remark on Obama’s
speech: “The President’s speech was just another great
example of his disastrous foreign policy. The reset and
the pivots have all failed. All you have to do is look at
Syria, Iran, Libya, Ukraine, or the South China Sea to
see where this foreign policy gets us in the world.”
President Obama has approximately one and a half
years before he leaves the White House. Many citizens
of the US were expecting the president to spell out his
foreign policy plans in coming months, but failed to get
any satisfaction from the West Point speech. The rest of
the world always carefully listens when an US president
speaks.
The fact that there was hardly any adverse reaction to
his speech from the rest of the world signals that
Obama was actually speaking to his own people at
West Point. One key new suggestion that needs more
clarification is his proposal to set up $5billion worth
structure to combat terrorism with willing partners
around the world.
8 Jun 2014
SYRIA TODAY: IS REGIME CHANGE THE ANSWER?
There are three aspects of the Syrian imbroglio: First,
what was originally a political struggle has become a
progressively more devastating civil war. Second, those
fighting against the Assad regime have fragmented into
several distinct and contending elements - the Western
and Gulf countries’ backed Syrian National Coalition,
now the weakest of the opposition groups in terms of
fighting ability; a large array of Islamist groups, many
armed and funded by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
significant numbers of whom have come together under
two different Islamist fronts; the Nabhat Al Nusrah, an
effective fighting unit largely composed of Syrians but
an affiliate of Al Qaeda; and, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), an Al Qaeda outfit, consisting
mainly of Iraqis, the most extremist, brutal and effective
fighting unit, whose agenda goes much beyond the mere
removal of Assad and is the establishment of a
fundamentalist Islamist Emirate. The involvement of so
many different groups makes the possibility of any
solution very difficult. Third, the active involvement of
foreign countries – France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, UK and the US; this has led directly to
Syria getting to the point where it is now. The
enormous complexity of the situation should be self
evident.
Those advocating regime change need to seriously
ponder over the fact that that the internal situation
today in both Iraq and Libya is far worse than it was
when Saddam and Gaddhafi were in power. Intrusive
military interventions by foreign countries in Libya and
Iraq are not examples to be emulated but shunned.
Indeed, externally encouraged efforts towards regime
change in Arab countries must stop forthwith. Given the
current ground realities in Syria and its diverse ethnic
and sectarian makeup, regime change in Syria could
lead to a much worse outcome than in those two
countries, even the breakup of the country with deeply
destabilizing consequences for the Levant as a whole.
In the past year Assad has regained a lot of lost ground.
All other opposition rebels are now spending greater
effort fighting the ISIL considering it a more detestable
and dangerous enemy than the Assad regime. The very
recent Turkish air strike on a convoy of the ISIL and
Premier Erdogan’s visit to Iran suggest that Turkey is
rethinking its policy in Syria. There is increasing
reluctance of Western countries’ to aid rebels fearing
that arms will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
Thus, Assad is much stronger today vis-a-vis both his
domestic and international adversaries than in June
2012 when the first Geneva conference “agreed on
guidelines and principles for a political transition that
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”. It
is now increasingly highly unlikely that Assad can be
defeated on the battleground. Therefore, he is hardly
likely to agree to his handing over power in a conference
room. Pursuing regime change now is a no brainer.
Humanitarian issues such as ensuring that aid should
reach the millions in dire distress and urgently attending
to the desperate conditions of the 4 million plus
internally displaced should be accorded top priority. The
second priority must be addressing the growing violence
much of which, for all practical purposes, has now
morphed into pure terrorism. Geneva II can be said to
represent the beginning of a peace process and an
encouraging sign is agreement that the next meeting
will be held starting Feb 10th.
Another hopeful feature of Geneva II was, in the words
of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, “there is of course
agreement (amongst the fighting entities) that terrorism
…is a very serious problem inside Syria but there's no
agreement on how to deal with it”. Another good omen
is that both sides of internal Syrian conflict observed a
minutes silence together to remember those killed. Now
that a door has been opened, the warring parties within
Syria need to pursue these two issues on a priority
basis. However, the boycott of hard line extremists
suggests that in the unlikely event of any agreement, its
implementation would be sabotaged. This is a risk that
will have to be taken and should not become an excuse
for no action.
Iran was not represented even though the UN Secretary
General had invited it; the invite had to be withdrawn
due to strong US opposition. Iran commands the
greatest influence with Assad; Iran and Russia acting in
tandem are the only two countries that can persuade
Assad to make meaningful compromises. Iran’s
participation therefore is absolutely vital to the success
of any conference on Syria.
An agreement amongst the main players – the patrons
of the different contending parties within Syria: the P- 5,
EU, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - on a common
approach is a prerequisite. Therefore a separate
conference involving them should be held soonest
possible complementing a resumption of the Geneva II
talks on February 10. A priority subject should be taking
on the ISIL and similar extremist groups head on.
what was originally a political struggle has become a
progressively more devastating civil war. Second, those
fighting against the Assad regime have fragmented into
several distinct and contending elements - the Western
and Gulf countries’ backed Syrian National Coalition,
now the weakest of the opposition groups in terms of
fighting ability; a large array of Islamist groups, many
armed and funded by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
significant numbers of whom have come together under
two different Islamist fronts; the Nabhat Al Nusrah, an
effective fighting unit largely composed of Syrians but
an affiliate of Al Qaeda; and, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), an Al Qaeda outfit, consisting
mainly of Iraqis, the most extremist, brutal and effective
fighting unit, whose agenda goes much beyond the mere
removal of Assad and is the establishment of a
fundamentalist Islamist Emirate. The involvement of so
many different groups makes the possibility of any
solution very difficult. Third, the active involvement of
foreign countries – France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, UK and the US; this has led directly to
Syria getting to the point where it is now. The
enormous complexity of the situation should be self
evident.
Those advocating regime change need to seriously
ponder over the fact that that the internal situation
today in both Iraq and Libya is far worse than it was
when Saddam and Gaddhafi were in power. Intrusive
military interventions by foreign countries in Libya and
Iraq are not examples to be emulated but shunned.
Indeed, externally encouraged efforts towards regime
change in Arab countries must stop forthwith. Given the
current ground realities in Syria and its diverse ethnic
and sectarian makeup, regime change in Syria could
lead to a much worse outcome than in those two
countries, even the breakup of the country with deeply
destabilizing consequences for the Levant as a whole.
In the past year Assad has regained a lot of lost ground.
All other opposition rebels are now spending greater
effort fighting the ISIL considering it a more detestable
and dangerous enemy than the Assad regime. The very
recent Turkish air strike on a convoy of the ISIL and
Premier Erdogan’s visit to Iran suggest that Turkey is
rethinking its policy in Syria. There is increasing
reluctance of Western countries’ to aid rebels fearing
that arms will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
Thus, Assad is much stronger today vis-a-vis both his
domestic and international adversaries than in June
2012 when the first Geneva conference “agreed on
guidelines and principles for a political transition that
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”. It
is now increasingly highly unlikely that Assad can be
defeated on the battleground. Therefore, he is hardly
likely to agree to his handing over power in a conference
room. Pursuing regime change now is a no brainer.
Humanitarian issues such as ensuring that aid should
reach the millions in dire distress and urgently attending
to the desperate conditions of the 4 million plus
internally displaced should be accorded top priority. The
second priority must be addressing the growing violence
much of which, for all practical purposes, has now
morphed into pure terrorism. Geneva II can be said to
represent the beginning of a peace process and an
encouraging sign is agreement that the next meeting
will be held starting Feb 10th.
Another hopeful feature of Geneva II was, in the words
of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, “there is of course
agreement (amongst the fighting entities) that terrorism
…is a very serious problem inside Syria but there's no
agreement on how to deal with it”. Another good omen
is that both sides of internal Syrian conflict observed a
minutes silence together to remember those killed. Now
that a door has been opened, the warring parties within
Syria need to pursue these two issues on a priority
basis. However, the boycott of hard line extremists
suggests that in the unlikely event of any agreement, its
implementation would be sabotaged. This is a risk that
will have to be taken and should not become an excuse
for no action.
Iran was not represented even though the UN Secretary
General had invited it; the invite had to be withdrawn
due to strong US opposition. Iran commands the
greatest influence with Assad; Iran and Russia acting in
tandem are the only two countries that can persuade
Assad to make meaningful compromises. Iran’s
participation therefore is absolutely vital to the success
of any conference on Syria.
An agreement amongst the main players – the patrons
of the different contending parties within Syria: the P- 5,
EU, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - on a common
approach is a prerequisite. Therefore a separate
conference involving them should be held soonest
possible complementing a resumption of the Geneva II
talks on February 10. A priority subject should be taking
on the ISIL and similar extremist groups head on.
SAUDI ARABIA -US ESTRANGEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA SUBCONTINENT
The Arab Spring strongly compounded Saudi Arabia’s
progressively increasing disillusionment with the US
when, to its utter consternation and deep anger, the US
failed to prevent the overthrow of Mubarak, a faithful
ally for more than three decades. US criticism of Gen Al
Sissi’s overthrowing of the Muslim Brotherhood
government of President Morsy and cutting off economic
and military assistance added fuel to the fire.
The West’s holding back of arms supplies to rebels
fighting against the Assad regime in Syria and the US
decision not to take military action against it for
breaching a publicly announced red-line, the use of
chemical weapons, added to Saudi Arabia’s growing
anger. After these disappointments, the sudden opening
of negotiations on the nuclear issue with Iran, the
rapidity with which an interim agreement was reached
and the continuing pursuit of a thaw in relations with
Iran represent in Saudi eyes a willful disregard of its
security concerns and sensitivities. Saudi Arabia has
maintained that no agreement will constrain the nuclear
programme and Iran would still be able to make the
bomb very quickly should it finally decide to do so.
From 2009, Saudi Arabia started sending signals from
the King downwards and has more than once since then
stated publicly that in the event Iran acquires the
capability to make nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will
do so also.
Pakistan-Iran relations have been witnessing a serious
downturn in the past few months – Iran has threatened
military intervention to secure the release of its security
personnel and in the context of the continuing killing of
Shias; Iran has cancelled the much flaunted gas pipeline,
etc. A flurry of exchange of visits between Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia are coincidentally taking place during this
downturn. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud’s sudden
visit to Pakistan in January 2014 followed very soon
thereafter by the new Pakistani Army Chief’s visit to
Saudi Arabia and now Prince Salman choosing Pakistan
as the first country to visit after becoming Crown Prince
and Defence Minister has prompted a lot of speculative
commentary in the Western strategic community. Those
who closely follow Saudi Arabia’s relations with South
Asia believe that the Saudi Arabia-funded Pakistani
nuclear programme and payback time may be
approaching. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan was
given privileged and complete access to Pakistani
nuclear installations in 1999 (and again in 2002) and
soon thereafter Dr AQ Khan visited Saudi Arabia. US
experts such as Bruce Reidel and Gary Saymore, who
should know, say that a secret and long-standing
agreement exists that Pakistan would provide the
Kingdom with nuclear technology and weapons should
Saudi Arabia feel threatened by a third party nuclear
programme. This would inevitably invite strong
reactions from the US and Iran and would also almost
surely evoke strong opposition from China which would
not want to jeopardise its overarching relationship with
the US for an issue far removed from its core national
interests. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have strongly
denied any such intention and also reports that
Pakistan will, at Saudi request, be supplying
sophisticated weapons to rebels in Syria – this would
greatly anger Iran but will hardly make a difference in
Syria. However, both these contingencies are unlikely to
happen.
It is far more likely that these visits are in the context
of the domestic situation in Saudi Arabia. These are
delicate and sensitive times in Saudi Arabia – Crown
Prince Sultan and Crown Prince Nayef passed away in
quick succession in October 2011 and June 2012
respectively; the King is in his mid-nineties and his
health is fragile; Crown Prince Salman’s health is not
particularly robust; Saudi Arabia is approaching
uncharted territory in relation to the succession to the
throne. Massive unemployment, the popular appeal of
the Arab Spring, Sunni Islamic extremism, Shia
restiveness particularly in the oil-rich eastern provinces,
are factors that present serious putative security
concerns. Given the one-of-its-kind rather unique
Saudi-Pakistan relationship, assertively Sunni Pakistan
may be the perfect security partner to help meet internal
threats. Western security partners cannot be used while
Arabs will always be more problematic and risky.
Crown Prince Salman also paid a highly satisfying
three-day visit to India during which an MoU on defence
cooperation was amongst agreements signed which
build upon the relationship spelt out in the Delhi
Declaration of 2006 and the Riyadh Declaration of 2010,
both landmark, path-breaking documents signed
personally by King Abdullah with the Indian Prime
Minister. These established a wide-ranging strategic
partnership. An Indian defence minister had paid a first-
ever visit to Saudi Arabia in 2012. In contrast to
Pakistan, the interaction with India is in the context of
tentative beginnings of a potential reorientation of Saudi
foreign policy to move away from complete and total
dependence on the US. Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi
Foreign Minister, had given a thought provoking speech
in Manama, Bahrain, on 5 December 2004. The subject
was ‘Towards a New Framework for Regional Security’.
He said, inter alia, that "the international component of
the suggested Gulf security framework should engage
positively the emerging Asian powers as well, especially
China and India." Since then, this theme is increasingly
reiterated by leading Saudi personalities.
progressively increasing disillusionment with the US
when, to its utter consternation and deep anger, the US
failed to prevent the overthrow of Mubarak, a faithful
ally for more than three decades. US criticism of Gen Al
Sissi’s overthrowing of the Muslim Brotherhood
government of President Morsy and cutting off economic
and military assistance added fuel to the fire.
The West’s holding back of arms supplies to rebels
fighting against the Assad regime in Syria and the US
decision not to take military action against it for
breaching a publicly announced red-line, the use of
chemical weapons, added to Saudi Arabia’s growing
anger. After these disappointments, the sudden opening
of negotiations on the nuclear issue with Iran, the
rapidity with which an interim agreement was reached
and the continuing pursuit of a thaw in relations with
Iran represent in Saudi eyes a willful disregard of its
security concerns and sensitivities. Saudi Arabia has
maintained that no agreement will constrain the nuclear
programme and Iran would still be able to make the
bomb very quickly should it finally decide to do so.
From 2009, Saudi Arabia started sending signals from
the King downwards and has more than once since then
stated publicly that in the event Iran acquires the
capability to make nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will
do so also.
Pakistan-Iran relations have been witnessing a serious
downturn in the past few months – Iran has threatened
military intervention to secure the release of its security
personnel and in the context of the continuing killing of
Shias; Iran has cancelled the much flaunted gas pipeline,
etc. A flurry of exchange of visits between Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia are coincidentally taking place during this
downturn. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud’s sudden
visit to Pakistan in January 2014 followed very soon
thereafter by the new Pakistani Army Chief’s visit to
Saudi Arabia and now Prince Salman choosing Pakistan
as the first country to visit after becoming Crown Prince
and Defence Minister has prompted a lot of speculative
commentary in the Western strategic community. Those
who closely follow Saudi Arabia’s relations with South
Asia believe that the Saudi Arabia-funded Pakistani
nuclear programme and payback time may be
approaching. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan was
given privileged and complete access to Pakistani
nuclear installations in 1999 (and again in 2002) and
soon thereafter Dr AQ Khan visited Saudi Arabia. US
experts such as Bruce Reidel and Gary Saymore, who
should know, say that a secret and long-standing
agreement exists that Pakistan would provide the
Kingdom with nuclear technology and weapons should
Saudi Arabia feel threatened by a third party nuclear
programme. This would inevitably invite strong
reactions from the US and Iran and would also almost
surely evoke strong opposition from China which would
not want to jeopardise its overarching relationship with
the US for an issue far removed from its core national
interests. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have strongly
denied any such intention and also reports that
Pakistan will, at Saudi request, be supplying
sophisticated weapons to rebels in Syria – this would
greatly anger Iran but will hardly make a difference in
Syria. However, both these contingencies are unlikely to
happen.
It is far more likely that these visits are in the context
of the domestic situation in Saudi Arabia. These are
delicate and sensitive times in Saudi Arabia – Crown
Prince Sultan and Crown Prince Nayef passed away in
quick succession in October 2011 and June 2012
respectively; the King is in his mid-nineties and his
health is fragile; Crown Prince Salman’s health is not
particularly robust; Saudi Arabia is approaching
uncharted territory in relation to the succession to the
throne. Massive unemployment, the popular appeal of
the Arab Spring, Sunni Islamic extremism, Shia
restiveness particularly in the oil-rich eastern provinces,
are factors that present serious putative security
concerns. Given the one-of-its-kind rather unique
Saudi-Pakistan relationship, assertively Sunni Pakistan
may be the perfect security partner to help meet internal
threats. Western security partners cannot be used while
Arabs will always be more problematic and risky.
Crown Prince Salman also paid a highly satisfying
three-day visit to India during which an MoU on defence
cooperation was amongst agreements signed which
build upon the relationship spelt out in the Delhi
Declaration of 2006 and the Riyadh Declaration of 2010,
both landmark, path-breaking documents signed
personally by King Abdullah with the Indian Prime
Minister. These established a wide-ranging strategic
partnership. An Indian defence minister had paid a first-
ever visit to Saudi Arabia in 2012. In contrast to
Pakistan, the interaction with India is in the context of
tentative beginnings of a potential reorientation of Saudi
foreign policy to move away from complete and total
dependence on the US. Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi
Foreign Minister, had given a thought provoking speech
in Manama, Bahrain, on 5 December 2004. The subject
was ‘Towards a New Framework for Regional Security’.
He said, inter alia, that "the international component of
the suggested Gulf security framework should engage
positively the emerging Asian powers as well, especially
China and India." Since then, this theme is increasingly
reiterated by leading Saudi personalities.
US IN ASIA: A NON-ALIGNMENT STRATEGY?
As territorial and maritime disputes in Asia have sparked
regional cold wars, the United States appears to have
adopted a non-aligned strategy to navigate in troubled
political space of the continent.
George Washington and Non-Alignment
Non-alignment as a diplomatic instrument of state craft
has been known to American Administrations for
centuries. Although the term “non-alignment” was not
used, the need of such a strategy was first articulated
by first President of the United States—George
Washington. In his farewell address, Washington warned
against the folly of getting involved in the European
entanglements.
In order to keep the US out of European quarrels,
controversies and collisions, he pleaded that “Europe
has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or
a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships
or enmities.”
Three centuries later, as the US recognizes the
economic and strategic significance of Asia for its
national interests, it encounters myriad Asian quarrels
and controversies over “sovereignty” issues. Such
disputes are “essentially foreign” to American
“concerns”.
Asia Pacific Today and the American Non-Alignment
Turbulence in the Asia Pacific is discernible in Sino-
Japanese rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The
spat over the islands, islets and reefs in the South China
Sea between China and five other claimants, such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei
threatens to contaminate the cooperative ties of China
with these countries. China-Taiwan conflict remains
unresolved despite a series of confidence building
measures and rising trade and investment ties.
During the Cold War days, Washington shunned the
non-alignment foreign policy championed by India and
many others. But the strategic compulsions and
economic imperatives of the post-Cold War era have
tempted the US policy makers to innovate “non-
alignment” strategy and apply in the mini-Cold Wars of
Asia.
TheUS political support to the idea of creation of a
“Palestinian State” in the post-9/11 incident and
building of pressure on Israel to seriously negotiate
peace; Washington’s policy of making India a “strategic
partner”, while elevating Pakistan’s status as “major
non-NATO ally” during the anti-terror operations in
Afghanistan; constructing a rock-solid economic
partnership with China, while maintaining defence and
security ties with Taiwan; giving lip service to
multilateral dialogue for resolution of South China Sea
disputes, yet conducting joint research with China for oil
exploration in the waters of this sea; refraining from
backing Japanese claim of sovereignty over Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands, but standing by the US-Japan bilateral
alliance treaty are some of the prominent illustrations of
American non-alignment.
It is true that non-alignment emerged out of a bipolar
power structure in the international system. The two
poles, represented by capitalist USA and communist
USSR, made it difficult for a large number of newly
independent countries to take sides in the Cold War. The
enlightened self-interest compelled them to pick out a
stratagem that would enable them to seek cooperation
with both the rival power blocs. The hostility to the idea
of non-alignment by both Washington and Moscow
often posed acute dilemmas for the non-aligned
countries. Since non-alignment was not maintenance of
equidistance from the two poles, non-aligned countries’
stances on various cold war related issues were
sometimes sympathetic to Moscow and sometimes
supportive of Washington. For example, India appeared
to have appreciated the US position on the Suez crisis,
but sympathized with Moscow’s approach to the
Hungarian crisis in 1956.
The United States in the post-Cold War era has no die-
hard adversary. Although there is visible decline of the
US influence in world affairs and relative rise of the
Chinese power, the PRC is no USSR. Up-and-coming
superpower China perceives an emerging new
containment strategy of the established superpower, the
USA.
American strategic community, on the other hand,
senses a Chinese project to push US out of the Asia
Pacific. Such mutual mistrust has, nevertheless, not
sparked a new cold war. Complex economic
interdependence is almost certain to preclude a Sino-US
Cold War, though cold confrontation seems to be
mounting between the two.
China has responded to America’s Asia rebalance
strategy by picking up squabbles with most American
allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and
others. But the non-aligned approach adopted by
Washington has resulted in growing Chinese
assertiveness and dwindling credibility in the US as a
security provider. The Asian allies of the US doubt, if
Washington would protect their interests at the cost of
losing business in China. American non-alignment
makes China fear less and America’s allies doubt more
about the efficacy of alliance treaties.
regional cold wars, the United States appears to have
adopted a non-aligned strategy to navigate in troubled
political space of the continent.
George Washington and Non-Alignment
Non-alignment as a diplomatic instrument of state craft
has been known to American Administrations for
centuries. Although the term “non-alignment” was not
used, the need of such a strategy was first articulated
by first President of the United States—George
Washington. In his farewell address, Washington warned
against the folly of getting involved in the European
entanglements.
In order to keep the US out of European quarrels,
controversies and collisions, he pleaded that “Europe
has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or
a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships
or enmities.”
Three centuries later, as the US recognizes the
economic and strategic significance of Asia for its
national interests, it encounters myriad Asian quarrels
and controversies over “sovereignty” issues. Such
disputes are “essentially foreign” to American
“concerns”.
Asia Pacific Today and the American Non-Alignment
Turbulence in the Asia Pacific is discernible in Sino-
Japanese rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The
spat over the islands, islets and reefs in the South China
Sea between China and five other claimants, such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei
threatens to contaminate the cooperative ties of China
with these countries. China-Taiwan conflict remains
unresolved despite a series of confidence building
measures and rising trade and investment ties.
During the Cold War days, Washington shunned the
non-alignment foreign policy championed by India and
many others. But the strategic compulsions and
economic imperatives of the post-Cold War era have
tempted the US policy makers to innovate “non-
alignment” strategy and apply in the mini-Cold Wars of
Asia.
TheUS political support to the idea of creation of a
“Palestinian State” in the post-9/11 incident and
building of pressure on Israel to seriously negotiate
peace; Washington’s policy of making India a “strategic
partner”, while elevating Pakistan’s status as “major
non-NATO ally” during the anti-terror operations in
Afghanistan; constructing a rock-solid economic
partnership with China, while maintaining defence and
security ties with Taiwan; giving lip service to
multilateral dialogue for resolution of South China Sea
disputes, yet conducting joint research with China for oil
exploration in the waters of this sea; refraining from
backing Japanese claim of sovereignty over Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands, but standing by the US-Japan bilateral
alliance treaty are some of the prominent illustrations of
American non-alignment.
It is true that non-alignment emerged out of a bipolar
power structure in the international system. The two
poles, represented by capitalist USA and communist
USSR, made it difficult for a large number of newly
independent countries to take sides in the Cold War. The
enlightened self-interest compelled them to pick out a
stratagem that would enable them to seek cooperation
with both the rival power blocs. The hostility to the idea
of non-alignment by both Washington and Moscow
often posed acute dilemmas for the non-aligned
countries. Since non-alignment was not maintenance of
equidistance from the two poles, non-aligned countries’
stances on various cold war related issues were
sometimes sympathetic to Moscow and sometimes
supportive of Washington. For example, India appeared
to have appreciated the US position on the Suez crisis,
but sympathized with Moscow’s approach to the
Hungarian crisis in 1956.
The United States in the post-Cold War era has no die-
hard adversary. Although there is visible decline of the
US influence in world affairs and relative rise of the
Chinese power, the PRC is no USSR. Up-and-coming
superpower China perceives an emerging new
containment strategy of the established superpower, the
USA.
American strategic community, on the other hand,
senses a Chinese project to push US out of the Asia
Pacific. Such mutual mistrust has, nevertheless, not
sparked a new cold war. Complex economic
interdependence is almost certain to preclude a Sino-US
Cold War, though cold confrontation seems to be
mounting between the two.
China has responded to America’s Asia rebalance
strategy by picking up squabbles with most American
allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and
others. But the non-aligned approach adopted by
Washington has resulted in growing Chinese
assertiveness and dwindling credibility in the US as a
security provider. The Asian allies of the US doubt, if
Washington would protect their interests at the cost of
losing business in China. American non-alignment
makes China fear less and America’s allies doubt more
about the efficacy of alliance treaties.
ASIA PACIFIC: RESET FOR QUALITATIVE CHANGE
Permeated by many turbulent events in May 2014, East
Asia served as the milieu for events from the coup
d'état in Thailand, to maritime cooperation for the
Indonesia-Vietnam boundary between President Susilo
and the Prime Minister of Vietnam, all on the backdrop
of the World Economic Forum in East Asia in Manila.
Indonesia, the largest Muslim democracy in Southeast
Asia, was at the center stage. During the forum,
outgoing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono received
the Statesmanship Award, and many of his
achievements during his decade of Presidency were
discussed. During his speech, President Susilo made
direct reference to China regarding the East China Sea
emphasising that “…any disputes including maritime
border tension can be resolved peacefully - not with the
use of military might which [may] endanger stability and
peace in our region.”
East Asia, with a population of 600 million, which is
roughly double the size of the US, is planning to build a
US$4.3 trillion economy with a single market in the next
several years. The challenges to achieve these targets,
however, are many. The infrastructure to link many
ASEAN countries is weak, poverty rates are high, and
rates of corruption are staggering. It is important to
move away from the present culture of high corruption,
to a better culture that fosters development of regional
framework to fight corruption. Countries should not
confine to their own boundaries but work
collaboratively. The point of intersection between
countries has to be improved. President Benigno Aquino
in his remarks stated his leadership to introduce good
governance to Philippines to dismantle corruption is
commendable with the improving positive economic
indicators.
In the Eurasian region, a Sino-Russian partnership for
US$400 billion for energy for the next three decades has
been signed, and the sophisticated Russian military
missile system has been given to the Chinese
government. There are signs of China and Russia
moving towards a strategic relationship in the very near
future.
There is now a tripolar world with US, Russia, and China
in the new equation. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to
the South China Sea, disputes with Japan, and the
placement of a Chinese oil rig in Vietnamese waters, are
a few of the events that have raised many eyebrows.
According to geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan, “This is
a region that’s going to be on the boil for years and
years to come. Seas crowded with warships,
submarines, merchant shipping, fifth generation fighter
jets – that can easily create incidents that in turn could
enable a crisis.” In Seoul during his Asia visit, President
Obama said that China “has to abide by certain norms”
when it comes to its quarrels with neighbours. With all
the notable events that have taken place in this part of
the region, the US pivot to Southeast Asia cannot be
negated.
In India, Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) has been sworn in as the new Prime Minister. The
Indian public believes that he can deliver rapid growth
in the country as he did in his 13-year tenure as Chief
Minister of Gujrat. However, India has many internal
challenges to consider first. Nearly half the country’s
households lack basic access to electricity. Modern
infrastructure is underdeveloped. Creation of job
opportunities through a large manufacturing sector,
especially for its young population aged 15-34 – which
is around 400 million people making up one-third of the
population – amidst rising corruption, is an obstacle.
These are some of the major challenges for the new
government. The question is, does India need a total
reset on its many internal and external challenges?
Sri Lanka, with whom India’s has had a love affair since
the days of the Mahabharata, always sends a tiny ripple
towards India. A line in an Indian newspaper before the
Geneva HR Council vote on Sri Lanka was, “Will Ceylon
become a Cyclone to India?” The Sri Lankan President’s
visit for the swearing-in ceremony created certain
political turmoil in South India and Sri Lanka’s Northern
Province Chief Minister Vigneswaran. Despite the stormy
atmosphere, both leaders, PM Modi and President
Rajapaksa, held successful talks as both possess high
resilience levels when facing challenges. Hopefully, an
improved and stronger relationship between both
countries is on the cards in the coming years, not
cyclones.
All of these episodes, however, have failed to address
one fundamental issue: bringing qualitative change to
the people living around the world. How can one thrive
in a world where 1 billion people go to bed hungry each
night? Can progress be made in a global community
where 1.2 billion of the poorest people on the planet
account for just 1 per cent of global consumption? 1
billion people are without food and 1 billion who are
obese. 85 of the richest people in the world have as
much wealth as 3.5 billion of the poorest. The inequality
gap is widening every day. So, is a world of 9 billion
people to be catered to in the future? This is a topic
that should be looked at seriously. World leaders must
look to improve points of intersection between
countries, rather than focus on internal boundaries with
nationalism or hubris. Does every country need to reset
its strategies to bring that qualitative change?
Asia served as the milieu for events from the coup
d'état in Thailand, to maritime cooperation for the
Indonesia-Vietnam boundary between President Susilo
and the Prime Minister of Vietnam, all on the backdrop
of the World Economic Forum in East Asia in Manila.
Indonesia, the largest Muslim democracy in Southeast
Asia, was at the center stage. During the forum,
outgoing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono received
the Statesmanship Award, and many of his
achievements during his decade of Presidency were
discussed. During his speech, President Susilo made
direct reference to China regarding the East China Sea
emphasising that “…any disputes including maritime
border tension can be resolved peacefully - not with the
use of military might which [may] endanger stability and
peace in our region.”
East Asia, with a population of 600 million, which is
roughly double the size of the US, is planning to build a
US$4.3 trillion economy with a single market in the next
several years. The challenges to achieve these targets,
however, are many. The infrastructure to link many
ASEAN countries is weak, poverty rates are high, and
rates of corruption are staggering. It is important to
move away from the present culture of high corruption,
to a better culture that fosters development of regional
framework to fight corruption. Countries should not
confine to their own boundaries but work
collaboratively. The point of intersection between
countries has to be improved. President Benigno Aquino
in his remarks stated his leadership to introduce good
governance to Philippines to dismantle corruption is
commendable with the improving positive economic
indicators.
In the Eurasian region, a Sino-Russian partnership for
US$400 billion for energy for the next three decades has
been signed, and the sophisticated Russian military
missile system has been given to the Chinese
government. There are signs of China and Russia
moving towards a strategic relationship in the very near
future.
There is now a tripolar world with US, Russia, and China
in the new equation. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to
the South China Sea, disputes with Japan, and the
placement of a Chinese oil rig in Vietnamese waters, are
a few of the events that have raised many eyebrows.
According to geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan, “This is
a region that’s going to be on the boil for years and
years to come. Seas crowded with warships,
submarines, merchant shipping, fifth generation fighter
jets – that can easily create incidents that in turn could
enable a crisis.” In Seoul during his Asia visit, President
Obama said that China “has to abide by certain norms”
when it comes to its quarrels with neighbours. With all
the notable events that have taken place in this part of
the region, the US pivot to Southeast Asia cannot be
negated.
In India, Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) has been sworn in as the new Prime Minister. The
Indian public believes that he can deliver rapid growth
in the country as he did in his 13-year tenure as Chief
Minister of Gujrat. However, India has many internal
challenges to consider first. Nearly half the country’s
households lack basic access to electricity. Modern
infrastructure is underdeveloped. Creation of job
opportunities through a large manufacturing sector,
especially for its young population aged 15-34 – which
is around 400 million people making up one-third of the
population – amidst rising corruption, is an obstacle.
These are some of the major challenges for the new
government. The question is, does India need a total
reset on its many internal and external challenges?
Sri Lanka, with whom India’s has had a love affair since
the days of the Mahabharata, always sends a tiny ripple
towards India. A line in an Indian newspaper before the
Geneva HR Council vote on Sri Lanka was, “Will Ceylon
become a Cyclone to India?” The Sri Lankan President’s
visit for the swearing-in ceremony created certain
political turmoil in South India and Sri Lanka’s Northern
Province Chief Minister Vigneswaran. Despite the stormy
atmosphere, both leaders, PM Modi and President
Rajapaksa, held successful talks as both possess high
resilience levels when facing challenges. Hopefully, an
improved and stronger relationship between both
countries is on the cards in the coming years, not
cyclones.
All of these episodes, however, have failed to address
one fundamental issue: bringing qualitative change to
the people living around the world. How can one thrive
in a world where 1 billion people go to bed hungry each
night? Can progress be made in a global community
where 1.2 billion of the poorest people on the planet
account for just 1 per cent of global consumption? 1
billion people are without food and 1 billion who are
obese. 85 of the richest people in the world have as
much wealth as 3.5 billion of the poorest. The inequality
gap is widening every day. So, is a world of 9 billion
people to be catered to in the future? This is a topic
that should be looked at seriously. World leaders must
look to improve points of intersection between
countries, rather than focus on internal boundaries with
nationalism or hubris. Does every country need to reset
its strategies to bring that qualitative change?
INDIA-US: WILL MODI AND OBAMA COME TOGETHER?
After denying Mr Narendra Modi a visa for nearly a
decade the US saw the writing on the wall and started
changing its tune just before the 2014 elections were
held. Mr Modi is now officially welcome in the
Washington but it will be a long time before the US-
India relationship will reach the same levels it was at
during the second term of George Walker Bush.
Obama’s Compulsions
The US, once again, has had its focus shifted from
China to a series of brush fires around the world - Syria
and Ukraine being the most prominent. The Bush
administration when it came to power named China as
a strategic competitor but was forced to shift its
attention to Afghanistan because of the September 11
attacks. These traditional battlegrounds have their
constituents in Washington. The bottom line is that
quite a few American strategic analysts are obsessed
with the Middle East and would like to revive the Cold
War even though President Obama quite correctly
dismissed Russia as a regional power. Because brush
fires have overridden grand strategy in Washington, the
Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia and enhanced ties
that go with it have been put on the backburner and,
instead, the focus is on regions that both present
unsolvable problems and provide little reward to the US.
The Middle East, after its flirtation with the so-called
Arab Spring, has swung back to soft authoritarianism,
and Russia will never be in the US camp. Nor will
challenging Russia, a much diminished power, bring the
sort of global rewards that the Cold War did to the US’
position in world affairs. Now, challenging Russia does
not lead to a rise in military budgets or in a national
rejuvenation as happened with the race to the
moon. But the Obama administration is likely to be
caught up in putting out these brush fires till the end of
its term.
Coupled with the shift from a strategic to a tactical
focus is the fact that the three trends in the short to
medium term are going to make US foreign policy take a
less proactive role in world affairs. First, the country is
tired of wars and, therefore, there is a real dislike for
foreign intervention. President Obama recognised this
when he put the Syrian issue in the hands of Congress
knowing fully well that the legislature was unlikely to
authorise American troop commitments. Secondly, at a
time when the American economy has yet to fully
recover from the economic crisis of 2008, it is difficult
to tell the American people to spend more on defense
and external military commitments. Third, the bills of
the Iraq and Afghan wars are now starting to pile up
with the need for new equipment as well as taking care
of tens of thousands of walking wounded. Given these
facts, the US is quite happy in pursuing a foreign policy
where, as in Libya, it leads from behind unless its
security interests are threatened (President Obama has
argued that a terrorist attack remains the most direct
threat to the US). President Obama’s domestic critics
see all this as a sign of weakness but he has made a
more careful exercise of American military power as a
centerpiece of the last two and a half years of his
presidency as stated in his speech at West Point on 28
May 2014.
Along with this preoccupation with short term crises and
the exhibition of caution in exercising military power is
the fact that the Pivot to Asia has not been concretised
in an economic plan of action for Asia. Consequently, it
is China that is making major economic inroads in the
region as some of the US’ major allies - South Korea
and Australia - now have China as their largest trading
partner. The fact that the Trans Pacific Partnership - the
Obama Administration’s economic centerpiece for Asia -
does not include China or India means in fact that it will
have a limited impact on the US role in Asia.
All these trends should mean that the US takes the
initiative to build a stronger relationship with Asia since
as President Obama stated at West Point, “On the other
hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a
direct threat to the United States, when such issues are
at stake -- when crises arise that stir our conscience or
push the world in a more dangerous direction but do
not directly threaten us -- then the threshold for military
action must be higher. In such circumstances, we
should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilise allies
and partners to take collective action. We have to
broaden our tools to include diplomacy and
development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to
international law; and, if just, necessary and effective,
multilateral military action. In such circumstances, we
have to work with others because collective action in
these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more
likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly
mistakes.” Instead, for several reasons, the two
countries will likely take some time to warm up to each
other.
US businesses ranging from the commercial to the
defense sectors, for example, now suffer from a bad
case of India fatigue. The last five years of the UPA
government saw Indian decision-making move at a
glacial pace and simple attempts to open up the
economy were stymied by corruption charges and
coalitional infighting. The Modi government, therefore,
will have to recreate the kind of excitement that existed
in business quarters about India in the early 2000s in
order to generate renewed interest from Western and
particularly US firms. Given the economic focus of the
new Indian government, however, this is likely to
happen sooner than later as witnessed by the move to
allow 100 per cent foreign direct investment in the
defense sector.
A more difficult issue will be to see if India and the US
can develop complementary world views especially on
the issue of the rise of China and how to balance Beijing
with a pivot to Asia. While New Delhi sees the value of a
US that balances China in Asia it is not keen on being
part of an anti-Chinese alliance as some in the US and
Asia would want it to be. This is especially the case
with Mr Modi who has made several trips to China and
quite clearly recognises the role Beijing could play in the
economic development of India. Moreover, as long as
the word expeditionary is taboo in New Delhi it is
doubtful that the Indian government will agree to
participate in coalitional efforts with the US (unless of
course it is under the aegis of the United Nations).
And there is the simple fact of personalities. Mr Modi, in
his years as chief minister, spent time cultivating the
nations of East Asia because he was not permitted to
visit the West. He is likely to use that friendship to
bring quick investment to India, something that the
West will not be willing to do. Consequently, an India
that finally adopts a true Look East policy and for a
while at least adopts a wait and see approach with the
US may be seen.
Having said that, such an approach cannot be
maintained in the long run since India’s development
will require technological inputs from the West and that
means at some time either Mr Modi goes to Washington
or Mr Obama comes to Delhi. It will happen but not any
time soon.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own
and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Air Force
or the Department of Defense.
decade the US saw the writing on the wall and started
changing its tune just before the 2014 elections were
held. Mr Modi is now officially welcome in the
Washington but it will be a long time before the US-
India relationship will reach the same levels it was at
during the second term of George Walker Bush.
Obama’s Compulsions
The US, once again, has had its focus shifted from
China to a series of brush fires around the world - Syria
and Ukraine being the most prominent. The Bush
administration when it came to power named China as
a strategic competitor but was forced to shift its
attention to Afghanistan because of the September 11
attacks. These traditional battlegrounds have their
constituents in Washington. The bottom line is that
quite a few American strategic analysts are obsessed
with the Middle East and would like to revive the Cold
War even though President Obama quite correctly
dismissed Russia as a regional power. Because brush
fires have overridden grand strategy in Washington, the
Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia and enhanced ties
that go with it have been put on the backburner and,
instead, the focus is on regions that both present
unsolvable problems and provide little reward to the US.
The Middle East, after its flirtation with the so-called
Arab Spring, has swung back to soft authoritarianism,
and Russia will never be in the US camp. Nor will
challenging Russia, a much diminished power, bring the
sort of global rewards that the Cold War did to the US’
position in world affairs. Now, challenging Russia does
not lead to a rise in military budgets or in a national
rejuvenation as happened with the race to the
moon. But the Obama administration is likely to be
caught up in putting out these brush fires till the end of
its term.
Coupled with the shift from a strategic to a tactical
focus is the fact that the three trends in the short to
medium term are going to make US foreign policy take a
less proactive role in world affairs. First, the country is
tired of wars and, therefore, there is a real dislike for
foreign intervention. President Obama recognised this
when he put the Syrian issue in the hands of Congress
knowing fully well that the legislature was unlikely to
authorise American troop commitments. Secondly, at a
time when the American economy has yet to fully
recover from the economic crisis of 2008, it is difficult
to tell the American people to spend more on defense
and external military commitments. Third, the bills of
the Iraq and Afghan wars are now starting to pile up
with the need for new equipment as well as taking care
of tens of thousands of walking wounded. Given these
facts, the US is quite happy in pursuing a foreign policy
where, as in Libya, it leads from behind unless its
security interests are threatened (President Obama has
argued that a terrorist attack remains the most direct
threat to the US). President Obama’s domestic critics
see all this as a sign of weakness but he has made a
more careful exercise of American military power as a
centerpiece of the last two and a half years of his
presidency as stated in his speech at West Point on 28
May 2014.
Along with this preoccupation with short term crises and
the exhibition of caution in exercising military power is
the fact that the Pivot to Asia has not been concretised
in an economic plan of action for Asia. Consequently, it
is China that is making major economic inroads in the
region as some of the US’ major allies - South Korea
and Australia - now have China as their largest trading
partner. The fact that the Trans Pacific Partnership - the
Obama Administration’s economic centerpiece for Asia -
does not include China or India means in fact that it will
have a limited impact on the US role in Asia.
All these trends should mean that the US takes the
initiative to build a stronger relationship with Asia since
as President Obama stated at West Point, “On the other
hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a
direct threat to the United States, when such issues are
at stake -- when crises arise that stir our conscience or
push the world in a more dangerous direction but do
not directly threaten us -- then the threshold for military
action must be higher. In such circumstances, we
should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilise allies
and partners to take collective action. We have to
broaden our tools to include diplomacy and
development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to
international law; and, if just, necessary and effective,
multilateral military action. In such circumstances, we
have to work with others because collective action in
these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more
likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly
mistakes.” Instead, for several reasons, the two
countries will likely take some time to warm up to each
other.
US businesses ranging from the commercial to the
defense sectors, for example, now suffer from a bad
case of India fatigue. The last five years of the UPA
government saw Indian decision-making move at a
glacial pace and simple attempts to open up the
economy were stymied by corruption charges and
coalitional infighting. The Modi government, therefore,
will have to recreate the kind of excitement that existed
in business quarters about India in the early 2000s in
order to generate renewed interest from Western and
particularly US firms. Given the economic focus of the
new Indian government, however, this is likely to
happen sooner than later as witnessed by the move to
allow 100 per cent foreign direct investment in the
defense sector.
A more difficult issue will be to see if India and the US
can develop complementary world views especially on
the issue of the rise of China and how to balance Beijing
with a pivot to Asia. While New Delhi sees the value of a
US that balances China in Asia it is not keen on being
part of an anti-Chinese alliance as some in the US and
Asia would want it to be. This is especially the case
with Mr Modi who has made several trips to China and
quite clearly recognises the role Beijing could play in the
economic development of India. Moreover, as long as
the word expeditionary is taboo in New Delhi it is
doubtful that the Indian government will agree to
participate in coalitional efforts with the US (unless of
course it is under the aegis of the United Nations).
And there is the simple fact of personalities. Mr Modi, in
his years as chief minister, spent time cultivating the
nations of East Asia because he was not permitted to
visit the West. He is likely to use that friendship to
bring quick investment to India, something that the
West will not be willing to do. Consequently, an India
that finally adopts a true Look East policy and for a
while at least adopts a wait and see approach with the
US may be seen.
Having said that, such an approach cannot be
maintained in the long run since India’s development
will require technological inputs from the West and that
means at some time either Mr Modi goes to Washington
or Mr Obama comes to Delhi. It will happen but not any
time soon.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own
and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Air Force
or the Department of Defense.
AFGHANISTAN ELECTION 2014.
The first round of counting is over and the contest
seems to be between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Ghani to become the next President of Afghanistan. No
one would have expected that the elections fwould be
such a success story. Undoubtedly, this was one of the
most historic moment in the contemporary history of
Afghanistan. Not only was this election historical, but
also likely to set an important milestone in
Afghanistan’s transition and its progress towards
becoming a democratic polity.
There was so much pessimism about the future of
Afghanistan, as could be seen from the multiple reports
during the last one year in terms of what would happen
to Afghanistan once the international security forces
leave in 2014. There were questions also about the
ability of the Afghans to take the transition process
ahead as the draw down comes closer. The elections is
a partial, but a positive answer, signaling a slow but a
steady transition.
The first round of elections in choosing the next
President took place in a particular geo-political
environment. Karzai’s tenure as the President comes to
an end with no possibility of him being elected for a
third time legally. Though Karzai could not “appoint” his
successor, he had allowed the electoral process to
decide who would be the next President. This election
was special, for the simple reason, there were not many
such examples in the recent decades in the history of
Afghanistan.
When was the last time, a ruler in Afghanistan, allowed
an electoral process to choose his successor? Mullah
Omar, Najibullah, Babrak Karmal, Nur Taraki, Daoud
Khan, Zahir Shah—the history of succession in
Afghanistan in the last hundred years has been more
through coup, forcible ouster and exile with so much of
blood shed; political and peaceful transition has never
been a part of the Afghanistan’s history from one rule
to another. That is why this election is so important
and a milestone in the history of Afghanistan.
Second, the security, political and geographic
environment was not that conducive, when the elections
took place during the first week of April 2014. The
security situation within Afghanistan and the regional
security situation outside were not too positive.
Consider the following in this context: the Afghan nation
is deeply polarised along the ethnic lines – the
pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and the Hazaras. The internal
peace process vis-a-vis the Taliban has not made any
major breakthrough; nor there has been a great success
in the efforts of the international community to
“discover” the good Taliban and strike a successful
dialogue with them.
In terms of external security, Karzai refused to sign the
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United
States, following which the latter had threatened to cut
the aid and military support to Afghanistan. Even more
importantly, relations with Pakistan had hit a low and
were yet to recover when the elections took place.
And then, there has been another great question: are
the Afghans ready for democracy? The April elections
and the Afghan vote have to be interpreted in the above
background. The Afghan nation seems to be on a
positive road towards the transition. What are the
challenges ahead? Will they be able to convert the
positive elections into a successful transition and draft
a new history?
seems to be between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Ghani to become the next President of Afghanistan. No
one would have expected that the elections fwould be
such a success story. Undoubtedly, this was one of the
most historic moment in the contemporary history of
Afghanistan. Not only was this election historical, but
also likely to set an important milestone in
Afghanistan’s transition and its progress towards
becoming a democratic polity.
There was so much pessimism about the future of
Afghanistan, as could be seen from the multiple reports
during the last one year in terms of what would happen
to Afghanistan once the international security forces
leave in 2014. There were questions also about the
ability of the Afghans to take the transition process
ahead as the draw down comes closer. The elections is
a partial, but a positive answer, signaling a slow but a
steady transition.
The first round of elections in choosing the next
President took place in a particular geo-political
environment. Karzai’s tenure as the President comes to
an end with no possibility of him being elected for a
third time legally. Though Karzai could not “appoint” his
successor, he had allowed the electoral process to
decide who would be the next President. This election
was special, for the simple reason, there were not many
such examples in the recent decades in the history of
Afghanistan.
When was the last time, a ruler in Afghanistan, allowed
an electoral process to choose his successor? Mullah
Omar, Najibullah, Babrak Karmal, Nur Taraki, Daoud
Khan, Zahir Shah—the history of succession in
Afghanistan in the last hundred years has been more
through coup, forcible ouster and exile with so much of
blood shed; political and peaceful transition has never
been a part of the Afghanistan’s history from one rule
to another. That is why this election is so important
and a milestone in the history of Afghanistan.
Second, the security, political and geographic
environment was not that conducive, when the elections
took place during the first week of April 2014. The
security situation within Afghanistan and the regional
security situation outside were not too positive.
Consider the following in this context: the Afghan nation
is deeply polarised along the ethnic lines – the
pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and the Hazaras. The internal
peace process vis-a-vis the Taliban has not made any
major breakthrough; nor there has been a great success
in the efforts of the international community to
“discover” the good Taliban and strike a successful
dialogue with them.
In terms of external security, Karzai refused to sign the
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United
States, following which the latter had threatened to cut
the aid and military support to Afghanistan. Even more
importantly, relations with Pakistan had hit a low and
were yet to recover when the elections took place.
And then, there has been another great question: are
the Afghans ready for democracy? The April elections
and the Afghan vote have to be interpreted in the above
background. The Afghan nation seems to be on a
positive road towards the transition. What are the
challenges ahead? Will they be able to convert the
positive elections into a successful transition and draft
a new history?
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA EXIT.
The announcement of a drawdown timeline for US
troops from Afghanistan predictably garnered mixed
reactions. However, most of the issues that brought the
US-led ISAF to the region still remain unresolved. Where
on one hand Osama bin Laden’s killing is an ace for the
US, the al Qaeda as an entity still remains. This leaves
the second spoiler, the Afghan Taliban, as well as their
faith brothers, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Both
of them have the advantage of being sons of the soil.
There is no timeline to chase, so they have the luxury to
act as spoilers, keep the security profile turbulent in real
time and wait for the ‘foreigners’ to exit. Though the
Afghan Taliban has suffered significant losses, their
structures, ability to recruit, and countrywide operations
remain intact with new tactics and means to hold
ground.
Afghanistan today is not the one left in the wake of the
Soviet withdrawal and the faulty Geneva Accords. This
is good news, as even in the worst-case future scenario,
one cannot envision the international community leaving
Kabul in the lurch. However it correspondingly gives rise
to another problem: that too many actors with vested
interests will turn Afghanistan into their proxy strategic
playfield. For the moment, Afghans are happy with this
international focus and seemingly positive attention, but
the years to come may change this happy picture. A
larger chunk of Afghan civil society, which is highly
proactive in democratic nation-building, is drawn from
the Afghan diaspora, who despite their best intentions
may not be able to withstand a possible surge in
militancy and violence in case a situation so arises. The
law enforcement and security apparatus, ANSF, though
much improved and stronger than before still has a long
way to go and its performance post transition would at
best remain a mixed bag, which given Afghanistan’s
complex security dynamics, is not at all a good news.
That leaves the ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’
democratic and nation-building process, which like
many of the ‘Made in US’ products leaves much to be
desired. In a cross-section of Afghan nationals, there
exists deep skepticism about the ‘Afghan-owned’
component largely missing from the frame, thus once
again constructing a system that has very weak
foundations.
Much depends on the results of the forthcoming
elections. With all the presidential candidates and their
affiliates minus incumbent president Karzai consenting
to the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), Afghanistan
requires a strong representative government with
indigenous legitimacy and capacity to extend its writ
outside Kabul without external props. Will the Taliban
be willing to negotiate and agree to some non-violent
power-sharing? There are serious doubts. What would
be the impact of these developments on Pakistan?
Though the Pakistani government is already in talks
with the TTP (Pakhtun faction) and there is a temporary
respite from the US drones, bombings and civilian
killings have not reduced and nor has the US announced
a complete termination of its drone attack policy. In fact
most of the Taliban high shura has comfortably crossed
over into Afghanistan and will remain there for as long
as it suits them. Though the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban are pursuing their independent agenda, one
must not forget their past links and the strength and
resilience of their networks. In addition, the history of
Pak-US relations is highly checkered, and even after
eleven plus years, Pakistani society remains highly
divided about whether this has been Pakistan’s war.
In case the talks with the TTP fail and there is a breach
in the security framework that would result as a part of
the agreement, would post-2014 Afghanistan be able to
provide security cooperation to Pakistan, mainly in the
shape of border closure, hot pursuit into ‘friendly’
territory to capture militants, intelligence-sharing and
perceivable joint operations? With divergent perspectives
and a strong sense of the other side being the spoiler,
there is doubt that such a cooperative security regime
could work. However, for the Afghan and Pakistan
Taliban, the post 2014 timeline would actually be a
welcoming notion. So long as there is an American
security interest and presence, there is optimism for a
better security framework. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan can conveniently dump their bad diplomacy
on the US. It also acts as a balancer against a stronger
Indian presence.
Though Pakistani decision-makers have reinforced the
point that they have no reservations with New Delhi’s
‘legitimate’ interests in Afghanistan, they would always
remain wary of any military or strategic role India has in
Afghanistan. Realistically, every country, be it the US
(Monroe doctrine) or India (Nepal, Bhutan), has similar
concerns when it comes to its strategic interests.
Afghanistan of the future holds increased economic and
commercial activity and corresponding involvement of
the international community, as well as pressure for
increased transit and trilateral (India-Pakistan-
Afghanistan) trade. Pakistan has to prepare itself for the
changing trends and pressures. Ironically, the energy
pipelines still remain somewhat elusive; a problematic
profile for energy-stressed Pakistan specifically. The
coming months are fraught with multiple challenges that
need a sustainable, well-articulated and well thought-
out approach. The 2014 exit timeline in fact heralds a
new chapter in the region’s strategic relations, which
would largely shape future dynamics.
troops from Afghanistan predictably garnered mixed
reactions. However, most of the issues that brought the
US-led ISAF to the region still remain unresolved. Where
on one hand Osama bin Laden’s killing is an ace for the
US, the al Qaeda as an entity still remains. This leaves
the second spoiler, the Afghan Taliban, as well as their
faith brothers, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Both
of them have the advantage of being sons of the soil.
There is no timeline to chase, so they have the luxury to
act as spoilers, keep the security profile turbulent in real
time and wait for the ‘foreigners’ to exit. Though the
Afghan Taliban has suffered significant losses, their
structures, ability to recruit, and countrywide operations
remain intact with new tactics and means to hold
ground.
Afghanistan today is not the one left in the wake of the
Soviet withdrawal and the faulty Geneva Accords. This
is good news, as even in the worst-case future scenario,
one cannot envision the international community leaving
Kabul in the lurch. However it correspondingly gives rise
to another problem: that too many actors with vested
interests will turn Afghanistan into their proxy strategic
playfield. For the moment, Afghans are happy with this
international focus and seemingly positive attention, but
the years to come may change this happy picture. A
larger chunk of Afghan civil society, which is highly
proactive in democratic nation-building, is drawn from
the Afghan diaspora, who despite their best intentions
may not be able to withstand a possible surge in
militancy and violence in case a situation so arises. The
law enforcement and security apparatus, ANSF, though
much improved and stronger than before still has a long
way to go and its performance post transition would at
best remain a mixed bag, which given Afghanistan’s
complex security dynamics, is not at all a good news.
That leaves the ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’
democratic and nation-building process, which like
many of the ‘Made in US’ products leaves much to be
desired. In a cross-section of Afghan nationals, there
exists deep skepticism about the ‘Afghan-owned’
component largely missing from the frame, thus once
again constructing a system that has very weak
foundations.
Much depends on the results of the forthcoming
elections. With all the presidential candidates and their
affiliates minus incumbent president Karzai consenting
to the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), Afghanistan
requires a strong representative government with
indigenous legitimacy and capacity to extend its writ
outside Kabul without external props. Will the Taliban
be willing to negotiate and agree to some non-violent
power-sharing? There are serious doubts. What would
be the impact of these developments on Pakistan?
Though the Pakistani government is already in talks
with the TTP (Pakhtun faction) and there is a temporary
respite from the US drones, bombings and civilian
killings have not reduced and nor has the US announced
a complete termination of its drone attack policy. In fact
most of the Taliban high shura has comfortably crossed
over into Afghanistan and will remain there for as long
as it suits them. Though the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban are pursuing their independent agenda, one
must not forget their past links and the strength and
resilience of their networks. In addition, the history of
Pak-US relations is highly checkered, and even after
eleven plus years, Pakistani society remains highly
divided about whether this has been Pakistan’s war.
In case the talks with the TTP fail and there is a breach
in the security framework that would result as a part of
the agreement, would post-2014 Afghanistan be able to
provide security cooperation to Pakistan, mainly in the
shape of border closure, hot pursuit into ‘friendly’
territory to capture militants, intelligence-sharing and
perceivable joint operations? With divergent perspectives
and a strong sense of the other side being the spoiler,
there is doubt that such a cooperative security regime
could work. However, for the Afghan and Pakistan
Taliban, the post 2014 timeline would actually be a
welcoming notion. So long as there is an American
security interest and presence, there is optimism for a
better security framework. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan can conveniently dump their bad diplomacy
on the US. It also acts as a balancer against a stronger
Indian presence.
Though Pakistani decision-makers have reinforced the
point that they have no reservations with New Delhi’s
‘legitimate’ interests in Afghanistan, they would always
remain wary of any military or strategic role India has in
Afghanistan. Realistically, every country, be it the US
(Monroe doctrine) or India (Nepal, Bhutan), has similar
concerns when it comes to its strategic interests.
Afghanistan of the future holds increased economic and
commercial activity and corresponding involvement of
the international community, as well as pressure for
increased transit and trilateral (India-Pakistan-
Afghanistan) trade. Pakistan has to prepare itself for the
changing trends and pressures. Ironically, the energy
pipelines still remain somewhat elusive; a problematic
profile for energy-stressed Pakistan specifically. The
coming months are fraught with multiple challenges that
need a sustainable, well-articulated and well thought-
out approach. The 2014 exit timeline in fact heralds a
new chapter in the region’s strategic relations, which
would largely shape future dynamics.
AMERICAN ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN POST 2014
As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
prepares to pull out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014,
it is of significance to assess larger American interests
at play in the country and the region. How will the US
leverage its resources to secure those interests?
American Strategy: Keeping a Residual Force
Several voices in the US are of the view that the troop
drawdown is reasonable. The US has achieved the
mission of killing Osama bin Laden and has paralysed al
Qaeda's operational structure. The prevailing argument
is that the war that has been expensive and has
resulted in the loss of several thousand American lives
needs to finally end. Yet, official declarations talk in
terms of ensuring stability in Afghanistan that requires
US presence for training and supporting the ANSF while
focussing on counter-terrorism missions.
What remains understated is how Afghanistan, as an
important geopolitical asset, serves larger American
interests in the region. It is the Pentagon’s only military
base in Central Asia, with Iran to the west, Pakistan to
the east, China to the northeast, various resource-rich
former Soviet republics to the northwest, and Russia to
the north. A presence in Afghanistan would not only
serve to enhance economic and trade interests but also
help the US keep a close tab on these countries.
This explains US involvement in painstaking negotiations
to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that
would enable it to maintain bases post-2014. The
prospect of a continued presence in Afghanistan has
also led the Obama administration to seek a peace deal
with the Afghan Taliban by offering them a de-facto
diplomatic mission in Qatar.
The charged confrontation between the US and Russia
over Ukraine has further boosted the support towards
maintaining bases. Former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in a Washington Post article , linked
Russia’s actions in Ukraine with the troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. According to her, anything less than
the American military’s requirement for 10,000 troops
will suggest that the US is not serious about helping to
stabilise that country, which is likely to embolden
countries like Iran, Iraq and Russia.
Aid as Carrot and Stick
The US Congress has been giving out multibillion dollar
annual bills as aid to the Afghan army. However, with
Karzai sticking to his word on not signing the BSA until
after elections, the administration has claimed that the
financial assistance, whether for armed forces or
development programmes, is likely to drop steeply. In
January 2014, Congress slashed the development
budget for Afghanistan by half and even reduced
security aid by 60 per cent.
A recent report by the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) states that the delay in signing the BSA is
compounding uncertainty and diminishing economic
confidence in Afghanistan. According to the report, the
Afghan economy is witnessing increased capital flight,
delay in investments, incipient job losses, declining
demand for goods and services, and is leading to
farmers planting more poppy. More families are
choosing to arm themselves, leading to a hike in
weapon prices. Stating that it is bound to spread into
the government and security structures, the report puts
the BSA as an anchor in navigating transition
challenges.
Using the Region to Leverage US Interests
It is a given that with or without the BSA, the US is
likely to play a lesser role in Afghanistan in the coming
months. However, the region as a whole has braced
itself for more involvement in Afghanistan, with
America’s blessings. The neighbouring countries realise
that an unstable Afghanistan is likely to become an
incubator of terrorism, poppy production and other illicit
activities. Pakistan and Iran understand the
repercussions of a failed state in their backyard that has
the potential to create unrest and instability within their
own territories. Russia and China are already worried
about the spread of insurgency in the troubled
Chechenya and Xinjiang provinces respectively.
India for its part is uniquely positioned - as a friend to
both Washington and Kabul. India remains in a position
to use its good offices to ensure that a version of the
BSA agreeable to both the countries is signed. Building
on the 'narrative of opportunity' to counter the anxiety
of withdrawal, New Delhi is attempting to shift focus to
regional confidence-building, development, governance,
trade and investment. India until now has transferred
‘no strings attached’ aid directly to Kabul despite
knowing that the Afghan government is considered
corrupt. India has also tried to deal with Pakistan’s
fears over military involvement in Afghanistan. Thus, it
has been evasive towards Afghan requests for tanks,
field guns and aircraft. As it turns out, Washington,
which was more than ambivalent regarding India’s
participation in the region, wants more from New Delhi
today.
The ‘new silk road’ initiative to link Afghanistan’s
energy, mineral and trade resources with the rest of the
world ideated by the Obama administration is also being
taken up by the region collectively to exploit the transit
potential that can accrue much needed economic growth
for the country. If successful, the project can serve as a
conduit for mutually beneficial cooperation between the
US, Central Asia and Russia, helping the US to continue
playing a consequential role in the region.
prepares to pull out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014,
it is of significance to assess larger American interests
at play in the country and the region. How will the US
leverage its resources to secure those interests?
American Strategy: Keeping a Residual Force
Several voices in the US are of the view that the troop
drawdown is reasonable. The US has achieved the
mission of killing Osama bin Laden and has paralysed al
Qaeda's operational structure. The prevailing argument
is that the war that has been expensive and has
resulted in the loss of several thousand American lives
needs to finally end. Yet, official declarations talk in
terms of ensuring stability in Afghanistan that requires
US presence for training and supporting the ANSF while
focussing on counter-terrorism missions.
What remains understated is how Afghanistan, as an
important geopolitical asset, serves larger American
interests in the region. It is the Pentagon’s only military
base in Central Asia, with Iran to the west, Pakistan to
the east, China to the northeast, various resource-rich
former Soviet republics to the northwest, and Russia to
the north. A presence in Afghanistan would not only
serve to enhance economic and trade interests but also
help the US keep a close tab on these countries.
This explains US involvement in painstaking negotiations
to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that
would enable it to maintain bases post-2014. The
prospect of a continued presence in Afghanistan has
also led the Obama administration to seek a peace deal
with the Afghan Taliban by offering them a de-facto
diplomatic mission in Qatar.
The charged confrontation between the US and Russia
over Ukraine has further boosted the support towards
maintaining bases. Former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in a Washington Post article , linked
Russia’s actions in Ukraine with the troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. According to her, anything less than
the American military’s requirement for 10,000 troops
will suggest that the US is not serious about helping to
stabilise that country, which is likely to embolden
countries like Iran, Iraq and Russia.
Aid as Carrot and Stick
The US Congress has been giving out multibillion dollar
annual bills as aid to the Afghan army. However, with
Karzai sticking to his word on not signing the BSA until
after elections, the administration has claimed that the
financial assistance, whether for armed forces or
development programmes, is likely to drop steeply. In
January 2014, Congress slashed the development
budget for Afghanistan by half and even reduced
security aid by 60 per cent.
A recent report by the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) states that the delay in signing the BSA is
compounding uncertainty and diminishing economic
confidence in Afghanistan. According to the report, the
Afghan economy is witnessing increased capital flight,
delay in investments, incipient job losses, declining
demand for goods and services, and is leading to
farmers planting more poppy. More families are
choosing to arm themselves, leading to a hike in
weapon prices. Stating that it is bound to spread into
the government and security structures, the report puts
the BSA as an anchor in navigating transition
challenges.
Using the Region to Leverage US Interests
It is a given that with or without the BSA, the US is
likely to play a lesser role in Afghanistan in the coming
months. However, the region as a whole has braced
itself for more involvement in Afghanistan, with
America’s blessings. The neighbouring countries realise
that an unstable Afghanistan is likely to become an
incubator of terrorism, poppy production and other illicit
activities. Pakistan and Iran understand the
repercussions of a failed state in their backyard that has
the potential to create unrest and instability within their
own territories. Russia and China are already worried
about the spread of insurgency in the troubled
Chechenya and Xinjiang provinces respectively.
India for its part is uniquely positioned - as a friend to
both Washington and Kabul. India remains in a position
to use its good offices to ensure that a version of the
BSA agreeable to both the countries is signed. Building
on the 'narrative of opportunity' to counter the anxiety
of withdrawal, New Delhi is attempting to shift focus to
regional confidence-building, development, governance,
trade and investment. India until now has transferred
‘no strings attached’ aid directly to Kabul despite
knowing that the Afghan government is considered
corrupt. India has also tried to deal with Pakistan’s
fears over military involvement in Afghanistan. Thus, it
has been evasive towards Afghan requests for tanks,
field guns and aircraft. As it turns out, Washington,
which was more than ambivalent regarding India’s
participation in the region, wants more from New Delhi
today.
The ‘new silk road’ initiative to link Afghanistan’s
energy, mineral and trade resources with the rest of the
world ideated by the Obama administration is also being
taken up by the region collectively to exploit the transit
potential that can accrue much needed economic growth
for the country. If successful, the project can serve as a
conduit for mutually beneficial cooperation between the
US, Central Asia and Russia, helping the US to continue
playing a consequential role in the region.
US-CHINA: THE PROBLEM OF CONGAGEMENT
Over the past two decades, China has grown
exponentially, both in military prowess and economic
might. The US, one of the major contributing factors to
China’s rise, now realises the importance of countering
this advancement. But is its policy of ‘congagement’,
apt for the issue at hand?
Inconsistent Engagement
Over the past decade, the US maintained a policy of
‘engagement’ towards China. This has in fact been a
tactic to hedge its own bets, without getting into the
primary context. Militarily, Washington has been
facilitating Beijing’s participation in multilateral defense
exercises such as the Cobra Gold and RIMPAC, thus
coming clean and allowing China to gauge US intentions
in the region. Economically, the US has granted China
the Most Favoured Nation status, thereby reducing
export control policies and allowing Beijing to operate
relatively freely in the US markets.
Washington has tried to maximise bilateral ties while
keeping existing disputes in control. Simultaneously, the
US continuously tries to bring China into various arms
control regimes dealing with WMDs, proliferation, arms
trade, etc., and also into international regimes such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Bilaterally, Washington has tried to involve Beijing in the
regional issues regarding North Korea, and may also
invite it to assist with Iran.
While there can be several intended results from this
relationship, the most practical and favorable outcome
is that of Beijing’s integration into the international
system. If China gets as engaged in international
relations as most other Western nations, the probability
of a military intervention by Beijing decreases. This is
because the leadership in Beijing understands the
benefits the current ‘rules of the game’ have to offer,
and also to avoid doing anything that would scuttle its
own off-shore interests.
However, engagement is a relatively flawed policy, as it
does not offer advice on what needs to be done, in the
event of Beijing not adhering to current international
norms. The primary assumption – engaging China on
the international stage as a primary actor, to change its
outlook towards a positive direction – is an a priori
concept. Should this prove to be incorrect, engagement
would have only assisted China in becoming a more
threatening adversary in the future.
Containment: Boon or a Bane?
Containment is seen as a more realistic approach of
dealing with a powerful China in the future. Under this
policy, all elements of the US-China relationship would
be subservient to the primary objective: preventing
China’s growth. This would entail drastically reducing
US-China trade agreements, particularly insuring non-
proliferation of technology and military
development. Furthermore, Washington will have to
enhance its regional presence in the Asia-Pacific,
engaging with other nation states in the region, into
forming an ‘anti-China’ alliance. The US would also
have to convince other potential political and security
partners into limiting their diplomatic and trade
relations with China.
As realist international theory dictates, rising powers
generally tend to assert themselves on the global scene
and challenge the predominant power. This challenge
often translates in a systematic war with the
predominant power. Washington needs to take these
containment steps to ensure this ‘systematic war’ is not
realised. Also, given its political tradition of imperial
rule, China is unlikely to democratise, and this would
only lead to an increase in its bellicosity.
In the present geopolitical scenario, containment will be
a difficult policy to implement. Obtaining domestic
consensus for subordinating other policy goals (such as
trade and commerce) to dealing with a Chinese threat
that is yet to manifest itself will not be easy. This may
even lead to Beijing becoming increasingly hostile
towards the US’ interests. Furthermore, policy will
require the total cooperation of all leading industrial and
military nations of the world to succeed – that which
doesn’t seem to be the case. In the last decade, along
with the US, other major regional players too have been
pivoting to China, and not all of them may want to
sever their economic and diplomatic relationship with
the latter.
Feasibility of a Middle Path
Not only the Obama administration, but much of the US
policy establishment is ambiguous in their reactions
towards the growing Chinese economic and military
power. Recently, the curious term called
‘congagement’ (a mix of containment and engagement)
is making rounds in the US policy circles. It describes
the current policy confusion and contortions of
Washington towards Beijing Well. Many call this a
hedging strategy.
‘Congagement’, however, is built on contradictory
policies. The aspects of engagement and containment
are incoherent – they do not complement each other.
This hedging strategy is unsubstantiated. Hedging is
defined as ‘making an investment to reduce the risk of
adverse decision movements in an asset’. In the China
policy analogy, the US position is that of engaging
China in bilateral agreements, facilitating the bridging of
the gaps between both countries, while at the same
time enhancing its own position to ensure proper
counter-measures for any future Chinese threats.
This confusing stance is the primary reason why
Washington cannot directly or indirectly retaliate to
Beijing’s influence or activities detrimental to its own
security. US President Barack Obama’s ambiguous
silence on the issue of the South China Sea dispute
stands evidence for this. Furthermore, Washington’s
inability to react more than just making international
statements in the recent case of cyber espionage by
China validates this.
exponentially, both in military prowess and economic
might. The US, one of the major contributing factors to
China’s rise, now realises the importance of countering
this advancement. But is its policy of ‘congagement’,
apt for the issue at hand?
Inconsistent Engagement
Over the past decade, the US maintained a policy of
‘engagement’ towards China. This has in fact been a
tactic to hedge its own bets, without getting into the
primary context. Militarily, Washington has been
facilitating Beijing’s participation in multilateral defense
exercises such as the Cobra Gold and RIMPAC, thus
coming clean and allowing China to gauge US intentions
in the region. Economically, the US has granted China
the Most Favoured Nation status, thereby reducing
export control policies and allowing Beijing to operate
relatively freely in the US markets.
Washington has tried to maximise bilateral ties while
keeping existing disputes in control. Simultaneously, the
US continuously tries to bring China into various arms
control regimes dealing with WMDs, proliferation, arms
trade, etc., and also into international regimes such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Bilaterally, Washington has tried to involve Beijing in the
regional issues regarding North Korea, and may also
invite it to assist with Iran.
While there can be several intended results from this
relationship, the most practical and favorable outcome
is that of Beijing’s integration into the international
system. If China gets as engaged in international
relations as most other Western nations, the probability
of a military intervention by Beijing decreases. This is
because the leadership in Beijing understands the
benefits the current ‘rules of the game’ have to offer,
and also to avoid doing anything that would scuttle its
own off-shore interests.
However, engagement is a relatively flawed policy, as it
does not offer advice on what needs to be done, in the
event of Beijing not adhering to current international
norms. The primary assumption – engaging China on
the international stage as a primary actor, to change its
outlook towards a positive direction – is an a priori
concept. Should this prove to be incorrect, engagement
would have only assisted China in becoming a more
threatening adversary in the future.
Containment: Boon or a Bane?
Containment is seen as a more realistic approach of
dealing with a powerful China in the future. Under this
policy, all elements of the US-China relationship would
be subservient to the primary objective: preventing
China’s growth. This would entail drastically reducing
US-China trade agreements, particularly insuring non-
proliferation of technology and military
development. Furthermore, Washington will have to
enhance its regional presence in the Asia-Pacific,
engaging with other nation states in the region, into
forming an ‘anti-China’ alliance. The US would also
have to convince other potential political and security
partners into limiting their diplomatic and trade
relations with China.
As realist international theory dictates, rising powers
generally tend to assert themselves on the global scene
and challenge the predominant power. This challenge
often translates in a systematic war with the
predominant power. Washington needs to take these
containment steps to ensure this ‘systematic war’ is not
realised. Also, given its political tradition of imperial
rule, China is unlikely to democratise, and this would
only lead to an increase in its bellicosity.
In the present geopolitical scenario, containment will be
a difficult policy to implement. Obtaining domestic
consensus for subordinating other policy goals (such as
trade and commerce) to dealing with a Chinese threat
that is yet to manifest itself will not be easy. This may
even lead to Beijing becoming increasingly hostile
towards the US’ interests. Furthermore, policy will
require the total cooperation of all leading industrial and
military nations of the world to succeed – that which
doesn’t seem to be the case. In the last decade, along
with the US, other major regional players too have been
pivoting to China, and not all of them may want to
sever their economic and diplomatic relationship with
the latter.
Feasibility of a Middle Path
Not only the Obama administration, but much of the US
policy establishment is ambiguous in their reactions
towards the growing Chinese economic and military
power. Recently, the curious term called
‘congagement’ (a mix of containment and engagement)
is making rounds in the US policy circles. It describes
the current policy confusion and contortions of
Washington towards Beijing Well. Many call this a
hedging strategy.
‘Congagement’, however, is built on contradictory
policies. The aspects of engagement and containment
are incoherent – they do not complement each other.
This hedging strategy is unsubstantiated. Hedging is
defined as ‘making an investment to reduce the risk of
adverse decision movements in an asset’. In the China
policy analogy, the US position is that of engaging
China in bilateral agreements, facilitating the bridging of
the gaps between both countries, while at the same
time enhancing its own position to ensure proper
counter-measures for any future Chinese threats.
This confusing stance is the primary reason why
Washington cannot directly or indirectly retaliate to
Beijing’s influence or activities detrimental to its own
security. US President Barack Obama’s ambiguous
silence on the issue of the South China Sea dispute
stands evidence for this. Furthermore, Washington’s
inability to react more than just making international
statements in the recent case of cyber espionage by
China validates this.
US, UKRAINE AND THE END OF UNIPOLARITY
When Ukraine became a sovereign independent republic
following the Soviet disintegration, a unipolar world
order was born. Now with Crimea’s secession from
Ukraine and the annexation to Russia, the death of the
unipolar world seems certain.
US unilateralism during the era of a unipolar world order
remained unchallenged.
There was no one to question then US President Bill
Clinton’s decision to rain missiles on Afghanistan as a
response to the bombing of two US embassies in Africa;
no one could challenge then US President George Bush’s
decision to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, invade
Iraq, and overthrow Saddam Hussein from power.
Incumbent US President Barack Obama promised to
promote a liberal world order; employ more diplomacy
and less force; end occupation of Iraq; talk Iran out of a
suspected nuclear weapon programme; bring North
Korea back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; positively
engage the Islamic world; strive for establishment of a
nuclear weapon free world; reach out to the largest
democracy of the world; make China a responsible
stakeholder; make Russia a partner for peace; and many
more.
However, project Obama, although partially successful,
it has largely failed. President Obama can be given
credit for Iran’s decision to accept the détente with the
US, Syria’s willingness to destroy its chemical weapons,
US Navy Seal’s spectacular assassination of Osama bin
Laden, and his successful approach to stemming the
country’s downward economic spiral.
Nevertheless, his foreign policy flops appear more
stunning. The Arab world is clearly on fire with
dangerous political upheavals and unrelenting violence.
The White House will have to accept a fair share of the
blame for the Libyan chaos, Egyptian instability, the
interminable civil war in Syria, and the North Korean
nuclear tenacity.
Additionally, the US is not in a position to inspire
confidence among its Asian allies at the time of growing
Chinese assertiveness. All goodwill between India and
the US appears to have become a thing of the past
following the fierce diplomatic discord sparked by the
arrest and perceived mistreatment of an Indian consular
officer by the New York Police Department. The
Marshall Plan aid to Europe in the post World War II
period remains in the history books, and the present day
US is simply incapable of instituting a similar
assistance programme to rescue Europe from its current
economic calamity.
In other words, the unipolar world order was already
facing the risk of extinction, when Russia’s response to
the political turbulence in Ukraine threatened to alter
that order. During the period of Soviet disintegration,
pundits could not predict the final outcome of events in
Moscow. Similarly, in the case of the Ukrainian political
turmoil, no one could imagine the speed with which
Russian President Vladimir Putin would be able to
dismantle Ukrainian political geography and annex
Crimea.
The Obama administration’s response was slow and
meek. Along with the EU, it imposed sanctions against
some Russian individuals. Although Russia’s
membership from the G8 and its voting rights in the
Council of Europe was suspended, no sanctions could
be imposed on critical sectors of the Russian economy,
and nor could any military measure be contemplated.
High rhetoric and docile measures highlight
Washington’s response.
All these are the result of the resilience of a resurgent
Russia and the relative decline of the US. The US
military presence in Europe is far less today compared
to that during the height of the Cold War. There are no
US aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean; US navy
personnel numbers in Europe have reduced to 7000 from
40,000; and army personnel numbers have been
reduced to 66,000 from over several hundred thousand
in the recent past.
Reduction in the US military presence has coincided with
the increased Russian leverage in Europe, especially in
the energy sector. Germany purchases one-third of
Moscow’s gas; Russia accounts for over half of
Austria’s gas imports; and Finland imports all of its gas
from Russia. Germany’s exports to Russia stand at $40
billion a year; France’s banks have over $50 billion
claims from Russia; and UK reaps billions of dollars of
profit from the indulgences of Russian Oligarch in
London.
How can the US and the EU unite to resist expansion of
Russian sway over Ukraine?
While the European allies have developed mistrust in the
US since the Snowden episode, Asian allies lack
credibility in the US in the wake of Chinese muscle
flexing. Brazil is upset with the US’s eavesdropping
activities and India is more than offended by the State
Department’s handling of the Devyani Khobragade
incident.
President Obama managed his relations with US allies,
strategic partners and emerging powers shoddily, and
finds it difficult to deal with Russian advances in
Ukraine. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea have
fallen into Russian hands, and three provinces in
Eastern Ukraine seem to be in the queue. As the
dominoes fall, the unipolar global order also appears to
be breaking down.
following the Soviet disintegration, a unipolar world
order was born. Now with Crimea’s secession from
Ukraine and the annexation to Russia, the death of the
unipolar world seems certain.
US unilateralism during the era of a unipolar world order
remained unchallenged.
There was no one to question then US President Bill
Clinton’s decision to rain missiles on Afghanistan as a
response to the bombing of two US embassies in Africa;
no one could challenge then US President George Bush’s
decision to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, invade
Iraq, and overthrow Saddam Hussein from power.
Incumbent US President Barack Obama promised to
promote a liberal world order; employ more diplomacy
and less force; end occupation of Iraq; talk Iran out of a
suspected nuclear weapon programme; bring North
Korea back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; positively
engage the Islamic world; strive for establishment of a
nuclear weapon free world; reach out to the largest
democracy of the world; make China a responsible
stakeholder; make Russia a partner for peace; and many
more.
However, project Obama, although partially successful,
it has largely failed. President Obama can be given
credit for Iran’s decision to accept the détente with the
US, Syria’s willingness to destroy its chemical weapons,
US Navy Seal’s spectacular assassination of Osama bin
Laden, and his successful approach to stemming the
country’s downward economic spiral.
Nevertheless, his foreign policy flops appear more
stunning. The Arab world is clearly on fire with
dangerous political upheavals and unrelenting violence.
The White House will have to accept a fair share of the
blame for the Libyan chaos, Egyptian instability, the
interminable civil war in Syria, and the North Korean
nuclear tenacity.
Additionally, the US is not in a position to inspire
confidence among its Asian allies at the time of growing
Chinese assertiveness. All goodwill between India and
the US appears to have become a thing of the past
following the fierce diplomatic discord sparked by the
arrest and perceived mistreatment of an Indian consular
officer by the New York Police Department. The
Marshall Plan aid to Europe in the post World War II
period remains in the history books, and the present day
US is simply incapable of instituting a similar
assistance programme to rescue Europe from its current
economic calamity.
In other words, the unipolar world order was already
facing the risk of extinction, when Russia’s response to
the political turbulence in Ukraine threatened to alter
that order. During the period of Soviet disintegration,
pundits could not predict the final outcome of events in
Moscow. Similarly, in the case of the Ukrainian political
turmoil, no one could imagine the speed with which
Russian President Vladimir Putin would be able to
dismantle Ukrainian political geography and annex
Crimea.
The Obama administration’s response was slow and
meek. Along with the EU, it imposed sanctions against
some Russian individuals. Although Russia’s
membership from the G8 and its voting rights in the
Council of Europe was suspended, no sanctions could
be imposed on critical sectors of the Russian economy,
and nor could any military measure be contemplated.
High rhetoric and docile measures highlight
Washington’s response.
All these are the result of the resilience of a resurgent
Russia and the relative decline of the US. The US
military presence in Europe is far less today compared
to that during the height of the Cold War. There are no
US aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean; US navy
personnel numbers in Europe have reduced to 7000 from
40,000; and army personnel numbers have been
reduced to 66,000 from over several hundred thousand
in the recent past.
Reduction in the US military presence has coincided with
the increased Russian leverage in Europe, especially in
the energy sector. Germany purchases one-third of
Moscow’s gas; Russia accounts for over half of
Austria’s gas imports; and Finland imports all of its gas
from Russia. Germany’s exports to Russia stand at $40
billion a year; France’s banks have over $50 billion
claims from Russia; and UK reaps billions of dollars of
profit from the indulgences of Russian Oligarch in
London.
How can the US and the EU unite to resist expansion of
Russian sway over Ukraine?
While the European allies have developed mistrust in the
US since the Snowden episode, Asian allies lack
credibility in the US in the wake of Chinese muscle
flexing. Brazil is upset with the US’s eavesdropping
activities and India is more than offended by the State
Department’s handling of the Devyani Khobragade
incident.
President Obama managed his relations with US allies,
strategic partners and emerging powers shoddily, and
finds it difficult to deal with Russian advances in
Ukraine. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea have
fallen into Russian hands, and three provinces in
Eastern Ukraine seem to be in the queue. As the
dominoes fall, the unipolar global order also appears to
be breaking down.
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