AFGHANISTAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY: AFTER ELECTIONS

The outcomes discussed are based on the paper,
‘Afghanistan’s Region: 2014 and Beyond’,
published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The
results of the preliminary elections have just been declared and the Afghan Security Forces ensured that they were relatively peaceful. They were able to do so because they have an upper hand with the Taliban. However, upon the imminent departure of the International Security Forces, there is bound to be a dip. Following this dip, there are two likely
scenarios. In the first scenario, the Taliban suffers a gradual decline, and the absence of foreign troops eliminates incentives for fighters to join their ranks, thus hindering recruitment. In the second scenario, security rapidly deteriorates with the Taliban establishing a de-facto state, but even this outcome does not anticipate the fall of Kabul.
There have been reports of rigging in the elections with prime candidate Abdullah Abdullah slipping in the race and this is problematic because the elections need to have legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. It is also important that the Afghan Security Forces have access to economic resources
because they are a key factor in the determination of an outcome.
India’s primary interest in Afghanistan is to ensure
that it does not become a sanctuary for anti-India
militant outfits and that would include preventing a
takeover of the country by extremists. For this to
be possible, Afghanistan needs to become a viable
economic entity, and for this, India must establish
a corridor of trade through Central Asia since it is
not viable through Pakistan alone. India has been
providing aid but is not prepared to put boots on
the ground because of the inherent risk of NATO
troops pulling out early if it does so. India has not
been very successful in converting goodwill into
influence; there also needs to be greater focus on
the development of infrastructure in Afghanistan.
India should also be a little more discerning about
projects taken up in Afghanistan. There has been
slight favouritism when it comes to provinces
dominated by Pashtuns, and little work has been
done in former Northern Alliance states; this could
be remedied by partnering with NATO on some of
the projects. Afghanistan’s stability is in India’s
interest and India must do whatever is feasible in
order to achieve the desired outcome and when
NATO forces do pull out, India will have to
shoulder greater responsibility in Afghanistan.
There are three major issues in the current
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan:
• Border Issues : The ghosts of the Salala incident
(November 2011) still haunt the relationship, and
despite mutual suspicion, superficial attempts at
cooperation have been loosely supervised by the
US Afghan Military delegations have been visiting
Pakistan in order to have discussions on border
machinations. Pakistan has requested the Afghans
to ensure that the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan
do not harbour any anti-Pakistan elements and
that there are no support attacks on any Pakistani
installations. In return for this, Pakistan will
restrain its support to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan
will also expect assistance in the hunt for Maulana
Fazlullah. Expectations for improved relations are
low because of the lack of sincerity on both sides
and the lack of genuine intelligence sharing.
• Reconciliation with the Taliban: The Afghans want
to lead and be in control of the process while
Pakistan wants the exact opposite. Meanwhile,
there have been developments in the ‘Qatar
Process’ because the US has convinced moderate
elements in the Taliban based in Qatar to distance
themselves from Pakistan’s ISI. The ISI expressed
its disapproval by detaining the twin brothers of
Tayyab Agha for 15 days. The Afghan Taliban has
clearly made its bid for independence but Pakistan
will try to scuttle this effort through its own proxies
and will use limited violence to get what it wants.
• Trade Issues : Trade and transit issues have been
bedevilled right from the time of the first 1950
treaty, which gives Afghanistan access to the port
of Karachi. However, 80 per cent of the imports
come back into Pakistan even though they are
assigned for Afghanistan because they are brought
back in and sold at premium prices. There is an
adverse balance of trade. Afghanistan wants to be
able to send its goods to India via Pakistan and it
is currently impossible for Indian goods to make
their way to Afghanistan through Pakistan despite
the heavy demand for them. Another issue is the
corruption of Pakistani Customs, which has
completely looted the container cargo business and
causes frequent delays of perishable goods in
transit, rendering them useless.
Over 60 experts drafted the report over 2 years.
Iran, Turkey, China and the Central Asian Republics
also provided inputs. These were drafted from a
country point of view and the agreement on what
was required was unanimous. The report has been
launched in Kabul, Islamabad, Istanbul and Tehran.
It will soon be launched in New Delhi as well. There
was a great deal of movement in the selling of
these ideas and that is the essence of the report.
Key features:
•Confidence-building measures: To improve
bilateral relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which have been clouded by mutual
distrust.
•The implementation of a non-interference
agreement: Everybody involved in the drafting of
the report supported this agreement with the
exception of the Pakistani Army and the ISI. The
code of conduct expected and punishments for
non-adherents has been spelt out.
•Policy of neutrality: A clause that was insisted on
by the Afghan Policy Group that drafted the report.
Discussion
•A situation that demands boots on the ground
should never arise.
•The Afghan Taliban wants independence from the
ISI and it is inexorable. Their inevitable
independence must therefore be factored into any
plans for the future.
•The Shia-Sunni dichotomy should also be taken
into account.
•The withdrawal of American troops is a vote-
catcher for President Obama and the Republican
Party cannot use it against him.
•Supporting any candidate in the election might not
have worked out for India and Ashraf Ghani is very
likely to come under US pressure. India would in
fact have been much happier with Zalmai Rasool
but he did not go past the first round.
•An academy to train the Afghan Security Forces
must be set up in Afghanistan itself.
•The worst-case scenario is either trifurcation or
civil war but all of this is based on whether
everyone abandons Afghanistan. Other actors react to the source of the threat and do not wait till it is knocking at the doorstep. It is time to start thinking about the abandonment situation and burden- sharing.