Chintamani Mahapatra
The US’ influence in South Asia is fast diminishing
and this trend is likely to continue deep into the
future. In the aftermath of World War II, South Asia
was considered a strategic backwater by the US
policymakers. Additionally, South Asia offered little
economic opportunities to the US corporate sector.
With the solitary exception of turning Pakistan into
an alliance partner, the US cared little about this
region.
Even in the realm of alliance politics, the US had
little to offer Pakistan. Pakistan’s membership in
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the
Central Treaty Organization, and the US’ military
assistance to Pakistan was ineffective during
Pakistan’s military misadventures against India. It
was only after the late 1970s’ Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan that Washington got
critically involved in South Asia.
The US’ interest in South Asia deepened in the
post-Cold War era in view of Indian economic
reforms, nuclearisation of the region and the
pivotal role Afghanistan played in the terrorist
attack on the US in September 2001. As the US
once again turned Pakistan into an alliance partner
in the war against terrorism and established an
extraordinary strategic understanding with India,
South Asia occupied substantial priority in the US
national security agenda.
The US’ war in Afghanistan that began in 2001 is
about to come to a close. The US troop withdrawal
from this country is indisputable. Irrespective of
debates over the probable level of US engagement
in Afghan affairs post 2014, it is almost certain
that the closure of billions of dollars worth of war
in Afghanistan will trim Washington’s influence in
South Asia. The resilience of the Afghan Taliban
and limitation of a superpower’s abilities to
confront non-state-actors will question the US’
credibility in the region.
Secondly, the US leverage over Pakistan in the
post-Afghan war phase will dry down with an
almost automatic cut in the US military and
economic assistance to Islamabad. History will
unquestionably repeat and the US-Pakistan alliance
will terminate, as was the case after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.
Thirdly, the US’ influence over India, resulting from
an innovative “strategic partnership” project during
former US President George Bush’s era may not
survive his successor Barack Obama’s
administration. The enthusiasm of the first Obama
administration to further elevate this partnership
was short-lived and the second Obama
administration has paid less than modest attention
to India.
There is no doubt that the election victory of the
Bharatiya Janata Party under the leadership of now
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with a strong
popular mandate, has generated sizeable
excitement in Washington. Hope of revival of the
earlier impetus in the Indo-US strategic partnership
has been rekindled. Obama’s invitation to Modi to
visit Washington, Assistant Secretary of State
Nisha Biswal Desai’s trip to India soon after the
new government assumed office, visits by
influential Senator John McCain and Deputy
Secretary of State William J Burns to prepare the
ground for the Indo-US strategic dialogue between
Secretary of State John Kerry and Indian Foreign
Minister Sushma Swaraj are all signals of
Obama’s renewed interest in India.
But Prime Minister Modi appears less animated to
visit the US, more involved in constructing a
peaceful neighbourhood, more focused on reviving
the national economy and less enthralled to project
India as a global leader. About ten months have
passed since the Devyani Khobragade episode
begot a psychological divide in the New Delhi-
Washington bond. Repairing the mind-set is not
going to be easy even for the new Indian
government.
The Obama administration’s relationships with
other smaller South Asian countries – especially
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – have also soured in
the recent years. Washington was hesitant to do
business with the Awami League government after
the January 2014 elections, criticised Dhaka’s
handling of human trafficking problems, and
reduced import of garments after a deadly fire in a
garment factory.
The US’ efforts to hold the Sri Lankan government
responsible for severe human rights violations
during the closing weeks of anti-Liberation Tigers
of the Tamil Eelam operations have widened the
political divide between Colombo and Washington.
The Sri Lankan government has demonstrated
bitterness over the US double standard in
combating terrorism—one standard for itself and
another for other countries.
Significantly, India’s smaller South Asian
neighbours are fast moving towards developing
closer relationships with China. Although this is
generally perceived as an anti-India phenomenon,
the reality is that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are
looking up to China as a new guarantor of help in
the face of the US’ heavy-handed approach
towards them.
It is also a fact that the US has enhanced its
engagement with Nepal in response to fast growing
Chinese economic presence and political influence
in that country. But compared to China,
Washington’s influence in Nepal is minimal. It is
almost certain that the drop in Washington’s
political weight will further augment Chinese
leverage over Islamabad as well. It is time to
ponder over the diminished US and rising Chinese profile in the region.
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