Gurmeel Kanwal
In a completely partisan and somewhat
condescending editorial in early-July 2014, The
New York Times wrote: “If India wants to be part of the nuclear suppliers group, it needs to sign the treaty that prohibits nuclear testing, stop producing fissile material, and begin talks with its rivals on nuclear weapons containment.” The editorial is sharply critical of and vehemently opposes India’s efforts to acquire membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It bases its criticism on a report by IHS Jane’s that India is in the process of enhancing its capacity to enrich uranium – ostensibly to power the nuclear reactors
on the INS Arihant and future SSBNs, but much in excess of the requirement. This, the editorial says, is causing anxiety to the Pakistanis and has raised the spectre of an arms race in Southern Asia.
It is obvious that the editorial writer understands
neither the background to nor the present context
of India’s nuclear deterrence. As stated in a letter
written by then Prime Minister AB Vajpayee to US
President Bill Clinton after India’s nuclear tests at
Pokhran in May 1998 (in an unfriendly act, the
letter was leaked to the media by the White House),
the primary reason for India’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons was the existential threat posed
by two nuclear-armed states on India’s borders
with both of which India had fought wars over
territorial disputes. The China-Pakistan nuclear
and missile nexus, including the clandestine
transfer of technology from China to Pakistan, has
irrevocably changed the strategic balance in
Southern Asia by helping Pakistan to neutralise
India’s superiority in conventional forces and has
helped Pakistan to wage a proxy war under its
nuclear umbrella.
Since then, the nuclear environment in Southern
Asia has been further destabilised. China’s ASAT
(anti-satellite weapons) test, BMD (ballistic missile
defence) programme, efforts aimed at acquiring
MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry
vehicle) capability and ambiguity in its no first use
(NFU) commitment, while simultaneously rapidly
modernising the PLA (People’s Liberation Army)
and its efforts to establish a ‘string of pearls’ by
way of ports in the Indian Ocean, are a cause for
concern for India. Similarly, Pakistan is engaged in
the acquisition of ‘full spectrum’ nuclear capability,
including a triad and tactical nuclear weapons
(TNWs), which invariably lower the threshold of
use. Pakistan has stockpiled a larger number of
nuclear warheads (100 to 110) than India (80 to
90) and is continuing to add to its numbers as it
has been given unsafeguarded nuclear reactors by
China. In view of several mujahideen attacks on
Pakistan’s armed forces’ establishments during the
last few years, there is apprehension in the
international community, entirely justified, that
some of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could fall
into jihadi hands.
Some statements made by IHS Jane’s in its report
are factually incorrect. The research group has
assessed that the new Indian uranium enrichment
facility at the Indian Rare Metals Plant near Mysore
would enhance India's ability to produce ‘weapons-
grade’ uranium to twice the amount needed for its
planned nuclear-powered SSBN fleet. The report
does not say how the research group arrived at this
deduction. Also, the nuclear power reactors of
SSBNs require uranium to be enriched only up to
30 to 40 per cent. Weapons-grade uranium must
be enriched to levels over 90 per cent.
For the record, the Government of India has denied
reports that it is ‘covertly’ expanding its nuclear
arsenal. An Indian official told The Hindu (Atul
Aneja, “India trashes report on covert nuclear
facility,” 22 June 2014) that the report was
“mischievously timed” as it came just before a
meeting of the NSG. He said, “It is interesting that
such reports questioning India’s nuclear credentials
are planted at regular intervals.”
The US Government also dismissed the report (“US
dismisses report on India covertly increasing
nukes”, The Hindu , 21 June 2014) as “highly
speculative.” The US State Department
Spokesperson said, “We remain fully committed to
the terms of the 123 agreement and to enhancing
our strategic relationship. Nothing we provide to
India under the civ-nuke agreement may be used
to enhance India’s military capability or add to its
military stockpile…”
The Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement of
2005 gives an exemption to India’s nuclear
weapons facilities and stockpiles of nuclear
weapons fuel from inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and India is at liberty
to set up additional military facilities using
unsafeguarded materials if these are considered
necessary. India has agreed to bring 14 nuclear
power reactors under international safeguards.
Eight military facilities, including reactors,
enrichment and reprocessing facilities and three
heavy water reactors will remain out of the purview
of IAEA safeguards.
India has been a responsible nuclear power and
has a positive record on non-proliferation. India
has consistently supported total nuclear
disarmament and is in favour of negotiations for
the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Non-
proliferation ayatollahs should channelise their
efforts towards identifying and shaming the real
proliferators.
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