Pramod Jaiswal
The constitutional debate in Nepal has bene caught up in peculiar twists and turns ever since late 1940s. So far, Nepal has had six constitutions, at different points in time, and the debate to get an acceptable constitution for long-term social peace and stability continues.
Why have constitution debates been unable to
bring social peace and political stability in Nepal?
Why have federalism debates in Nepal been so
polarised that Constituent Assembly (CA) I was
dissolved and elections to CA II were held to draft a constitution? There are two simple questions to deconstruct the question of federalism in Nepal.
First, why do historically marginalised communities
(Madhesis, Janjatis, dalits etc) that constitute
almost 70 per cent of the Nepal’s population
strongly sympathise with federalism? Why are the
Caste of High Hill Elites (CHHE) (Brahmins and
Chettri etc) who are dominant in Kathmandu’s
power structure are oppose federalism in its true
spirit and agreed on a federal model of governance
only after the large-scale Madhesi movement in
2007?
Why is the Federalism Narrative So Dominant In
Nepal?
Nepal has been monolithic, upper caste hill-centric
dominance of one language, culture, and an
extremely centralised power structure of
governance throughout history. However, the
diversity in languages, cultures and a sense of
belongingness that exists in Nepal has not been
given due recognition; and the State’s
discrimination and exclusionary policies triggered
a sense of deep dissatisfaction among the
historically marginalised community.
In this context, on the basis of ‘unity in diversity’,
federalism narratives gained prominence to
institutionalise self-rule, autonomy, and dignity in
the country. This brings us to the debate of
‘identity–based’ federalism that is largely the
politics for recognition of diversity in Nepal for
these communities.
What are the Technicalities of the Federalism
Debate?
The debate on federalism has become one of the
most contentious issues in Nepal. This polarised
debate is approached via various perspectives,
such as: change (pro-identity based federalism)
Vs. status quo forces (federalism on the basis of
viability); pluralist Vs. Mono-culturalist;
historically marginalised communities Vs. upper
caste hill dominance; and political de-
centralisation Vs. administrative de-centralisation.
By and large, the new political forces that emerged
in Nepal after the promulgation of the 1990
constitution – like Maoists and various political
parties that arose from social movements of
Madhesis, Janjatis etc. – associate themselves
with the former while traditional parties like Nepali
Congress and CPN-UML associate themselves with
latter categories.
This brings us to the technical debate on
federalism, that, on the basis of the ‘Committee on
State Restructuring and Allocation of State Powers’
during CA I agreed upon – “Identity based
Federalism” and “viability,” i.e., on the basis of
economic capability. There are five indicators for
“Identity” – ethnicity, language, culture, geography
and regional continuity, and historical identities
( historically subjected to discrimination in various
forms in their homeland). The “viability” has four
indicators – economic interrelationships and
capability; status and potential for infrastructural
development; availability of natural resources; and
administrative feasibility.
Complexities of the Federalism Issues in Nepal
The technical details are no less complex, adding
complexities to the issues in the federalism debate.
However, there exist battles of narratives regarding
the debate on federalism. It is alleged that the
status quo forces try to obfuscate the federalism
debate to benefit the CHHE and curve out federal
lines of a new Nepal in ways that give
demographic advantage to ruling elites and
maintain dominance in Kathmandu’s power
structures. Conversely, the status quo forces allege
that the pro-identity-based federal forces support
single identity ethnic based federalism. However,
Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual nation and it
is not possible to have a majority of any single
ethic group in any model of federalism. The only
difference that adds complexities is the devolution
of power from dominant elite’s high hill castes to
pave Nepal’s transition towards inclusive
citizenship and recognition of marginalised
communities, identities, culture and self-rule.
Perhaps, the buck stops at the top leaders of the
political parties in Nepal who are all traditionally
ruling high-caste Brahmins to strike constitutional
agreement. And, the rationale choice has to be
made on ways to delegate power from the hill
upper caste elites to the people who have been
historically marginalised and such choices are
more difficult given how CA I winners are losers in
CA II elections.
Is Nepal Postponing the Inevitable?
Nepali politics is in transition and fast-changing its
state characteristics from a monarchy to a
republic; a Hindu state to a secular one; and a
unitary structure towards an inclusive federal
model of governance. The CA I postponed
federalism issues for the CA II despite marginalised
communities united and had adequate support
base of 2/3rd majority – that includes the
aspiration of identity and viability model of
federalism denouncing 14 state models of federal governance.
If Nepal postpones the identity criterion of
federalism, the constitutional debate will be likely to be endless – merely postponing the social peace and stability. The constitution is the document of
compromise and the debate to make the new Nepal inclusive must ensure the aspiration of historically marginalised people towards making the people equal, and simultaneously not making them unequal via federalism.
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